


# What History Failed To Record



A Phantom Force - Lost To History

Ray C. Vallowe

# What History Failed to Record

-A Phantom Force-

East: of the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir?

About the author: Ray C, Vallowe

He served with the 1st Cavalry Division 7th Regiment, “B” Troop at Camp Drake outside Tokyo Japan between November and June of 1948-1949. This time trained as infantry.

He was transferred to the 7th Infantry Division—Headquarters Battery 31st Field Artillery Battalion, (155mm) at Camp Youngham’s Sendi Japan in June of 1949. He was assigned to the Wire Section Communications of the Battalion.

In August of he was transferred to the Headquarters Battery 57th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm) — again assigned to the Wire Section Communications of the Battalion.

Now to unite with the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry Regiment at Camp Crawford on the Northern Island of Hokkaido, Japan. Now a Corporal he was in place to be involved with the relocation of the 31st RCT for action in both amphibious landings in North and South Korea.

Photo credits:  
Joseph M. Vallowe

Book cover;  
Daniel L. Vallowe

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Author & Wife

Newly engaged-May 1, 1952

Dedication:

*To my wife-the eternal love of my life:*

*Elaine Rose Vallowe*

*Nee; Postelanczyk*

*4/27/1932-12/22/2010*

*For our 58 plus years; of married life: always together.*

*For stabilizing my life after combat, and enduring the sudden jolts of my earlier nighttime nightmares.*

*For her undying love and devotion through sudden chills from my cold hands and feet without complaint!*

*For our children*

*Susan Marie (9/6/53-deceased-12/6/1956)*

*Our three sons David, Joseph and Daniel*

*And last: (eight years later) but not least Mary Rose, in their order.*

*Between the above picture and the picture below, many years have passed with some tears of sadness over shadowed by those of many more of joyful and happy ones' The privilege of raising a family together would never have been possible had I never survived the disaster at the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir.*

*That survival was through no individual merit of my own, but through efforts made by all, some that survived by the merits of one or more of those 900+ KIA/MIA's over five days at the reservoir. The guilt always remaining that you survived and they did not, cannot be calculated that some of them may have been more worthy than you to survive, remain in your thoughts always. But that was not your individual call, rather a higher power diverting that missile that may have been within an enemy rifle to end your life as well.*

*However, to neglect the cause as to that failure at the reservoir-corrupted to "reinforce the failure" is inexcusable.*

*Therefore, this dedication must also extend to those that were "Sacrificed" East of the reservoir as well.*

*Perhaps just perhaps there may have been a change of doctrine over war tactics had many of those officer's, NCO's and the common Soldier survived.*



*April 2010: Eight Months before I lost my wife to cancer.*

-- What History Failed to Record --

## Of Mountains and Monuments and Men

WE IN AMERICA DO NOT BUILD MONUMENTS TO WAR;  
WE DO NOT BUILD MONUMENTS TO CONQUEST;  
WE BUILD MONUMENTS TO COMMEMORATE THE SPIRIT  
OF SACRIFICE IN WAR—REMINDEERS OF OUR DESIRE FOR  
PEACE.

*President Franklin D. Roosevelt  
St. Louis, Soldiers Memorial Dedication  
October 14, 1936*

-Prologue-

### *Of Monuments and Men*

Throughout the ages of mankind, many monuments have been erected throughout the world; only one of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World still remains from those days of old: Egypt's famous Great Pyramid of Khufu, some 450 feet in height. It was the tallest manmade structure for two millennia. However, one of the highest monuments of recent times is known as The Gateway to the West. That St. Louis Arch built on the western banks of the Mississippi River, its height being 630 feet. It therefore surpasses that height of the Great Pyramid. This Arch was originally scheduled to begin construction in early 1933, sometime before my third birthday. Had it been finished before 1943, I would have matured into my teen age years under its shadow, as the sun would set in the west. Being born at home—with the help of a mid-wife—in East St. Louis, Illinois, I was an only child, of a single mother; no brothers or sisters. Born in this deteriorating city, where today the schools and church I attended and both homes I had lived in are long gone, now only vacant lots remain. I had spent many hours on the Illinois side of this river bank. Today the shadow of a gaming boat, the Casino Queen, shades the spot where as a young boy and with connecting memories of the Korean War and the Second World War, I return in those memories to this river bank.

Many of my early days were completed along this river bank with the help and inventive genius of the fishermen of those days erecting nets of all kinds, most left unattended for days. Tripods set into the water's edge to support a square fish net, sometimes four feet square, with pulleys connected to ropes and crank drums on this bank. Many of us would help ourselves to the use of these idle nets, lowering them and catching many, many fish—mostly carp and, rarely, a few buffalo—these to clean, eat, or sell. A proverbial problem child from a fatherless family, I have vivid memories of horse-drawn wagons in the 1940's and the scrap-man with his call, "Rags and Iron, buying rags and iron," while patrolling the many alleyways. Those disgusting uses of the two seated out-house adjoining a coal shed. A depression- era baby, born in October of the first year of the thirties, I also recall collecting commodities from various government supply houses to the immediate entry into World War II. Much has changed since the Sunday of December 7<sup>th</sup> 1941, and to the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry Regiment—on the island

of Bataan in the Philippines—, one that I would be connected to and through in upcoming military history. The numerous scrap drives, the ration books, also remembering the creation of Oleo, that white lard substitute for butter, adding a red dye pill, to be kneaded into the body of that white substance, would produce the yellow appealing color of butter.

My early days of walking next to the set of double railroad tracks, and that endless moving of war materials, both eastward and westward. My days of collecting letters from the onboard military troops as their trains stopped for traffic or switching of other trains, of mailing those letters for them at the nearest mail box on my way to school. Those troop trains being pulled by those mighty and massive giant locomotives of that day, coal-fired, spewing dense black smoke dust and ash, settling downward to earth. Rattling, and shaking the furniture in our three-room house next to those railroad tracks. My days of old in following those railroad tracks, collecting the coal off-fall, along the tracks for home use. This coal continuously falling from the coal tender car as the fireman transferred it from the tender car into the locomotive furnace. My many days of following the railroad tracks back to the Mississippi riverfront. The locomotives roundhouse and other switching junctions, connected to many places unknown to me, but for those troops aboard the vital link to far, far destinations from which far too many of these troops would never return, from Europe, and the Far East. Many of these memories would connect to my upcoming life experience connected to the Korean War; mainly the water and the railroad track around a bitter cold place in North Korea called the Changjin [Chosin]<sup>1</sup> Reservoir.

Shortly after the Second World War was over, I started working in a poultry house, at age fifteen; I was killing and gutting chickens. At sixteen—blowing off school—I was employed at Bemis Brothers Bag Co. in St. Louis stocking and supplying women seamstress with various vegetable and feed bags to be sewn on the edges and turned inside out. Restless at seventeen and a half, I encouraged my mother to let me join the army. On 20 July 1948, I enlisted for three years in the United States Army. I completed my basic training at Fort Knox, Kentucky. I selected duty with the 1st Cavalry Division in Tokyo Japan, and arrived in Japan on 9 November 1948. But I had learned an ever-changing fact about the Army: its continuous changes to our military uniforms and staff ranking systems. For example, I went into basic training with the lowest rank of a Private, and was caught in a major change in ranking, I came out a Recruit. It would take another six months to get back to the rank I went into service with! The military budget reductions were at work after the war, and our ranks had to be reduced to save money. The new rank of Recruit, a shift down from the Staff Sergeant [four stripes], he would now be referred to as a mere Sergeant and the rank below him, the old three stripe Buck (Staff) Sergeant was eliminated. The rank of Corporal now moved up into that vacant slot of the old Buck Sergeant, cheating me of that coveted third stripe.

For some reason, during the Second World War I was more fascinated by the fighting in the Pacific than in Europe. Perhaps, as I state later, this was because it was the first blood of America's involvement in that war. Whatever my reason, I was assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division in Japan outside of Tokyo. Leaving from the port of debarkation, Seattle, I boarded the US Army Transport, M [Mason] M. Patrick, and after fourteen days at sea—seasick twelve of them—I arrived in Japan and Camp Drake. I was assigned to B Troop of the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment. Sometime later in Japan, the division, Troop designation would be changed to Company designations. After some seven months of

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<sup>1</sup> For accuracy, I prefer the Korean name Changjin for the reservoir located in that peninsula, which has become more popularly known by its Japanese name Chosin from outdated maps used by the UN forces during the battle. "Frozen Chosin" has a concise and poetic ring to it, which also may explain its dominance, but Changjin is gaining more traction in history (see Wikipedia, for example). I use the Changjin and Chosin interchangeably to refer to the Reservoir.

advance infantry training, firing a mixture of all infantry weapons, I was reassigned in June of 1949 to the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division which had just recently relocated to Japan, from their duty in South Korea. I was attached to Headquarters Battery of the 31st Field Artillery Battalion, (Wire Section). This battalion was just receiving some rebuilt and refurbished WWII 155mm howitzers with new, prime-mover tractors. Located at Camp Youngham, near Sendi on the Main Island of Honshu, all four of the artillery units of the 7th Division were located there. In August, the artillery units were ordered to relocate, and unite, for combat training with that infantry unit they were now to provide direct fire support for any future combat operations. I was now transferred to Headquarters' Battery, 57th Field Artillery Battalion, as it was now moving to the northern island of Hokkaido to Camp Crawford to link with the 31st Infantry Regiment ("Polar Bears") as their direct supporting artillery armor unit.

As the old saying goes, history does indeed repeat itself, and the ground work was already in place for a second encounter of 31st Regimental Combat Team (RCT) fateful meeting with an Oriental enemy force, recreating a military disaster for this 31st Infantry Regiment. This later event would occur at a different time and place, in December 1950 around a reservoir in North Korea.

### *Of Mountains*

The Army, unlike the Marine Corps, rarely names the mountains shown on their maps, using its map height as its designation. To honor the sacrifice that will be discussed in this book made at the foot of this mountain, Hill 1221 on the banks of the Changjin Reservoir should henceforth be renamed for a special officer—Lieutenant Colonel Don Carlos Faith for his heroism in leading Task Force Faith. At the time of this writing, I have just learned that Lt. Col. Faith's remains have been positively identified and he will be laid to rest shortly at Arlington National Cemetery as befitting a Medal of Honor recipient who will finally be at rest after 62 years. I plan to attend.

### *Shadows*

When God created the heavens and the earth, He separated the light from the darkness. HE PLACED THE SUN IN THE HEAVENS, AND A RULE OF LAW FOR ITS PATH. Whether one accepts the Book of Genesis; or not, this law of astrophysics still holds.

The sun will rise in the east and set in the west. For a full fifty years—one half of a century—Task Force Faith has consistently remained under the shadow of the 1st Marine Division located on the west banks of the Changjin Reservoir in North Korea. That their shadow would overshadow the battles on the east side, and would remain in place until the very enemy we fought on our side of Chosin were the very ones to elevate our battles and overshadow those of the Marine force on the west side of the reservoir. However, the rule of law concerning shadows was always there in the beginning. That the shadow cast by those nightly battles on the east side of that reservoir is now recognized for what it truly was its true effort to stop this enemy force in place from overrunning the Marine division garrison at Hagaru-ri, that vital and important hub for the Marines on the west side. The Marine Division being the main beneficiary of their vital hub. The men of Task Force Faith would never return intact to this vital hub. The Marines reinforced by some 500 plus fresh replacements flown into Hagaru-ri.

Recent information from enemy documents verified that the Communist Chinese Forces (CCF) 80th Division was joined by the CCF 81st Division on the east side. Yet, Marine history, mythically, and

eternally list this 81st enemy division as, “No contact reported!”<sup>2</sup> The Marines speculate the CCF 81st may have been around Yudam-ni and around their forces. One can but wonder why they “may” have been facing only the 5th and 7th Marines, “around Yudam-ni,”<sup>3</sup> when in reality they document being east of Changjin. The revelation as to where these extra forces “may” have been could not change history after 60 years, a matter of fact and reality. The CCF is already locked in combat with our task force at the time (or they were not), speculation having nothing whatsoever to do with it. That CCF force increased the force against Task Force Faith by 133%. Now the speculation can be laid to rest forever with the truth.

One of the poignant realities of shadows is within that picture on the front cover of Roy Appleman’s book, *East of Chosin*. Those long shadows cast ten times larger than the height of those men creating them. Truly, here, on the center of that Changjin reservoir ice is a revelation in reality. The sun is setting in the west, only then as the final phase of our battle east of Changjin ends, will the shadow from the west come into play. As this same sun journeys over the United States—bathing the homes and rooms where these men slept months or years before—returns again to the east side of reservoir on the morning of the 2nd of December, 1950, few remaining human shadows of Task Force Faith will appear on the ice. Only those survivors will live to cast their shadows for other days.

Those that have read my material over time know that I have consistently stated that Task Force Faith survivors made no great claim to any fame. That no matter how hard we fought, we lost. I stand by these positions still. I simply want the historical record to be accurate, and to be known.

This due to many factors, depletion of ammo, food, water, and the withdrawal of our own rear tank command used for defense of the Marine perimeter at Hagaru-ri. Certainly, the enemy also suffered—almost certainly more than American forces—from the bitter cold. Still we have remained in that shadow of the Marine Corps, denied our own warmth from that sunlight, heat we so desperately could have used over the last sixty years. However, the next fifty may be different. That “alleged” division of enemy that “may have been around Yudam-ni” was not on the west side facing the Marines, but on the east side of the reservoir fighting the Army. Task Force Faith owns that page on the east side of that reservoir. We paid a high price for it, and we will not yield that page in history to anyone. That page belongs exclusively to the 7th Infantry (Army) Division, RCT-31. It always did, it just took time for the facts to come out of the shadows. Now others will know.

For my comrades in Task Force Faith, enjoy the warmth of the sunlight, God knows you earned it. For all those MIA’s yet to be returned, we eternally remember and mourn your loss. For those who have passed on—in combat, from wounds, or in the decades since—rest in peace that your service and sacrifice were not in vain.

The Old Farmer’s Almanac tells us:

“The Full Cold Moon: During this month the winter cold fastens its grip, and nights are at their longest and darkest. It is also sometimes called the Moon before Yule. The term Long Night Moon is a doubly appropriate name because the midwinter night is indeed long, and because the Moon is above the horizon for a long time. The midwinter full

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<sup>2</sup> USMC: Chosin Reservoir, Volume III, p. 398.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.



Moon has a high trajectory across the sky because it is opposite a low Sun.”<sup>4</sup> This reference to the full moon of 24 November 1950! Though waning over those additional days, it was the brightest moon light I can remember in my entire lifetime on the night of 1-2 December the night of the destruction of the Task Force. That was by no means a benefit to us, merely exposing us to the enemy forces that controlled this night.

### *Of Men*

In the larger disaster unfolding all across Korea during that “coldest winter” of 1950 the grim story of Task Force MacLean-Faith went virtually unnoticed. Both then and since; “Within Army circles, however, the story was well known: Five senior combat commanders—MacLean, Faith, Reilly, Miller, Storms—as well as a dozen company and platoon commanders were lost. The 31st Infantry was as thoroughly gutted and disorganized as the 8th Cavalry had been a month earlier at Unsan. Charles Beauchamp’s 32d Infantry emerged in better shape, but minus his entire 1/32. Ray Embree and two-thirds of his 57th FAB firing batteries were gone. Of the infantry regiments in the 7th Division, only Herb Powell’s 17th, far removed from Chosin Reservoir, remained as a fully effective RCT.”<sup>5</sup>

I simply want to scatter the shadows that have covered the story of these men. Those men, who fought and died, and were wounded at the Frozen Chosin, some sixty-two years ago,.

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### Non-Fiction

#### -What History Failed to Record-

This book is a complex study, covering the Battle at the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir. Unlike other books it details those elements ignored, or completely fabricated in the non-fiction history concerning this battle. The exclusion of the 7th Infantry Division role in this battle is a blot on American history neglecting to add this full division to its rightful place in the annals of our military history.

While two movies/documentaries are currently anticipated—one by the Marine Corps—another by this Army 31st Regimental Combat Team, (RCT-31) it is my belief neither movie will cover any (of my) facts relating to this RCT connection to the reservoir in the first place. As only one of many survivors of this battle, we merely (suddenly) appear, and (disappear) like a Phantom Ghostly Regimental Combat Team, disappearing, from history as fast as we arrived at the reservoir. The underlining reason, we were there “on the whim” of Major General Edward Almond the X Corps commander! This commander appointed by General Douglas MacArthur, over objections from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Almond will (also) remain as General MacArthur’s Chief of Staff, in absentia!

While General Almond admits his failure to follow regulations concerning his mixture in cross attachment of battalions between regiments, (attaching one battalion of the 32nd Regiment to 31-RCT) he merely implies; in this situation this employment was “an expedient necessitated by the time element and the location of the most available elements.” This is also “the time element” that creates

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<sup>4</sup> Inside the 2013: Farmers' Almanac.

<sup>5</sup> Clay Blair: “The Forgotten War” America in Korea-1950-1953. p- 521. This LOST reference is inclusive of Reilly and Embree who were evacuated from the east side by helicopter!

this disaster for the 31-RCT at the reservoir resulting in a list of over 844 American soldiers,<sup>6</sup> Killed in Action (KIA) within “the time element” of five days and four nights at the reservoir! It is also the reason for pulling and classifying several documents “Secret” since those documents establish “the time element” that “necessitated” “the location of the most available elements.” These are the documents of concern, yet, never exposed in detail until, and through, my effort!

The excessive North Korean winter was a burden as inherited, was connected to the collection and storage of each mans duffel bag filled with issued winter gear, but, never retrieved for use in North Korea. Under training for intended ski troops in Hokkaido Japan, and on the same parallel as Changjin reservoir, we had adequate winter gear stored in those duffel bags, for this campaign! An interesting note, after my return to duty I requested my personal items stored be returned to me, with the explanation, that nothing of personal value was deemed as stored within my duffel bag!

The lack of highlighting the addition of South Korea conscripts: “attached” to our force also underestimated our problems at the reservoir. Little is recorded of their attachment to our division, their 38% influence; meaning of every 100 men, 38 of them were South Korean conscripts, “fresh out of the rice paddies” in South Korea.

The end result, and demise of this Army force sacrificed due to “the time element” that “necessitated, the location of the most available elements” were written off as expendable, with the shameful withdrawal of its rear tank command four miles back into Hagaru, to reinforce that weak garrison.

So much has been written about this “Forgotten War.” There are many reasons for that by the victory losses in the first three months of this so called “Police Action” and the increased losses of men and materials of war, due in part to a lack of battle hardened and incomplete regimental combat teams, these under-strength via congressional budget reductions that reduced those RCT units by removal of one of their three battalions. That it was not a war as known and defined in our nation’s military history. Rather a new defined “Conflict” under the first United Nations Banner!

Things might have been different, had the National Security Act of 1947, been fully understood by all of the commanders committed to the battlefield, had they respected the chain of command, and once outlined by General MacArthur. The separation of X Corps from Eighth Army direct control was paramount in the continual pursuit of the enemy, over who was really in charge of the 1st Marine Division attached to the X Corps organizational chart as defined by X Corps:


Missing from the chart below, the fact that, the 1st Marine Division (FMF)<sup>7</sup> With its Commander listed as Oliver P. Smith; via X Corps, Draft 3, Operational Order 7, 25 November was under the Pacific Fleet Marine Force therefore, there should be a dashed line from X Corps to that —1 Mar— box just as the ROK box outlines those units not directly under Almond’s direct command other than combat operation and mission control! General Smith’s consistent statement and view-never denied-he was never at anytime under X Corps Administration control.

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<sup>6</sup> Requested: Listing from the National Monuments Battle Commission.

<sup>7</sup> The South Korean’s are under their Presidents command.

**CHART 2- ORGANIZATION OF UNC GROUND FORCES IN KOREA  
23 NOVEMBER 1950**



Source Mossman Ebb & Flow: Page 30.

Note of interest: There is no dashed line between any of the American Division's assigned to X Corps!  
Including the 1 Mar Division!

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The infighting between The Department of the Navy over the Army “Attached” use of the sole marine division understanding that X Corp “Operational Control” was separated from their “Administration Control.” This was highlighted at the capture of Seoul in late September of 1950, the marine commander objection to the X Corps commander, that the equipment he was using-too cross the Han River-was Marine Corps property. To which General Almond replied: “They are the property of the United States Government and I intend to use them.”<sup>8</sup> The Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of 1958-far too late for Korea-strengthened the Secretary of Defense direction, authority and control over the department and clarified the operational chain of command from the President and Secretary of Defense to the combat commanders. Without these changes, the Korean chain of command—as evident at Changjin Reservoir —was ambiguous and confusing between World War II, and Viet Nam. The results were an unstable chain of command, and the forces involved were caught and placed at risk between disputes, as to who was in charge of what units, and where boundary lines would be established between those units. So the “Forgotten War” was fought under this missing data, and lack of a unified chain of command. A major general question; how does one turn over the chain of command to the Department of the Navy—to its Marine Commander, surrounded by two Army forces in three different division zones of independent operation?

The Department of the Navy, missing “The clash of fleets” has to rely on land operations to establish their (land) history by “mixing up” in the affairs of the other two services, the Department of the Navy, relying solely on —their connecting anchor chain— their 1st Marine Division on land, that smaller

<sup>8</sup> Shelby L. Stanton: Ten Corps in Korea 1950. P.101. Presidio Press

contribution, in numbers (bacon & eggs maxim<sup>9</sup>) rather than a total commitment by this one marine division, with attempts to overshadow the greater Army forces, that made the greatest sacrifices and commitment on land.

Results:

The 1958 Act removed the Military Department from the operational chain of command and clarified their support and administration responsibilities for the unified commands. It would therefore seem; better to deem Korean Military History a colossal mistake in hindsight and reclassify it as —The Forgotten War.

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<sup>9</sup> Bacon and Eggs; The pig made a total commitment to this meal, while the hen only made a small contribution!

## What History Failed to Record

### --Chapter 1--

#### An Upper Echelon Veil of Silence:

##### A Mystery about the Chosin Reservoir Campaign

Who may seek to unravel the mystery of the North Korean Chosin (Changjin) Reservoir campaign? To understand the contents of this book, one must look closely at the maps and documents in the following pages – documents that were long hidden from public view. Careful study of these documents is a vital prerequisite to understanding a military retrograde retreat movement from North Korea that was not only shrouded in a veil of silence, but was also embellished with undeserved Distinguished Service Cross Medals (DSC's) Those awarded by General Almond to five Marine officers!

The Army documents in question were originally classified as “Secret” and were thus hidden from the public eye. However, all upper echelon officers at the G-2-3<sup>10</sup> and S-2-3 levels within the X Corps had direct knowledge of what was in play concerning the 31<sup>st</sup> RCT 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division's relocation. These officers also had a direct after the fact knowledge concerning the disaster that claimed so many of the men involved in this rapid and fatal redeployment! Perhaps the reason for this sudden exchange of divisions was never fully understood! Still, the *impact, and end results*, of this order were common knowledge. The higher officers' innuendoes that lower officers were also to blame for this event were merely part of the higher officers' attempt to justify their loyalty to secrecy. The fact that no higher X Corps officer broke ranks on this issue to focus on the large number of men lost in combat proves that these higher officers attempted to shift the blame to the force trapped at Chosin. The fateful G-3 and S-3 order that placed these men at Chosin will haunt their military career forever. The X Corps officers betrayed the troops at Chosin with their silence about the valor that these troops showed and the respect that each man lost at the Reservoir deserved. Their silence about this campaign, likewise still haunt those men who fought there as much as the battle itself.

One must understand that combat conditions may spin out of even the best commander's control, and that such a shift in fortune may jeopardize that commander's own forces and, at times, require him to abandon his men in position. Such are the misfortunes of warfare. However, an attempt to remove an abandoned force from history can never be fully justified. There is a time for silence, and a time to speak. To maintain silence over one's faults in order to exonerate one-self is a disgrace. Because the X Corps' officers did just that: they used our truck column's failure to reach Hagaru-ri as a scapegoat for their demise and to clear their consciences of the division plans they had made and of the orders they had issued. Responsibility for this disaster belongs to those G-2 and G-3 X Corps officers who, from their warming tents, cut the orders that sent troops to that bitter cold at the Reservoir. However, those orders could never be carried out without the orders passing through the lower chain of command.

The following documents are listed in descending order of importance. These documents are the official travel orders that were issued to the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division and are the reason that members of

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<sup>10</sup> The G-2 consisted of the X Corps' intelligence staff, and the G-3 consisted of the X Corps' operational staff. S-2 order's at division level.

this division, (myself included,) were involved in the Chosin Reservoir campaign. It seems that if a military mission is classified as secret, this mission's location and the location of all Army forces involved must also be kept secret! Such has been the case concerning the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division's involvement at Chosin. Indeed, it is difficult to find any documentation about Army involvement at the Reservoir in military records dating before 1980 and in many books published after this date! Had either Colonel Allan D. MacLean or Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith, Jr. survived, history would certainly have been recorded differently, and the Army's involvement at Chosin would have been revealed. It is also likely that, if either of these men had survived, some court martial proceedings would have been initiated. The lower echelon officers of Faith's task force were placed at a disadvantage when defending the relocation of their forces. Many of these officers and soldiers were called upon to explain why their individual actions caused such a large disaster at Chosin. These soldiers needed the knowledge in those hidden [Secret] travel orders to justify their actions.

While the Marine Corps claims that this mission at the Reservoir was solely assigned to the Marines, Army documents challenge this exclusive and mythical claim to fame – and shame. While an Army task force was located east of the Reservoir, this force suffered the largest total number of men killed in action! The men of this force “made no claim to fame,” nor did they receive any! It has been a long journey to fully reveal what happened at the Chosin Reservoir, merely six decades ago. This event really happened. It can never be erased, and the dead can never be restored – so why not tell it like it was?

Search as one may, these travel documents reveal absolutely no evidence to justify their “Secret” classification. Without such evidence, there is no reason why these documents were withheld from the National Archives for so long. The documents' secret classification were most likely originated at the X Corps level immediately following the North Korean Chosin Reservoir withdrawal action between November 27 and December 10, 1950. Operational Order 25 was the first of these documents to be declassified. This order originated in the S-3 planning section and was prepared by Colonel MacLean, the commander of the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry Regiment. I list Operational Order 25 first, even though it was issued after the other documents that I am going to discuss. This order was declassified in 1979, while Operational Orders 23 and 24 were not declassified until 1991. Lack of interest appears to be the reason for the forty-year delay in the release of Operational Orders 23 and 24. During this forty-year period, no historian seemed remotely interested in the combined importance of these other documents, or as to how all three of these documents relate to one another. Yet, these documents directly concerned all those men who were involved in the Chosin Reservoir action and withdrawal. As long as these operational orders remained classified, these men had no documentation to support their participation in the disaster that enveloped them at Chosin.

Here is the major point concerning Operational Order 25: the Marine Division “must” have a similar order to justify its westward mission out of Yudam-ni to “seize Mupyong-ni.” According to Operational Order 25: the “7<sup>th</sup> Inf. Div (is also too) attack 270800 November 1950 [and] seize Mupyong-ni.” Operational Order 25 thus directly contradicts the Marine Corps' identical document and its claim that the Marines were solely responsible for seizing Mupyong-ni. In his book, *Chosin*, Eric Hammel offers a disclaimer that the order to attack westward came “*after*” the Marines had received their withdrawal order from General Smith and that General Almond supplemented this order to withdrawal ASAP from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri on November 29. This later date: two days after Operational Order 25!

## -Document Pages-

Operational Order 25 (declassified January 9, 1979): I do not know who kept this document hidden (if anyone would know, it would be Clay Blair!) or why he did so. I received my copy of this document on the same date that I received the following two documents (July 13, 1991). Seven copies were sent to others in the division.
Other authors affirm that this document changed history. Since November 25, 2005, three copies of this document have been available at the Korean War Educator. Per Ray Vallowe. Research. <a href="http://www.koreanwareducator.org/topics/chosin/vallowe_research/Vallowe-declassified.htm">http://www.koreanwareducator.org/topics/chosin/vallowe_research/Vallowe-declassified.htm</a>
Operational Order 25. November 27, 1950.
<b>7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division Mission</b>
1 .a: Intel summaries. b: 7 <sup>th</sup> Inf. Div atks 270800 Nov, seizes Mupyong-ni. Adv to Yalu-Ri. Destroys en in Z. Secures the Pugsan area. (by G-3)
<b>31<sup>st</sup> Infantry Regiment (Task Force MacLean)</b>
2.a: RCT atks w/o delay N from Chosin Reservoir, seizes Objs A,B,C,D,E. Prepares to continue attack to Changjin and attack to Yalu-ri. (By Colonel MacLean.)
Either Operational Order 7 (November 25, 1950) ordered MG Smith to seize Mupyong-ni on 270800 November, or it did not. If it did, then the National Archives' document released on January 9, 1979 ordering the 7 <sup>th</sup> Infantry Division to attack and seize Mupyong-ni at the same date and hour at the Marine Corps is a ploy or a joke. Which is it? One possibility supersedes the other! "No amount of experimentation can ever prove me right; a single experiment can prove me wrong." -Albert Einstein; Thus, No amount of earlier speculation or redundant statements can ever prove historians right, but a single document can prove them wrong. Like a Rubik's Cube, one can twist the pieces of the puzzle all one wants, but there is only one correct solution
Operational Order 23 [declassified 7/13/1991]: Places the 31 <sup>st</sup> Regiment east of the Fusen (Pujon) Reservoir. The Regiment's mission is to continue within this zone per order 222400I (November 1950). Vic Untaek, Korea. Under 1. b. (1) 7 <sup>th</sup> Inf. Div: Continue advance in (Z)one to (N)orth.
1.b. (1) 7 <sup>th</sup> Inf. Div: Continue advance in Z to N. By Colonel MacLean.

Operational Order 24 (declassified July 13, 1991): Orders the 31<sup>st</sup> Regiment to begin road march to Pukchong railroad station, where it will receive update orders to prepare for movement south and west by railroad and motor vehicle, 242400I November 1950. Vic Untaek, Korea: Under 1.a. 2.b. and 2.a.

1. a: Omitted. 1.b: Omitted. 2. a: 31<sup>st</sup> RCT moves (250800 November 1950) to assay area vic Pukchong railroad station. Prepare for further movement to south and west by railroad and motor vehicle. By: Colonel MacLean.

A long-promulgated Marine “legend” affirms that the Marines were scheduled to attack westward from Yudam-ni and seize Mupyong-ni! However, this objective was “reassigned,” not to the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, but, as outlined in Operational Order 25, to the Army’s 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division. Reality therefore contradicts this Marine “legend.” It is true that this objective was “previously assigned” exclusively to the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division (Reinforced) as part of General MacArthur’s “Home by Christmas” offensive. MacArthur’s plans for this offensive involved using the Eighth Army and the X Corps as a combined force. The Marine Corps verifies that “[t]he Marine advance was ordered in preparation for the combined offensive of the Eighth Army and X Corps scheduled for the 24th.”<sup>11</sup> However, things changed dramatically in the X Corps’ sector of North Korea. The Marine division failed to meet its schedule for the November 24<sup>th</sup> offensive, due in part to its division commander’s failure to provide forces at Yudam-ni. The Army’s 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division played no part whatsoever in this offensive. On November 24, the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division was operating within its center zone of the X Corps, miles away from the Chosin Reservoir and east of the parallel Pujon [Fusen] Reservoir! [Ebb and Flow: Map #3]

Nevertheless, a radical change occurred in the mission and its forces.

The *Entire* 7<sup>th</sup> Division was now directly involved!

