

that North Korean authorities organized these so-called "construction brigades" under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (rather than military) to hide the fact they were actually POW labor camps. Huh believes that North Korea's claim that there were no POWs held against their will at the end of the war is based on the nominal civilian control of the POWs through the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

He testified that POWs were not allowed to have lunch time while other workers were given lunch boxes. POWs were allowed to eat only after finishing their 8 hour shifts. Huh said that the food (usually rice mixed with millet grains and seaweed or radish leaf soup) was not enough for the POW who were performing hard labor so all suffered from hunger and malnutrition.

Also, whenever accidents happened, POWs would be unfairly blamed and punished for sabotage. POWs were always punished more severely than other workers.

On June, 1956, he was given North Korean citizenship following Cabinet Order 143 along with 450 other South Korean POWs. He was formally discharged from his camp and construction brigade. Although he was nominally a full citizen, he still faced discrimination in his employment and residence and treated as the lowest caste in North Korean society. The POWs would frequently be called up for forced labor even after they were discharged and were always under strict surveillance.

POWs were also discriminated in housing allotments. North Korean laborers were supposed to be given a house with 2 rooms if they had more than 5 people in the family. However, Huh, his wife and their seven children all lived in a one room house their whole life.

Victim 26 Huh

Huh was captured by People's Volunteer Army(PVA; Chinese) forces on July 17, 1953 in *Kumhwa*, in *Kangwon* Province. He was held in the Sepo and Kangdong POW camps. Later he was sent to the *Chunma* mineral mine and *Hamyon* coal mines. Huh forced to work for 40 years as a miner. If he could not reach his daily quota (usually 100 tons), he had to work overtime. He usually worked 12 to13 hours daily. Sometimes he would have to work 8 hour shifts, back to back.

The authorities thought that giving the POWs even a minute of free time would lead to subversive thoughts. So in addition to the hard labor, he would have to attend political lectures.

Huh felt lucky that the coal he mined was bituminous coal. The bituminous coal generated less coal dust. He believes that he avoided severe damage to his lungs because of this.

Victim 27. Roh

Roh was captured by the Korean People's Army(KPA; North Korean) on June 29 1950. He was sent to a re-education camp in Yanji, China where he received military training for one year. He was then incorporated into to the KPA 8th Corps. He attempted to escape but was captured and consequently sentenced to 13 years of re-education. He was moved between re-education camps in *Pyongyang*, *Wonsan*, *Hamheung* and the Susung Re-education camp in *Chongjin*. Roh has testified about conditions and prisoners held in the North Korean re-education camps during the 1950's and 1960's.

Victim 28. Roh

Roh was captured by the People's Volunteer Army(PVA; Chinese) in late November of 1950 near *Simuiju* in North *Pyongan* Province. Roh was incorporated into a Labor Brigade in *Pyongyang* that supported logistics operation for the Communist forces. Although he was not forced to engage in direct combat duties against UN forces, he and other POWs built and repaired air fields and railroads that were used by the Communist military forces.

Victim 29. Park

Park was captured on October 20, 1952 by the People's Volunteer Army(PVA; Chinese) near *Yangku* in *Kangwon* Province. He was wounded and then treated in the 57th Hospital of the Korean People's Army (KPA; North Korean) in *Heechun*, *Jakang* Province. After he recovered, he was assigned to work at a textile factory in *Hoeryung*.

Victim 30. Jang

After Jang was captured, he was incorporated into the Korean People's Army (KPA; North Korean). He subsequently tried to escape but was recaptured and sentenced to a re-education camp.

Victim 31. Kim

Kim served in the Republic of Korea Army(ROKA; South Korean) 2d Division, 17th Regiment. He was taken prisoner and held in North Korea without being exchanged. He passed away due to tuberculosis. His daughter escaped from North Korea in 2004 and reached South Korea in 2008. She filed an administrative suit in South Korea to verify her father's status as a Korean War POW. She also has testified about the persecution her father and her family suffered in North Korea.

According to Kim's daughter, her father tried to hide the fact that he was a former South Korean POW from others. Her mother would forbid her to speak about their father. POWs and their families were treated with disdain and were part of the lowest caste in North Korean society.

She also testified that Kim was imprisoned at one time and served a 15 year sentence. Kim worked many years in a coal mine before he passed away.

Appendix B. Documentary Evidence from Soviet Archives

Excerpts from:

Alena VOLOKHOVA, (2000), *Archives. Armistice Talks in Korea (1951-1953). Based on Documents from the Russian Foreign Policy Archives*, in *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 2, Mar. 1 2000, pp. 74-91.
<http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/2798784>

Pages 86, 89-90.

The Americans initially agreed on an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, and then on settlement of the question as a whole. On April 26, the talks were resumed and at that time the Korean-Chinese side handed over 684 POWs to the Americans, and the Americans (on May 3) 6,670 POWs to the Koreans and Chinese.