At this point; The Army 3<sup>rd</sup> Division I already involved in the Changjin Reservoir Campaign! Due to the time delay to add a second Army Division element into the Chosin Reservoir, “Almond [resets] November 27th as the 7<sup>th</sup> Division’s opening date. As at Seoul—two months earlier—he has narrowed the *entire* 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division Zone—now directly *above* Hagaru-ri! “The 7<sup>th</sup> Division meanwhile [between 24-27- November] was to expand its zone westward, placing forces on the east side of the Changjin Reservoir for an advance to the Yalu *through the zone previously assigned to the marines*. The ROK I Corps was to continue to the border from Hapsu and Ch'ongjin while Almond's ‘remaining major units,’ the U.S. 3d Division and 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment, secured the corps rear area between Wonsan and Hungnam.42” [42 X Corps WD, Sum, November 1950; X Corps Operational Order 7, November 25, 1950] (my italics). Note: “The 7<sup>th</sup> Division meanwhile...” Not reduced to any single RCT!

There is no X Corps information that specifically, details any [full] 7<sup>th</sup> Division Mupyong-ni mission in Operational Order 7. However, Operational Order 25 contradicts this order

According to the above documents, what mission remained for the Marine division? There is none listed! The 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, on the other hand, does have a mission: move to the Chosin Reservoir then to seize Mupyong-ni as Operational Order 25 instructed. However, *Policy and Direction: The First Year*; states that these two objectives were too widely separated to be assigned to a single division! Yet, the carefully-preserved Operational Order 25 proves that these two objectives were assigned to one Army single division! Many men sacrificed their lives to accomplish these objectives. Did they do that as part of a plot, ploy, or decoy? Further north, Task Force Kingston (32<sup>nd</sup> Regiment) was assigned to seize Singalpajin at the Yalu. This 7<sup>th</sup> Division mission conformed with

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<sup>11</sup> Wonsan to the Reservoir-Red China Enters the fight, By Lynn Montross, October 1951 issue of: The Marine Corps Gazette. Marine Corps: Historical Branch.



their order to “advance to the Yalu through the zone previously assigned to the marines.” Again, what mission remained for the Marine division that was no longer listed as one of “Almond's remaining major units”?

“Almost two decades had passed since the early books on “Chosin” were published; books by Hammel, Appleman, Blair, Knox and others. Since that time many survivors of the campaign have surfaced to provide new insights which enable us to update history.” (Changjin Journal 02.28.02)

-From Hugh Robbins' *Breakout*-

On 24 Nov 1950 the 31st Regimental Combat Team was in a defensive position just east of the Pujon [Fusen] Reservoir and out of contact with enemy forces. The 31st RCT CP was near the village of Untaek, North Korea. The 7th Infantry Division's 17th RCT had the honor of being the first unit to reach the Yalu River on the Manchurian border, and without much difficulty. The weather had been an obstacle, however, with temperatures were ranging to 10 below zero.

“Orders came from 7th Division Headquarters to *shift to the left in all zones of the X Corps*. The 1st Marine Division on our left was to move its forces west of the Chosin Reservoir and be *replaced by our division* on the east shore. Col. Allan D. MacLean [RCT commander], following a hurried conference with Maj. Gen. [David] Barr, 7th Division commander, gave orders over the phone to move a quartering party of the regiment, less the 1st and 2d Battalions, to the vicinity of the Chosin Reservoir immediately. On 25 November I had assembled the party and moved over the snow-covered trails (a road was a scarce luxury) to the south.[Thus, Colonel MacLean only learned of his new mission —via a phone call from Division Headquarters in the late evening of November 24 1950.]

“We halted for the night in Pukchong, site of the division rear command post. Col. MacLean met us and *outlined the plan for the shift to the left*. A *gap* was to be filled *between* the Eighth Army and the 1st Marine Division. [Note: If the 7<sup>th</sup> Division had not executed this mission to seize Mupyong-ni that “gap” between the Eighth Army and the Marines would have remained. That “gap” was the result of the Marines' failure to fill it in timely fashion. Would the Marines move 1.2 miles, 12 miles, 120 miles, to the Yalu and complete their assigned mission, [under Plan 6, 11 November] or not at all?] The regiment was to relieve marine units of the Chosin Reservoir, then advance north to the Manchurian border. [Again, the important point “was to relieve marine units of the Chosin Reservoir” – first things first – and then advance north.] *Initially* we would have only our 3d Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. William Reilly, the 1st Battalion of the 32d Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. Don Faith, and the 57th Field Artillery Battalion, less one battery, commanded by Lt. Col. Embree. Division and Corps had other plans for the balance of the 31st RCT for the present.”

“The 1/32 had preceded us and was assembled in the vicinity of Hagaru-ri, a small village controlling the roads at the south end of the reservoir. Col. MacLean, with his S-2 [Major Carl Witte] and his S-3 [Lt. Col. Berry K. Anderson], preceded us to Hagaru to await the arrival of our quartering party and the 3d Battalion. [To my knowledge, MacLean never did interact with anyone from the Marine division.] Late in the afternoon of 26 November, our quartering party passed through Hamhung, dropping off guides for the 3d Battalion following, and turned north toward Hagaru-ri. [At this same date, A Company of 7th Marines stumbled into a Chinese staging area and was driven back.] About 2130 hours we were halted on the road by a detachment of marines who controlled traffic through the steep and curving mountain pass ahead. We were able to talk by radio-telephone relay with our regimental commander already at Hagaru 30 miles away. [Colonel MacLean had full authority here, as his X

Corps credentials superseded any authority that the Marine division had in this area.] Clearance was arranged for our little convoy and we moved north through the one-way section of the road, and to a point some six miles north of Hagaru where the CO had picked out a schoolhouse for our command post [Hudong-ni]. It was after midnight when we got into our sleeping bags on the cold floor”<sup>12</sup> (my italics).

It seems that historians have their work cut out for them in order to revise these previously recorded statements! As the 7<sup>th</sup> Division received late orders on November 24 to “expand its zone westward,” Colonel MacLean briefed his combat and staff officers about the mission. While the mission’s scope was still vague at this point, MacLean was the only man who possessed the complete plan for the 31<sup>st</sup> RCT’s mission. This knowledge died with Colonel MacLean at the Reservoir.

### -Notes on General Smith’s Comments-

General Smith stated that “[t]he Chinese we had met were a *delaying force* sent south to *delay our advance* and permit the main body of the Chinese forces to get deep into North Korea before meeting us”<sup>13</sup> (my italics). It seems that the X Corps and General Smith were directly at odds with each other. Other X Corps units were actively pursuing the enemy forces! Smith was totally irrational in his assessment of the Chinese being “a delaying force.” If a delay of the Marine force was indeed the enemy’s plan, then General Smith was the only commander working this plan to perfection and conforming to this enemy tactic! Each side delayed an additional three days (November 24-27). This time was used –by each side- to stockpile ammo. Smith delayed in out-posting or securing his own Main Supply Route (MSR). However, as the Yudam-ni/Hagaru/Koto-ri entrapment verifies, Smith’s actions were not a sufficient trade off for his delay! The Chinese were the ones to break early contact with the Marine forces, and Smith now delayed his own division’s advance in pursuing them. In reality, Smith was not just working against the X Corps and MacArthur’s plans to pursue the enemy; he was also working *within* the enemy plan! Smith’s actions call to mind a statement that President Lincoln made to his reluctant commander, General George McClellan, during the Civil War. McClellan had found General Robert E. Lee’s battle plans drawn on a cigar wrapper but failed to act on this knowledge. Lincoln told McClellan, “By delay the enemy will gain on you?” and asked, if McClellan was not “going to use the army, could I borrow it?” Task Force MacLean can also be compared to the Titanic, which collided with a moving iceberg. Had the Titanic’s captain resisted the pressure to set a time record, and had he delayed increasing his speed by several knots, that iceberg would have moved out of the ship’s path by natural progression! Therefore, the collision – at least with this particular iceberg – would never have occurred!

Likewise, if General Smith had maintained his past speed of advance (his “one mile per day” strategy) and therefore failed to yield to whatever “pressure” was being applied to him, the 7<sup>th</sup> Division’s relocation might have been more beneficial to his division than it was. General Smith was now relieved of the east side of the reservoir at Sinhung-ni. He could have relocated his newly freed 5<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment at Hagaru, since; “[o]n 27 November, the CP of RCT-5 displaced from Hagaru-ri to Yudam-ni and opened at 1230 just west of Yudam-ni at TA3982S”<sup>14</sup>. Furthermore, the X Corps never ordered these RCT-5 troops to relocate to Yudam-ni! If Smith had refused to move his RCT-5 troops,

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<sup>12</sup> Changjin Journal, 02.28.04

<sup>13</sup> Smith, - OPS 581-585 (p.223)- Changjin Journal, 09.01.06

<sup>14</sup> Smith, - OpO 24-50 (p.253) [p.733-735]- Changjin Journal, 11.10.07

Hagaru would never have been in danger, and the Task Force Drysdale and MacLean-Faith disasters would never have occurred.

The problem seems to be that Smith was true to his well-stated delaying persona and his reputation as a general who “rarely gave an order” and who delegated his authority to his G-3 Alpha Bowser! Smith lived up to this reputation many times through his delays and his inability to take the military risks involved with seeking out the enemy in his own area. A large “recon patrol” from 1/A/7 engaged the enemy in one of its staging areas at Hansan(g)-ni. This engagement killed three marines and left them MIA. Among these marines was First Lieutenant Frank N. Mitchell, whose body was never claimed. Mitchell was awarded the Medal of Honor. The Mitchell incident occurred on the evening of November 26 while the Marine 2/5 Battalion was moving westward past Hagaru and on to Yudam-ni. Due to this oversight, the two “remaining” battalions, 1/5 and 3/5, did not relocate from Sinhung-ni until the early morning of November 27. Between nightfall and daylight, Colonel Bowser should have halted these two battalions at the Yudam-ni/Hagaru-ri/Sinhung-ni axis for a G-2 intelligence briefing to process this engagement information. With the data that 1/A/7 had just reported to G-2, Bowser could have commenced an immediate continuing attack against the enemy staging area near Yudam-ni. Instead, 1/A/7 had orders from Colonel Litzenberg to secure a hill overlooking the road at Yudam-ni.

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Murray was the “junior officer” of-one-the three (infantry) regiments in the Marine division. Because Murray’s battalion was considered the “freshest” of the three, he and his troops were continuously placed in harm’s way. Colonel Lewis “Chesty” Puller’s 1<sup>st</sup> Regiment was the most famous of the three, and Colonel Litzenberg’s 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment was the least efficient. Litzenberg’s regiment arrived at Inchon (on the 21st) too late for the landing. His regiment was also the weakest in terms of its composition, as fifty percent of its troops were reservists, some of whom had never fired a weapon. These forces were on par with the ROK forces that were “attached” to the 7<sup>th</sup> Division.

Brigadier General Edward Craig was the assistant division commander who led the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Brigade (now Colonel Murray’s, 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment) at the Pusan perimeter. However, General Smith had just authorized Craig to return stateside on emergency leave to visit his ailing father. This leave authorization occurred on the morning of November 27 – the same morning of the so-called attack westward out of Yudam-ni! I firmly believe that General Craig would have rejected the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines’ relocation on such short notice, especially considering the data about company 1/A/7’s clash with enemy forces the evening before. General Smith could have and should have placed his entire 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment at Hagaru, but he did not. As a result, a disaster occurred, even though it never should have! According to Smith, “[a]t 1500, a patrol from A Company 1/7 made contact with an *undetermined number of enemy* southwest of Hansang-ni (4 miles southwest of Yudam-ni), exchanged fire with the enemy, who withdrew to the southwest. The patrol returned to the perimeter at 1730 reporting the *area cleared of the enemy*. Other local patrols of the 1/7 ranged as far as 2000 yards east of the MSR without making enemy contact”<sup>15</sup> (my italics).

It is strange that Smith accepts the patrol’s Special Action Report (SAR) “at 1730 reporting the area cleared of the enemy” yet ignores the “undetermined number of enemy” and fails to send another force back to either confirm and/or retrieve the bodies of those three marines lost in action.

-Endnote-

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<sup>15</sup> Gen. O.P. Smith’s Aide-Memoire; (253) Attack of RCT-5 to the West from Yudam-ni on 27 November. [Changjin Journal 11/10/07]

The following pages provide the original documents from the National Archives. I follow each document with a map from Navy records to illustrate how the Navy records the 7<sup>th</sup> Division's location on key dates. Students of this battle should study these maps before moving forward in this book in order to understand how the truth about this battle was manipulated. However, one should not be so naive as to believe that updated records will in any way change prior written history. Navy map number 17 ("On to the Border") and number 18 ("Retreat in the West") merely reverse the arrowhead for the 7<sup>th</sup> Division's travel to and from Hyesanjin on the Yalu River. However, elements of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division were heavily encircled east of the Chosin Reservoir. Over 800 7<sup>th</sup> Division soldiers died there (excluding attached ROK's), and a similar number of troops was evacuated by air from Hagaru-ri between December 2-6, 1950. When reviewing Navy map 19 ("A Day at the Reservoir"), note the lower left insert, which depicts three CCF divisions deployed east of the Fusen Reservoir. However, this map fails to show a friendly force of any kind engaged with either one of these three enemy divisions prior to December 3. Thus, prior to the release of declassified documents, the overwhelming evidence from these maps is that there were no Army forces whatsoever in the vicinity east of the Chosin Reservoir! My purpose in this book is to locate where Army forces were at the time of the action within the Chosin Reservoir campaign and to thus document THIS document that history records, yet fails to explain!

"1.b: **7th Inf. Div** attacks (270800 November 1950) and seizes **Mupyong-ni**. Advances to Yalu-river. Destroys en in Z. Secures the Pugsan area."

## -Chapter 2-

### -Inchon-

On August 26, 1950, the X Corps was established and activated under direct command authority of Major General Edward (Ned) Mallory Almond by General Order #24. Thereafter, the constant speed of Almond shines forth. On September 21st, he assumes full and complete control ashore as operation Chromite (15 September) ceased to be an amphibious operation. It now became an inland command force, and Almond was now in charge of that force as the corps commander. He was to exercise complete control of the mission from here on in. Are, so it would seem! When one considers all the controversy and disagreement to execute this complex and urgent plan to land between the low tides involved and secure the beach at Inchon were a remarkable achievement of close cooperation by all three military Departments; the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Plus: additional credit to the Coast Guard and the Merchant Marines. What really happened to superior authority in the planning after Inchon is hard to imagine, that all controversy would revolve around the X Corps command, and the individual command of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division may require some deep analysis of the situation that existed between the Army and the Marine troops at that time. Certainly here could be justification for deep attitude research by a Ph.D.! (Doctor of Philosophy) The Marine Corps History employing (one) and relying on such an expert!

That a natural hostility would exist between these two groups is understandable to some degree. In World War II the marine role was an exclusive one of amphibious operations. But they were too small (Corps) in force size or divisional strength to invade every island that was required to be invaded; As a result the Marines were never used in the amphibious landings in any strength size in the European Campaign. That need would require that Army forces be substituted to duplicate and become proficient amphibious forces as well as reinforce their own roles of inland assaults. The Army expands its amphibious divisions to twenty-eight while the Marine Corps will top out, at only six amphibious divisions. That training would place Army forces at least on a level with any amphibious marine mission, with the 7<sup>th</sup> Division actually exceeding the 1st Marine Division involvement in the Pacific region, and that could diminish the Marine Corps role somewhat in future conflicts. That took some of the glory away from the Marine Corps. The Army at that time had their own; Army Air Corps and Army Transport Ships. That General MacArthur would use the marines at all was only because he had to utilize every force he could muster. As a matter of fact he had dismissed the reality of ever getting any marines for the landing and had proceeded in the planning (Bluehearts) with Army forces. His earlier plan for an amphibious landing had not been approved as such in using any marine size forces! As CINCFE he would be required to structure an army amphibious plan without them. In his book "Reminiscences" he states that then Chief of Staff Omar Bradley was against amphibious operations, that they were long past obsolete. He (Bradley) stirred up a storm in calling the Navy personnel, which included the marines as: "Fancy Dan's". President Truman was likewise against using the marines as a major unit of our armed forces. His reference to "Propaganda Machine"

The very first dispute about the creation of X Corps was the choice of its commanding general. General MacArthur as CINCFE would pick his own Chief of Staff, Major General Almond, who would also remain his Chief of Staff, (in absentia) wearing two hats. Still it was implied that once the Inchon landing was over and a link between this X Corps and Eighth Army was completed, than full command of X Corps would pass over to General Walton (Bulldog) Walker, a four star general,

however, that would not happen during Walker's remaining life time. (Dec.23,'50) After the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed information from staff members, General Collins and Admiral Sherman, and receiving approval from President Harry S. Truman, the plan was approved for the Inchon landing, and the X Corps was born and formed for action under the command of Major General "Ned" Almond, (1892-1979) It would be said of him: "He was one of the most controversial officers in the Korean War; especially detested by the marine officers who served under his direct command." So it would seem inevitable that from its very creation the X Corps was cursed with hostility between the Army and Navy-Marine units. Almond would not follow regulations on structure of units, and regiments. It should be noted that this tactic was never a ground breaking event by army generals! His unilateral unlawful use of these units-as small task forces-is now legendary. Here was the focus of the dispute between Almond and Smith over the integrity of units. The very fact that Almond was never in full control over the structure of the one marine division assigned also enters into his many problems! Almond having only "operational control" while Smith's claim, that Almond never had "administration control" maintained by the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) commander of the Pacific region! [X Corps records list General Smith as that FMF Commander on several documents.] The fact that Smith was never going to order his forces where he was ordered to have them, at the time he was ordered to have them there, will unfold in this drama. One constant excuse by Smith; He always needed more time to free his forces from his last commitment to the next battle zone! This in contrast too: In the United States Army, "an order calls for instant compliance." The one fact with continuity throughout the arrival of Major General Oliver Prince Smith's arrival on the scene was his constant desire to delay. Yet, he is separated from the marines in that action—it was always "Smith" that delayed—not the marines as such. Still; he is their one sole commander to order that command to move whatever the direction X Corps assigned it. Indeed it is recorded: "Thus it was, that with virtually no enemy opposition, the marines advanced at an average rate of only a mile a day between 10 and 23 November."<sup>16</sup> So the attempt at separation of "Smith" from "The Marines" disclaimer cannot be fully justified. However, the fact that his regimental commanders received no leadership to follow orders issued at later dates, can be justified, as too their direct involvement! However, those individual regimental commanders ignoring Smith's orders once given can never be wholly justified-while outright refusal would be cause for at least a reprimand for their failure to respond ASAP after consideration of any breakout from entrapment by enemy forces.

But here the marines have to share some blame, for while we are in the process of picking and confirming generals for command, we must focus on their General: Oliver Prince Smith, (1893-1977) For all the remarks about the Army occupation forces being "green troops" here we have a "green general" placed within his first divisional command; the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, (Reinforced) in Korea. This being in contrast to General Almond commanding the 92<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division in the Italian Campaign, during WWII. So some blame is due to the marine selection of its divisional commander, and as stated his attitudes against the Army forces in the X Corps. Of his reported dislike for its commander Almond and filtering down to the lowest line forces as well. It was indeed an unfortunate situation, and as I record -and history itself; a deadly one, for he would take it upon himself to challenge lawful orders, not only those directly from Almond, but those from the planning staff of X Corps G-3, (Operations section, which included some marine personnel.) At Seoul in South Korea,

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<sup>16</sup> SOUTH TO THE NAKTONG, NORTH TO THE YALU. CMH, GPO. Roy Appleman: The Big Question-p.773.

there would be an unprecedented compromise; at Chosin Reservoir in North Korea, there would be no time for another one; and the results would be deadly. There were enough enemy troops to vent anger on so there was no reason whatsoever to blame other Americans or any other United Nations troops for a screw-up he himself helped to create.

That the marine commander did not like; the Inchon landing site, nor the Wonsan landing site, nor the inland mission at Chosin is well recorded by authors' Ridgway, Hammel, Blair, and Knox, as well as Appleman. These writers; in their books, all reflect his attitude about his missions. As if he stood alone, as if any other division commander was fond of their situation to wage this budget war with far, far less men, equipment and ammo, less food supplies than the marine commander had for his forces. Even from the very creation of X Corps, it seemed the order of the day that every effort would be made by the press corps to glorify the marine units, to the extent of and disregard those army units involved. Indeed in many cases to never mention these units at all-Task Force MacLean/Faith- or to imply that those actions were marine actions instead of an Army or United Nations operation. All of this borders on the book "Stolen Valor" and how someone claims individual valor [Korean-unit action belonging to others] they never personally earned.<sup>17</sup>

In the taking of Seoul, it is reported and implied (by Marine's) as a sole marine operation, yet the marines would feel slighted in the taking Seoul, that they were not given full credit for it. That as a matter of fact, the 32<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Regiment was involved in a blood chilling event that would be a clone copy; replayed in a deadlier fashion on the east shore of the Chosin Reservoir two months later!<sup>18</sup> But what did it matter who took Seoul-the first time as it was lost again within months. The most important time was the second time-we held it- the ROK's walked right in! Frankly, I don't believe the Army really cares if the marines are given credit for both of these. The Army is entirely too big a force, and distributed too widely, too ever be concerned with one individual battle by one individual division-even though that division will note the event. That battle being just one of many collective battle streamers on their Army Division and Regimental Standard. For proof: This book subject and the latest book from Army Historians just published in 1990: "Ebb & Flow." (prior to 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division Operational Orders (OPN O) #23 & #24 being declassified, as copied from the National Archives, 1991.) This latest book covers that time frame between November '50 and July '51, we still have two years to report. That is two years lost to history: The Marine Corps, "single *division* history" written in 1957. General Smith's remarks stand alone in the history of Korea, they reflect his contempt for the army forces fighting there; it show through his remarks about "Army Jokers" his very reference to some survivors of Task Force Faith, implying his expertise as a medical expert to judge their medical condition for evacuation. However, Smith would also be critical of those men from his own division, as covered in later pages. Still he was not alone in this respect, as some top army echelon officers will also criticize the army forces, encircled at Chosin Reservoir in North Korea, and systematical annihilated there, although these very officers were the very ones sending these men into that trap set by Chinese Forces, further sealing their fate by allowing the removal of their rear Tank command, thus severing their line of retreat eight miles to the rear! That betrayal and silence, by those officers still haunt that reservoir campaign until this day.

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<sup>17</sup> Stolen Valor: How the Vietnam Generation Was Robbed of Its Heroes and Its History: BG Burkett, Glenna Whitley: Books.

<sup>18</sup> General Almond narrows the Marine zone by realigning their zone "North of Hagaru-ri" and reducing their zone east of the reservoir: As that Blood Chilling Clone Copy at Seoul—two months later in North Korea with dire results!

The Marine Corps remains under the Department of the Navy, therefore its budget for men and equipment is appropriated through that department, so that one and only division could be better inventoried at any given time through their G-1 and G-4 section. Still the Navy will record different figures than the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division over the latter non-battle casualties (NBC) suffered at Chosin, that they exceed those related to the total battle casualties in all categories listed as KIA's, MIA's, POW's, and DOW's! Remember this fact; the Army had to maintain all foreign United Nations forces in Korea, a total of 22 Nations, as well as those complete Republic of Korea (ROK) units in all things required. The Army task overlapping even those in the marine division itself; i.e. X Corps supply of Army maps, as the Navy used Nautical Miles; rather than Army standard scales! Smith will object to those scales used by X Corps over his own maps-in his complaint letter to his Marine Commandant Clifford Cates-November 15, 1950. While one may state "Army Jokers" was only a figure of speech—it must be considered and placed in context of the battle those men survived. The fact that General Smith left his main garrison at Hagaru-ri intentionally so weak, and thus burdened by these returning army wounded from the east side of the reservoir, as those men reached his garrison through friendly fire and napalm drops, escaping over the frozen reservoir, were now an overburden force to his center hub at Hagaru-ri. Review the battle casualties, for that battle-as will become redundant throughout this book; this was by no means; a joking matter. The returning wounded over 1,400 now requires immediate evacuation from the air strip at Hagaru-ri. It is understandable about Smith's concern, his marine regiments' having delayed his, and General Almond's earlier orders to return to Hagaru, was still out there somewhere, and Smith has no idea of when they will arrive, but it was General Smith, that had left his command post weak and he was now reaping what he had sown.

General Smith's recorded earlier remarks around Seoul-about Yong'dung-po, "O.P Smith, with typical Marine pride, blamed the annoying delays on the fact that the quality of the 7th Division was in no way comparable to that of the First Marine Division."<sup>19</sup>[2] GOD; One could only hope that were true, that they were "*at least*" a little better, than a division with some 8,000 plus untrained ROK's "attached". This merely a rerun of a WWII event and Holland M. Smith' USMC, complaint at Makin and Saipan, and his justification to have the army commander replaced over his delay in keeping his front line advancing at the pace he demanded! In each case one could wonder the motive for being more defensive, rather than consider the standard tactical excuse; "the terrain" and "enemy resistance" as slowing the advance. Yet, each commander-Holland Smith and Oliver Smith would consistently feel the need to point out army failures, to the press. While Colonel Puller would threaten friendly fire on Army forces! One could only wonder why that would be required. Why would General Smith feel so insecure about his own "reinforced" division? Was the press biased toward the Marines? Hold that thought until you have read the facts from this author in; "What history failed to record" in the upcoming Chosin Drama. You may then form a truly different slant or picture of reality.

Prior to the Inchon landing General MacArthur made this statement about the coming invasion: "All over the ship the tension that had been slowly building up since our departure was now approaching its climax. Even the Yellow Sea rushing past the ship's sides seemed to bespeak the urgency of the mission. That night about half past two, I took a turn around the deck. The ship was blacked out from stem to stern. At their posts and battle stations the crew members were alert and silent, no longer exchanging the customary banter. At the bow I stood listing to the rush of the sea and watched the fiery sparkles of phosphorescence as the dark ship plowed toward the target, the armada of other craft converging on the same area, all now past the point of no return. Within five hours, 40,000 men would

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<sup>19</sup> Clay Blair: The Forgotten War p. 277.



act boldly, in the hope that 100,000 others manning the thin defense line in South Korea would not die, I alone was responsible for tomorrow, and if I failed, the dreadful results would rest on judgment day against my soul."<sup>20</sup>

After assembly at Yokohama harbor and boarding of ships, the Navy drops anchor outside of port to await the invasion force for Inchon to join in its convoy. My section will sleep on the weather deck with blackout conditions in affect. We would sail for Inchon harbor. The marine landing on 15th of September with two regiments of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division to follow a few days later, out loading from ship required a long road march toward Suwon, our objective twenty miles south of Inchon. The mission assigned to the 31<sup>st</sup> Regiment, to capture the airstrip at Suwon. The road march was stifling hot and dusty as the rear tanks debarked and raced forward to catch up with the infantry troops. Those familiar smells-of the Japanese-use of human fertilizer everywhere, more pungent-in Korea-now after the ocean trip and the sea breezes, added to ones sight and those smells were bloated bodies littering the roadside, rotting and burning flesh, new sights and smells turning ones stomach, creating a foul taste in your mouth. The realization of combat hits you suddenly, this is for real. Burning buildings and huts create smoke to almost choke off ones breath, it is an overwhelming experience, one you realize must be put behind you, for this is only the first day and hours of each and more destruction to come in the months ahead. We would bivouac over night in a pepper patch, digging in for the night and seeking whatever rest one can get for the next days' advance on Suwon. But sleep is evasive as your mind reels to discredit what your eyes have just seen.

Our artillery truck column will form, as trucks become available with their attached howitzers that had been delayed for loading in Japan. We must seek out those belonging to our units, our wire supplies to be located to establish and setup switchboard and lines for telephone service between the fire direction center and the CP headquarters. Suwon was a walled city, the airstrip was secured without too much trouble, and our artillery would locate near the flat space along the runway. One pilot landing on the airstrip would erroneously pepper the field with .30 caliber ammo. Our commander was going to ream him a new one but the pilot happened to be a full bird, a rank over our commander, no one was hurt, and no more was made of it. This only to recall the RCT-31 (Regimental Combat Team) first event with friendly fire —there would be more accurate on target drops in store for this force, at Chosin. Rapid link-up would complete the action as the 1st Cavalry Division moved northwest out of the Pusan perimeter to link up with our forces at Osan. Some friction would develop here as well over harassing fire missions. 1st Cavalry to 7th Division, "What the hell are you guys firing at?" And the reply, "we're firing harassing missions to keep the enemy on edge."The veteran 1st Cavalry brass didn't take kindly to that explanation, stating that they "had traveled at rapid speed to get here, they were tired and needed rest, the one thing they didn't need was a harassing mission from our very own artillery."<sup>21</sup> Those firing missions were aborted.

Once this area was secured, the 1st Cavalry would continue forward under orders from General Walker, here Eighth Army had been bearing the whole burden of the fighting, for three long months of battle. The fresh troops were in X Corps- now an illogical order would foul-up the next movement. President Syngman Rhee will reestablish his government in Seoul, and would immediately authorize his ROK forces to be in hot pursuit of the North Koreans fleeing north of the 38th Parallel; the battle for North Korea would begin. Here some reason should have prevailed, what was the hurry? Unlike

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<sup>20</sup> MacArthur: Reminiscences, p.400-401.

<sup>21</sup> Personal conversation heard over switchboard by this author on duty at the time.

our rush into this Conflict/War; there was no immediate need to cross the parallel, as it was proven a delay of two weeks before our forces would follow, we could have allowed supplies and orientation of the North Korean country to be studied, but that did not happen, and we in haste would suffered the results.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division will be pulled out of Korea the same way they entered—through Inchon harbor—via ships, then out to sea. Given the tide time tables for the use of the port of Inchon, those ships previously mired in the mud flats by low tide were now afloat due to the return incoming tide. Now as supplies were required to support Eighth Army, the harbor again becomes a depot and a combination dock facility at Inchon. Eighth Army, General Walker was not pleased with the limited dock facilities, some priorities were required as to what was important. Was it to be the marine division troops leaving; are incoming ammo and supplies arriving to sustain the war effort? General Walker was still in charge of those ROK's moving into North Korea. Apparently some balance was worked out, but Eighth Army would be slightly pissed about their supplies being interfered with due to the marine tie up at Inchon. It was here that General Walker will coin his phrase about X Corps being; "MacArthur's Pets." In all hindsight, it would have been better here to have shipped the marines out of the area all together. Indeed the Navy may well have done that since once at sea they had control over this division, and the decision to retain them rests with them, and the action and the eventual withdrawal of this division—as first in line—to leave North Korea to South Korea was their decision as well! This would not hinder the 7<sup>th</sup> Division amphibious landing as it was already changed and separated from landing behind the marine division at Wonsan as originally planned! The 7<sup>th</sup> Division now scheduled to land over one hundred miles future north of the 1st Marine Division, at Iwon.

But all of this was of no big concern to the 7<sup>th</sup> Division, what the marine division was doing was none of our business, we had our own problems, instead of remaining in place or moving forward we now receive orders to form another road march southeast towards Pusan, via a truck convoy from Seoul, the 32<sup>nd</sup> Regiment and the 17<sup>th</sup> Regiment coming through Suwon, consolidated the division and was heading south through Taegu to Pusan, the very same road that Eighth Army had just traveled, over 350 miles by road. The division would side track to the ocean, all troops ordered in the water to bathe, wash dust out of uniforms, which we had accumulated over two week of it.

At Pusan we bivouac and await further orders –rumors were rampant of our returning to Japan, as South Korea was secure, its government back in power. As far as we were concerned this war was over! We could honor our dead; those occupation troops that had their enlistment date extended for an extra (Truman) year could now perhaps return to the states. But such was never in the cards; the deck was being reshuffled while we waited. So we waited; trained and accumulated supplies, but no winter gear as yet, it was mid October, not cold yet but the sea breezes were beginning to cool off the nights. We were again in a pepper path and some dried out rice paddies around the Pusan area. The interval between October 8th and the 26th, that lull in battle, X Corps could have and should have been used constructively to seek information on our lost or missing in action forces. The 7<sup>th</sup> Division as structured with the many ROK's could have been utilized and of immeasurable value to search the country side for those lost Americans. Small units could have been disbursed with those South Koreans as interpreters to check out those areas fought over prior to their withdrawal into this Pusan perimeter. Our units were in the Osan area, that area of Task Force Smith's first battle, the very same area of General William Dean's disappearance, and his withdrawal from Taejon with the rest of the 24<sup>th</sup>

Division, those men lost there could have perhaps been accounted for, had they been sought out. But, again, that did not happen.

Yet our division bivouacked in those dried out pepper patches around Pusan, while those MIA's were never located. Instead we would board ships—staying docked, with cramped conditions, and boredom and nervous energy for some nine days. The urgency to invade North Korea of prime concern, but in reality having no urgency at all—and history would record the total loss of numerous casualties, KIA'S, MIA'S, and POW'S, for the South Korean action. This should have been a strong requirement on the South Korean government newly reestablished in Seoul, to seek information on all MIA'S, American as well as their own. Yet, the prime concern was to pursue the North Korean Army—now decimated—across the parallel. Their independent action to do that had not been sanctioned at that time by the United Nations, the outstanding fact that South Korea was never a member of that world body. Their disregard of that world body and its set military commitment to them should have been under the command of MacArthur and weighed as to the effects of that invasion of North Korea. After all, this just gave credence to the initial propaganda claim—that South Korea had invaded North Korea first on June 25th, 1950. The reality, in that claim that North Korea could not explain how the defending army got so deep into the invading army's territory in such a short time. But these are things that might have been and never were reality. Again here using some hindsight, again which has no merit?

So the results; our forces were scattered, the Eighth Army changing places with X Corps. Walker is now on the 38th Parallel, awaiting full control of both his Eighth Army forces and X Corps, as MacArthur (CINCFE) had promised. Now X Corps 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division is half out into the Yellow Sea; as the 7<sup>th</sup> Division was in-route, from the eastern Inchon landing, heading to Pusan, around that Sea of Japan port to await the next command for movement, whether it was back to Japan or into North Korea, we as the ground force, had no idea. We were merely pawns in this “Greatest of all games man plays-war itself” to be moved as X Corps G-3 staff was ordered to move us. So we waited and checked and rechecked our weapons, as boredom was increasing. The NCO's having more duties of minor detail, trips to supply points with work details to pick up various items; food and clothing, extra telephone units, reels of wire, at least it broke the boredom, that monotony of the daily routine-hurry up and wait. So we waited and waited, with no word of our coming adventure, and that RCT-31, pending disaster.

We were ready to return to Japan. Our little taste of combat had made us all official combat veterans; that being enough to leave a foul after taste in your mouth and debunk the stories of glory in battle. Only a true idiot could crave more of this carnage that is labeled as war. But whatever it was, more of it was in store for all the American forces located in South Korea but poised to cross over that line into North Korea. That nervous energy may have been only a premonition of doom yet to surface.

During our stay in and around Pusan, those that were there will recall that asinine dispute about "The FREE BEER issue" that we were more drunkards than fighters. The press corps had reported that free beer was being given to the forces in Korea, at least it would have been rationed if it were true, maybe, and it was to substitute for ammo shipments. I just throw it out there to reminisce, recall events of that parallel “good life” transferred with the occupation force from Japan into all parts of Korea.

-TOWARD CHOSIN -

However, before we can get the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry Regiment to Chosin Reservoir in North Korea, we should follow its history, its journey to the ranks of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division. Their story for my purpose begins on December 8, 1941, in the Philippines. The Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor one day before, (American time) America was officially at war in the Pacific region. It was at that point in time the one and only war we had going for us, and it was in the Pacific. It was at this place that an official army garrison would be openly attacked by the Japanese. American sons and daughters, military as well as civilian have been killed. Our forces in the Philippines were trapped, attacked outside the continental limits of the United States. America was at war in the Pacific-yet would not truly admit it on December 8, 1941, while that Declaration of War against Japan will be declared, at a *rare* Joint Session of Congress, there was never one declared against Germany!

Here, "First Blood" would be drawn for the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry Regiment, at this very first face-to-face battle, with the enemy on the ground. Still one battle that will re-echo: some 8 years later in North Korea. Both would be: The wrong war, location wise; at the wrong time; at the wrong place, not Europe. Thus history records; the fate of these men, nurses, American civilians and dependents trapped on these islands throughout the Pacific region. There were Army & Marine forces trapped in the Philippines, and marine forces stranded on Wake Island and Guam. Both of these and others would fight delaying actions with whatever amount of equipment, ammo, and food available, but in the end; defeat and reluctant surrender to the enemy: Those living forces becoming prisoners of war. This very first day of the ground war would place it second in line to Europe, as regards to troops, planes, ships, and all other supplies necessary to wage this war. The Pacific War was therefore secondary and budgeted in importance to that other war in Europe. That is the way it was; and that is the way history records it! Let me state here, that I have no intention whatsoever of trying to change or rewrite history, indeed I am going to rely heavily on its reports to present my point of view, for history provides hindsight as well as insight.

#### -HISTORY OF THE 31<sup>st</sup> REGIMENT -

It was organized on August 13, 1916, when components of the 8<sup>th</sup>, 13<sup>th</sup>, and 15<sup>th</sup> Infantry's were united in the Philippines. It had been called the Foreign Legion of the United States Army as it had never served, in nor been stationed in the continental limits of the United States.

Prior to this time; this regiment's first combat mission during World War I in 1918 was when the 31<sup>st</sup> Regiment together with the 27<sup>th</sup> Infantry was ordered to Siberia. For two years it struggled successfully in keeping the Trans-Siberian Railroad in operation fighting off attempts by revolutionary bands to block it. From this duty they gained their first battle streamer and their nick name: THE POLAR BEARS. In 1920, they returned to the Philippines. In 1923: Sent to Tokyo to assist in earthquake relief work. In 1932, Trouble between Japan and China in Shanghai, the 31<sup>st</sup> was assigned the mission of protecting the government and the lives and property of United States citizens there.

In 1941 they returned back to the Philippines. On December 7, the Empire of Japan bombed Pearl Harbor. The 31<sup>st</sup> rolled northward out of Manila to meet the aggressor at Lingayen. Being outnumbered outgunned and suffering from a lack of air power, the American and Filipino Army fought a grim battle at Lingayen beaches. Without hope of reinforcements, the 31<sup>st</sup> fought a bloody withdrawal which led them southward through San Miguel, then to Galumpti where they destroyed all bridges and stalled General Homma, allowing the American-Filipino force to reach the last ditch; Bataan. Here they would face their supreme test, fighting until it was practically annihilated. When it

became apparent that capture was inevitable, Captain George A. Sansep burned the colors and standards to keep them from falling into enemy hands. Here the famous "Shanghai Bowl" a prize possession, made in 1925 in Shanghai of some 1,500 Chinese silver dollars and inscribed with the names of the regimental, officers would be buried on Corregidor. The survivors were forced to take part in that infamous "Death March". —For their gallant stand the regiment was awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation, and two Oak Leaf Clusters.

In January 1946, the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry Regiment was returned to the ranks of the United States Army as part of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division, already in Korea. For two and a half years, the Polar Bears guarded the eastern half of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel. The "Shanghai Bowl" would be recovered and returned at that time. In the latter part of 1948, the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry Regiment left Korea to occupy the northern island of Hokkaido. Here it was joined—from the main island of Honshu—by the 57<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery Battalion, as support for their Regimental Combat Team. A battalion from each of these two units, plus one battalion from the 32<sup>nd</sup> Infantry would within two years relive a smaller scale, "Death March" between Sinhung-ni and Hagaru-ri in those high mountains of North Korea. There the game would again be played out, the final roll of the dice. The number "7" would lose, big time over 2,500 of its prime chip's.

But in spite of that loss, they had not let the division down in North Korea. For as had been written in their history, in 1948, "The 7<sup>th</sup> Division in Korea" - "No division in history of the United States Army had been called upon to perform so many missions under such varied terrain and weather conditions as the Seventh Division. They traveled further than any other division in any war, covering a total of 16,910 miles from May 1943 to September 1945."<sup>22</sup>

The division forces in North Korea had kept their record intact, adding two more amphibious landings to the many of World War II. One north and another south, the division had traveled further again than any other in the Korean War. It had traveled from the furthest island in Japan, Hokkaido, to the furthest point reached in all of Korea, the Yalu River. Landing at Inchon and then proceeding to Seoul, by road to Pusan, by sea to Iwon in North Korea. Again from North Korea back to South Korea. The first unit of X Corps back on line in spite of the heavy loss at Chosin. Combined again with the full division and being one of the last units on line fighting at Pork Chop Hill, and Old Baldy when the armistice was declared in July 1953.

And the most important point of all: a source of pride, exclusive to the 7<sup>th</sup> Division in X Corps, obtaining every objective assigned without delay, before the Chinese offensive began on November 27, 1950. The only American division to reach the Yalu at two points on November 21st by the 17<sup>th</sup> Regiment, and the 32<sup>nd</sup> Regiment—Task Force Kingston reaching the Yalu on the 28th, at Singalpajin. And there is pride and some glory in that feat, even some arrogance in its final attempt to expend its force-chips- in an entrapment and breakout attempt from East of Chosin by Task Force MacLean - Faith; isolated and alone, with only empty rifles and a slick road ahead between Chosin Reservoir and Hagaru, some twelve miles. In the end its actions proved to be a safety relief valve in the defense of Hagaru, taking the blunt of the attack from those Chinese forces massed at Kanggye and Changjin just miles ahead of our position East Of Chosin; a foreign element of the US Army once again.

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<sup>22</sup> 7th Infantry Division History Book, concerning the occupation of the division in its early 1945 liberation of South Korea, and its relocation to Japan in late 1948.

As one past commander would state, "I think this is one of the best divisions in the United States Army. It can do more different things than any other I know,"<sup>23</sup> And that was true in North Korea, as well as South Korea, for no other division was required to inter-depend upon so many ROK's integrated within a division, to train, equip, clothe and feed and obtain an assigned objective with them "attached." We were required under the "Buddy System" to work with over 8,000 of them. A heavy burden indeed, for this division; would be one-third ROK's when the division returned back to Korea; bringing them along from Japan. In the Chosin Campaign we will have 38% of them "attached" to RCT-31 another fact that history failed to record as well.

#### - A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DIVISION-

It was activated on December 6, 1917 at Camp Wheeler, Georgia. It went overseas in August 1918, taking part in the Second Army offensive, including Penny Ridge Attack on November 10, 1918. It returned home in 1919 and was disbanded in 1923. It was reactivated in July of 1940 being quartered at Fort Ord, California. Upon the attack at Pearl Harbor, it was immediately moved into defensive positions along the California coast line. On May 11, 1943, the division landed the first wave in the battle for Attu. During the next three weeks the division engaged in bitter fighting against the Japanese. Such names as Massacre Bay, Holtz Bay and Chichagoff Harbor will be ever present in the division's history.

On May 30, 1943, the last Japanese counterattack was defeated and the 7<sup>th</sup> Division had captured Attu the first American territory lost in World War II. It next landed on Kiska in August 1943. In February of '44 the 7<sup>th</sup> attacked Kwajalein and after five days of fighting the 32<sup>nd</sup> and the 184<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiments killed every living enemy, save a few who surrendered. The 17<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment attacking the nearby island of Ebeye. Next, came the island of Leyte, where the division was engaged from October 20, 1944 until February 10, 1945, during the battle of Leyte the division fought over thirty-seven miles, patrolled 1,857 square miles, moving a total of 110 miles. The division then received four days rest before re-embarking for Okinawa. On April 1, '45, the division landed on Okinawa where it proved its ability to fight all day and take heavy artillery shelling all night. The bloody battle ended on June 21, '45. Just three days after V-J Day on September 5, 1945, the division set sail for Korea to receive the surrender of Japanese forces south of the 38th Parallel.

While the division had an impressive history in World War II, the present make up of the division with all those ROK'S, did or suit General Oliver P. Smith of the 1st Marine Division, —as our division activities surpassed those of his division in W.W.II. While his opinion of us was of no big concern of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division, for it was not his concern at that time, (only when the divisions would be required to engage the enemy in the same offensive) separate, there would be no problems. The 7<sup>th</sup> Division problems were unique to any other division, and only their "sole" responsibility to work through. (There being no manuals to rely on.) As I stated earlier: What was achieved, was achieved the hard way. We had to work the problem ourselves, sadly even through -some marine division- placed obstacles.

Before the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division arrived in North Korea to join with X Corps, on November 17, there were only two other American divisions in X Corps, the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Division. This created a very sticky situation for press coverage. Regrettably the glory stories, the headlines, who was to get them? While the 7<sup>th</sup> Division was moving fast covering more ground, defying the

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid

tactics of battle through use of task forces instead of full and complete regiments or battalions, the marine commander was upset, and in my opinion, it's commander was looking over his shoulder entirely too much, as too what the army forces were doing or not doing. In North Korea that was a wasted effort as we were always in front of him! He had one larger division-his own-to worry about; not the other six army divisions, they were not his and never his concern! Yet, his division once ashore, would count as X Corps responsibility, and there could be some overlap of duty by our division to move supplies into his division. But our losses rather in manpower, equipment, or lives lost were not his (administrative) responsibility. Unfortunately he would be compelled to commit and submit his views publicly about the "Quality" of his marines as compared to the 7<sup>th</sup> Division; and that was uncalled for, each man had their own job to do, each could lose his own life or limbs by doing that job. Part of the problem was the 31<sup>st</sup> Regiments fate in early World War II. But again that fate was inclusive of marine forces as well! Yet their service to our country outside of the country itself predated the 7<sup>th</sup> Division activation alone, as an infantry division by one full year.

While the 31<sup>st</sup> Regiment had contributed within their early history throughout the orient before the 7<sup>th</sup> Division was created, it was not entirely popular in army circles because of its defeat at Bataan. But its members and survivors had suffered in that "Death March" and the later years of captivity. But there could be no discrimination or shame on them, for their fate was the shame of the nation to shift from this area of battle. As at Chosin, whatever the diplomatic reasons, right or wrong, these men were abandoned. They had fought the good fight with all their might, with what ammo was allotted to them. In the condemnation of them, there is lost the time frame of their battles and their forces: Described later in the Chosin Drama. First we must reestablish them here in Korea as a fighting force.

At Inchon the planners of X Corps -as at Chosin later- were deprived of all three-under strength-regiments for deployment there. Here at Inchon the 17<sup>th</sup> Regiment was missing, being held as floating reserve between Inchon and Pusan, whoever, needed them the most they would be rushed in to support that area. Hence the 31<sup>st</sup> Regiment was designated as the reserve unit at Inchon. However, as the 32<sup>nd</sup> Regiment moves out towards Suwon, General Almond would replace their mission with the 31<sup>st</sup> Regiment, reversing the mission of the 32<sup>nd</sup>, which includes the 1/32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion; commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Don Carlos Faith Jr. to assist in the capture of Seoul. The 31<sup>st</sup> RCT, was now commanded by Colonel Richard P. Ovenshine, (West Point, 1910) he was 50 years old and by no means a favorite of Almond. The 31<sup>st</sup> at Suwon will have a serious threat from the NKPA. (North Korean People's Army) 105<sup>th</sup> Armored Division, two dozen tanks and other motorized elements. As their infantry was pulling back it struck the regiment head on during the night of September 24, with artillery support from the 57<sup>th</sup> and the addition of the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion 187<sup>th</sup> Airborne RCT, this area was secured. A push south of the 31<sup>st</sup> tanks and the 2/31 commanded by Robert R. Summers caught the NKPA in a double envelopment near the place where Task Force Smith's 1/21<sup>st</sup> Infantry (24<sup>th</sup> Division) had met the enemy on July 5, (His fireworks, on this American—4th of July—timeline) firing the first American shots of this war, regretfully suffering the first (of many thousand) American soldier killed in action: The first of many more thousands' to come. The 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry proudly claimed a stirring victory, they had returned to the army ranks as a fighting force, back from a defeat at Bataan, 14 tanks, several hundred NKPA troops killed. Osan was liberated and the Suwon-Osan highway was secured, but the cost was high, Commander Summers and the 31<sup>st</sup>, G-3, Lester K. Olson were seriously wounded and evacuated.

Colonel Ovenshine also will become a casualty, but of a different sort, he will receive a Silver Star from Almond before being sacked by him. (replaced-by Colonel Allan Duart MacLean) it was said here of Almond: “He had only slight regard for conventional doctrine governing the deployment of infantry divisions in a well integrated mass, too create task forces and to employ these as BCT (Battalion Combat Teams) or *mixed* RCT’s in independent and risky actions.” This as stated earlier was our burden to carry and work through as best we could. Those in the Army circle were not concerned in the least what the marines would do or how they were employed by their commander. Rather as task forces or RCT’s, rather marine or army. Each had his own mission to work through.

At Suwon the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry complete their race up from the Pusan perimeter to meet and link with us at Suwon, with much confusion while the 57<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery was firing missions at NKPA tanks, the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry was coming up immediately behind them. Word had reached us that they were on the way, but they had not been expected so soon. On September 27, that link-up of Eighth Army and X Corps would become “official” at Osan.

Within a week the 38th Parallel was declared in friendly hands and secure. The war was over pending further developments; those would develop immediately! The race to the Yalu in North Korea was underway.

To all those 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division veterans of its campaigning; I salute you for your service and sacrifice—through the hardships and scars of battle and days of mental anguish—and lastly of those sharing the frozen areas common within the history of this division. I praise your valor, your integrity, and above all, your humility; —for over fifty years to let others “claim the fame” that rightfully belongs to you. Since time dictates, I will soon join your rank, of those to be included with those long lost in battle. I hope my effort will not diminish but merely explain some of the oversight of your efforts through this later event in North Korea.



### -Chapter 3-

#### *The United Nations Resolution of 7 October*

The Departments of State and Defense agreed that if North Korea collapsed and its Russian and Chinese neighbors kept hands off, MacArthur should occupy North Korea under the auspices of the United Nations. Some officials favored a unilateral occupation by the United States if the United Nations took no new steps authorizing occupation, "even at the expense of some disagreement with friendly United Nations." But this was decidedly a minority view.

In late September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sent MacArthur a State Department opinion which held, "It will be necessary to consult with and obtain the approval of United Nations members before the United Nations commander can be authorized to undertake the occupation of North Korea." The State Department proposed that MacArthur send mainly South Korean and other Asian troops to occupy only key points in North Korea. U. S. troops would leave Korea as early as possible. There would be no revenge or reprisal in the occupation. "The general posture of United Nations forces should be one of liberation rather than retaliation," State Department authorities believed, and General MacArthur agreed and told the Joint Chiefs, "The suggested program from the standpoint of the field commander seems entirely feasible and practicable."<sup>24</sup>

In the meantime, President Rhee has released his ROK forces from MacArthur's command and ordered them in hot pursuit after the North Korean army. But the newly reinstated government of South Korea has no immediate back-up forces to support such an offensive. Pending a complete victory, Rhee's forces could suffer a severe setback or worse, a complete disaster. The two ROK divisions on the east coast moved at rapid speed, into North Korea, but the old adage of "haste makes waste" was at work here.

In all reality if the last six months had not qualified as a Civil War between the Northern and the Southern forces of Korea, this could certainly qualify as one! What President Rhee has done was merely place the United Nations in an awkward situation. After passing large numbers of enemy forces in the eastern coastal mountains, those forces turned to guerrilla warfare and annoying attacks. Having no direct military connection, these newly formed guerrilla bands will now had to be routed out by many patrols within the 7th Division area of operations and were always a constant threat to road-bound troops, supply trucks, wire repair line crews, and messengers between group areas. The 1st Marine Regiment would suffer an embarrassing event by those by passed forces at Kojo in North Korea as well. In a reply to Walker's request, and concern over his responsibility for logistical support of these South Korean (ROK) divisions; and too what authority and control he has over these ROK forces, he was informed from GHQ in Tokyo, "They are to be considered as members of the team and working with the team in whatever area they may be employed." On the 11th of October, the ROKs captured Wonsan, still supplied by Eighth Army. General Walker flew into the city the same day it was captured. These ROK's seemed in a position to carry out the entire original mission assigned to X-Corps. By advancing from Wonsan to the Pyongyang axis, they could link with Eighth Army, (if that was, the yet to be; new plan approved by the UN resolution, thereby sealing off North Korea to this line.) Here was the origin of a fateful mistake by CINCFE to deny the most senior commander in the field the authority to be in command of the entire operation—and correct the mistakes made in South

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<sup>24</sup> Policy and Direction: The First Year. CMH: [p. 193] (1) Rad, JCS 92608, JCS to CINCFE, 26 Sep. 50. (2) Rad, CM-IN 15683, CINCFE to JCS, 26 Sep. 50.

Korea by separation of operations! X Corps was now disconnected and separated far from the 38th Parallel where all of these problems had ignited this conflict in the first place.

However, the ROK success has already caused MacArthur to change the employment of X Corps. He directed the planners to re-route the Marines to a landing at Hungnam. This plan was ready on October 8. [Never carried out—at Wonsan—until 26 October] Admiral Joy strongly opposed this change because it would split the two forces. Here is the origin of an upcoming situation concerning Admiral Joy, getting the Navy involved in Army affairs; (“*for the purpose of advising and assisting-Admiral Joy, with particular emphasis on Marine Corps matters*”) the splitting up of a marine division! There was also less time for naval planning, and both harbors could not be cleared of mines in record time. Admiral Joy missing his own opportunity to delay the entire X Corps landing dates in North Korea beyond the original date set for 20 October. His landing now delayed; MacArthur reverted back to the original plan, to land the marines at Wonsan, now delayed by nine days. Since General Walker now has his (prior) Eighth Army ROK’s already operating in the Wonsan area, he put forth his own plans, thereby establishing his own authority over these ROK’s already at Wonsan. “It is vital to provide for the supply of five divisions of the ROK Army through the port of Wonsan.” But MacArthur was to make it crystal clear to Walker that Eighth Army was not going to expand its mission. “Wonsan port facilities will be secured and utilized for operations of X-Corps in accordance with the United Nations Command Operations Order No. 2.” MacArthur then reassigned the previously assigned ROK divisions from Walker’s Eighth Army to Almond’s X Corps. Thus Almond has gained a two to one advantage over Walker’s supply line, as he has a shorter route from the Sea of Japan for his supplies while Walker’s larger force of Eighth Army is required to move his supplies from Inchon, or through the Yellow Sea with shallow depth for incoming ships. Most of MacArthur's principal GHQ staff officers had assumed, before seeing the new plans, that the UNC commander intended to place the X Corps under General Walker after Seoul was returned to ROK control. MacArthur had created the X Corps specifically for the landing at Inch'on, had tailored it hurriedly, and had taken its key officers from his own staff. As the corps completed its mission in late September, it could logically be assumed that the combat elements of the corps would be assimilated by the Eighth Army and that MacArthur’s key officers would return to GHQ and their normal duties. Generals Hickey and Wright advised General MacArthur to follow this course; Maj. Gen. George L. Eberle, MacArthur's G-4, also strongly favored Walker's taking over the X Corps; and General Almond had always understood “that when the Inchon operation was completed that the X Corps troops would be absorbed by Eighth Army....”<sup>25</sup> Subsequently, General MacArthur could not believe that these officers really disagreed with his decision!

"In order to exploit to the maximum all forces under CINCUNC [Commander in Chief, United Nations Command] and to implement the full concept of operations..... X Corps, operating as an independent Corps of GHQ Reserve, will, effective at 1200 hours, 20 October 1950, and until further orders, assume operational control of all UN and ROK ground forces operating north of 39 degrees and 10 minutes north." –MacArthur.

General Walker and the Eighth Army staff apparently felt very strongly that the X Corps should become part of the Eighth Army. Walker seems to have had two plans in mind for the possible employment of Almond's forces. In one of these, the X Corps would drive overland from Seoul to seize P'yongyang, and the rest of the Eighth Army, after coming up behind the X Corps, would then

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<sup>25</sup> Policy and Direction: The First Year. CMH: [p. 189]

move laterally from P'yongyang to Wonsan on the east coast where it would join the ROK I Corps as the latter moved up the east coast. Such a maneuver might save a great deal of time, since the X Corps was already in position to advance on P'yongyang, and would establish a line across Korea at the narrow waist that could cut off a large number of North Koreans still trying to move northward through the central and eastern mountains. [This strategy could well have allowed the United Nations to consider this choke line as a means of stopping hostilities here, above the 38th Parallel and providing a bargaining chip to the North Korean Government to agree to terms to settle for what they originally had, a face saving solution for both sides!] Meanwhile, the X Corps could move on above P'yongyang toward the Yalu River. The operations of both the X Corps and the Eighth Army could be coordinated under Walker's command; and both could be supplied from Pusan and Inch'on until the Wonsan area fell, at which time the forces operating in the east could be supplied by sea through Wonsan and Hungnam, farther north." The importance of Walker plan, the time lag would be diminished, and no amphibious landings would be required, thus the delay for X Corps as the fresher forces from Japan could ease the combat fatigue suffered by Eighth Army forces. General Walker's second plan was to approach Wonsan by a more direct, diagonal route. Assuming that the X Corps became a part of the Eighth Army, Walker would, in this instance, send a corps to the east coast objective through the Seoul—Ch'orwon—Wonsan corridor. However the reality to Walker's plans were already superseded by the rush to return the marine force to sea at Inchon and the 7<sup>th</sup> Division to relocated by road over three hundred miles to Pusan to also load on ships to await further orders from MacArthur.

If these were the plans Walker had in mind, he did not ask authority to carry out either of them. Apparently unaware of what Almond's plans were, and uninformed as to what MacArthur planned for X Corps, General Walker contented himself with asking General MacArthur discreetly that he be let in on what was going on: "To facilitate advance planning for the approaching juncture with the X Corps, request this headquarters be kept informed of the plans and progress of this Corps to the greatest extent practicable. To date the X Corps operations plans have not been received."<sup>26</sup> General MacArthur told Walker that as soon as X Corps had completed its CHROMITE missions, he would place it in GHQ Reserve in the Inch'on—Seoul area and that he, MacArthur, would direct its future operations. These operations would be revealed to the Eighth Army commander at an early date. MacArthur, in fact, consulted neither Walker nor Almond on the next operation until the plan was almost in final form. But MacArthur would separate and split the X Corps primary divisions of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division from the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division by sending the marines out to sea and the 7<sup>th</sup> Division on the road to Pusan, as reminiscent of a reverse duplication in the upcoming battle of the Changjin Reservoir. Result: The X Corps was removed completely from the Seoul area! Thus what history failed to record, was the reliability of MacArthur's word to Walker as to the location and intention for his X Corps forces after securing the Inch'on—Seoul area, a pattern and thread that will carry through the reservoir campaign as well!

MacArthur's guidance to his GHQ planners was tantamount to an order *that they recommend* another amphibious operation by the X Corps. While MacArthur did not specify that the X Corps would make the amphibious landing, no other element of the United Nations Command could have carried out the maneuver. Also, General MacArthur had been most favorably impressed by Almond's performance at Inch'on and by the over-all results of his operations. Furthermore, he saw amphibious maneuver as the best means of slashing deep into North Korea, of cutting off escape routes for thousands of fleeing

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<sup>26</sup> Policy And Direction, The First Year. Schnabel: p. 190. [38] [38] Rad, G 25090 KGO, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 26 Sep. 50.

enemy soldiers, and of seizing a major port to support his troops. [But the real question would be, where else could those enemy soldiers go except into China, or Russia?] This last-named purpose was perhaps uppermost in his thinking. Ammunition, food, gasoline, and most other supplies that kept the UNC divisions fighting in late September came into Korea through two ports, Pusan and Inch'on. As troops moved farther north, Pusan's value dwindled, since the rail lines and roads over which materiel had to be brought from the port to the combat units had been severely damaged in the earlier heavy fighting. The other port, Inch'on, had a limited capacity for receiving vessels and could scarcely have supported, with its facilities, all U.N. forces involved in the fighting."<sup>27</sup> General Wright points out in this connection. "Inchon was not capable of fully supplying Eighth Army and I think a logistical check will show that, temporary handicap to Eighth Army as it was, the movement out of X Corps enabled Eighth Army to provide itself with the logistic capability to perform its advance to the Pyongyang area." The two points totally lost in all of this was the relocation of the X Corps forces. One; they were by far the fresher of the two forces between Eighth Army and the ROK divisions on line and continuous in battle since the beginning of the invasion-Eighth Army remaining engaged since Task Force Smith fired their first shots at the enemy on 5 July (4 July American) and to continue the attack into North Korea was unrealistic to continue with little rest from combat. Two; Walker was deprived of incoming supplies as the priority to the port of Inchon was given to evacuation of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, and the incoming 17<sup>th</sup> Regiment for the 7<sup>th</sup> Division. While the later claim to fame in North Korea would favor the marines as the ones in mortal danger from Chosin Reservoir totally ignored this fact; that the Eighth Army would have to return via road convoy back into South Korea, the same way they got there in the first place was totally ignored as any handicap to that Eighth Army force!

However, the two Wonsan and Hungnam ports available to Almond on the east coast greatly enhanced his direct sea route to supply X Corps while General Walker's North Korean west coast ports had shallow depth for his supply lanes. But with the addition of the Wonsan port facilities, MacArthur reasoned, two separate forces, coordinated and supported from Japan, could operate in Korea without impairing the effectiveness of either. MacArthur was wrong!

Walker had a greater burden of moving his supplies north of the 38th Parallel. Fighting under Patton's Army in Europe he was familiar with the "Red Ball Express" method used there to supply forces on line as rapidly as possible. This was an issue for the GHQ meeting in Tokyo, 28-29 November: General Walker had already suffered from Inchon port restrictions as the X Corps 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division was clogging the port to load on ships and out to sea, while the 7<sup>th</sup> Division was ordered to move over the reverse roadway Eighth Army has just traveled from Pusan northwest to Inchon. One could see why Walker would be irritated over movement of his weary forces on line for three months. The changing build up of CCF forces in front of Walker's Eighth Army required a greater "coordinated" effort between the two forces. Here starts the great divide for X Corps the fresher of the two forces to coordinate their individual efforts to help each other. The Navy historical opinion that "A single *service* history, was not possible" while supporting the Marine Corps "single *division* history," as not only possible, but fully supported by their Department Of The Navy, with their official departmental seal affixed to that marine "single *division* history" publication. That recorded history became the core source to dominate all of the Changjin history yet failed to include documentation on the Army units mixed with the Marine forces at Changjin. Neither does it validated any effort to honor their commitment as part of X Corps to assist Eighth Army while in North Korea! That was grossly self-serving and unfair to those Army units that suffered the majority of the casualties at the reservoir. As

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid

grossly unfair as this (upcoming) council of war, where no one other than Army officers were invited to comment on the issue of retrieving all units, regardless of their branch of service! After all it was the Navy, Merchant Marine and civilian ships lines that shipped all Army units of X Corps into North-and South Korea, and will ship them out again. The Air Force contribution of dropping needed supplies and evacuation of wounded to Japan was invaluable to the team effort. To isolate either group—and overhype one marine division was a tremendous oversight.

The statement by MacArthur that: “X Corps, [is] operating as an independent Corps of GHQ Reserve,” Question why is that, and what overriding military benefit or reason is attached to this organization, since GHQ is situated 700 miles from the battle zone and requires an emergency council of war at that HQ’s in Tokyo?

#### -Premature dreams of occupation duty.-

General MacArthur, as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, would carry out such missions and functions as became necessary to bring things to a satisfactory conclusion in Korea. The X Corps was named to stay in Korea for occupation duty. It would have one American division, plus all other U.N. units in Korea, ROK Army units, and KMAG. The U.N. units would be withdrawn progressively, with European units leaving first. Insofar as possible, no forces other than ROK would be stationed in South Korea. The Eighth Army headquarters, along with its original four American divisions, would return to Japan; and the 5th RCT would go back to Hawaii. Within Japan, after the return of the Eighth Army, the Northern and Southwestern Commands would be dissolved and their functions assumed by the Eighth Army. The Japan Logistical Command would be retained to perform all army logistic functions in Japan.