Debates began again at the talks. The Korean-Chinese side accused the Americans of wanting to forcibly keep prisoners of war in Korea, although its position was far from sincere. Soviet Ambassador Suzdalev to North Korea wrote that "our Korean comrades preferred to keep a large number of South Korean prisoners of war, using them for various kinds of hard work in North Korea and ignoring their desire to return to their families.... A total of 1,300 South Korean prisoners of war were detained in North Korea and another 42,000 Southerners were recruited into the Korean Peoples Army in the South and remain in the KPA ranks to this day."⁽²⁶⁾ The Soviet ambassador believed that the detention of such a large number of prisoners of war eligible for repatriation was not justified and most of them could have been repatriated.

Finally, on June 8, the delegations of both sides signed a document, Competence of the Repatriation Commission of Representatives of Neutral States, which defined the repatriation conditions.⁽²⁷⁾ According to this document, a commission was formed from five neutral states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Switzerland and India), which look charge over those prisoners of war who did not avail themselves of the right to be repatriated. The Indian representative was made commission chairman, and India provided the armed forces necessary for helping the commission in its work. Explanatory work could be conducted among the prisoners of war for 90 days, after which POWs who did not exercise the right to repatriation were transferred to the Political Conference to be convened in accordance with the Armistice Agreement. If the question was not resolved at the Political Conference, the commission was supposed to give the POWs civil status and help them move to a neutral country.

After signing this document, the negotiating parties were left only with administrative matters, including the final drawing of the demarcation line and final adjustment of the text of all 63 articles of the Armistice Agreement.

Even at this point, however, the signing of the Agreement was nearly thwarted, after approximately 26,000 prisoners were released from the camps on Syngman Rhee's order. Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai protested and were not satisfied with the explanation obtained from General Park, holding him responsible for Syngman Rhee's behaviour, but the incident was soon deflated.

On July 10, the parties resumed closed-door meetings, and between July 10 and 26 an agreement was reached on all matters.

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26. Russian Foreign Policy Archives, Folio 0102, List 9, File 46, Case 14, p. 2.

Original reference in Russian:

Архив Внешней политики Российской Федерации., Фонд. 0102, Опись. 9, Папка 46, Дело 14, Лист 2.

for holding the Political Conference. The Korean-Chinese side agreed to begin such negotiations in Panmunjom, insisting that the question of representatives to participate in the Political Conference also be discussed at them.

The negotiations began on October 26, 1953 and serious differences in opinion between the Korean-Chinese side and the "UN side" became immediately obvious. The US insisted on discussing and adopting recommendations on the time and place for holding the Political Conference, while the Korean-Chinese side was in favour of first discussing those to participate in it. After a lengthy debate, an agenda for the negotiations was adopted (composition of the Political Conference, time and place for holding the PC, procedural questions at the Political Conference, administrative preparatory measures, and costs). Significantly, the Korean-Chinese side sought that the final decision be taken in a package after coordinating all the items on the agenda.

The sides standpoints on the first two items on the agenda were diametrically opposed; they could not agree either on the date or place, or the composition, bringing forward proposals that were totally unacceptable to each other. The Korean-Chinese side believed that the US was intentionally delaying the Political Conference until January 22, 1956, the date for releasing the prisoners of the Korean war, which would give them the opportunity to hold more than 20,000 people.(36)

But the Korean-Chinese side itself violated this condition of the Armistice Agreement by detaining prisoners. As follows from a memorandum sent from Fedorenko to Molotov, on December 2, 1953 and drawn up on the basis of reports from Ambassador Suzdalev to the DPRK, 13,094 prisoners of war from Syngman Rhee's troops eligible for repatriation and 6,430 men serving in the KPA were being detained in North Korea, the others were being employed on various jobs in the Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Railways. In addition, there were 42,262 servicemen in North Korea who had been mobilized in South Korea, but who did not serve in Syngman Rhee's army. During his stay in Beijing, Kim Il Sung consulted with Mao Zedong on what to do with the other prisoners of war, and Mao Zedong said they should not be sent to South Korea, since such a belated transfer of prisoners of war could give the American side a pretext to accuse the Korean-Chinese side of violating the Armistice Agreement, with which Kim Il Song agreed. He told Suzdalev, however, that the North Korean government would take the necessary measures to distribute the remaining prisoners of war throughout the northern regions of the country and prevent their further escape to the South or their establishing contact with the Armistice Commission of neutral states. "We believe," Fedorenko concluded his memorandum, "that in this

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situation, it is not advisable for us to adopt any measures on this question."(37)

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37. Russian Foreign Policy Archives, Folio 0102, List 9, File 50, Case 67, pp. 59-60.

Original Reference in Russian:

Архив Внешней политики Российской Федерации., Фонд. 0102, Опись. 9, Папка 50, Дело 67, Лист 59-60.