On the day the plan was issued, the GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary carried what it termed a "reliable report" that 400,000 Chinese Communist soldiers were in *border-crossing areas*, alerted to cross into North Korea. To detect any such crossings, the U.N. Command ordered daily air reconnaissance flights over the border area. (1) CINCFE Opn Plan No. 202, 20 Oct. 50, in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC files. (2) General Smith, the Marine division commander, gives some hint of the effect of this planning and what he calls the "end of the war atmosphere." He recalls, "On 21 October I received a dispatch from COMNAVFE stating that upon the conclusion of hostilities it was the intention to recommend to CINCFE that the 1st Marine Division, less one RCT, be returned to the United States. The RCT not returned to the United States would be billeted at Otsu, Japan. I was requested to comment. On 24 October, we learned that X Corps had received a document, for planning purposes only, to the effect that the present Corps commander would become Commander of the Occupation Forces. [Almond] One American division, probably the 3d Infantry Division, would remain in Korea as part of the Occupation Forces." Under this plan the Eighth Army would return to Japan. The receipt of information such as that cited above could not help but spread the impression that the war was about over. There was a noticeable let-down. [?] However, it was only a matter of days until the operations at Kojo brought home to us forcefully the fact that the war was not over. Talk of redeployment was never heard again." See General Smith's Chronicles, p. 403.<sup>28</sup> This incident was a total embarrassment to the marine division and was not general knowledge in recorded history, Its action reports while listed in

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<sup>28</sup> Policy and Direction: The First Year. CMH: [p. 221-223] The attack of North Korean forces by passed by the rapid advance of the ROK forces into North Korea left pockets of cut-off units to attack UN forces, as they sought to mop-up these areas to the rear. A section of the Marine RCT-1 was attacked as they took control of a ROK ammunition dump at KOJO. This created confusion and chaos with that Marine unit, forcing recall of the unit commanding officer!

marine literature exclusively, as one marine regiment criticized the other—this being Chesty Puller’s regiment involved. This unit meeting a North Korean unit bypassed and overlooked; by rapid advancing ROK forces. It included reports of “men killed while still in their sleeping bags.” This has credence too marine damage control to point their finger at a like Army event at Chosin-while distracting against it happening once again to their forces as well. There will be more of these like events as; I proceed to them and point them out, as one sided Marine damage control, to deflect an event with the implication it could never have happened to them!

This plan had scarcely reached the interested staff members of General MacArthur's headquarters when word from Washington disrupted its entire concept. On 21 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told General MacArthur that demands for American troops in other parts of the world were forcing them to withdraw the 2nd and 3rd U.S. Divisions from the Far East Command as soon as possible after fighting ended in Korea. Consequently, the forces to guard Japan and also to occupy Korea would have to come from the four divisions (1st Cavalry, 7th, 24th, and 25th Divisions) originally based in Japan. It was inconceivable and premature that a drawing down of forces would also highlight and occupy and change the plans, not only for ammunition and supplies but for replacement of daily casualties that were still occurring everyday with enemy forces and bands of guerilla fighters, hit and run tactics. The X Corps force have not landed yet or re-activated their “boots on the ground” offensive to capture the remaining North Korean forces! This relates back to MacArthur’s reassurance to President Truman that in his opinion the Chinese would not intervene in massive numbers to prevent a United Nations full scale victory in North Korea. The consensus of his GHQ, G-2 staff was that only Chinese “volunteers” were involved. A prime factor would be for the Navy to withdraw its one marine division, already on ships, moved from Inchon into the Sea of Japan now the closest force to Japan; at the very least back to Japan. The embarrassment to the marine “administration landing” at Wonsan was while a Bob Hope road show was already in progress making them the butt of Hope’s jokes to his guests at this show!

MacArthur had left the 14 October meeting with President Truman at Wake Island under the impression that the 3rd Division would be kept in Korea as part of the occupation force. But General Bradley had asked only that one division, either the 2nd or 3rd, be made available for Europe by January 1951, and MacArthur had recommended the 2nd. He therefore objected when he learned that the Joint Chiefs planned to take both divisions from him. He explained his understanding of the arrangements agreed upon at Wake Island, saying he was “. . . under the impression that this proposal had received approval of all concerned. I resubmit it at this time for your consideration.” [The confusion created over “verbal” agreements!] Per: Handwritten notes by the President, dated November 25, 1950, regarding the Wake Island Conference with General MacArthur. Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's files, page five: “He again said the Communist would not attack, that we had won the war and that we could send a Division “from Korea” in January 1951.”<sup>29</sup> While this Wake Island meeting was taking place the X Corps forces were out of action and displaced from the battlefield, the marines were aboard ships out to sea, steaming up and down the coast line as they dubbed operation YO-YO. Total time aboard ship 5 October-26 October: The 7<sup>th</sup> Division after a 350 mile road convoy to Pusan would board ship and wait for their orders, sailing 20 October [authors’ 20th Birthday] one hundred miles above that of the marine landing site at WONSAN to land at IWON. “Upon take-off at [Tokyo's] Haneda airport, [Far Eastern Commander General Douglas] MacArthur sat down on the arm of my seat and I heard, for the first time, directly from him, where we were headed.

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29 Wake Island Meeting, President Truman and General MacArthur; Online Documents, p. 5.

He appeared irked, disgusted, and at the same time somewhat uneasy [about the order to meet the President at Wake Island]. In the course of his exposition, he used such terms as "summoned for political reasons" and "not aware that I am still fighting a war." (*Ambassador to Korea John Muccio to John Wiltz, February 18, 1976: Miscellaneous Historical Documents Collection. Truman Library*) All that was lacking seemed to be—a minor matter of either a North Korean surrender, or a truce doctrine!

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had not hastily reached their decision to take both divisions. The American force in Western Europe badly needed strengthening; and on the basis of estimates from General MacArthur and other sources, they had concluded that the Far East Command would soon revert to its pre-Korean War status. Several logistic actions taken within the Far East Command indicate that the Department of the Army officials was not alone in foreseeing an early end to the fighting. On 22 October, General Walker requested authority from General MacArthur to divert to Japan all bulk-loaded ammunition ships arriving in Korea after 20 October. Ammunition already in Korea, Walker believed, could take care of the North Koreans and still leave a balance for post-hostilities requirements.<sup>30</sup> This was another fatal mistake as 25 November-10 December, massive air drops would be required to sustain all divisions on line and those packing units located in Japan, could not supply the increased daily tonnage requirement to adequately sustain all ammunition requests to various encircled forces, thus priorities would be required. Mixed with errors in drop zones, our forces would be short of the mixture of 40-mm and 50 caliber ammo, including drops of 105-mm shell erroneously dropped four miles south of Task Force Faith-at Hudong-ni. MacArthur granted this request and ordered Japan Logistical Command to take the necessary actions. In the same vein General Weible, commander of Japan Logistical Command, asked MacArthur to authorize the return to the United States of six ships loaded with 105-mm. and 155-mm. artillery ammunition and aerial bombs. Both General MacArthur and General Stratemyer (prematurely) agreed that this ammunition was in excess of the needs of the Korean theater in view of the existing tactical situation. MacArthur, on the other hand, felt it would be highly desirable to have a reserve stock of ammunition placed at Hawaii for use in the event of another emergency and asked the Department of the Army at least to consider diverting these ammunition ships to Hawaii before ordering them back to the United States.<sup>31</sup>

### *Eighth Army's Plans and Problems*

The temporary setbacks in early November did not alter MacArthur's plans. He continued to prepare for the northward advance in the face of proof that Chinese Communist forces had entered Korea. General Bolte had visited Korea just after, as he described it, "the Chinese had destroyed the 8th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team." He found General Walker apprehensive but confident over the ultimate outcome. Walker assured Bolte that he had no intention of going on the defensive and had withdrawn only as a temporary regrouping measure. Walker, at the time, was bringing up his IX Corps on the right of his I Corps in order to renew the attack in greater strength. [1] Walker intended to advance three corps abreast, with his United States, I Corps on the west, and the U.S. IX Corps in the center, and the ROK II Corps on the east. He had set D-day at 15 November and gives his army the

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30 This author finds this statement asinine and hard to believe from the Eighth Army commander, concerning the plans he had outlined earlier (in this chapter) for the ROK divisions, "he put forth his plans for Wonsan." "It is vital to provide for the supply of five divisions of the ROK Army through the port of Wonsan." Adds too his Army demands more-not less supplies merely to feed and update winter supplies, stoves, clothing, fuel etc. This before Walker's American forces crossed the 38th Parallel. The time lapse of only 15 days between 7&22 October seems suspect here. Review my highlighted sections above. It is equally hard to believe that MacArthur would approve this request. Better to have more ammo on line than a lack of it!

<sup>31</sup> Policy And Direction, The First Year; [Page 229]

mission to "attack to the north destroying enemy forces, and advance to the northern border of Korea in zone." [2]

Walker's main concern in preparing for the attack *lay in alleviating a shortage of supplies in his forward areas*. Since moving above P'yongyang, the Eighth Army had been supplied mainly by airlift. General Milburn, commanding the I Corps, told General Bolte that his corps was operating with only one day of fire and one and one-half days of POL in reserve. General Walker felt that he could not improve this dangerous situation in the face of the limited transportation, the poor roads, and the long distances involved, unless the Chinnamp'o port was in full operation.

[1] Memo, G-3 (Bolte) for CofS USA, 14 Nov. 50, sub: Visit of Gen. Bolte and Party to the Pacific Area, in G-3, DA file Pac, Case 8/2-[2] (1) EUSAK Opns Plan No. 14, 6 Nov. 50. (2) War Diary, EUSAK G-3 Sec, 6 Nov. 50.

General Bolte thought that the solution to these supply problems lay in greater effort by the Air Force. He pointed out that the Air Force was lifting 1,000 tons daily but could double this with more flight crews and better maintenance. "Cargo aircraft stand idle and supply is critical," Bolte complained to Washington, "Cannot this be remedied soonest? I emphatically recommend more help including triple crews immediately." [3]

In response to Bolte's question, General Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, stepped in and asked General Stratemeyer, the FEAF commander, if his command was supporting the Eighth Army to its fullest capability. MacArthur's air chief replied indignantly that his planes could do no more to step up airlift tonnage because the capacity of Korean airfields simply would not permit doubling airlift while at the same time rendering combat tactical air support. "General Bolte's statement re: the ground situation is quite correct," he asserted, "but his statements re Tunner's [CG FEAF Combat Cargo Command] are not quite so accurate. We could use much more airlift than is available, but Bolte's recommended solution of triple crews is an over-simplification." [4]

Reporting by teleconference to the Army chief of transportation on 9 November, the transportation officer of the Far East Command sketched the situation with regard to ports and lines of communication in Korea. Pusan was handling about 15,000 metric tons of supply daily and Inch'on about 8,000 metric tons. Chinnamp'o, a vital port since it was much closer to the front, had been opened for partial operation; but could handle only shallow-draft vessels. The port had not been completely mine swept, and the large tidal basin at the port had silted up considerably. Some LST's were being unloaded even though they rested on the bottom of the harbor at low tide. [5]

Rail lines were equally restrictive. Single-track bottlenecks and destroyed bridges materially reduced their capacity. The supply shortage remained serious, and General Walker decided to postpone his attack. On 14 November, General MacArthur's headquarters so notified the Department of the Army. [Of interest here is MacArthur's concern over General Walker's delay, still MacArthur will tolerate Almond's delay's-beginning the following day-after he approves two of three drafts to coordinate X Corps attack date with the final delay date via Walker on 24 November. Further MacArthur grants Almond an additional three day delay from 24 to 27 November-indeed hard to compute the CINCUNC logic, or reason concerning Almond's extended delays, while so critical of Walker's! Worst scenario MacArthur fails to support Walker's excuse to Washington as based on ignorance of his GHQ staff knowledge on Walker's logistic supplies. Addendum too this would be the haste and unprecedented



movement of the 7th Division and a disastrous time schedule that its leading RCT-31 could not possibly meet! When pressed for reasons, the Far East Command staff officers told their counterparts in Washington that the logistical estimate on which General Walker's decision was based was not available to GHQ. Meanwhile, Walker's forces took a few steps forward along the Ch'ongch'on River to positions they would use as a *line of departure* when they did reopen their general advance. The Eighth Army would need about 4,000 tons of supply per day in order to sustain the offensive northward. By 20 November, the efforts of all supply agencies began to pay off and achieved the required figure. General Walker, on 22 November, notified General MacArthur that the logistics problems in the forward area of the Eighth Army had been solved and that he could now support a renewed offensive.<sup>32</sup>

[3] Rad, CM-IN 8483, CINCFE (Bolte) to DA, 6 Nov. 50.

[4] (1) Rad, AFOOP-OD56864, CG USAF to CG FEAF, 10 Nov. 50. (2) Rad, AX 3359 B VCAP, CG FEAF to CG USAF, 12 Nov. 50.

[5] Telecon, TT 3992, DA to GHQ, 9 Nov. 50.

### -Then the reality of changing events alters all plans of occupation!-

General MacArthur called an emergency council of war in Tokyo on the night of 28 November. Generals Walker and Almond, hastily summoned from Korea, joined MacArthur, Hickey, Wright, Willoughby, and Whitney at MacArthur's American Embassy residence. What are lacking here were Admiral Joy, and General Stratemeyer, and the JSPOG Staff? Nevertheless, both, the Navy and Air Force, needed inclusion here. "MacArthur seems to have overestimated the power of his own command vis-à-vis the Chinese. Both the Eighth Army and the X Corps, he reasoned, were victorious, battle-tested military forces. His naval and air forces gave him complete control of the sea and air. Furthermore, Chinese troops, during World War II, had proven inferior to Japanese troops and thus, by inference, to American troops. A significant factor was MacArthur's belief that his air power could isolate the entire battlefield. MacArthur still persisted in this view on the eve of the attack to the Yalu. He announced on 24 November, "My air force for the past three weeks, in a sustained attack of model coordination and effectiveness, successfully interdicted enemy lines of support from the north so that further reinforcement there from has been sharply curtailed and essential supplies markedly limited." General Wright contends that this belief in the effectiveness of air power was one of General MacArthur's greatest weaknesses in dealing with the Chinese.<sup>33</sup> In all fairness here, what was lacking was that authority for the JSPOG staff, left unresolved by the National Security Act of 1947. The wisdom of that act by spinning off the Army Air Corps, to create a new Department of the Air Force, without defining their role-and the Navy role- as members of the JSPOG staff, left them out of the loop by the CINCFE, an old wound lingering from just two departmental agencies in WWII. The disputes between General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz were legendary!

But, from all indications, the overriding consideration in MacArthur's decision to push on to the Yalu was his firm conviction that his mission, "the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces," dictated his line of action, and could be accomplished only by an advance to the border. This mission, in spite of noticeable tendencies on the part of Washington toward its modification, was not altered, largely because of MacArthur's vehement protests during November. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff had told MacArthur on 8 November that "... this new situation indicates that your objective ... the destruction of the North Korean armed forces may have to be re-examined," MacArthur retorted in extremely

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<sup>32</sup> Policy and Direction, The First Year; [Page 258-259]

<sup>33</sup> Policy and Direction, The First Year; [Page 278-279] (A large portion of this chapter is from this source.)

strong terms that any course short of complete destruction of the enemy would be tantamount to abject surrender and a breaking of faith with the peoples of Asia. This paragraph connects to the next in Policy and Direction; its author-maybe attempting to justify MacArthur's military mission with the "breaking of faith with the peoples of Asia." is misdirected, in my opinion, Had MacArthur lost sight of who held the largest populace of Asian people in the Asia region?

"There is little doubt that MacArthur ardently believed in his mission and that he was more than willing to call what he regarded as a Chinese bluff in order to carry out that mission. He may well have recalled those tenets of American military doctrine which hold that "the mission is the basic factor in the commander's estimate," and that "to delay action in an emergency because of incomplete information shows a lack of energetic leadership, and may result in lost opportunities. The situation, at times, may require the taking of calculated risks." Here, is where MacArthur's personal ego soars to new heights! Here is where he locks horns with his Commander in Chief; President Harry S. Truman. MacArthur will remain on this downward spiral until the president sacks him on April 11, 1951. MacArthur was taking too much risk with the lives of the forces available to him. It was not so much that MacArthur wanted to win this one; but he could never fully understand the concept of operating under a new and "limited war" philosophy.

In a meeting which lasted from 2150, 28 November, until 0130, 29 November, the seven officers studied the possible countermoves in meeting the entry of the Chinese. MacArthur, feeling that above all else he must save his forces, finally ordered Walker to make withdrawals as necessary to keep the Chinese from outflanking him and directed Almond to maintain contact with the Chinese but to contract the X Corps into the Hamhung-Hungnam area. The result of this meeting seemed to accomplish nothing of value. The decisions still had to be made on the ground in North Korean bitter cold, not somewhere in Tokyo. Since the Eighth Army seemed in greater danger than Almond's corps, the main theme of the conference appears to have been "What can X Corps do to help Eighth Army?" When General Almond held that his first mission was to extricate the Marine and Army forces cut off in the Changjin Reservoir area, MacArthur agreed but asked Almond what he could do to relieve the Chinese pressure on Walker's right flank. Apparent as no answer was given it was a suggestion by General Wright, that Almond might send the U.S. 3rd Division west across the Taebaek mountain range to join Eighth Army and to attack Chinese forces moving in on Walker's right flank. Almond pointing out to Wright that the road across the Taebaek Range appeared on the map but was actually nonexistent, but this was merely recycling the same planning that has delayed Almond's action under three drafts since 15 November! General Wright ignoring his own input on placement of X Corps forces formulated by MacArthur's directive placing forces as directed under Opn O 7. Surely Wright should have been aware of the distance covered by the 3rd Division, as he was the prime author of the draft two plans, that they were stretched thin from Wonsan to Hagaru-ri under MacArthur's order and as he spoke were under attack by one-half of the 89th CCF Division: (The other half attacking marine forces at Yudam-ni.) Almond objected that the bitter winter weather and the possibility of strong Chinese forces in the gap between the two commands would make any such relief expedition and extremely hazardous venture in which the whole 3rd Division might be lost. Nevertheless: he agrees to the scheme if Eighth Army would supply the division after it crossed to the west side of the Taebaek Mountains. Walker made no such promise, and MacArthur made no immediate decision on the attack.

He later ordered, then, canceled, a drive by a task force from the 3rd Division to link up with the Eighth Army right flank.<sup>34</sup>

Here, consider the last sentence: “MacArthur made no immediate decision on the attack. He later ordered, then, canceled, a drive by a *task force* from the 3rd Division to link up with the Eighth Army right flank. Why didn’t Almond state he has a marine division situated already over his prior boundary line [?] hence already in Eighth Army original territory! This would be the ideal time to spin off that troublesome division to Eighth Army. Eric Hammel’s (upcoming) statement concerning the: “Yudam-ni garrison”, Mystery Clue; d) on returning to Korea immediately following this meeting. That Almond’s “X Corps was not making any sense, having issued no orders for two days now issued a series of them.” The “suggestion” for this Yudam-ni garrison to attack westward and ease Eighth Army withdrawal by maintaining contact with the CCF forces, at the same time withdrawing “one regiment” to clear the road between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri! While a like suggestion was made for the entire 3rd Division, MacArthur reduces that “by a task force for the 3rd Division.” What was evident here, neither MacArthur nor Almond is capable (after Inchon decision) to make a major decision over this issue. Almond does not want to lose an army division to Walker Eighth Army command, without a concession from Walker to supply their division. Again the “suggestion” for the 1st Marine Division could be acceptable if he could encourage or “pressure” them to complete the mission they insist was theirs alone, the extra bonus being Walker would have to supply them as well! However, General Smith has preempted Almond in relying on his own -X Corps directive- locating the 3rd Division “below” the marine division boundary line, at Chinhung-ni via Opn O 7. It was difficult to understand who was in charge over X Corps Almond or Smith! Instead of “below Hagaru-ri” the 3rd Division were miles south below Chinhung-ni, in a “blocking position” to the left rear flank of the 1st Marine Division! MacArthur apparently unaware that Almond has never enforced his 3rd Division boundary line rather granting MG Smith’s “request” to accept responsibility for part of that 3rd Division area of responsibility, “below” Chinhung-ni! But, Almond’s concession to Smith was never common knowledge as “rescinded” or “published” under a new revision. Unlike his duplication at Seoul in narrowing the boundary line there, Almond informed all officers of his decision to do so. Such was not the case, in this case, at the reservoir.

Plan 8, Draft 3: “e. 3rd Inf Div. (1) Gains and maintains contact with right flank Eighth Army along boundary in Z, (2) Protects X Corps W flank in Z, (3) Supports 1st Mar Div on X Corps O, (4) Protects airfields and harbor facilities in Wonsan area, and (5) destroys En guerrilla forces in Z.”<sup>35</sup> In spite of having the 1st Marine Regiment “attached” this was still a large area of responsibility for a small force-regretfully a neglected one as well. The 3rd Division placement: They will maintain a “blocking position” and protect X Corps west flank in zone *below* Hagaru-ri. Support the 1st Marine Division on X Corps order, and protect the airfields and the harbor facilities in the Wonsan area, while destroying enemy guerrilla forces in zone, a large responsibility.

Those top GHQ officials were totally confused as to what has been happening in Korea and now even more so, as they could not rely on boundary lines as issued, now rapidly changed- yet never secured. General Walker was the most stable of the group as he had told his forces; the first time they smell Chinese cooking to pull back. While Almond could rely on a navy evacuation, Walker was stuck on

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<sup>34</sup> (1) Rad, C 50106, CINCFE to CG X Corps, 30 Nov. 50. (2) Interv, Col. Appleman with Almond, copy in OCMH. Policy And Direction, The First Year; [Page 279]

<sup>35</sup> Headquarters, X Corps Command report: Special Report on Chosin Reservoir, 27 November to 10 December 1950. [p.10]

land and would have to get back into South Korea the same way he got there-by a road network with the enemy close on his heels. It was a miracle Walker had supplied his Eighth Army forces as well as he did up to this time. Being schooled in General George Patton's Army he understood and placed Patton's famous WWII Red Ball express network in place. Not only did they supply the forces supplies night and day in Korea, they moved over 130,000 North Korean prisoners of war back into South Korea. Maintenance crews were available to repair the trucks on line or retrieve them and move the disabled ones back for repair. Those trucks were the life blood of his Eighth Army, while Almond had no ready plan on using the trucks he had in any effective way. The RCT-31 was short its 2nd Battalion because X Corps switched control over the trucks available to move them forward. That confusion compounded by other events concerning the 3rd and 7th Division increased in all areas of operation, plus the bitter winter season adding additional problems to the mix. Nevertheless; in this tragic drama the enemy forces were increased by the Chinese intervention and a battle between friendly top echelon officials.

What history failed to record accurately begins to unfold, at the Changjin Reservoir.

## -Chapter 4-

### President Truman

How and why, was the First Marine Division ever assigned to Korea in the first place?

The Marine Corps—like the Army—was under-strength and underfunded at the opening shots of this war. All four of the Army American occupation divisions in Japan, and the 2nd Infantry Division from the States, had set foot on Korean soil and were engaged in combat, before the third [7<sup>th</sup>] regiment of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division arrived for action at Inchon. Rather than increase the number of Army forces, and immediately reinstate the draft,<sup>36</sup> that money was used to augment those untrained ROK's as buddy-soldier members of the Seventh Infantry Division, this division burdened with this addition throughout the remaining four months in spite of the deficiency in Army forces already known. It was also known then that Inchon would be an overland—rather than an amphibious—operation of long duration. Rather than concentrate on the Marine Air Wing (MAW), to supplement the loss of the Army Air Corps, too cover air to ground cover for Army forces, a battle was fought over who controlled this Marine force at the reservoir. Indeed that control would be a fatal flaw in who would receive the most coverage at the Changjin reservoir—the Marine (west) side or the Army (east) side. In the end, the result was a “priority status” unilaterally controlled by Major General Oliver P. Smith, USMC. It does not take a mathematical expert to calculate which of these two sides were to receive the larger “priority” on any given day. Or which side will receive adequate airdrops of ammo, as each attempted their breakout from opposite sides of that reservoir. One needs only to review the Army men killed, and missing in action, and lack of significant ammunition drops, on the east side of the reservoir to define this answer. Added to the effect of General Oliver P. Smith’s stated evaluation of the deficiencies in his own ranks—the First and Seventh Regiments also burdened with Marine Reserve fillers—he was not going to compromise the survival of his one (amphibious) division. A reliance: therefore on the inflation of the number of his division casualties.<sup>37</sup>

#### President Truman—The Commander in Chief

The First Marine Division was never required to serve in Korea via any request by the Commander in Chief. To the contrary, President Truman was openly—and vocally—opposed, on record, to their combat use under his command. Truman’s much publicized controversial statement: “That the Marine Corps are the Navy’s police force, and as long as I am president that is what they will remain. They have a propaganda machine that is about equal to Stalin’s.”<sup>38</sup> This remark was after Truman had authorized the Inchon Landing and Congress was suggesting an increase in the total Marine Corps. The Marine Corps League applied political and public pressure to turn on Truman over his statement. Nevertheless, the Marine Corps command sought their own piece of the action in Korea, via MacArthur’s chief of staff, General Almond. This fact lost in the Marines’ outward criticism of MacArthur, and his X Corps commander General Almond, by extension, under whose X Corps command they were placed. Marine General Shepherd of the Pacific Fleet Command (without

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<sup>36</sup> The draft had been suspended in 1949. All active draftees were given an option to shorten their two years, by an agreement to extend their terms by six years in the reserves. We had two soldiers from those drafted men in my barracks. Both elected to take this option.

<sup>37</sup> Smith interview, Benis Frank: “We had taken all the casualties of the X Corps. The 7<sup>th</sup> Division, outside of the two battalions that got messed up at the reservoir, had had no casualties. We have 4-5,000 casualties.” (Emphasis added.) Really!

<sup>38</sup> Harry Truman: Famous quote.

informing his Marine commandant) informed Almond, that a full division of Marines could be mustered for his planned amphibious operation around Inchon. So at their own request they were added, a tremendous victory over the president's opinion of them.

In his book, *Korea—The Untold Story*, Joseph C. Gaulden states that it was General MacArthur and General Shepherd that finally got the Marine division for the invasion at Inchon. Lt. General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. "liked MacArthur's idea for an end run invasion around the North Koreans." Shepherd saw a chance for the Marines to grab themselves a significant role in the Korean War. Since MacArthur had already requested the Marines—and the JCS had already denied them—he told Shepherd, "You sit down and write me up a dispatch to the JCS requesting that the 1st Marine Division be sent to my theater of command." "This request shook Shepherd," he would state, "it was a delicate dispatch to compose. Here I was recommending that a Marine division be sent to Korea and the [Marine Corps] commandant didn't know anything about what I was doing. This was a hell of a spot to be in, but the ball had been dropped in my hands, and I felt I must run with it."<sup>39</sup> Little did he know what control, he was giving to MacArthur. But that was not MacArthur's fault, if that division was approved without restrictions to only amphibious operations, General MacArthur would find use for them inland. For the Marine Corps to imply—after the fact—that some restrictions did apply was far too late in the game. At this time Almond was only MacArthur's chief of staff, before his additional appointment as X Corps Commander.

However, Lieutenant Colonel John Chiles was Almond's aide (later his G-3 in X Corps) and stated that very few Army officers ever had any personal face-to-face contact with MacArthur. One had to go directly through Almond to reach MacArthur. Here is another myth that MacArthur had an open relationship with Navy-Marine commanders. John Chiles states in his Oral History, Interview 290 at the Truman Library, that few men know it was Almond, with General Shepherd, that sought and got the Marine units for Korea. While indeed MacArthur requested the Marine division through the JCS, he was consistently denied use of them. Here the added insult that the Marines ended up under Almond's direct command would not sit well with them. As far as the Marines were concerned, it was by no means going to be a cohesive command from Day One. Yet, MacArthur's own JCS request for them was previously denied, and it seemed evident that the First Marine Division, due to their own request, ended up attached to X Corps. Unknown after landing at Inchon, and control changed from General Smith's amphibious operation, it would revert to General Almond's complete overland mission—and not General Shepherd (FMF)—in operational command of the Marine forces, now firmly "attached" to X Corps. Having received the 1st Marine Brigade earlier, once they arrived in Japan, MacArthur sent them directly to Korea, as he had with all Army forces placed under his command. This 1st Marine Brigade now became the 5th Marine Regiment of the 1st Marine Division. Hence, only one cannibalized under-strength 7th Division remained in Japan. This division, depleted of experienced men and cadre, was used as fillers for the other three Army divisions already in Korea.<sup>40</sup>

While the Marine Corps did that end run around Truman, they also had little respect for MacArthur; however, their luck ran out after being assigned to MacArthur for the Inchon landing. MacArthur wanted his detailed CHROMITE plans accomplished under his own close and constant supervision and not by a group less subject to his direct view than his own GHQ staff. However, General Wright, as

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<sup>39</sup> *Korea—The Untold Story*, Joseph C. Gaulden

<sup>40</sup> MacArthur merely stated his request was twice denied and General Shepherd should request them on his own. Thus, General Shepherd as detailed in "Korea, The Untold Story" was responsible in requesting them. The reality, once placed under MacArthur's United Nations Command, this force will not be exempt from any and all inland missions!

MacArthur's G-3, suggested General Shepherd should be in charge of the landing. But, MacArthur already has reserved that position for Almond. Certainly, this ruled out any direct Marine influence over any land operational missions anywhere in Korea—either: North or South. They learned this when the Marines tried to persuade MacArthur to land thirty miles further south of Inchon—at Posung-Myon, “almost due west of Osan”—at the last moment. Again, any contact—with MacArthur—would be through Almond. Smith upon meeting with MacArthur complained the stated: landing date—15 September—“would be too early to assemble his forces.”<sup>41</sup> He had been told before leaving the states: it would be 23 September!

As just reviewed, the most important event of all was the involvement of the First Marine Division in the first place. The JCS opposed their use, as did President Truman. Therefore, the Army officers never directly requested their aid. Indeed, General Omar Bradley had this to say about the Marines, "This is no time for fancy Dan's who won't hit the line with all they have on every play, unless they can call the signals."<sup>42</sup> MacArthur did not wait for their approval in drawing his plans, and using Army forces, and the Marine Brigade to seize Inchon via an amphibious landing, under the code name “Bluehearts”.<sup>43</sup> Before this plan would be effective, the powers that be however assigned the 1st Cavalry Division and the small Marine unit to the Pusan area. In her book, *The Korean War*, Marguerite Higgins, defends the Marine Corps against President Truman's statement, made months before the Changjin Campaign: “I have read President Truman's accusations that the Marines have a propaganda machine equal to Stalin's. Actually, they have almost no organized propaganda at all. I have run across only one public relations officer attached to the Marines, and he never interfered with us in any way. That was most unusual, for I have observed that the main effect of military public-relations officers is to hamper correspondents. The Marine as an individual is extremely proud of his origination. He welcomes correspondents because they are there to tell the rest of the world about the job he is doing. Also since they are a smaller organization than the Army, the Marines are less stuffy and less involved in red tape. It is easier for them to help you out.”<sup>44</sup> However, that “one public relations officer attached to the Marines,” made some later recorded remarks about Lieutenant Colonel Faith's “duty” over which, I have yet to take issue! Still as long as she was accepting as fact, whatever she received via that Marine public relations officer, the Marines had nothing to fear from her reporting their unofficial, unilateral point of view.

Yet this war was a United Nations Action. Some 22 nations were involved before its termination of conflict. However, make no mistake: The American Army carried the weight and the freight, and the excessive casualties from day one to the final days, per individual division, no matter how one records it outside of military history. The removal of American Army forces at Changjin was a disgraceful attempt to minimize the Army action there yet elevate the Marines at Changjin. In addition, the Marines appointing a British Commander under the UN command, over a “task force” combined of both Marine and Army is another effort to elude the fact that this Task Force (Drysdale) was a sole Marine creation as well! Without the Marines, the American side could have absorbed the same

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<sup>41</sup> Policy and Direction-The First Year, GPO: p.149.

<sup>42</sup> Revolt of the Admirals: From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

<sup>43</sup> Policy and Direction-The First Year, GPO: p.140. MacArthur had conceived these "planned operations" a few days after the North Koreans struck. MacArthur believed that he could land an assault force from the 1st Cavalry Division and the Marine RCT against the enemy's rear at Inchon as early as 22 July. This force would envelop Seoul and seize the high ground to the north. At the same time, all forces available to General Dean would attack to drive the North Koreans back against the Han. Maj. Gen. Edwin K. Wright's planning group, JSPOG, worked out the details of this early plan. They assigned to it the code name Operation BLUEHEARTS.

<sup>44</sup> Marguerite Higgins: *The Korean War, 1951*, p.150.

achievements. That task force will suffer excessive casualties, due to one Marine officers' failure to execute Colonel Drysdale's distribution of their tanks, spread throughout the column as he suggested. However, the entire end results would not change had an Army division filled that void. That retrograde retreat, from the reservoir, would have happened. However, had the Marines *reversed* that retrograde retreat *that indeed* would have been a single historical Marine event! But history records no such event. He who retains control of the land is the victor of that battle.

Admiral Sherman (JCS) had great concern about the availability of a full Marine division for the Inchon landing. However, after President Truman's approval of the landing, he stated, "It must be assumed that the operation will not be delayed and if two battalions are late, the division will fight without them."<sup>45</sup> This highlights that General Oliver P. Smith had no great input over the quantity of his force or their time of arrival. For in spite of Admiral Sherman's urging, the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines with accompanying troops did not embark from the United States until September 3, reaching Korea on the 21<sup>st</sup> too late for the landing. Therefore, General Smith was short one full regiment of his Marines. If he harbored any objection over this, it should have been with Admiral Sherman and the Department of the Navy, not Almond. Here are Almond's first-of-many compromises to Smith. He adds the 32<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Regiment to compensate for the yet—to—arrive Seventh Marine Regiment. However, Smith "objects" he wants no part of this Army regiment as they "are 40% South Koreans" augmented, and conscripts, drafted into the Seventh Infantry Division. This was also "most usual" for a "smaller organization" to refuse an extra battalion, regardless of its structure to support your own division. Would have been a logic question for history to record, as I do now!

Regretfully, one important point escapes notice. That as in General Holland M. Smith USMC of World War II fame, his words, from his book, *Coral & Brass*, that a seldom-used regulation "allowed the Marine Corps to be placed under the full regulations of the Army" as in World War II. "...At Iceland, there they would report to the Secretary of War, (changed to Secretary of Defense) instead of the Department of the Navy."<sup>46</sup> The only time he could recall when the Marine Corps had two bosses. However, in Korea that should have been the case, but it was not, and the Marine Corps division commander resented and despised being under any Army rule. This oversight by President Truman was to have severe consequences. That order should have been without question as this was the first American United Nations Command—under General MacArthur—and all forces so assigned were directly under his sole command authority. Unfortunately, this was a first test for such authority of this kind, but not strange. As the governments of World War II, countries turned their military authority over to the American Commander, in charge of their regions. However, since they were not assigned as such, it can only be implied that they remain under Major General Oliver P. Smith, Pacific Fleet Marine Force (FMF-Reinf) as confirmed via X Corps-G-3- (Opn O-7, Nov.1950, Task Orgn: Annex A.) documentation.

Thus if any dereliction of duty over the Marine Division command concerning O.P. Smith, would have to come via the Department of the Navy. This—misunderstanding—gave Major General Smith a tremendous amount of latitude.

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
<sup>45</sup> Policy & Direction: The First Year. Since the amphibious operation could not be made without a corps headquarters, members of JSPOG recommended that their chief, General Wright, ask MacArthur either to organize a provisional corps headquarters locally or to bring from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC) headquarters, commanded by General Shepherd. General MacArthur did not accept Wright's suggestion. p-156-157.

<sup>46</sup> Coral and Brass: p.99.



If **not reassigned** to the Army the—earlier—Chart 2 should show a dotted line—to the 1 MAR box above—as with the 41st Royal Marines, attached to the Marine Division. That is not the reality on the date indicated on **this Chart 2, which shows a solid line indicating the Marine Division as being under Army control per the Army regulations.** Had there been no Army *veil of secrecy* this could have been known earlier in history and a full investigation could have been conducted over this neglect at the reservoir.

**CHART 2- ORGANIZATION OF UNC GROUND FORCES IN KOREA  
23 NOVEMBER 1950**



The fatal order by General Almond to General Smith to assume full operational control at Changjin, over Army units, proved detrimental for all the Army units trapped there. These Army units were cut loose from Army command, having no idea how this reverse chain of command could work. Who was the main honcho in charge? Was it General Almond, or General Smith? Where was the unity of command? What was the relationship to Navy control? Since, the Marine Corps is under the Department of the Navy, was this Army force now directly under the Department of the Navy? Or was this one division of their Marine Corps, still attached to official X Corps Army orders? Are partially so? Or was it under General Oliver P. Smith's (FMF) full Marine responsibility and his full authority? It was never crystal clear, if anyone within Task Force MacLean/Faith was officially informed under any such order, since the Marines denied an earlier "attached" status. In our (RCT-31) situation, it would be of no great earthshaking news to any of us! What we needed was an official order to withdraw—by whoever was in charge with authority to issue it—along with our own tank company! That order never came for us. However, General Smith (FMF) did order our 31st RCT rear guard tank company to "reinforce" Hagaru-ri. The result, and cost, in lives is now recorded in history. Yet, our Army three-battalion force is on record in Marine G-3 History. That is indisputable, incomplete, and wholly inadequate, removing our Army history from their Marine Corps history. Thus the Marine Corps was forced to create their own praiseworthy history out of this chaotic history. As every battle won on our American side was followed closely by two costly losses.

A controversial dispute between General Holland M. Smith's (later at Saipan) dismissal of an Army division commander over the island invasions of Makin and Tarawa in World War II caused General George C. Marshall of the JCS to state that never again would an Army general serve under a Marine general's command.<sup>47</sup> Here at Changjin was a diversion from that Army rule, not entirely due to the competence of that Marine general, for he was proven inadequate for this Army task, but rather due to the mixture of that force; the Marines Corps being the dominate force of numbers in this case. The ironic identical case between Holland M. Smith and Ralph Smith—was over the slow movement of that Army force to move forward as fast as Holland Smith demanded. His explanation, when the two adjacent Marine units moved forward, the Army was slow to move and created a loop between the two Marine forces.

“You can search MacArthur's communiqués describing the Philippines fighting and you will be unable to find a single reference to the Marines. The average American can be excused for believing the Philippines exclusively an Army show. I wager that not one newspaper reader in a thousand knows there were Marines at Leyte and Luzon unless he had a Marine in the family who was there. Granted that Marine numbers were small in comparison with the Army, nevertheless, the Marines were there when the Philippines were recaptured. Seventeen squadrons of Marine planes were employed in the Philippines--and that's quite a few planes to cloak in anonymity.”<sup>48</sup> It seems the Changjin Reservoir was merely going to be play back time to equal history by shutting out the Army completely!

“A strange sidelight on the amorphous American command in the Pacific during World War II was the fact that MacArthur and I never met. By fate or circumstance, our paths never crossed during the war or before the war. We both were leaders of victorious troops moving toward the same goal but we were total strangers. My superior was Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, CINCPAC (Commander-in-Chief, Pacific) and CINCPAC (Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas). Our commands never overlapped and the first time more than two Army divisions were employed jointly with Marines, command went to the Army.”<sup>49</sup> This was at Okinawa.

There have been widespread charges that the Marines resented serving under Army leadership. Nothing is farther from the truth. As Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, told the Senate Military Affairs Committee on December 7, 1945: “In our 170 years we [the Marine Corps] have never acquired the view that to support another arm or branch in the performance of a service to the country was to suffer either an indignity or a loss of prestige. I was not invited to attend the surrender ceremony on the deck of the USS *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay on September 1, 1945. This was a great personal disappointment after fighting all those weary miles from Tarawa. However, the Marines are a team, not a collection of individuals, and our team was ably represented by General Geiger, who succeeded me as Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force.”<sup>50</sup>

Regardless of the above, O.P.Smith had many more delays in Korea with no reprimand from the Navy. Nevertheless, this set a dangerous precedent. If this military organization (One Corps) did an end run around the President, its Constitutional Commander-in-Chief, surely it would be but a small step for a Marine Division Commander to dispute and delay the military authority of any appointed Army Corps Commander of his equal rank, with its results yet to be fully played out on some distant

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<sup>47</sup> Reference Smith vs Smith: the Army Division commander Major General Ralph Smith.

<sup>48</sup> Holland Smith: Coral and Brass, p 10.

<sup>49</sup> Holland Smith: Coral and Brass, p 12.

<sup>50</sup> *Coral and Brass*, p.14.

field of battle somewhere and some future time. This must be the answer to the confusion in Korea. The Marines were not fully under Army control per Army regulations. However, they should have been! Had that been the reality the petty dispute over Major Generals being of equal rank would be a moot issue. In the United States Army, this was a non-issue, as all Army Divisions were commanded by Major Generals, yet understood that Almonds' appointment made him the head honcho, and his full authority as such, outweighed his equal rank.

In reality, the Marines were "attached"—independently—just as any other United Nations force. Their welfare and supplies were supplied and appropriated through their parent Department of the Navy. Therefore the reality is each Army soldier had that basic training with the M-1 rifle and two years of service by the start of the Korean War. The training cycle from occupation duty, to combat readiness was short-circuited by the remaining time before the Korean "conflict" began. At that point in time, we were only into the *task force* stage, which accounts for the overuse of these ad hoc frequently used forces. While it is important to preserve facts for history, these small *task forces* of the Seventh Division achieved their assigned mission in North Korea by seizing those objectives of Hyesanjin and Singalpajin both on the Yalu River. Of special note, these were the only two objectives American forces seized as ordered, by any other United Nations Force that far north overlooking the border between North Korea and Manchuria.

While both of those achievements, of reaching the Yalu River at those two points, were lost or buried for the 7<sup>th</sup> Division, one can only speculate how great both victories would had played out, had the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division been the center force of X Corps, instead of the Seventh Division! The important two dates are 21 and 28 November 1950. What was lost in all of this is that the Marines were delaying movement on the east side of the reservoir, which was 70 miles further south of their—Marine—assigned objective, Singalpajin on the Yalu River, just adjacent to the Seventh Division objective, Hyesanjin also on the Yalu. While the Seventh Division was at Hyesanjin on 21 November, the Seventh Division was totally without any left flank (Marine) protection, whatsoever without that Marine division moving north along its left flank. This merely highlights another asinine statement that we were sent to the Changjin reservoir to protect the Marine flanks, as they moved out to complete their mission. If anything, it was to defend our own 70 mile—open ended—left flank, left open by the Marines' refusal to move north on the east side of the Changjin reservoir! The Task Force (Cooper) sent to seize Hyesanjin was, again, 70 miles north of the Marine force, the Army forces still to the front of their entire Marine "*spearhead*" forces. The early division removal of General Oliver P. Smith for General Thomas, in April of 1951, changed the importance of the Marine independent achievements under their newly assigned commander. What happened? Were the Marine achievements any less, or merely commonplace, with all other events? Press censorship was imposed in Korea as of December 20, 1950. Too late to prevent any overrated "Glory" for "one single division" in North Korea. Yet, the repeated divisional achievements of the First Marine Division continued as long as General Oliver P. Smith was in charge of that division. General Smith's name being continually separated and isolated from "The Marines" being a rare redundant occurrence throughout his command and reign over that division. After Smith's departure, it was back to "The Marines" did such and such, and few accolades, after Smith's *early* relief were rarely given directly to Major General Thomas the new commander!

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To update the reader, there should be a short recap of the relationship between these two amphibious divisions, and their training cycles for WWII. The Marine Corps' continuous desire to publicize their

achievements on the battlefield includes any and all praiseworthy quotes from whatever source they may come. This includes praiseworthy quotes concerning Inchon from General MacArthur, even though he was never a favorite commander over the Marine Corps. However, one neglected quote concerning the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, but never widely published, is one from their Marine Commander, General Holland M. Smith in WW II. That quote diminishes the overall Marine praise achievements over their combined amphibious landings at Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, Makin, Saipan, and Peleliu. The latter landing was the only one opposed to their landing forces. This Marine commander wrote his book, *Coral and Brass*, and his connection to the creation, from the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Brigade, into the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, as it was re-designated, on February 1, 1941, as the First Marine Division. Thus the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division was born on this date. Its officers were from General Holland "Mad" Smith's own staff. Its first mission was to take Guadalcanal, but due to a malaria outbreak, they could not complete their mission, and the Army 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division *finished that mission*. This earlier and first: 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division landing 7 August 1942 at Guadalcanal. On 13 October the 164<sup>th</sup> Infantry, the first Army unit on Guadalcanal, came ashore to *reinforce* the Marines and took a 6,600-yard sector at the east end of the American perimeter. Commanded by Col. Bryant E. Moore the 164<sup>th</sup> had come through the South Pacific ferry route in January to New Caledonia. There, the 164<sup>th</sup> joined the 182<sup>nd</sup> Infantry and 132<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Regiments, in addition to artillery, engineer, and other support units, to form a new division called the "Americal," a name derived from the words America and New Caledonia. *Until the Americal commander*, Maj. Gen. Alexander M. Patch, and other units of the division arrived the 164<sup>th</sup> would join the fight with the Marines. This change of command to the Americal Division shifts to its commander General Patch, in December 1942. This is information lost to history concerning the Army involvement at Guadalcanal.

The 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division's first amphibious landing was on Attu, which along with the Changjin Reservoir Campaign was also lost to history. The reason: a delicate unpublished mission to play down any panic reaction by the American public from combat on the American homeland in the Alaskan Aleutian Islands off the North American continent. Attu was American territory, and the reaction to the June 3, 1942, Japanese invasion and occupation on Attu was deliberately kept out of the press as spreading undue alarm to the 48 States below Alaska. However, this situation could not stand, and Attu had to be reclaimed, via an amphibious landing. What force was available and trained to do that? Attu was successfully seized, and secured, by the Army, Seventh Infantry (Hourglass) Division. But the 7<sup>th</sup> Division had just been trained for desert warfare, not the arctic cold of Alaska. There were numerous "firsts" experienced by the U.S. Forces in the Aleutians. The American 7<sup>th</sup> Division had embarked on the first Allied sea-borne invasion of enemy-held territory. The 7<sup>th</sup> had trained in the Mojave Desert expecting eventually to fight the Germans in North Africa. Soon after the defeat of the German Army in North Africa, the 7<sup>th</sup> began to practice amphibious landings on San Clemente Island, California. With their training completed and plans in place, the 7<sup>th</sup> eventually shipped out of San Francisco, destination unknown. As the ships later set a northerly bearing, heading for the Aleutians once out to sea, the GIs were finally informed of their real destination. Cold weather uniforms were then issued to the men, including leather boots that would prove useless in the wet snow and mud soon to be encountered on Attu. On 11 March, 1943, CINCPAC made available three battleships, three heavy cruisers, three over-aged light cruisers, one escort carrier, nineteen destroyers, plus tenders, oilers, minesweepers, etc., and *four attack transports*. The Army commander was Commanding General 7<sup>th</sup> Division. The forces assigned Navy were Task Forces KING and ROGER. Army forces, assault, reserve, and initial occupation troops were as follows: Assault on Attu, 7<sup>th</sup> Division Combat Team, consisting of the 17<sup>th</sup> Infantry, one battalion field artillery, one battalion engineers for shore

parties, one battery AA automatic weapons, three detachments 75<sup>th</sup> Special Signal Company, one company 7<sup>th</sup> Division Organic Combat Engineers, one medical collecting company, 7<sup>th</sup> Division, one platoon 7<sup>th</sup> Division Medical Clearing Company, Detachment HQ 7<sup>th</sup> Division Battalion, detachment 7<sup>th</sup> Division Quartermaster Battalion, detachment 7<sup>th</sup> Division Organic Signal Company. For the initial occupation of the selected site in the Near Islands, 18<sup>th</sup> Combat Engineers from Adak, 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Composite Regiment from Adak. The floating reserve was one regimental combat team consisting of the 32<sup>nd</sup> Infantry with reinforcements similar to those for the 17<sup>th</sup> Infantry indicated above. The garrisons for Attu and the selected site in the Near Islands are to be designated by the Commanding General Western Defense Command, and are to include 17<sup>th</sup> Infantry Combat Team, 32<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Combat Team, 78<sup>th</sup> CAAA and 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion 51st CAAA.

With winds clocked as high as 100 miles per hour, known as “*williwaws*,” that prevented air to ground cover and the “*tundra*” caused men to sink in the marsh covered layers. Additional, fog and mist prevented the landing craft operators from seeing each other, and some collided before reaching shore.

Thus, the Seventh Division was deprived of any support or acknowledgement of this achievement at Attu. Nor, this following praise, expressed by Holland M. Smith’s missing statement from Marine Corps History: **“I have always considered the landing of the Seventh in the dense fog of Attu, on May 11, 1943, an amphibious landing without parallel in our military history.”**<sup>51</sup> This indicates, since General Holland M. Smith was never in charge of this operation at Attu, but merely wishing to be an observer. NO Marine Corps amphibious landing in WWII, even those under *his* command, EVER, matches, exceeds, or eclipsed, this amphibious landing at Attu by the Seventh Infantry Division. After the Seventh Division left Southern California, Holland Smith, followed them to Cold Harbor, Alaska, aboard the USS *Pennsylvania*. “From Cold Harbor I flew to Amchitka with Colonel W.O. “Bill” Aereckson, USA, and then ploughed through the fog shrouding Attu, trying to catch a glimpse of the fighting. This was my first experience in battle with any troops I had trained and I was keen to see how they made out. But in spite of Bill’s low flying, I saw very little through the cold, gray blanket. Attu was secured by May 31, after the Japanese made a *banzai* attack, cutting through our lines and penetrating to some hospital tents, where the crazed men murdered many of our patients before they could be wiped out.” This inspired General Holland M. Smith to state: “If my Aleutians trip had produced nothing but the memory of that *banzai* attack, it was worthwhile. That mad charge through the fog made a profound impression and alerted me to the ever present danger of just such a final desperate attack ... during my operations in the Central Pacific. Before I left the Aleutians, I decided to amplify our training to include countermeasures against such an eventuality.”<sup>52</sup> Here, Holland M. Smith admits to knowledge gained from “The Seventh Infantry Division,” an Army Division in existence since 1917. RED FLAG: A little too late: to update the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division’s (*banzai* attacks) post invasion of Guadalcanal! A lesson learned and inserted, via the later 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division experience at Attu months later!

This oversight may well be the justification for the animosity created here between the newly formed First Marine Division’s baptism of fire at Guadalcanal. Their continuous efforts to undermine any achievements by the Seventh Infantry Division may well revolve around this statement by *their* commander Holland M. Smith, to bury his statement—if it surfaces at all—in later years. However,

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<sup>51</sup> Coral and Brass: Holland Smith: p.103

<sup>52</sup> Holland M. Smith: *Coral and Brass*. Department of the Navy Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, DC 20380-0001, pp. 103-104.

this lingering animosity, from the First Marine Division from the top down through their ranks, in Korea, got slightly out of hand.

To understand the rocky Korean relationship between the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, and the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, one must separate the antagonism by the former towards the latter. The animosity heightened to such a state that Marine commands were issued to fire on friendly forces via reports issued from Marine Corps commanders—and directed against—7<sup>th</sup> Division forces.

The friendly fire orders against the 7<sup>th</sup> Division forces by  
Colonel Puller, USMC

“Puller had his own way of getting his point across to unit commanders serving under him. When an Army captain asked him for the line of retreat in case he was overrun, Puller got on the radio with the 11<sup>th</sup> Marine Artillery. He gave the artillery commander the exact location of the captain’s units, the correct distance and azimuth, and then said, *“If this unit starts to pull back from the line even one foot, I order you to open fire on them.”* The reality in fact that the 7<sup>th</sup> Division lost men to Marine Corps (accidental napalm drops) friendly fire on leaving (1 December 1950) their entrapped area north of Hudong-ni, calls for investigation to why those events occurred in the first place. Colonel Puller’s own neglect (“bugging out”) to honor his own standing order, as the last unit, remaining in place. His leaving Koto-ri earlier, borders on hypocrisy, not only to the Marine Corps, but to his own command.<sup>53</sup>

However, this should never be about mistakes in orders, or the execution of them. God knows, there was an overabundance of these mistakes at Changjin Reservoir, and every unit was at fault. But the main point is the Army made “no claim to any fame there,” while the Marine Corps exaggerated their “fame” even at the expense to degrade the Army units over their loss of lives, via unproven innuendoes of “bugging out” and not holding positions assigned. History failed to explore and record, this also happened to the Marine Corps as well. Certainly the Army had no monopoly on making mistakes. But mistakes must be made, before they become known as mistakes. Once made they cannot be erased—only covered up—that short napalm dropped on the leading force of Task Force Faith, on the early morning of 1 December cannot be undone, the dead cannot be restored, and the event cannot escape history.

This 7<sup>th</sup> Division would be on line for the Inchon Invasion on 15 September 1950. But only two of its regiments would be immediately available. The 17<sup>th</sup> Regiment would be in floating reserve status to be rushed in either at Inchon or Pusan as needed. In the latter case that could separate this 17<sup>th</sup> Regiment from the other two, three hundred road miles apart. This is of interest while General Smith will oppose his orders to move north in North Korea because his division may be split on each side of the reservoir. Stating, his Marine Division, “cannot make an attack, in two different directions.” Thus, another general concession, by General Almond—to replace that —late arriving 7<sup>th</sup> Marine mission, with the 7<sup>th</sup> Division—32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion—forces at the reservoir.

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<sup>53</sup> “There is where Lewie Puller slipped up, on the loss of the tanks. The plan was that the 1<sup>st</sup> Marines were to be left in Koto-ri to defend and come out as rear guard. By that time Lewie had his two battalions. The 3<sup>rd</sup> had come down from Hagaru-ri and he had the 2<sup>nd</sup> there with him. He also had an Army battalion that had come up the road.” Smith: Interview with Benis Frank-June 1969. In this case, Colonel Puller had pulled out leaving only the smaller 1st Recon unit as rear guard.

The following charts' below should be studied to understand the makeup of the forces remaining after the Changjin Action!

**Chart 3-1  
Department of the Navy**

[Part 5. 7 December 1950–25 January 1951: The Second Chinese Offensive]  
(Percentages are mine)

Marine casualties, 27 November–11 December 1950

Total	KIA	MIA	WIA
3610	556	182	2,872
100%	15.4%	5.04%	79.56%

NBC (non-battle casualty) =3,648 ("the last largely from frostbite.")

**Chart 3-2  
Army Casualties, per General Smith interview –June 1969**

2,800 Total Task Force	less 385 Salvaged	2,415 Unaccounted
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<b>Total 1,200 -KIA</b>	<b>(+) 900 WIA Evacuated</b>	<b>(+) 315 MIA</b>	<b>2,415 Total</b>
<b>49.69%</b>	<b>37.26%</b>	<b>12.95%</b>	<b>100%</b>

TABLE 3 X CORPS BATTLE CASUALTIES, 27 NOVEMBER  
–10 DECEMBER 1950-

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Killed in Action</i>	<i>Wounded in Action</i>	<i>Missing in Action</i>	<i>Total</i>
X Corps headquarters/service	5	20	15	40
Corps combat troops	3	8	--	11
1st Marine Division	393	2,152	76	2,621
Army attached	1	2	1	4
41st Royal Marine Commando	8	31	39	78
2d Engineer Special Brigade	--	--	--	0
1st Marine Air Wing	2	2	2	6
3d Division	50	206	147	403
ROKs attached	17	76	94	187
<b>7th Division</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>2,505</b>	<b>2,760</b>
<b>ROKs attached</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>1,560</b>	<b>1,602</b>
1st Korean Marine Corps Regt	13	80	--	93
Headquarters, I ROK Corps	1	3	0	4
ROK Capital Division	126	318	334	778
3d ROK Division	15	127	6	148

Totals	705	3,251	4,779	8,735
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Source: Personnel Section of X Corps Special Rpt, Chosin Reservoir.

One should also keep in mind that these comparisons are justified, only to the fact that Task Force MacLean-Faith was removed, due to the Army failure to record and correct this battle from the reservoir action, in 1990, and then only *highlighted* by the exaggerated claims by General O. P. Smith who said that his one division had taken “all” of X Corps casualties. That is unjust and unsupported by facts and figures. That three Army Battalions were never there. But nevertheless, that is the reality of his claim. So any isolation of this battle at Chosin per one Marine Division highlighted their sole individual battle, being open to comparison from start to the finish of this campaign, between 27 November and 11 December 1950. However, one should also keep in mind, the bloodiest battle and loss of American lives, was not at the reservoir, or X Corps. Rather, in the southwestern Eighth Army arena at Kunu-ri. That battle involved the Army 2nd Infantry (Indian Head) Division. But the press agents failed to highlight that battle for history as well.

What is evident here that none of this information is going to be of help in a total of Army men relocated to the reservoir. After 60 years it just creates and causes more confusion. While any new student of history may wonder what role these “1,602 ROKs attached” played out, to these three battalions, 1/32<sup>nd</sup> and the 3/31<sup>st</sup> Infantry, supported by the 57<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery Battalion (-C Battery) named by necessity—Task Force MacLean/Task Force Faith—on the former Commander MacLean’s status as MIA as of 29 November 1950. Those ROKs were added from MacArthur’s “buddy system” to augment the 7<sup>th</sup> Division by over 8,500 of them.<sup>54</sup> They were “attached as individuals,” not as company, squad, or any other small unit. For every intent and purpose they were added as any other American replacement to the division. Everything about them, their clothes, weapons, and battle gear was issued by this division. For those “attached to the 57<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery” even their mailing address was the same as mine. Even before he realized that the 7<sup>th</sup> Division would have to make up his major Army component for Inchon, General MacArthur had begun to rebuild this depleted unit as much as he could. In mid-July, when the 2<sup>d</sup> Division was still slated for Inchon, General MacArthur had ordered 20 percent of all combat replacements from the United States diverted to the 7<sup>th</sup> Division in Japan. He had also halted all further levies against the division for men and equipment. By stabilizing the division, by feeding in such resources as could be spared from Eighth Army, and by intensive training, he hoped to make the 7<sup>th</sup> Division strong enough to fight effectively in Korea by October. On 26 July, MacArthur ordered General Walker to prepare the 7<sup>th</sup> Division “by intensified training.” The division then stood at less than half strength, with only 574 officers and 8,200 enlisted men. Moreover, many of the division’s enlisted men had had little training, and *few* of the specialists and experienced noncoms taken from the division to patch up units going into combat in early July had been replaced.

The clash between General Almond’s authority to set the mission and schedule dates would be challenged by the Marine commander from day one—21 September—after *his authority* for the landing changed over to the Army X Corps command. While Almond detested General Smith’s slow advance in the taking of Seoul, his impatience with the Marine advance, caused him to issue an

<sup>54</sup> Losses by 5 August totaled 7,859, but only 7,711 individual replacements had reached the FEC and only part of these had arrived in Korea. The 7<sup>th</sup> Division, used as replacements for the other three occupation divisions already in Korea, were severely depleted of it forces. Compensating, numerically at least, for this slight under strength of the 7th Division, MacArthur, after conceiving the idea that South Korea might be called on to provide soldiers for American units, attached more than 8,000 South Koreans to the division. On 11 August, he directed General Walker to procure, screen, and ship to Japan for use in augmenting the 7th Division approximately 7,000 able-bodied male Koreans. Fortunately the ROK Government cooperated since no American commander had authority beyond merely requesting these men. *Policy and Direction; The First Year*: GPO, 1972, p. xx.



ultimatum to Smith. On 24 September, Almond would give Smith a full 24-hour window to advance and seize the capital city of Seoul. If he could not—or would not—he would then order the 32<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Regiment with Lt. Colonel Don Faith's 1/32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion to join the fight for the city. Having waited that 24 hours, he called his commanders to a meeting and ordered the 7<sup>th</sup> Division force to assist in capture of South Mountain overlooking the city. This “clone copy” of compensating for delay will replay on the east side of the Changjin Reservoir, two months to the day, in North Korea, and the cost in 7<sup>th</sup> Division lives would exceed those of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division. This was Almond's third intervention and using the 32<sup>nd</sup> Regiment to augment the Marine division. They say that history repeats itself, and that was verified in this case as well.

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“As the 1st Marines fought its way along the Inchon-Seoul highway and into Yong'dungp'o, the 7th Infantry Division protected its right flank and engaged enemy units moving toward the battle area from the south. An extensive mine field delayed the 32d Regiment on the 20th as it attacked toward Anyang-ni where it was to cut the Seoul-Suwon highway. Exploding mines damaged three tanks of A Company, 73d Tank Battalion, and completely blocked the narrow dirt road the column was following. Colonel Beauchamp, the regimental commander, had a narrow escape. A mine destroyed his jeep, killing the driver and wounding the radio operator a few minutes after he had left it. Engineer troops removed more than 150 mines, from this field. The regiment during the day captured T'ongdok Mountain and part of Copper Mine Hill.

On the 21st, the 32d Infantry seized the rest of Copper Mine Hill. It also captured the high ground two miles south of Yongdungp'o and Hill 300, the high ground immediately northeast of Anyang-ni. The 7th Division Reconnaissance Company arrived at Anyang-ni at 1430. When darkness fell, the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, held blocking positions astride the Suwon highway two miles south of Anyang-ni, the 1st Battalion held the road east and the high ground northeast of the town, and elements of the regimental combat team had established contact northward at Toksan-ni with the 2d Battalion, where the latter had captured a considerable quantity of ordnance and medical supplies.

At daylight Hannum led his armored column south through the town, now deserted. Below it he passed the crushed jeeps and the bodies of Hampton and two or three other men killed there. At midmorning Hannum's armored force joined the Reconnaissance Company at Suwon Airfield where Major Edwards had moved it and Van Sant's tanks at daybreak. Before noon, Col. Richard P. Overshine's 31st Infantry Regiment of the 7th Division (less the 3d Battalion in division reserve) arrived at Suwon and relieved Task Force Hannum at the airfield. The Reconnaissance Company then reconnoitered south toward Osan. Task Force Hannum rejoined the 7th Division in the Anyang-ni area.

The big event of 22 September was —**The 31st Regiment Moving Southward**— securing Suwon Airfield and opening it to United Nations air traffic. This field, 21 miles south of Seoul, could accommodate the large C-54 transport planes with its 5,200-foot runway.

Meanwhile, seven miles northeast of Anyang-ni, enemy forces succeeded in ambushing the lead platoon of B Company, 32d Infantry, and badly disorganized it. Lt. Col. Don C. Faith, Jr., the 1st Battalion commander, withdrew B Company 2 miles, to the vicinity of Kwanmun-dong, closely pursued by the enemy. There the battalion checked the North Koreans. During the day, Lt. Col.

Charles M. Mount's 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, seized the series of hills from 1 to 2 miles south of the rail and highway bridges that crossed the Han into Seoul.

On 23 September, the 1st Battalion captured its objective, Hill 290. This hill, three miles below the Han River and seven miles southeast of Yongdungp'o, dominates the approaches to the Han River and Seoul from that direction.

### *The 32d Infantry Enters Seoul —Moving Northward*

By this time an important change had taken place in the plan to capture Seoul. The original operations plan required the 1st Marine Division to clear the city. But the expected capture of Seoul by the Marines was moving behind schedule. The stubborn enemy defense had denied the Marine division any important advance for three days. General Almond, the corps commander, had been growing increasingly impatient. Seoul was a symbol in the Korean War, just as Paris, Rome, and Berlin had been in World War II. It was a political and psychological as well as a military target. General MacArthur desired to capture the city as soon as possible and restore the Korean capital to its people.

Dissatisfied with the Marines' progress, General Almond on 23 September told General Smith that he could continue his frontal assaults but that he strongly urged him to use the space south of the Han River for an envelopment maneuver by the 1st Marines. Smith was unwilling to act on Almond's suggestion because he wanted to unite the 1st and 5th Marines on the north side of the Han instead of having them on opposite sides of the river. Almond told Smith that he would give him twenty-four hours longer to make headway. If Smith could not, Almond said, he would change division boundaries and bring the 7th Infantry Division and its 32d Regiment into the battle for the envelopment of the enemy defenses in Seoul.

On the morning of 24 September the North Koreans still held the Marines at the west edge of Seoul. About 0930 General Almond arrived at 7th Division headquarters and conferred with General Barr, the 7th Division commander, Brig. Gen. Henry I. Hodes, assistant 7th Division commander, and Col. Louis T. Heath, the division chief of staff. Almond told Barr he had tentatively decided that the 7th Division would attack across the Han River into Seoul the next morning. Almond then returned to his command post and there told Colonel Paik, commander of the ROK 17th Regiment that he expected to attach his regiment to the 32d Infantry for the attack on Seoul.

His mind now made up, Almond called a commanders' conference to meet with him at 1400 at Yongdungp'o Circle. Present, besides Almond, were Generals Smith, Barr, and Hodes, Colonels Forney and Beauchamp, and Col. John H. Chiles. In this open-air meeting, Almond quickly told the assembled commanders that he was changing the boundary between the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division, and that the 32d Regiment, with the ROK 17th Regiment attached, would attack across the Han River into Seoul at 0600 the next morning. The meeting was brief. At its conclusion the officers dispersed at once to make their respective plans.

In the afternoon and evening, X Corps attached the ROK 17th Regiment, the Marine 1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion (less one company), and two platoons of A Company, 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion, to the 7th Division to support the crossing.

The crossing was to be at the Sinsa-ri ferry, three miles east of the main rail and highway bridges over the Han River. On the opposite (north) bank, South Mountain (Nam-san) extended from the river northwest two miles into the heart of Seoul, culminating in a peak 900 feet high, the highest point in the city, about one mile east of the main Seoul rail station. A long, ridge like, shallow saddle connected this peak with a slightly lower one. On a western finger ridge of the main peak, near the 350-foot elevation and only half a mile from the rail station was a large shrine and a formally landscaped park. From the western base of South Mountain a long series of steps led up to this shrine and park. Viewing Seoul on a north-south axis, the peak of South Mountain was halfway into the city. Government House, at the northern edge of the city, lay two miles away. The main highway and rail line running east out of the city passed about a mile beyond the northern base of South Mountain. On this mountain nearly three months before, a company of ROK soldiers had conducted the last action in the defense of Seoul, dying, it has been said, to the last man.

The 32d Infantry's mission was first to seize and secure South Mountain, then to secure Hill 120 situated two miles eastward at the southeast edge of Seoul, and finally to seize and secure Hill 348, a large, high hill mass five miles east of Seoul and dominating the highway and rail line entering the city from that side. The regiment had strength of 4,912 men as it prepared for the crossing—3,110 Americans and 1,802 ROK's.

Before daybreak of the 25th, General Hodes established an advanced division command post near the river from which he was to direct the crossing operation. At 0400, General Almond, Admiral Struble, and members of the corps staff departed the X Corps headquarters at Ascom City to watch the crossing of the 32d Regiment. General Barr went forward at 0430 to the 32d Infantry's command post and an hour later he and Colonel Beauchamp left for an observation post near the river. At 0600, the 48th Field Artillery Battalion began firing a 30-minute artillery preparation, and the heavy mortars joined in to pound the cliffs lining the opposite side beyond the river bank.

Colonel Mount's 2d Battalion, selected to make the assault crossing, loaded into amphibious tractors in its assembly area and at 0630 F Company started across the Han. A ground fog obscured the river area. The entire 2d Battalion reached the north bank without loss of personnel or equipment. The 2d Battalion hurried across the narrow river beach, scaled the 30- to 60-foot cliffs, and moved rapidly to the slopes of South Mountain. An hour after the first troops had crossed the river the bright morning sun dispersed the ground fog. Air strikes then came in on South Mountain and Hill 120. Apparently, this crossing surprised the North Koreans. Their works on South Mountain were only lightly manned.

The 1st Battalion, commanded by Colonel Faith, followed the 2d across the Han and at 0830 started to move east along the river bank toward Hill 120. Just after noon the 3d Battalion crossed the river, followed the 1st Battalion eastward, and passed through it to occupy Hill 120. The 1st Battalion then took a position between the 3d and 2d Battalions. The ROK 17th Regiment crossed the Han immediately behind the 3d Battalion and moved to the extreme right flank of the 32d Infantry line where, at 2150, it began an all-night attack toward Hill 348.


While the rest of the regiment crossed the Han behind it and moved eastward, the 2d Battalion climbed the slopes of South Mountain, reaching and clearing the summit against moderate resistance by 1500. Once there, it immediately began digging in on a tight perimeter.

The North Koreans did not counterattack South Mountain as quickly as expected. The night passed tensely but quietly for the waiting 2d Battalion. Finally, at 0430 on the morning of the 26th, the soldiers heard tanks moving about and the sound of automatic weapons fire to their front. In semi-darkness half an hour later a large enemy force, estimated to number approximately 1,000 men, violently counterattacked the 2d Battalion perimeter on top of South Mountain. On the higher western knob of the mountain, G Company held its position against this attack, but on the lower eastern knob North Koreans overran F Company. Using all its reserves, Colonel Mount's battalion finally restored its positions at 0700 after two hours of battle and drove the surviving enemy down the slopes. Mount's men counted 110 enemy dead within its perimeter and 284 more outside for a total of 394 enemy killed. They took 174 prisoners.”<sup>55</sup>

So the die was cast for the 7<sup>th</sup> Division to enter South Korea via the Inchon invasion. And a *clone copy* of an upcoming event in North Korea, at the Changjin Reservoir.

Given the varied sources of UNC air strength, effective air operations in Korea had required some form of centralized control. General Stratemeyer during the first days of the war had sought operational control of all aviation operating from Japan or over Korea except that employed in purely naval tasks, such as the patrolling by Fleet Air Wing Six. Admiral Joy had resisted giving over that much control of his aircraft and carriers, judging that doing so could damage his command's ability to meet other naval responsibilities. In compromise, General MacArthur had given Stratemeyer "coordination control," a lesser degree of authority that centralized the conduct of air operations in Stratemeyer without giving him direct control of Navy and Marine air units. Stratemeyer, in turn, had delegated the coordination of close support operations to the Fifth Air Force commander, General Partridge. Although differences arose between the air and naval commands over the exact meaning of coordination control, the system was still in use in late November.<sup>56</sup> (Chart 3) Note the dashed lines, which indicate the break in direct authority to those units.

CHART 3-3 ORGANIZATION FOR UNC AIR OPERATIONS IN KOREA  
23 NOVEMBER 1950



<sup>55</sup> SOUTH TO THE NAKTONG, NORTH TO THE YALU (June-November 1950) by Roy E. Appleman. GP: Chapter xxvi.

<sup>56</sup> *Ebb & Flow*: 1990, GPO. p.41.

Note, Once again the dashed lines, indicating the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) and the Navy Carrier Air units were “Attached” rather than directly under the “Operational Control” of, The Department of The Air Force! This would change in January of 1951, as the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing would then be under the complete “operational control” of the Fifth Air Force!

Indicating these lines would be changed to straight ones instead of dashed!

## -Chapter 5-

### Into North Korea

On 3 October, General Walton Walker's Eighth Army assumed overall command of South Korea, thereby control of all areas below the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel. Thus, all areas lost in this "Conflict" are restored in South Korea. The X Corps, while originally intended to be part of General Walker's Eighth Army, is immediately ordered out of Eighth Army area of operations. Had there been no change in separation of these two commands from each other, X Corps could never exist as a separate command, and would have to be united with Eighth Army under General Walker. Since everything lost in South Korea was now regained, technically this "Conflict" was over, and there was no immediate need to proceed over the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel into North Korea. The 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division was ordered to leave on 7 October the way they arrived, via ship, through Inchon. There they will remain afloat until 26 October, until landing at Wonsan in North Korea. However, two combat divisions outbound, could tax the port of Inchon too much, as incoming supplies also have to come through this port as well. The 7<sup>th</sup> Division was now ordered to travel from Inchon through Suwon by truck and rail 350 miles southeast to the Port of Pusan. This is the same route used by Eighth Army to reach the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel, in essence merely exchanging Army forces. But where was the logic in such move? The X Corps, as the fresher of the two commands, should have secured the parallel, and allowed those American forces, in bitter excessive combat losses for three months, to receive some weeks of rest and reorganization. As it was Eighth Army forces were ordered to cross into North Korea, the following week. The 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Brigade, (the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division, arrived in Korea, about the same time) now united as the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, will be aboard ship for 19 days, while the 2nd Division (with few days out of combat) within two months, will face the worst single- division disaster in North Korea.

The problems that were created within the first three months of this "Conflict" in South Korea have ended. I will leave all problems and American losses to be analyzed by other historians. However, the movement into North Korea will have diverse consequences. Many were created by our American side, in the X Corps sector via a lack of a unified command in North Korea. To quote a well-quoted phrase from that comic strip Pogo: "We have met the enemy and he is us." The Navy now controlled the total Marine force at sea and totally under their command. The precedent just followed at Inchon, and the problem between Generals Smith and Almond, should have been reviewed for this upcoming amphibious landing in North Korea. Since there is no indication that the Department of the Navy instituted any established principle or rule to using of its 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division for their next and final landing in North Korea. Merely to revert immediately back under full Navy authority rather than revert back to General Almond command—under his full Army authority in North Korea. Lacking any change from X Corps command in South Korea, the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division will serve under the same Navy authority as they did in South Korea. However, this is one "*single (FMF) Marine division*" and the Department of the Navy begins its own "*single service history*" with a confused disclaimer.

The Marine Corps first published their "*single Marine division*" history, concerning the year-ending battle at the reservoir in North Korea, in Volume 3, in 1957. The mystery to me is why the Department of the Navy approved their early rush to publication and release. The Official Seal of the Department of the Navy appears on this Marine Corps History. However, the Navy's "overlapping history" was not published until 1962. Moreover, both of these individual histories within the time

frame of twelve years from the battle. Contrast these periods to the Army history of forty years, and one may wonder why such a large period between histories. Part of the answer lies in the fact that many records of Army troop movements or stamped, as “Classified,” “Secret,” or “Top Secret,” at the discretion of the Corps commanders. The regulation time to release these records had various timelines as well. The Marine Corps history, written within that restricted time of “Classified.” Why so many orders, once executed, are then classified, remain a mystery to me. Still whatever that reason, if they were classified, means that only those officials with document clearance have access to them, but forbidden by law to publish them. This is a prime reason the publications of books was delayed in writing the history of the Korean War in any detail. The exception was the Marine Corps history. But he who publishes his history first has the lead advantage in setting the story according to their version. In other words, why were the Marine Corps exempt from the 12-year “classified publication” of “classified” information? This history includes reference to the Army force east of Changjin.” The question this poses is how can this be legal?

More precisely, the Marine inclusions of the Army forces on the east side of the reservoir, though lacking in great detail, our mission at the reservoir was under Opn Order’s ## 23, 24, and 25, all of which were marked “Secret.” That classification requires twenty-five years to release.

### *Preface (from Navy History)*

“Perhaps the simplest way to describe the Korean War is to say that it was different, for it fell, or seemed to fall, outside the pattern of all previous American experience. It was a surprising war in a surprising place at a surprising time, and one which imperatively called for answers to neglected problems of national defense. It had begun as a police action; it developed rapidly into an undeclared war of no small magnitude; it ended as an unpopular and seemingly profitless stalemate.”...“Since the enemy had no navy, the conflict lacks the drama inherent in the clash of fleets. Since the focus of action was always on land, the three services are constantly mixed up in each other's affairs and a (simple) single-*service* history—therefore—become an impossibility. The absence, in notable contrast to the situation of 1945, of any appreciable quantity of enemy records, constitutes a further obvious difficulty.”<sup>57</sup> In this case the Chinese enemy records are also delayed by forty some years as well. The enemy history, as to their location, (rather than simple speculation) by the Marine Corps, thus proves to embarrass the Marine published history. Rather than stick with a known record of fact, “No contact reported” on a given enemy division, the Marine Corps speculation, “spin” as to where any division “may have been” may have been deleted, as well! As the Marine Corps National Museum map deletes the location (Army force, east of the reservoir) of Task Force Faith as well.

The above statement, “the focus of action was always on land, the three services were (pretty) constantly mixed up in each other's affairs, and a (simple) single-service history—therefore— become an impossibility.” Since ships do not travel on land, how could the Navy become so mixed up in an exclusive land operation, except through this one Marine division? Nevertheless, a Marine Corps, “single-*service* history” (or more precisely defined as a “single-*division* history.”) did emerge. This statement from the Navy history begs the question: why were the (other) three services, “constantly mixed up in each other's affairs?” It would indeed be difficult for any Army veteran to understand how the Army—now—deprived, by having no ships or planes, and the 1st Marine Division was never

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<sup>57</sup> James A. Fields, Jr. Preface: History of United States Naval Operation’s–Korea, p.1

under Army regulations, how could the Army be constantly mixed up in the other two services affairs? It also outlines the first six months and how we failed in Korea. Why indeed would this “*constantly mixed up in each other’s affairs*” be so primal, and interfere and dominate, and degrade (Army) land operations? The isolation of the “three services” to indicate the Department of the Army (land) the Department of the Navy (sea) and the “new” Department of the Air Force (air). In 1947, the Army had lost its Army Air Corps, to the new Department of the Air Force. That left the Army with several Airborne Divisions and *not one single plane* to transport them anywhere. Also the Army lost their own Army Transport ships to the Merchant Marines, leaving them without individual ships to transport their own forces. I shipped to Japan in 1948 on an Army Transport ship. Since the Marine Corps remained a branch of the Navy, it remains under their control, or it should be! The Marine Corps, “*single-division*” history, therefore, as a *fourth branch*, should become “an even-greater-impossibility,” and have no place as a “*one division*” history! However, as stated, the Department of the Navy admits to interference in Army land operations! This last is my focus on land operations, specifically in North Korea. “Since the enemy had no navy, the conflict lacks the drama inherent in the clash of fleets.” The Navy addition of this: “single-division history” all importance of their 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division. And their total disregard for Army regulations. The Navy refusal to reprimand the Marine Commander’s delaying tactic, while their parent Department of the Navy undermines their own Navy role at sea. The Marine Corps cut loose as the anchor chain of a ship, *never anchored* to or became part of, an Army X Corps command, and attached, equally as important. Especially at the reservoir: *between* the Army 3<sup>rd</sup> Division and 7<sup>th</sup> Division on its X Corps organizational chart.

Army forces aboard Navy ships are directly subject—directly—to that ship Captain’s command. The Marine Corps’ claim to fame as an “elite” and “single-division” fighting force in Korea was negated by any Army Corps attachment. Their movement, mission, and schedules, and location are a part of that Army history! However, the Army under command of the Marine Commander is not! Why is that? The fact that the Marine Corps casualties or recorded within the Navy history is a mystery as some vital—yet contradictory—points and information stands out between their two separate histories. Example: The casualties reported or inflated within the Marine Corps history. Just as the Department of the Army, G-1 and Personnel Section handle all Official (Divisional) Records and total accounting of the final tally of casualties for any given battle—not each division itself, I believe that applies equally to the Navy.

Therefore, the Department of the Navy, G-1, lists the Marine casualties (directly contradictory) at the Changjin Reservoir as follows, “With a strength slightly exceeding 25,000, the Marine Division between 27 November and 11 December suffered 556 killed, 182 missing, 2,872 wounded, and 3,648 non-battle casualties (NBC), the last largely from frostbite.” Total Navy count is 7,258 men. The Marine Corps history lists a larger number of their non-battle casualties as 7,338 men, in addition, to others as listed, as 604 killed, 114 DOW, 192 MIA, 3,485 WIA, and total 11,733. Which of these two totals is the official record? This leads one to suspect the NBC figure of the Marine history is exaggerated, since the Marine NBC count is larger (by 3,690 men) than that total Navy count of ALL killed, missing, wounded and non-battle count. This suggests that the Marine Corps has counted their non-battle casualties twice! Quite a discrepancy, between two (non-battle) histories, each has the official Department of the Navy seal of approval. Note that all self-inflicted injuries are listed as non-battle as well.

Chart 4-1



-1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division Casualties - 27 November - 11 December 1950- (Navy G-1)<sup>58</sup>

Killed 556	Missing 182	Wounded 2,872	Non-Battle 3,648	<b>Total 7,258</b>
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-1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division Casualties - 27 November - 11 December 1950-(USMC History)<sup>59</sup>

Killed 604	Missing 192	Dow 114	Wounded 3,485	Non-Battle 7,338	<b>Total 11,733</b>
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The key here to remember, that it is not as important to resolve this Navy-Marine dilemma, just make sure we are aware of the facts. I did not create this discrepancy; I merely highlight it.

*The X Corps Moves to Northeast Korea* <sup>60</sup>

While the I Corps of Eighth Army was driving into North Korea on the P'yongyang axis and the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division was loading at Inchon, the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division was assembling at Pusan to out-load there in the X Corps amphibious movement into northeast Korea. On 30 September, the 7<sup>th</sup> Division had been relieved of its responsibilities in the Seoul area and its units began to shift southeast from the Suwon and Inchon areas preparatory to the long overland move to Pusan. Ten LST's were reserved at Inchon for the Division's tanks and heavy equipment. On 4 October, Eighth Army indicated the route it wanted the 7<sup>th</sup> Division to take through its zone, specifying the road through Ch'ungju, Hamch'ang, Kumch'on, Taegu, and Kyongju to Pusan, a road distance of 350 miles from Inchon. At Taegu the troops were to load on trains for the final part of the journey, whereupon the trucks would return to Suwon and for others.

The 3<sup>d</sup> Battalion, 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry (the upcoming disaster in North Korea) led the 7<sup>th</sup> Division movement, passing the initial point (IP) at Inchon at 0350, 5 October, with the rest of the regiment following. The command group of the 32<sup>d</sup> Infantry led the movement of that regiment through Inchon four hours later. The 17<sup>th</sup> Regiment, remained at Inchon, holding its blocking position there until relieved on 8 October, and it then began the motor movement to Pusan. Both the 31<sup>st</sup> and 32<sup>d</sup> Regiments closed at Pusan on 7 October. On 8 October, the 7<sup>th</sup> Division command post closed at Anyang-ni and opened at Pusan, although most of the headquarters was still on the road.

The movement to Pusan was not without incident. On two occasions enemy forces ambushed convoys in the mountains near Mun'gyong. The first ambush caught the head of the 2<sup>d</sup> Battalion, 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry, at 0200, 6 October, and inflicted nine casualties; the second ambush at 0230, 9 October, caught the division headquarters convoy in the pass three miles northwest of Mun'gyong. Enemy machine gun fire killed six men and destroyed several vehicles. Elements of the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 17<sup>th</sup> Infantry, succeeded in clearing the pass area that afternoon. This battalion thereafter patrolled the pass above Mun'gyong until it was relieved on 11 October by the 27<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment of the 25<sup>th</sup> Division.

The Division Artillery (separate unit from RCT artillery) was the last major unit to leave Inchon, clearing there at 1700 on 10 October. It and the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 17<sup>th</sup> Infantry, arrived at Pusan on 12 October to complete the division movement to the port. About 450 division troops had been airlifted on 11 October from Kimpo Airfield near Seoul to Pusan. In addition to the 7<sup>th</sup> Division, the X Corps Medical, Engineer, Ordnance, Transportation, Quartermaster, Chemical, and Signal units moved

<sup>58</sup> Navy History, Part 5. 7 December 1950–25 January 1951: The Second Chinese Offensive

<sup>59</sup> Marine History, Volume 3: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign.

<sup>60</sup> Roy Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, pp. 632-633.

overland to Pusan for out-loading. Altogether, in seven days, approximately 1,460 tons of supplies and equipment and 13,422 troops had moved overland in division vehicles and those of the 52<sup>d</sup> Truck Battalion. The loading of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division vehicles and equipment at Pusan began on 14 October and that of the men two days later. The division was completely loaded on 17 October, the deadline set by X Corps nine days earlier. The loading of corps troops at Pusan began on 19 October.

In its order of 8 October, X Corps had required the 2<sup>d</sup> Logistical Command to furnish 15 days' supply of all classes for the 25,000 troops out-loading at Pusan, 10 days of Class II and IV supplies for the troops out-loading at Inchon, and, for the entire corps, 15 days' resupply to arrive in the Wonsan area on D-day plus 8 (28 October). Except for Class I supply, the 2<sup>d</sup> Logistical Command had no reliable information as to the requirements of the various units. Providing the 15 days of supply depleted depot stocks in that area, particularly of winter clothing, operational rations, POL, and Post Exchange comfort items. This resulted in subsequent logistical difficulties for Eighth Army. Much of the 15 days' resupply for X Corps had to be requisitioned on the Japan Logistical Command. One can see here the problems heaped on Eighth Army to solve this problem, along with the responsibilities to attack north of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel.

The difficult logistical and out-loading problem given the 2<sup>d</sup> Logistical Command on such short notice was worked out successfully only by the constant mutual effort and co-operation of the staffs of the logistical command and of the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division. The out-loading was completed in time. It was an outstanding performance. On 16 October, the 7<sup>th</sup> Division advance command post opened aboard the USS *Eldorado*. But because mine fields in Wonsan Harbor now delayed sailing of the convoys for nearly two weeks, the hectic work at the port to meet the loading deadline was largely in vain.

### *The X Corps Ashore*

The ships of Amphibious Group One and the LST's of the tractor group sailed from Inchon late in the afternoon of 16 October. At 0800 on the 17<sup>th</sup>, the main body of the Attack Force with the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division aboard departed Inchon, moved into the Yellow Sea, and headed south to round the tip of Korea, into the Sea of Japan. From Inchon it was 830 miles to Wonsan by the shortest sea route. After arriving off the objective area, the flotilla carrying the 1st Marine Division steamed slowly back and forth from 19 to 25 October in the Sea of Japan just outside the Wonsan channel. The restless marines called it "Operation Yo-yo." It was a great relief to everyone afloat when twenty-one transports and fifteen LST's came into the harbor on 25 October and dropped anchor off Blue and Yellow Beaches. The X Corps began a quiet, administrative landing at 0730 on 26 October. At 1000 27, October the command post of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division closed aboard the USS *Mt. McKinley* and opened in Wonsan. By the close of 28 October all combat elements of the Marine division were ashore. However, quite late, as Bob Hope was already having his road show in the area, and ridiculing the Marine late landing.

Meanwhile, the 7<sup>th</sup> Division had remained idly afloat at Pusan for ten days. Finally, it received orders to proceed to Iwon, 150 miles above Wonsan and to unload there, across the beaches. Because the X Corps mission by now had been changed to advancing northward instead of westward from Wonsan, General Almond decided to land the 7<sup>th</sup> Division as close as possible to its axis of advance inland toward North Korea's northern border. This was to be the Pukch'ong-P'ungsan-Hyesanjin road to the Yalu. On receipt of the changed orders, the 17<sup>th</sup> Regimental Combat Team, which was to be first ashore, had to unload its unit equipment from its transports at Pusan and reload combat equipment on LST's, in order to be prepared to land on a possibly hostile beach. This done, seven LST's with the 17<sup>th</sup>

Regimental Combat Team aboard left Pusan on 27 October and headed up the coast to IWON, 150 miles north of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division. It would be of value to state here, the two American divisions would “Spearhead” their individual missions to the Yalu River from their point of each landing site. My point: The 7<sup>th</sup> Division by design will be the lead division, always, well above the Marine division, so any claim to this latter divisions claim to their “Spearhead” efforts could be challenged at best.

For what is the measure of an Army infantry man? No matter the length of his training, the event that he may be killed in action even before he reaches the beachhead, his intensive training—or lack thereof—is then of little value. Likewise, if he is fortunate enough to hit the beach alive, only then can his individual mettle be tested on the battlefield. However, adding to enemy fire, a sudden friendly fired bullet, or an unintended napalm—friendly fire—canister, dropped short, may also snuff out his life in a second. Searching for answers, one may review General Douglas MacArthur’s comments on this subject, concerning the American infantry man, on two occasions. Both from his memoirs: <sup>61</sup>

“The story of the infantry soldier is an old and honorable one. He carries his home with him—and often his grave. Somehow, he has to bring along the whole paraphernalia of fighting, as well as domesticated living: the grocery store, the ration dump; the hospital, the Medical Corps; the garage, the motor pool; the telephone, the Signal Service. He must sleep and eat and fight and die on foot, in all weather, rain, or shine, with or without shelter. He is vulnerable day and night. Death has his finger on him for twenty-four hours, in battle, going towards it, or retreating from it. It is a wonder that the morale of those uniformed gypsies never falters.”

The gains or losses suffered on any battlefield should never be allowed to diminish those men that gave their lives in those battles. For anyone to extract glory from those men that fell, to raise prestige for the ones remaining alive at the end of such a battle is to steal their place in history. That is the worst form of hypocrisy. The Marine Corps lists (and claims) all Marines as combatants (“Every Marine a rifleman.”), whereas the Army separates their combatants by designation of the stripes they wear on their uniforms, by reversing their colors, i.e. Divisional Combatant, Gold stripe(s) on a Blue background, all (Non Divisional) support groups, by the reverse, Blue stripe(s) on a Gold background. Thus, the Army combatant can be easily recognized from the non-combatant unit.

The other reference from MacArthur’s final speech at West Point:

“I do not know the dignity of their birth but I do know the glory of their death. They died unquestioning, uncomplaining with faith in their hearts, and on their lips the hope that we would go on to victory. Always for them—Duty-Honor-Country—always their blood and sweat and tears: as we sought the way and the light and the truth.”<sup>62</sup>

Also one should be aware of the exchange in designation too the more famous title: The *Chosin* Reservoir. This name was derived from the charts and maps the Japanese invasion/occupation forces, used in both North and South Korea. The Japanese were the ones that designed and built the reservoir. But this name (Chosin) was a direct degradation of the original Korean language and name for the Changjin Reservoir. Indeed, at the time of the battle for the reservoir, the town north of the reservoir

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<sup>61</sup> Douglas MacArthur Reminiscences, pp. 380-381

<sup>62</sup> Douglas MacArthur Reminiscences, p.482

was Changjin, and today the location of Hagaru-ri is also included in this Changjin name. Indeed, this change to Changjin is now inclusive of Hagaru-ri and the reservoir itself. Therefore, the name is properly Changjin when referring to the Korean War 1950 action.

The issue of who will seize this town of Changjin will become a very important issue in this case. This town sits above the northern rim of the Changjin reservoir. Its water drains north, from this northern rim, via the Changjin River—Pujon (Fusen) River—into the Yalu River. This town of Changjin becomes a vital pivotal point, once reached to pivot westward, to aid, and cut off enemy forces threat to Eighth Army under Plan 8, Draft One. However, it will always be an objective to be seized under Plan 6, 11 November 1950. So the issue will be:

### *Who will seize Changjin?*

As of 11 November, this mission is located—and confirmed—within the 1st Marine Division's zone of operations. Although the Marines have this mission to seize, and pass through the town of Changjin, they will never reach or seize this objective. General Smith, in his utter failure to block or reconnoiter this position at Changjin, has failed to impede enemy forces from relocation above Hagaru-ri, and also fails to secure his hub of operations at Hagaru-ri from any northern attack. General Smith, in his failure, therefore allows that massive increase and build-up of CCF enemy forces within his own northern zone of operations! Not until 23 November (under pressure) will he order the 5<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment, to locate east of the reservoir! That regiment will be short, some thirty miles of reaching Changjin. It should be noted that Changjin will remain in enemy hands, and remain a vital main supply route (MSR) for CCF forces to increase and finally envelope all friendly Allied forces (and the Seventh Division—on the road—but yet to arrive) at the Changjin Reservoir Zone of operations.


### *X CORPS MOVES NORTH*

#### BOUNDARY LINE-BETWEEN- EIGHTH ARMY & X CORPS

- Refer to: The Battlefield-Army Map, Number 3.
- Note locations requiring “Blocking Missions” at Yudam-ni & Changjin.
- “Blocking Positions” deny enemy force, (entering/escaping) either Zone of operations.

#### MAP: Marines and Chinese Forces in the Chosin Reservoir Area.

- Shows only the exclusive Marine area of withdrawal to the coast.
  - This map is supported via Navy Maps 17 & 18.
  - Map 18 merely reverses the arrows listed on Map 17.



- Map 19 note lower left corner two enemy divisions at the Pujon Reservoir indicating had we never moved from there we would have engaged these two divisions at this reservoir! We would have been better prepared and dug-in!

While it was my original intention to include these Navy Maps with a list of all Killed in Action and Missing in Action, in this book, I have decided to refer the reader to my existing site on the “Korean War Educator —Topics—Ray Vallowe Research.” where they already clearly exist under my listing of MIA/KIA East of Chosin.

The North Korean mission, to separate the units/divisions into three zones: On the east coast, the ROK South Korean Forces Zone of operation, to Hapsu under the Russian border. At Hapsu, the right flank of the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division central Zone of X Corps. The 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division anchored to the left flank

of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division, and adjacent to the right flank, boundary line, of Eighth Army Zone of operations, on the western side of North Korea.

The 26<sup>th</sup> ROK Regiment, having moved into North Korean, has already engaged the *CCF 124th Division*, on their way to the reservoir. When relieved by X Corps orders to unite with the other ROK units on the eastern coast, by the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines, RCT-7 faced its first battle with this Chinese division, which attacked them in the Sudong area on 3 November, and after a pitched battle which reportedly destroyed the enemy division, the Chinese suddenly “disappeared.” On 6 November near the north end of the Pujon (Fusen) Reservoir the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry, also encountered Chinese forces from the *CCF 126th Division*. They also “disappeared.” The 3<sup>rd</sup> Division landed at Wonsan during 5–17 November, where they began the relief of Marines units in that area so the Marines could move to the Changjin reservoir. By 10 November, the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines arrived at Koto-ri and by 14 November they were at Hagaru-ri where work on an airstrip began on the 19<sup>th</sup>. The 5<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment will move out on the east side of the reservoir on 23 November. Their mission, to seize the town of Changjin and advance to the Yalu River at Singalpajin adjacent to the left flank of the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, east of Samsu. On 21 November, elements of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division were already at Samsu, and holding Hyesanjin, east of Samsu, thus completing their assigned mission to reach the Yalu River.

While the above facts are all recorded military history, in this time span history deviates and “fails to record” what happens beyond these dates? To the contrary, history embellishes and expands the coming events, as static events and unchangeable at the Changjin Reservoir by neglecting to fill in all of the changing history yet to come.

The 7<sup>th</sup> MARINES ARRIVE at HAGARU-RI—14 November 1950.

- Refer to: Navy Map, Number 17. On to the Border.
- Map show these zones as they exist 27 Oct.–25 Nov. 1950.
- Note tip of arrows point to the North.

The 7<sup>th</sup> DIVISION SEIZES HYESANJIN on the YALU RIVER—21 November 1950.

- Refer to: Army Map, Number 5. The X Corps Zone.
- Map show these zones as they exist 26 November 1950.
- Note the existing Marine Zone, North to the Manchurian border, has been narrowed! Draft 3, of Plan Eight completely eliminates this part of the Marine mission! A blood-chilling replay of an event two months earlier at Seoul. This Marine Corps mission now reassigned to the 7<sup>th</sup> Division. This change will be far, far, more costly in American lives, than the **(previous? versus)** preview at Seoul.

Both of these maybe accessed via “Korean War Educator or Ray Vallowe Research under Topic’s.”

## TERRAIN

Other than the coastal road, there are only two main roads inland in this area, often single-lane roads, the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division MSR to Hyesanjin on the Yalu, and the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division MSR to the Changjin Reservoir and beyond, a road which climbs the rugged gorges of the Funchilin Pass. The elevation of the Changjin Reservoir is 1,060 meters, 3870 feet, with nearby mountains over 2,000 meters. This rugged terrain of the Kaema Plateau is adjacent to Manchuria across the Yalu River and Siberia to the north, an environment that experiences early frost.

## WEATHER

Mid-winter (January–February) temperature extremes can plunge to where the Fahrenheit and Celsius scales meet—40 below zero. The fact that there was no fall season here was evident everywhere. This was an early winter with ice beginning to form on lakes and streams in early November as the temperature continued to fall. Winter uniforms are beginning to be issued, but short supplies of many needed winter provisions were scarce, and some completely unavailable. Chap Stick was a sought item, and the newly issued mittens were a problem to retain, these are easily lost if one did not tie them by string through your fatigue jacket lapel straps. Regular gloves did not have to be removed as often to work with various items.

While this chapter covers event that “are recorded,” they are in no wise historically accurate. The chapters to follow will fill in many historical gaps that are missing in “What History Failed to Record.”

### *Status of those still unaccounted-for—Killed in Action and Missing in Action 2012*

“In addition, 96 per cent of those people identified and their remains brought back and turned over to their next of kin. Of that entire outfit, 96 per cent were identified, and I have to hand it to the North Koreans—they did an excellent job of digging up those bodies, put them in bags, and sent them to Panmunjom. They would not let us send up graves registration people to do it. They did it themselves.”<sup>63</sup> General Smith praised the North Koreans’ “excellent job of digging up those bodies.” (Benis Frank: Smith. Interview USMCH 1969.) Read how the North Koreans handled those remains from the North Korean battle zones, contained—as follows—concerning those K-208 Boxes in section at JPAC Lab in Hawaii. The North Koreans did a sloppy job of retrieving them! They merely mixed up the remains in 208 Boxes—known as K-208 at the JPAC lab in Hawaii—those boxes may contain some 400–450 mixed remains-yet to be identified!

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<sup>63</sup> Benis Frank, USMC Historian, his interview with General Smith, 1969.

- Chapter 6 -

EIGHTH ARMY & X CORPS–Boundary Lnes

Plan 6: -OPN 0 6 - 11 November 1950, 1st Marine Division.

Assigned mission(s):

The 1st Marine Division would guarantee the safety of Wonsan and Hungnam, then send the Marines from **Sudong** to Chosin Reservoir area, then on to the Yalu River at Huchangganggu\* and **Singalpajin**, west (or to the left) of the 7th Division forces. (\*Huchang'gu for short) located between Lin-Chiang and **Singalpajin**. Note, the two missions in bold print will be reassigned to the Army 3rd Division (Sudong) and Singalpajin to the 7th Division! 1st Marine Division order –too occupy a blocking position at Yudam-ni was issued, pursuant to Marine Corps order below.

“1MarDiv OpO 21-50, issued at 2000, 13 November, confirmed the frag orders issued earlier to seize Hagaru-ri, and in addition, provided for RCT-5 to pass through RCT-7 at Hagaru-ri and continue the advance to the north, while RCT-7 occupied a blocking position at Yudam-ni, 14 miles to the northwest.”<sup>64</sup>

The 1st Marine Division order issue above will never be executed prior too, Draft 3 OPN O 7-effective 25 November 1950. Those remaining X CORPS missions listed below will also be followed under this Plan 6.

3rd & 7th Division: ROK I Corps, Plan 6 -11 November '50,

Assigned mission(s):

- The Army's 7th Division, occupying a thirty-mile front in the center of X Corps, would push north to the Yalu from Pungsan to Hyesanjin. It would anchor its right flank at Hyesanjin (adjacent to ROK I Corps forces) and its left flank on the Fusen Reservoir (east of the Chosin Reservoir) Mission completed (Hyesanjin) under Plan 6-21 November.
- The Army's 3d Division, preparing to land at Wonsan at MacArthur's direction, would relieve the Marines at Wonsan and Hungnam and conduct such offensive operations as ordered by Almond. [2400-12 November] Mission completed under Plan 6.
- ROK I Corps (3d and Capital divisions) would continue northeasterly up the coast to Chongjin. Serving as X Corps right flank, the ROK', also send elements from the coast road north and northwesterly to the Yalu. Due to a JCS directive to General MacArthur that no American Forces will operate under the Soviet Border. This would place only Republic of Korea (ROK) forces under the Russian Boundary of North Korea. Mission completed under Plan 6.

–MAP 5–BELOW–

- However between the dates of 11 November and 23 November the plan of attack changes to assist Eighth Army in their westward zone. This New Plan 8 will go through three drafts before a final Plan 8 –Operational Order 7 is issued to execute it!

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<sup>64</sup> Rasula's: Changjin Journal, 09.01.06.



–Note's of interest–  
Missing from Map 5–1st Marine Division RCT-1 & RCT–11!

Date of Map is 26 November 1950—accurate to the fact(s) both Marine units are someplace else! 1st Marine Division units should be in their newly assigned Zone of Operations, “**North of Hagaru-ri.**” RCT-5 was relieved –251400 November, East of Chosin Reservoir—by arrival of 1/32 Infantry Battalion! They are still there on the 27th! Why is that?

Missing from Map 5–7th Infantry Division–31-RCT & 1/32 Infantry Battalion!  
7th Infantry Division 31st RCT–3/31, plus Attached Battalions–1/32 & 57th Field Artillery (-) & entire Tank Company—located East of the Changjin Reservoir –on the next day– indicated on this Map 5!

–PLAN 8, Draft One–

Almond initially proposed that he could best help the Eighth Army by continuing northward and then, if feasible, by attacking west from some point above the Changjin Reservoir. This proposal fairly coincided with what MacArthur had in mind. On 15 November he instructed Almond to open an attack to the west after his inland flank forces reached the town of Changjin, twenty-five miles north of the reservoir. Thirty miles west of Changjin lay Kanggye and a junction with the arterial road and rail line connecting Manp'ojin and Huich'on. The road and track obviously served as enemy supply routes, and it was MacArthur's intention that the X Corps' westward attack would cut them. [Mossman: Ebb & Flow, GPO. p.48.] **Smith objects; Almond cancels!**

–PLAN 8, Draft Two–

Apprehensive, after further consideration, that the supply line of the attack force would become precariously extended in any drive westward from a point as far north as Changjin town, Almond offered the alternative of an attack over the road leading into the Eighth Army zone from Yudam-ni at the western edge of the Changjin Reservoir. The enemy supply routes were to be cut at the village of Mup'yong-ni, fifty-five miles west of Yudam-ni and forty miles north of Huich'on. Almond intended that the 1st Marine Division make the westward effort into Mup'yong-ni and then press an attack northwestward to the Yalu, pinching out in the process the ROK II Corps on the Eighth Army right. MacArthur agreed to the change and instructed Almond to begin the attack as soon as possible. [Mossman: Ebb & Flow, GPO, p.49.] **Smith objects; Almond sends his G-3 to Tokyo for a face to face meeting with General MacArthur! He (CINCFE) approves the altered Plan 8, Draft Three this date, [240025 November 1950.]**

### The Outlook for Victory

Brightening the outlook for success in reaching the border during the time taken to prepare the forces and plans was the light opposition to the X Corps' latest advances, in which 7th Division units near the center of the corps zone had gone all the way to the Yalu. In the Eighth Army zone, too, enemy forces for the most part had remained inactive and inconspicuous since mid-November. Eighth Army patrols ranging deep into enemy territory during that time had encountered outposts but no major force or position. In neither zone was any evidence of offensive preparations uncovered. It appeared, rather, that the enemy had adopted a defensive strategy and that the Chinese, after breaking off their engagement on 6 November, had withdrawn into position defenses some distance to the north.[Mossman: Ebb & Flow, GPO, p.50]

**-MAP 5-**



MAP 5

What is important here: Plan 8, Draft One was the plan favored by CG Almond, as attacking from some point: “North of the Chosin Reservoir suitable lateral routes to the west appear to exist but these

routes would have to be weighed when that area is reached.” [Policy and Direction: The First Year, GPO. p.263.]

Note of interest: The confusion over the enemy statements that these earlier Chinese forces were merely “Peoples Volunteers” helping their (sister) neighbors, rather than the alternate confusion of PLA (Peoples Liberation Army) forces, was never understood until later! The fact that Marshal Peng (MacArthur’s equivalent) was in complete charge (alternately) of both Volunteers & the Peoples Liberation Army’s! Indeed, Marshal Peng’s signature appears on the Truce Agreement as the Volunteer Army Commander!

ON TO THE RESERVOIR: “[T]he circumstances that led to the tragedy are not documented in records or command reports. There are no records on deposit in the National Archives for the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, the 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, or the 57th Field Artillery Battalion, for the Chosin Reservoir action in November, 1950. I found none when I worked in the records there in 1974-75. Several years later a request to the National Archives for a search of these records yielded the reply that the search had turned up no such records. Probably none were ever prepared. All the units involved were part of the 7th Infantry Division.” [Appleman, *East of Chosin*, p. 391; Bibliographical note] The records were declassified, in 1979.

Colonel Allan Duart MacLean, Operational Order 222400I November, 1950: 7<sup>th</sup> Division, RCT-31<sup>st</sup> is pursuing his active mission in X Corps; under original Plan 6.

“On Thanksgiving Day (November 23), the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry was scattered across northeastern Korea. Advancing along tracks that could scarcely be called roads, the Regimental Headquarters and 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion were in the mountains near the northeast end of the Pujon (Fusen) Reservoir, the 1st Battalion was near the reservoir’s southeast end near Pungsan and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion was protecting the 7<sup>th</sup> Division’s Command Post near Pukchong.” 31<sup>st</sup> Regiment-Special copy-Chapter 14: Via Colonel Karl Lowe. [Newsletters]

1)-OPN 0 23-232400I (24 November Plan 8, Draft Nr Two) 31-RCT continues its present mission in the center Zone to north.

Likewise, the value of this information if revealed at that [1979] timeline, (\*) a time of high interest-too all authors about this era of history-was hidden from their view, either too confuse are as too explosive, which could change *every book being written* at that time. Contrary to this logic, it could likewise be a valuable document to enhance credibility for that army force that fought and made their history at the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir in 1950! This missing document established all 31-RCT credentials for this force being at the reservoir. Hence, lacking these credentials; deny validity to this Army force sent to the reservoir, and the true facts that history failed to record. Likewise, concerning all the misstated essentials and those unjustified innuendoes promulgated concerning those Army forces: Regretfully, from some top army officials. Supporting this belief, in Roy Appleman’s book “*East of Chosin*” his mistake-lacking these documents-listing Draft Two and his like attempt to correct this error as Draft number Three, in his later book “*Escaping the Trap*”.(\*25 Years to declassify!)

In 1991, two additional documents emerged from the National Archives, i.e. 7th Infantry Division concerning 31-RCT, have also come to the forefront of history. Combining these three-*published*-and well preserved, declassified documents, OPN O, #23, #24, and #25 now provide a *timeline* for transferring this Army 31-RCT to the Changjin Reservoir. Located in the upper part of each regimental unit mission; listed under; #1) b, Is a summary-by Division G-3 staff officers of what the rest of this Army Division is required to do within their assigned zone of operations. This information makes all the difference in this 7th Division major role to continue their highly controversial, X Corps, Draft Three mission as assigned by –CINCFE– General Douglas MacArthur. In this drama this WAS the same identical mission; as all historical authors of the past redundantly assign to the 1st Marine Division! That Marine division receiving the full credit in performing a (questionable) mission assigned them is another central issue, as only one division will have the final mission to seize Mupyong-ni! It can only be one or the other, not both sharing the same zone! Thus this is a very complex issue and another highly controversial one! Likewise, the later 31-RCT written 27 November 1950 supersedes the earlier Marine Division order to seize Mup’yong-ni!

The very designation of this major battle at the “Chosin Reservoir” in North Korea was a corrupt and dishonorable usage of a past Japanese-name for that reservoir, rather than its proper Korean name; The “Changjin Reservoir” as the native Korean language was fully restored in the liberation of the Korean people, as a reconstituted liberated nation. Yet after World War II, it remained bitterly divided at the 38th Parallel separating North and South Korean governments. The name “Chosin” now dominates all history books - *excluding* those of The Center for Military History (CMH). Regretfully, after five decades it is difficult to interchange the Chosin name, back to Changjin, as it is so publicized over fifty plus years in history! Thus, the Marine Corps rush to publication in 1957 set an agenda for two separate histories; One: The *Chosin Reservoir Campaign*, (that title stuck) and the facts contained therein are redundantly applied by most historians, as a valid fact. Secondly it established a “*single division history*” i.e. Army North Korean history (Ebb & Flow) although forty years late in publication; will rely–in most cases–directly on this Marine Corps History! In contrast this “*single division history*” was in opposition to all American Army division ratios in Korea; this one Marine division to seven Army divisions. Hence a Mystery #1: revolves around the structure of the Marine Corps, as it relates too who was in direct charge and bore the most responsibility for their one division under X Corps Army orders as related to its timeline connection: between 21 September and 15 December 1950.

The real drama concerning the Chosin Reservoir was interrupted by the sudden Chinese Communist Force (CCF) intervention! That dramatic change, flanked by prior events between Major General Edward “Ned” Almond of X Corps and Major General Oliver Prince Smith of the 1st Marine Division is one to rival that of two other Major Generals, i.e. Smith v Smith of WW II over the islands of Makin and Saipan.<sup>65</sup> While most authors; record pure speculation to why the 7th Infantry Division must relocate to the Changjin Reservoir. Those facts were classified as “Secret” until revealed –29-41– years later via Archive Documents, personal accountings, and Army history. Those delayed accounts of the rapid X Corps (Army) revisions and relocation however have nothing what-so-ever to do with supporting the 1st Marine Division at the reservoir. To the contrary; Mystery #2; was to replace their – mission– with the 7th Infantry Division! The maxim of the CCF should have been If your enemy is in

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<sup>65</sup> Those events likewise pitted two major generals of equal rank against each other’s “tactics” on battlefield missions. However, here the Marine General was the Corps Commander at Makin and Saipan so their roles were reversed at Seoul and Chosin! Holland Smith, USMC v Ralph Smith, USA. However both are Major General’s at both events!

the process of destroying themselves; do not interfere with them. Hence had the Chinese failed to intervene when they did, this would have been a far better drama between; two American General's with less casualties on each side, and like – Smith v Smith of WW II far more interesting for Korean history!

-The Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir-was a blood chilling replay of an earlier event at Seoul.-  
Citing one minor event over the army lacking amphibious amtrac's, organic to a marine force, became an item of dispute for the army forces to use them –in South Korea– to cross the Han River. In that (operational/administration) dispute General Smith's claim, those Amtrac's were Marine equipment, got General Almond's immediate reply; "They are the property of the United States Government, and I intend to use them". It would seem that Smith forgot to note that those 31-RCT Tanks belonged to the Army at the reservoir! How soon one forgets'!

-Defining the Marine Zone, under X Corps Operation Order 7.-Plan 8-Draft Three-  
"6. On 23 Nov 50, G-3, X Corps departed for Tokyo with Opn Plan number 8, Draft 3. This plan was presented at Tokyo on 24 Nov 50. By message CK 69661, dated 240025I Nov 50, CINCFE directed that Opn Plan 8 be implemented. CINCFE directed "one modification," i.e. a shift of the proposed boundary between X Corps and Eighth Army further West and South in the zone of the 1st Marine Division.<sup>66</sup> This will allow the 1st Marine Division to cross over into the previous Zone of Eighth Army. In reality, and contrary to earlier authors, CINCFE eliminates the boundary lines of ALL X Corps divisions. All forces will shift to the left, the 7th Division will shift into the 1st Marine Division zone, –now NORTH OF HAGARU-RI– and the 3rd Army Division will shift upward from the south into that prior Marine Division Zone, also the 1st Korean Marine Regiment will be attached to the 3rd Division and the ROK I Corps will extend their previously assigned zone westward into the center zone of the 7th Division to cover and compensate for those units transferred to the Changjin Reservoir. The mystery of how many of those Division units would be transferred, –do to circumstance– that has never been established to my knowledge.

"7) In compliance with CINCFE directive cited above, X Corps issued Opn Order number 7, dated 252400I Nov 1950. This order assigned the following missions to X Corps and its subordinate commands:"

**a. X CORPS:**

Attacks: 270800I Nov to severe En in Z to the Northern Boundary of Korea, along the YALU River on the left to the north of the TUMEN River on the right.

1st Marine Division: (FMF Reinf) Zone of operation.

**b. 1st Mar Div:** Attacks at 270800I Nov to seize MUPYONG-NI, advance to the YALU River and destroy En in Z." We need clarification of "destroy En in Z." That 1st Mar Div: Zone as defined by their division commander; is "*north of Hagaru-ri,*" as "The 3d Infantry Division now had the responsibility for the area (immediately) south of Hagaru-ri."<sup>67</sup> General Smith has three regiments; 1st, 5th, 7th, 11th, his new zone of operations consolidated north of Hagaru-ri! As also defined the 7th Division has the responsibility *east of the reservoir*. What is left for the 1st Marine Division?<sup>68</sup> NOTHING: other than NORTH OF HAGARU-RI WESTWARD TO YUDAM-NI. No other change, highlighted above has been indicated as approved by CINCFE for the Marine Zone of operation.

<sup>66</sup> Headquarters, X Corps Command report: Special Report on Chosin Reservoir, 27 November to 10 December, 1950. [p.10]

<sup>67</sup> Changjin Journal: Chapter 11.10.69: [(251) Provisions of the OPN 0 #7 of 25 November: Error as Chapter 67.]

<sup>68</sup> Having some 15,000 plus Marines now authorized, "north of Hagaru-ri" Smith has some 10,000 additional Marines remaining at the Port of Hungnam.

Therefore the boundary location previously assigned to marine forces south of Hagaru-ri was now reduced, and within the 3rd Infantry Division Zone, and remains so as written in “e” below! This detailed change in the Marine zone was not known except by General Smith’s own revelation in his Aide- Memories’. It may be of interest to note here the importance of Hagaru-ri. The prior Plan 6 –line of departure– for the 1st Marine Division, has been changed by X Corps order Plan 8-OPN O7. Due to the Marine 14 mile delay to execute their part of Plan 6, Hagaru-ri to Yudam-ni! Their new directive under Plan 8 has now been revised/restated, to compensate for the new line of departure now directly from Hagaru-ri to Mupyong-ni.

Unrecorded affect: The 1st Marine Division is now cut loose from X Corps, and -now- under the Fleet Marine Force full control of their own mission! The decision to delay movement of the marine battalions left *below Hagaru-ri* has no data to support this delay. Question, what are they doing here? The 3rd Division-under X Corps cannot occupy this same zone until free of the two remaining marine battalions.

Keep in mind that the following; creates a falling domino effect as the core result of moving the 5th Marine Regiment, from the east side of the reservoir –wherever– they were suppose to go! Likewise they too remain outside their Zone of operations, same question, Question what are they doing here?

7th Infantry Division: Zone of operation.

“c. 7th Inf Div: (1) Attacks N at 270800I Nov from CHOSIN Reservoir, advance to the YALU River, and destroy En in zone. (2) Secures: PUNGSAN area after coordinating, with I ROK Corps.” Ironical as it turns out to be, the only one of the three division regiments assigned to the Changjin Reservoir and within their legal zone of operation would be the RCT-31 of the 7th Division! Lacking one battalion 2/31-delayed at Koto-ri-it would never be a full RCT-31 as envisioned by the planners. The 7th Infantry Division now has the 1st Marine Division’s Yalu River zone reassigned to this Army Division of Singalpajin. Task Force Kingston of the 32nd Regiment will seize this objective on 28 November miles north of the Hagaru area!

- ❖ Special Alert: Serious sin of omission above, order published by 7th Inf Div, OPN O 25. RCT 31- [Declassified 1979-by someone unknown to me: My copy of that copy; obtained 7/13/91.]  
27 Nov 50

Opn O 25 Map: KOREA 1:50,000, Sheets 6625; I, II, III, IV. [G-3 Input to order] 1. a. Intel summaries

- ❖ (2b.) 7th Inf Div atks 270800 Nov, seizes MUPYONG-NI, adv to YALU RIVER, destroys en in Z. Secured PUGSAN area. Note, the absence of any line of departure, and date of creation 27 November 1950 for this document.

I ROK Corps: Zone of operation.

“d. I ROK Corps: Defend YALU River line in zone, advances from Hapsu and CHONGJIN areas, destroys En in zone to Northern Boundary of Korea.” 7th Division Order 26: “2. 7th Inf. Div assumes responsibility for new Z. Relieves 1st Mar Div in Z with Min of one (1) Inf. Bn; continues clearing HYESANJIN area until relieved by I ROK Corps.” Here is the official authorization for Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith’s too relieve the marine RCT-5; his arrival immediately relieves that RCT-5 of this area.

“e. 3rd Inf Div. (1) Gains and maintains contact with right flank Eighth Army along boundary in Z, (2) Protects X Corps W flank in Z, (3) Supports 1st Mar Div on X Corps O, (4) Protects airfield and harbor facilities in Wonsan area, and (5) destroys En guerrilla forces in Z.”<sup>69</sup> 1st KCM Rect. attached via Annex a, Opn O 7.

1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division located at Yudam-ni, Hagaru, Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni. Of special interest, is General Smith’s comment concerning the 3rd Infantry Division new zone, and defining his interference in changing it! Ironic indeed, since it was his earlier objection over his Division’s rejection of his earlier mission, to send his Division westward to link up with Eighth Army. “The 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division was fairly well concentrated for its task except that it was necessary to leave battalions of RCT-1 on the MSR at Hagaru-ri, Koto-ri, and Chinhung-ni.” >Changjin Journal 07.15.07 Chapter 67< “At this point, 25 November, the zone of advance of the Division was changed to the westward by Corps order. The new mission assigned, in the opinion of the Division, would require the entire effort of the Division. However, in view of the difficult route to communication and the general estimate as announced by X Corps to the effect that any action contemplated would not involve a force larger than a battalion, and of a certainty not exceeding that of a regiment, the following supply levels for Hagaru-ri were authorized: Classes I and III, 7 days, and Class V, 10 days (equal to approximately 3 units of fire), which included one unit of fire in the hands of the troops.” >Changjin Journal 03.25.07 Chapter 64< Supports repeating; Consider the difference of opinion on the mission General Smith as states: “opinion of the Division, would require the entire effort of the Division” whereas, “the general estimate as announced by X Corps to the effect that any action contemplated would not involve a force larger than a battalion, [Battalion size one third of the regiment] and of a certainty not exceeding that of a regiment.” Strange that both men would yield and completely reverse course for OPN O 7. A contradictory statement; *as* Smith pleads with Almond to change OPN O 7 as below!

General Smith’s attempt to justify his fatal mistake to concentrate his entire division,

—NORTH OF HAGARU-RI—

“In accordance with X Corps OpO 7 the rear boundary of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division had been moved *north* of a line just *south* of Hagaru-ri. The 3d Infantry Division now had the responsibility for the area south of Hagaru-ri”... [Smith here; offers his expertise on Almond’s inferior 3rd Infantry Division!] “...This force was entirely inadequate for the task. The 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division requested authority of the X Corps to retain garrisons at Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni to protect the MSR between Chinhung-ni and Hagaru-ri. This request was approved and the 3d Infantry Division was made responsible for the protection of the MSR from Sudong southward to Hamhung.” (Italics are mine) This verbal request fails to cover the authority of the person authorizing this delay in General Smith moving his entire 1st Marine Regiment North of Hagaru-ri! However this is directly in contradiction to Captain Patrick Roe-S-2-7th Marine Regiment statement:

Validation—Elements of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division would relieve the 1<sup>st</sup> Marines at Chinhung-ni and Koto-ri; 1<sup>st</sup> Marines, with attachments, would move from Chinhung-ni and Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri;<sup>70</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Headquarters, X Corps Command report: Special Report on Chosin Reservoir, 27 November to 10 December 1950. [p.10]

<sup>70</sup> Patrick Roe: Death of 31st RCT—Part I – Introduction. Pages are unnumbered.

However, one cannot be made responsible for an area *-if-* already assigned to them in the original order, before combat conditions demand an original change! In no way was this Army Division the responsibility of the Marine Corps, (boundary change number two) as the 3rd Division is required to “(3) Supports 1st Mar Div on X Corps O.” Plus the reliability of Order 7 cannot be taken for granted as written in Headquarters, X Corps Command report: Special Report on Chosin Reservoir, 27 November to 10 December 1950. [p.10]The fact, this report restates *e.*) 3rd Inf. Div. mission remains as originally written, and provides no indication of any X Corps revision change to this Third Division zone of operations! It does however; record General Almond’s rejection to General Smith’s request to now relocate one of his two rear battalions to Hagaru-ri. “During the night of 29-30 November the 1st Marine Division requested that the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment holding the railhead at CHINHUNG-NI be relieved by Corps in order that this unit might be moved north to HAGARU-RI. This request could not be honored as protection for the railhead was vital.”<sup>71</sup> What is overlooked, but evident here, Smith has realized his error in leaving Hagaru extremely weak as his main hub to support, not only his garrison here, but the entire safety of those forces north of Hagaru! Having no additional RCT-1 forces, due to his unilateral request, he lacks any reinforcements to assist those units trapped “north of Hagaru-ri.”

-General Smith letter to the Marine Commandant-15 November 1950-

“I do not like the prospect of stringing out a Marine division along a single mountain road for 120 air miles from Hamhung to the border. (The road mileage is nearer 200.) I now have two RCTs on this road and when Puller is relieved by the Third Infantry Division I will close him up behind.”<sup>72</sup> *Now*, “The 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division was fairly well concentrated for its task except that it was necessary to leave battalions of RCT-1 on the MSR at Hagaru-ri, Koto-ri, and Chinhung-ni.” But this prior problem is now fully solved by “**b**” as stated above! Rather influenced via feed back to MacArthur over Smith’s letter to his commandant is unknown to me, but the end result, that Smith now has complete freedom to pull all four (1st, 5th, 7th, and 11th) of his RCT’s “north” of Hagaru-ri and have his entire division concentrated within a “zone” approximately 16 road miles between Yudam-ni to the road junction outside of Hagaru-ri leading eastward to [a marine unit; at Sasu-ri; between] the 7th Infantry Division zone towards Hudong-ni. Smith has now obtained everything he requested in this OPN O 7, section “b”. “Recall: when Puller is relieved by the Third Infantry Division I will close him up behind.” To add credence and justification to the fact that: “Smith appointed the 1st Marines, in and below Hagaru-ri, as division reserve. His reconnaissance company, then pulling west flank security duty off the left rear of the division, was to reconnoiter north of Yudam-ni; the 41st Independent Commando, Royal Marines, only recently attached to the division, was to come forward from Hungnam to protect the marines’ left flank by reconnoitering southwest of Yudam-ni.”<sup>73</sup> Strange that both of these units, the reconnaissance company and 41st Independent Commando, Royal Marines, who were suppose to already be at Yudam-ni, were not there, but were retained back at Koto-ri within RCT-1 in “division reserve” status. Why would that be? Was this also part of Almond’s agreement? “1MarDiv OpO 24-50, issued at 0800, 26 November, modified 1MarDiv OpO 23-50 to the extent that the Commando unit was to move to Yudam-ni, prepared for operations in the direction of Sinpo-ri (8 miles southwest of

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<sup>71</sup> Headquarters, X Corps Command report: Special Report on Chosin Reservoir, 27 November to 10 December 1950. [p.38-39]

<sup>72</sup> General Smith: letter to his Commandant General Gates. 15 November 1950. He was officially relieved of this area via Almond’s order, *placing the 3rd Division in this zone south of Hagaru-ri*. See “b” footnote, 4, as above, Smith now had complete freedom: “... when Puller is relieved by the Third Infantry Division I will close him up behind.” He never did that!

<sup>73</sup> Mossman, Ebb & Flow CMH: p.89.



Yudam-ni) to protect the Division left flank in coordination with RCT-7. This latter order was – delayed- never carried out.” >Changjin Journal 11.10.07 Chapter 69<

As for Smith’s responsibility “from Hamhung” the 3rd Division has already relieved the Marine Division of that zone *below* Chinhung-ni cutting off any marine direct connection to Hamhung. Recall JCS, General Collins statement to Almond on 6 December, “Collins asked Almond why the Marines happened to be involved in the Chosin Reservoir area, implying it would seem, that it was no place for them to be. Almond replied that GHQ in Tokyo, in an effort to help Eighth Army in the west, had ordered the Marine advance and that X Corps was complying with that order.”<sup>74</sup> But, General Smith, again raises an “objection” to a plan that fulfills this own complaint to his commandant! The advantage of reinforcement to his already “reinforced division” is an increase of two army divisions added to his region, the RCT-31 and those forces “c and e” that will be added at Koto-ri on the way to the RCT-31. Reality being he had his third RCT-1 added north of Hagaru-ri and also had the freed RCT-5 relieved from the east side of the reservoir to strengthen his division for placement at Hagaru-ri. Little mentioned is his RCT-11 artillery unit, with all 48 pieces of artillery located at Yudam-ni thus overloading that area! In hindsight, Smith fails to use the tactic of the triangular benefit of having three instead of only two regiments for support at Changjin reservoir.

This reality hits home early morning 27 November to highlight General Smith’s costly panic and stupidity in “an attempt to reinforce Hagaru-ri” as detailed on Marine History Map 20, this map outlining the forces –from Koto-ri– needed to do that, which includes our RCT-31 tank company located at Hudong-ni. In reality what Smith was engaged in here is a “splitting up of an already smaller army unit” east of the reservoir, pulling back its rear guard to reinforce Hagaru-ri. What Smith had written to his commandant a mere two weeks before has come back full circle to haunt him about small units (Task Forces.) “There is continual splitting up of units and assignments of missions to small units, which puts them out on a limb. This method of operating appears general in Korea. “I am convinced that many of their setbacks here have been caused by this disregard for the integrity of units and of the time space factor.” Now he creates one of these (Task Forces) things he detests, “splitting up of units and assignments of missions to small units which put them out on a limb.” A small unit: a task force, a splitting up of units, and a “disregard for the integrity of units and of the time space factor.” Smith’s command to the commander of Task Force Drysdale to proceed at all cost contrary to Colonel Drysdale’s opinion against proceeding to Hagaru-ri, never the less Drysdale moved that task force forward at a high cost in lives. Only one-third made it to Hagaru-ri. “He sent me a message and told me about his situation and wanted to know whether I really wanted him to come on through. I told him if it was at all possible to fight his way on through, because we had been attacked in division strength and all we had was a battalion, less a rifle company at Hagaru-ri.”<sup>75</sup> However, General Smith had assigned Colonel Drysdale to Colonel Puller’s RCT-1 Koto-ri Battalion,” Here, too remain –in reserve status at Koto-ri. A direct violation of X Corps assigned zone north of Hagaru-ri! Here, Smith describes, and highlights, the weak defense of his forces at Hagaru-ri! On the afternoon of 27 November Smith has officially aborted his westward advance towards Mupyong-ni, while the two remaining battalions (from the east side of the reservoir) were just passing Hagaru, and could have, as he should have, (pulled those two battalions into Hagaru-with those other battalion of RCT-1,) creating a full mixed RCT-5, with one third of RCT-1 command under Murray. Why did General Smith leave Hagaru-ri so weak? By General Smith’s own admission he had no official defensive responsibility “below Hagaru-

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<sup>74</sup> Roy Appleman, *Escaping the Trap*: P.283-284.

<sup>75</sup> General Smith: Interview by Benis Frank: Marine Historian, June 1969.

ri” to the contrary, he states that is assigned to the 3rd Infantry Division! In fact the 3rd Division has tentative orders too: “(3) Supports 1st Mar Div on X Corps O,” Note: 7th Infantry Division order to seize Mupyong-ni now issued same day, 27 November! So again with the 3rd Division –as the X Corps W flank in Z– ordered to support the 1st Marine Division on X Corps O, and the 7th Division reassigned to seize Mupyong-ni, and Singalpajin, as well, there was no mission remaining for the 1st Marine Division!

“e. 3rd Inf Div. (1) Gains and maintains contact with right flank Eighth Army along boundary in Z, (2) Protects X Corps W flank in Z, (3) Supports 1st Mar Div on X Corps O, (4) Protects airfield and harbor facilities in Wonsan area, and (5) destroys En guerrilla forces in Z.”<sup>76</sup> The major problem: Almond fails to identify Smith’s requested change to his own order as published. Order 7 covers three different divisions in the Changjin Reservoir arena and each one of them needs to know what boundary areas exist, –outside their own. Recall: In the U.S. Army, “Once an order was published it could not be changed except by the issuing authority.”<sup>77</sup> This author finds no authorization from X Corps verifying - *this changed-* order!

Now, after approval by MacArthur we have Almond unilaterally changing ALL of his X Corps boundaries! Almond noted and reported as merely moving the 7th Division on “A whim” A “thought” or a “wish” he merely “wanted the 7th Division involved.”

My research has recently been updated by the new “Thesis” source to add to the above list. This “Thesis” verified Appleman’s “East of Chosin” as inclusive of the 7th Division. While all authors give redundant statements about MacArthur’s “one minor change,” not one of those authors satisfactory clarify what that “minor change” required! After rejection of Draft 1, Almond orders a new plan for “the Hagaru-ri–Mupyong-ni axis for the 1st Marine Division, while history fails to record that change. The Marine boundary zone has been moved forward of Hagaru-ri. At this time 2/3rds’ the marine RCT-1 remains below Hagaru-ri. “Almond approved the revised draft 2 on 21 November and subsequent approval was given by Far East Command on 23 November.” What will become evident here from the 1st Marine Division is their disagreement on this statement, certainly that is expected as they were now outside of their draft 3 assigned boundary zone! Why that is so, maybe debated in future history, but from my point of view the explicit boundary has now been defined not by X Corps but the commander of the 1st Marine Division. Therein lay the problem of clarification, there being no clarification from the X Corps commander to affirm or deny General Smith’s reference to various orders from X Corps as “verbal” in contrast to written orders, i.e. Almond verbally attached Lt. Colonel Faith Battalion to the 1st Marine Division, he then verbally rescinds that attachment as stated by Faith’s S-3! Detailing this “verbal order” attached to the 1st Marine Division, a major general problem here, MG Almond seems to have overlooked informing MG Smith of this decision–rather Smith is informed or not, he in turn fails to notify Lt. Colonel Ray Murray of RCT-5, as Murray states he knows nothing about any army unit attachment to his regiment.<sup>78</sup> Would that be a lawful order, given the army regulations? “MG Almond explained the composition of the 31st RCT: “cross attachment [of battalions between regiments] was not normal?”<sup>79</sup> It –Faith attached– would therefore be further corrupted by: “cross attachment” of an army battalion between the regiments of another branch of service! This would be listed on the organizational chart, Example, 41st British Commando’s

<sup>76</sup> Headquarters, X Corps Command report: Special Report on Chosin Reservoir, 27 November to 10 December 1950. [p.10]

<sup>77</sup> General Omar Bradley, "A Soldier's Story", p. 138.

<sup>78</sup> Appleman: East of Chosin, p.24.

<sup>79</sup> Thesis: Next chapter.

attached on X Corps chart to the 1st Marine Division! In this case no such other “attachments” have been listed.

CHART 2- ORGANIZATION OF UNC GROUND FORCES IN KOREA  
23 NOVEMBER 1950  
(See my Prologue)

As a result of revised tables of organization and equipment, the structure of U.S. divisions was distinctly different in many respects from that of their World War II counterparts. The modifications affected every unit level from squad upward; the latest change, to become effective on 29 November 1950, set the authorized war strength of an infantry division at 18,855, more than 4,000 greater than that of a World War II division. A comparable increase in organic firepower came largely from an increase in the number of field artillery pieces and the addition of tanks, antiaircraft artillery, and heavy mortars that previously had not been included in a division's own arsenal.”

By far the larger portion of the ground strength was vested in the Eighth Army and was located west of the main Taebaek spine, where, in the wake of the drive out of the Pusan Perimeter and the pursuit above the 38th parallel, General Walker's forces had become spread from the port of Pusan northwestward to the Ch'ongch'on River. Walker also had split his headquarters during the autumn offensive, establishing main headquarters in Seoul while he and a small staff operated from a forward command post in P'yongyang.

U.S. combat formations of the Eighth Army included two corps (I and IX), four infantry divisions (1st Cavalry, 2d, 24th, and 25th), the airborne regiment (187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team), and the Ranger company (8213th). Other U.N. forces in Walker's command accounted for the three infantry brigades (1st Turkish Armed Forces Command, 27th British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade, and 29th British Independent Brigade Group) and the three separate infantry battalions (10th Battalion Combat Team, Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea; 21st Regimental Combat Team, Thailand Expeditionary Force; and Netherlands Detachment, United Nations. )

Most of the ROK Army also was under General Walker's control. The major combat units included two corps (II and III) and eight divisions (1st, 2d, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 11th). To date, the ROK Army headquarters had seldom directed the operations of its combat formations within an assigned sector or zone at the front. The headquarters functioned more as a clearinghouse for instructions issued to ROK corps on line by Eighth Army headquarters and did not enter the command picture at all when an ROK unit was attached to a U.S. headquarters below Eighth Army level. On the other hand, the headquarters did play a normal role under the ROK Army chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Chung Il Kwon, in planning and directing operations in rear-area security missions.

Units with the separate X Corps in northeastern Korea included the ROK I Corps taken over from the Eighth Army in late October after General Almond's forces landed at Wonsan, three American divisions (3d, 7th, and 1st Marine), two ROK divisions (3d and Capital), the ROK marine regiment (1st Korean Marine Corps), the British commando company (41st Independent Commando, Royal Marines), and the American Special Operations Company. General Almond also controlled the U.S. Army's 2d Special Engineer Brigade, which handled port operations at Hungnam, fifty miles north of Wonsan, where most of the X Corps' seaborne supplies, either transshipped from Pusan or shipped directly from Japan, arrived. Ten miles inland from Hungnam, Almond had established X Corps headquarters in the city of Hamhung. (*Chart 2*)

The American predominance in operations was nowhere more evident than in the organization and equipment [30] of the assorted ground forces assembled under U.S. command. ROK formations and, except for the British Commonwealth forces, all U.N. units were structured under modified U.S. Army tables of organization, and all of their weapons and almost all of their other equipment and supplies were of American manufacture.”<sup>80</sup>

-Defining the 7th Infantry Division Zone, under X Corps Operation Order 7-  
Since, Historian Roe states: (260) *The Dragon Strikes* “General MacArthur approved X Corps Operation Plan 8, draft 3, with minor changes of boundaries.”

One of those “minor changes of boundaries” includes a confusing change in the boundary for an entire division! It involves pushing the marine division to the west side of the reservoir (boundary change number three, each one narrows the marine zone) That one RCT of the 7th Infantry Division has been given the mission of seizing Changjin (Town) leaves the question as to what the remaining two regiments of the 7th Division will be required to do at the reservoir. After completing their “coordinating with the I ROK Corps, and expanding division holdings between Pungsan through that “zone previously assigned to the marines.” “c. 7th Inf Div: (1) Attacks N at 270800I Nov from CHOSIN Reservoir, advance to the YALU River, and destroy En in zone. (2) Secures PUNG SAN area, after coordinating with I ROK Corps.” A Task Force Cooper of the 17th Infantry Regiment is situated at Hyesanjin on the Yalu River on 21 November on the “right flank” of the 7th Division zone of operations prior to MacArthur’s directive via *message CX 69661*, relocating them to the Changjin Reservoir. At the same time (25 November) Task Force Kingston has orders to seize Singalpajin west of Samsu, “through that zone previously assigned to the marines.”<sup>81</sup> He completed that mission (34 men) on the 28th, after three days of difficult conditions and North Korean forces, never realizing at the time the full Chinese intervention at the reservoir, he was ordered to withdraw back into Samsu, for the following withdrawal to the coast. Disregarding Almond’s impulsive nature to relocate Lt. Colonel Faith’s 1/32 Battalion in advance of his OPN O 7, Colonel MacLean issues his March Order effective 250800 November. So there were three boundary line changes, but, before all forces were in place the Chinese interrupt this drama between MG Almond and Smith which would have been a much more entertaining, and a less bloody drama than what developed at the reservoir. In spite of that, the army reinforcements in and below the marine forces made those marine units the beneficiaries’ of those boundary changes! Thus two army independent task forces has eclipsed the marine “claim to fame” as being the “spearhead” of any end mission movement to the Yalu River! However, Marine Corps history fails to record that as a fact!

“Almond had begun work on plans to carry out MacArthur's instructions, including a westward move to assist the Eighth Army, while flying back to Korea from the Tokyo conference on the afternoon of the 29th. His staff completed the plans that night. Almond's 30 November order placing these plans in effect left something further to be done with the ROK I Corps. For the time being Almond directed its commander, Brig. Gen. Kim Paik Il, only to protect the X Corps' right flank and secure the east coast road as he brought his forces south. The 7th Division forces in and around Hyesanjin were to fall back on Hamhung. General Barr was to protect the corps' northern and northeastern flank, establishing an especially strong position around Sinhung-ni twenty miles north of Hamhung, to block roads leading

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<sup>80</sup> Ebb & Flow: Mossman- (p.27) CMH-GPO.

<sup>81</sup> Singalpajin was assigned to the 1st Marine Division zone, per plan 6, 11 November. 1950. Reassigned OPN O 7-25 November to the 7th Division.

south out of the area to be vacated. Barr also was to place a regiment and his tank battalion in corps reserve. (Several locations have the name Sinhung-ni this one is in reference in the vicinity of the Oro-ri junction.)

Among several assignments given the 3d Division, General Soule's forces were to protect the Changjin Reservoir road from Sudong south to Hamhung and to continue to block the road coming east from Sach'ang-ni. Almond detached the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment and one infantry battalion from Soule's division and placed them under corps control. These two units, designated Task Force C and commanded by Brig. Gen. A. D. Mead, the assistant 3d Division commander, were to protect Wonsan and the Wonsan airfield. Except for one other battalion, Soule was to concentrate the remainder of his division between Chigyoung and Yonp'o, about four miles southwest of Hamhung and Hungnam. The excluded battalion was to head west over the road leading to Tokch'on. Almond's written order directed Soule to "attack with strong Task Force . . . and assist Eighth Army." But in a conference with Soule and 65th Infantry commander Col. William W. Harris during the morning of the 30th, Almond reduced the mission to a 'reconnaissance in force' by a reinforced battalion from Harris' regiment."<sup>82</sup>

As defined above by X Corps: "c".  
The huge huge error via a sin of omission.  
Below is not the 7th Inf. Div: Mission!

Rather one assigned exclusively to the 31st-RCT, by Division-Commanded by Colonel Allan Duart MacLean!

MacLean's timeline is W/O Delay-and is not the set timeline: **270800I Nov!**

-RECALL-

7th Infantry Division: Zone of operation.

"c. **7th Inf Div:** (1) Attacks N at **270800I Nov** from CHOSIN Reservoir, advance to the YALU River, and destroy En in zone. (2)Secures PUNGSAN area, after coordinating with I ROK Corps." Ironic as it turns, the only one of the three division regiments assigned to the Changjin Reservoir and within their *legal zone of operation* would be the RCT-31 of the 7th Division! Lacking one battalion 2/31-delayed at Koto-ri-it would never be a full RCT-31 as envisioned by the planners. [The 7th Infantry Division now has the 1st Marine Division's Yalu River zone reassigned to this Army Division of Singalpajin. Task Force Kingston of the 32nd Regiment will seize this objective on 28 November miles north of the Yudam-ni area!]

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RCT 31- [Declassified 1979-by someone unknown to me: My copy of that copy; obtained 7/13/91.]

27 Nov 50

Opn O 25 Map: KOREA 1:50,000, Sheets 6625; I, II, III, IV.

[Section 1-G-2-Division-Input to order]

1. a. Intel summaries

**[G-3, Division-Input to order]**

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<sup>82</sup> Mossman, Ebb & Flow, CMH: GPO. p.129

b. 7th Inf Div atks 270800 Nov, seizes MUPYONG-NI, adv to YALU RIVER, destroys en in Z. Secured PUGSAN area. [Typo (Pugsan) corrected in Captain Rasula's unclassified S-3 copy as PUNGSAN)

ABOVE: What the DIVISION is required to DO. / BELOW: What 31st RCT is required to DO.

**[Regimental S-3 Input to order]**

2. a. RCT 31 atks w/o delay N from CHOSIN Reservoir, sz Objs A, B, C, D, E, prepares to continue atk to sz CHANGJIN and atk to YALU River.

b. Annex 1, Opn Overlay,

3. a. 1st Bn, 32d Inf:

- (1) Sz and secure Obj B w/o delay.
- (2) Be prepared to sz Objs C, D, E on O.
- (3) Outpost w/o delay Obj C.

b. 3d Bn, 31st Inf:

- (1) Sz and secure Obj A w/o delay.
- (2) Be prepared to sz Objs D and E on O.
- (3) Protect RCT E (right) flank.

c. 2d Bn, 31st Inf:

- (1) Close vic Obj A w/o delay.
- (2) Prepare to atk to N on O.

d. 1st Bn, 31st Inf: Atched: C Btry, 57th FA Bn. Continue present mission.

Review original Archive Document for all remaining orders:

OFFICIAL: MACLEAN

s/LTC Berry K. Anderson Col S-3 5

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Breakdown and defined: As in "c", It is not the Division mission as stated under, "c. **7th Inf Div:** (1) Attacks N at **270800I Nov** from CHOSIN Reservoir, advance to the YALU River, and destroy En in zone. The Division has three regimental combat teams, 17th, 31st, and 32nd. This mission stated is assigned to only one of these regimental combat teams. Only this one abnormal 31st RCT commanded by Colonel MacLean-by Division-has this:

"2. a. RCT 31 atks w/o delay N from CHOSIN Reservoir, sz Objs A, B, C, D, E, prepares to continue atk to sz CHANGJIN and atk to YALU River."

The 7th Division mission as defined in Opn O 25:<sup>83</sup>

"b. 7th Inf Div atks 270800 Nov, seizes MUPYONG-NI, adv to YALU RIVER, destroys en in Z. Secured PUGSAN area."

How did all this confusion happen? It may be due directly to Almond's past predictability –and provability– of MG Smith's continuous delays to relocate his Division as ordered. Regardless, Almond

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<sup>83</sup> Archive declassified document Opn O 25. Review Chapter 7, for Division movement of regiments and battalions during this timeline of operations.

has covered all bases in this case, but time and nature was against him! Smith states excessive “verbal” orders from Almond at the reservoir. Apparently Smith was kept out of the loop as he was not part of the solution, and the confusion by the 7th Division G-3 to relocate an entire division to Changjin was over whelming to say the least. As Smith was concerned: “Smith: Every four hours we sent in a report of what was going on, but apparently they were stunned; they just couldn't make up their minds that the Chinese had attacked in force, you see. They just had to re-orient their thinking. It took them two days before we actually were told to withdraw to Hagaru-ri and advance to the coast -that took them two days to figure out.” However, MG Smith has issued his Division order for its two regiments to abort the X Corps orders (Questionable: if he received an order to advance to *Mupyong-ni* in the first place) and to begin opening the road between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri!<sup>84</sup>

“Murray made, as I said, about 2,000 yards, and I halted the attack, because it was manifest that we were up against a massive force out there. But we got no order from Corps for two days to actually withdraw, so we couldn't do anything but defend, as I couldn't withdraw without permission from higher authorities. On this redeployment of a regiment, I'd already told Litzenberg to use as much of his regiment as he could to try to clear the road back to Hagaru-ri. We didn't know just how much was across it.”<sup>85</sup> One can only wonder over this Division commanders understanding of his orders-once issued-“I couldn't withdraw without permission from higher authorities.” One may well wonder, what would be the major general difference too his responsibly to withhold his Division orders –from the same source– to advance to Yudam-ni in the first place? Once again; “In the US Army an order calls for instant compliance.”

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The Death of RCT31, Part V. By Patrick Roe: USMC.

Extremis:

The eventual erosion of tactical integrity had tragic results for the wounded in the truck column. After the block at Hill 1221 had been broken any functioning chain of command ended. Had it remained intact it would have been apparent at the railroad trestle that further resistance was futile and the column was halted for good. As a matter of elementary compassion the senior officer should have taken the opportunity to surrender the column and the wounded. There is nothing whatsoever that the Chinese could have done to the surrendered wounded that would have been any worse than what actually did happen to them. It might have saved some of the senseless and random slaughter of wounded that did occur.” [The consequence of any surrender is never to be taken lightly.]<sup>86</sup>

While any military officer is entitled to his own opinion, over battle losses, over what directly may or may not benefit his choice to surrender or not, the overall impact on the other men in the unit –while praise worthy of compassion– maybe an over extension of those men personally involved in his opinion over their individual welfare. Personally, given the condition of those abandoned, and the benefit to these men already written off as expendable– the burden of their large member would over burden the medical corpsman at Hagaru-ri, as well pointed out by General Smith, could be better –left unspoken. As this extension –below– of Roe’s opinion may imply, in grouping Task Force Faith

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<sup>84</sup> Review: 7th Division section One, Opn O25-27 November 1950-Copy end of this chapter>

<sup>85</sup> Interview by Benis Frank-June 1969

<sup>86</sup> Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ): ART. 100. SUBORDINATE COMPELLING SURRENDER: “Any person subject to this chapter who compels or attempts to compel the commander of any place, vessel, aircraft, or military property, or of any body of members of the armed forces, to give it up to an enemy or to abandon it, or who strikes the colors or flag to any enemy without proper authority, shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.”

survivors with those of Task Force Drysdale situation –were no wise similar! Colonel Drysdale situation was created by General Smith’s direct failure to have them consolidated within his new zone north of Hagaru-ri, likewise his attempt to reinforce Hagaru-ri by compounding the losses to Task Force Faith by his personal failure to rescind –whoever– issued that withdrawal order, –to order our tanks– back to Hagaru, must shoulder the burden on their career for that tank withdrawal. The overall failures were before the event, not for damage control after the event! These failures of commander, are why manuals are written of past tragedies, for correcting, and advance tactics!

“Two nights earlier Major John McLaughlin [USMC] did exactly that when his portion of the Drysdale task force was cut off, isolated, surrounded and encumbered with a large number of wounded. McLaughlin could have gotten away himself. Instead he chose to surrender on the agreement of the Chinese that they would take care of the wounded. The Chinese reneged on their agreement, but some of the lesser wounded did manage to escape. With Faith dead and Major Miller, his executive officer, incapacitated by wounds, the next senior man was Major Curtis. Curtis did not attempt to take command of what was left of the column. As it ground to a halt at Hudong he left the column and made his way to Hagaru-ri. Asked about it years later Curtis, then a colonel, said he thought he was the senior man and that he should have assumed, or attempted to assume command regardless of the consequences but said he would probably do the same thing in similar circumstances. He justified it by saying that the column was moribund, unable to resist. Neither he nor any other senior officer has ever admitted to considering the need to surrender in an attempt to save the wounded.” [Apparently those wounded that escaped on their own disagreed with the Marine Captain’s surrender mandate!]

### The outcome

“Whatever one can say about RCT 31 the striking thing is that they took, proportionally, the hardest hit of any major force at Chosin. The comparison in Table 1 (attached) is made on the basis of battalions since the size of the US and Chinese infantry battalions were similar. [\*] This ignores the relative differences in organic fire power, supporting arms, logistics and a host of other factors. But, since the Chinese made such prodigal use of their infantry, comparison of infantry strength is important although not necessarily decisive. One of the great tragedies is that because of the command failures, poor communication, failure to make coordinated use of supporting arms, and non-existent logistic support, the men of RCT31 were forced to fight on an almost equal basis with the Chinese. Whatever advantage US forces had in terms of command, control, communication, materiel, fire support and logistics, were thrown away by ignorance, incompetence and indifference. The two Chinese divisions involved in the attack on RCT31 essentially exhausted their strength in that effort. Much of the credit for that must go to the air support the task force received and to the tremendous fire power of the self propelled AA weapons. Neither of the Chinese division was identified in the attack on Hagaru-ri. One was identified in a brief contact later in the month in the shrinking Hamhung perimeter. Both had been so severely mauled they were not identified in action again until early in April on the central front. So the task force did succeed in engaging two divisions which otherwise might have struck a decisive blow at the critically stretched defenses of Hagaru-ri.”<sup>87</sup>

[\*] Roe’s remark: “that since the size of the US and Chinese infantry battalions were similar” from a G-2 (intelligence) officer –is misleading on the strength of the enemy. In no way were they similar! An enemy division had approximately 7,500 men per division! Where, as an American Army division

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<sup>87</sup> The Death of RCT31, Part V. By Patrick Roe: USMC.



(once brought to strength) had approximately some 19,000 soldiers. The one 1st Marine Division attached to X Corps was officially referenced as “Reinforced” in North Korea; exceeding 25,000. In other words, it would take three and one-third of any CCF Division to equal an American division, without factoring in the enemy fire power –no tanks, no aircraft, a little artillery– that would never be equal to that of the American division. The eight divisions listed at the reservoir total=sixty thousand; thus divided by eight=the 7,500 per division. Only within the marine division were the enemies number exaggerated and hyped too, 120,000 in 12 divisions! “Through this extreme cold, which brought frostbite and respiratory disease to personnel, adversely affected the operation of weapons and equipment, and made foxhole digging in the frozen earth a six to eight-hour affair, the northward advance had continued. By late November the entire Marine Division was strung out along the 75 miles of road from Hungnam to Yudam-ni.” Misleading information; –by late November– neglects (General Smith’s) request for 3rd Infantry additional responsibility to maintain the road network south of Sudong-ni to the Hungnam area! The rear most marine battalion remains at Chinhung-ni above Sudong-ni. The Marines now have no responsibility below Sudong-ni, another huge benefit for General Smith!

“Two regiments were in the Yudam-ni area, division headquarters and an infantry battalion were located at Hagaru, while on the MSR the villages of Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni were garrisoned by something more than two battalions. A total of about seven days’ supply had been dumped on the plateau. Against this force, divided and far from base and with a strength of slightly more than 25,000, there would be committed during the next two weeks eight divisions from three Chinese Communist armies whose strength totaled some 60,000 men.” Source: History of United States Naval Operations: Korea by James A. Field, Jr. Chapter 9: Retreat to the South; Part 2. 14 November-10 December-The Campaign at the Reservoir. Again misrepresented. The 1st Marine Division has absolutely, no official X Corps responsibility south of Hagaru-ri, or Koto-ri & Chinhung-ni to the Port of Hungnam!

Author’s note: It should be pointed out the role of the Marine Corps was reversed at Iwo Jima, there the marines were 60,000 in number while the enemy was 25,000 in opposition. While no direct comparisons to Changjin, as the enemy had well dug in fortifications. Being there long before the marine landing! Also the Navy seems to imply, the marine “base” is back at the coast, not at the reservoir! They were NOT as stated; “strung out along the 75 miles of road from Hungnam to Yudam-ni.” Their zone was now officially “north of Hagaru-ri” with the responsibility below Hagaru-ri to the coast, now that of the 3rd Infantry Division. Not with standing General Smith’s “verbal” claim that Almond agreed “verbally” to be below Chinhung-ni!

The failure of the G-2 sections to identify the number of enemy in a division was far more important at the time to the forces engaged to defeat the enemy, overhyping their number did not help morale. The description of “hordes” of Chinese became a joke over time, as “We met a horde of the enemy, and we destroyed; the entire squad of them.” The hype recorded in General Smith’s command to Colonel Drysdale: “I told him if it was at all possible to fight his way on through, because we had been attacked in division strength and all we had was a battalion, less a rifle company at Hagaru-ri.” So General Smith –in command of a division of over 25,000 Marines was worried about an enemy division of 7,500 peasant soldiers! He has 10,000 back at the coast of Hungnam! Remember, the 7th Division had over 8,000 South Korean conscripts “fresh out of the rice paddies of South Korea” fully attached as well! So knowing our enemy up close –we did– but personally; we did not! One would think that was information that should have been directly distributed to us?

## –Chapter 7–

A Case Study of: The United States Army Tactics and Doctrine for Encircled Forces-1975. *Hereafter: a Thesis-by Robert M. Coombs, Major, USA.*

On 26 July 1950 the 7th Division was relieved of occupation duties and directed to prepare for movement to Korea. The division was reported under-strength by 9,117. After being alerted for the combat zone, the division moved to Camp McNair near Mount Fujiyama. This area was vacated by the 1st Cavalry Division upon its deployment to Korea. The 7th Division began the process of requisitioning equipment and bringing itself up to wartime strength. There were insufficient supply levels remaining in Japan to outfit the division as deployment of the first three divisions had depleted theater reserve stocks. Requisitions for such items as mess kits resulted in the issuance of mess trays as substitutes. The 3rd Battalion, 32nd Infantry from Fort Benning, Georgia joined the 32nd Regiment at Camp McNair, Japan during August 1950. By 9 September 1950, the division was only 1,349 U.S. personnel short of its full wartime strength. The quality of the infantry crew served weapons and artillery personnel from the United States was high. Many of the officers lacked combat experience. Noncommissioned officer strength was poor in combat units. In Company C, 32nd Infantry Regiment, one of the platoon sergeant positions was held by a Private First Class during the Inchon invasion. Only one officer and three senior noncommissioned officers had combat previous experience. However officers and men were well qualified on weapons and communications equipment. While the division was in northern Japan, training included both summer and winter field exercises. The value of this training was downgraded due to the rapid turnover of personnel to other deploying divisions. Once the division deployed to southern Japan, it conducted field training. [This also included Amphibious training for the Inchon invasion.]

During the period 1-15 August 1950, the 7th Division received 8,637 South Korean civilian replacements. These men, known as Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA), had been impressed in South Korea. Upon arrival in Japan many KATUSAs were sick undernourished or confused. Their first week in Japan was spent in quarantine...The “buddy system” was used to assist in orienting them to each unit. Since only about three interpreters were assigned to each company, much of the training and combat communications was accomplished through the use of sign language. The KATUSAs received the same rations and equipment as U.S. Army personnel.

-In North Korea-

The 7th Infantry Division (Major General David G. Barr, Commanding) sailed from Pusan on 20 October. On the same day, X Corps established a forward command post in Wonsan, assumed operational control of I ROK Corps and responsibility for all of northeast Korea. The Corps was assigned the mission of attacking to the Manchurian border with the watershed of the Taebuck Mountains as *its* western boundary.

The 1st Marine Division (MG Oliver P. *Smith*, Commanding) landed at Wonsan on 26 October followed by the debarkation of the 7th Infantry Division at Iwon commencing on 29 October (Map B, p. 90) (The mission of the 7th Division was established by X Corps Operations Instruction Number 13, 261000 October 1950. It was directed to move over the beaches in the Hongwon/Iwon area; initially land one Regimental Combat Team (RCT) in the vicinity of Iwon; and, to advance rapidly in zone to

the Korean northern border relieving elements of I ROK Corps in place.) On 30 October this was modified by Operations Instruction Number 15 which directed the division to continue present missions expediting to the *maximum* extent practicable, completion of the landing of all elements.

On 20 October [my 20th Birthday] the strength of the 7th Division was 26,641 including 18,837 United States personnel and 7,804 KATUSAs. Upon completion of the 7th Division landings I ROK Corps was to continue its advance along the northeast coast. The two *U.S.* divisions were assigned zones to the left of I ROK Corps with the 7th Division in the center and the 1st Marine Division protecting the X Corps western flank". (p.11)

Certain extracts from this "*Thesis*" will be noted from this Chapter, forward.

### 31<sup>st</sup> Regimental Combat Team

#### 23 November 1950- Thanksgiving Day

In the meantime our North Korean military operational theater has turned bitter cold, for all the rumors about there being no autumn here near the Manchurian border proves true. For suddenly overnight temperatures would drop like a rock? Skies were turning misty gray, the smell of snow was in the air. It was winter! Bitter cold and heading below zero, the frostbite season was well under way, as old man winter encircled the troops. Warming tents were sparse. Extra layers of clothing were piled on and meals were extremely difficult to keep warm. Powered eggs and powdered milk at the mess tent seemed reminiscent of why it was named a mess tent in the first place, that phrase had to be coined in the field under these type conditions. Those required to eat on the run would find their liquid food items changed from liquid to a solid state in the matter of minutes. Thanksgiving Day though far from home would be the traditional feast of turkey, mashed potatoes and dressing but staying streaming hot; it would not. Mail delivery has been delayed over a week, and it was by no means a festive mood as those past holidays—for me three years ago—had been. Sadly, but regrettable, for far, far many of these men their last holiday on this earth. As the early morning fogs blanket our area, so too darkened clouds of doom prevent a un-for-seem shroud of doom looming over our upcoming mission. For unknown to us we have a "Rendezvous with Death"<sup>88</sup> awaiting some distance for us —for he was not here— but waiting, miles distant from this encampment area! Within 13 days, this 31st Regiment would lose its complete command structure and vanish completely from the pages of history. It will however, be reorganized and back in action by late January 1951!

But for now, at least sporadic snows were dusting the hillsides, a snow so dry that most of it blows down around the mountains, depositing as drifts in gorges and ridges. The snow further mixing with the dust from road traffic creates yellowish dust clouds, swirling within the sharp Manchurian winds rushing between high ridges and valleys. Ironic as it seems this dry snow was like tiny sponges, while dry, stepping on a snow drift, the pressure from ones boots would force out whatever moisture was packed inside, and create an instant slick spot under your boots! That snow melting on human lips, to crack and severely chap them. Your eyes will burn and tear from the dusty snow blown into them; Men were now walking with painful early stages of frostbitten feet and toes. Fingers were also numbing from the early affects of frostbite. C-rations were frozen solid, water in canteens as well. Washing and shaving were difficult tasks to perform. Our water ration was one steel helmet full per day, freezing instantly, leaving you with a block of ice requiring your own method and ingenuity to melt it as needed. Twig fires, or use of running—parked— truck mufflers, build an earthen small dam of dirt,

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A poem by Alan Seeger: (1888-1916)<sup>88</sup> Alan Seeger's "Rendezvous" echoes a letter he wrote in 1915, in which he says, "If it must be, let it come in the heat of action. Why flinch? It is by far the noblest form in which death can come. It is in a sense almost a privilege. . . ."

saturate with a little stolen gas for a slow burn to heat helmet etc. Beards and stubble were allowed to grow and showers were a thing of the past. Warming tents, for those lucky enough to be near them were indeed a luxury to enjoy. Those not so lucky to be immediately near them had to make due as best they could. Not all tasks allowed their use for long; the wire crews on the road laying and checking breaks in telephone lines, forward observers on some high ground, isolated MP's on sentry duty and far distant from the tents. Those infantry men manning the front line of defense or moving it forward were stuck outward around the perimeter of those tents, with no warmth from them. Barrel fires alone would have to substitute in some of these cases. Down mountain sleeping bags was indeed a prize item if you had one, and kept it in good condition from its outer cover being ripped and torn. Your own pup tent, sharing two men once in place will keep the thick night frost from settling down on you. Outpost duties could be in that sleeping bag to your waist, serving at least to keep your feet warm, the long nights, 15-16 hour of darkness, were-creating drowsiness, this becoming a problem while immobile in the cold to stay mentally alert, for your mental capacity was diminishing as well. But in spite of all this, the show must go on. The mission has to be carried out. Thanksgiving dinner was the full course meal, but difficult to keep warm as we were required to take some out to our post positions and eat the meal there. The one bright spot however, while we were having our "mess dinner" of holiday turkey, the Marine Division has to prepare for their next day, 240800 hour mission to seize Yudam-ni for that Eighth Army-X Corps combined attack at the Changjin Reservoir to end this war. For now at least the 7th Division was never involved or alerted for this "Home by Christmas" offensive. But the Marine movement upward to seize their objective on the Yalu River will secure those 70 miles-now wide open--on our divisions left flank!

–Never realizing within 24 hours how our mission would change for all concerned.–

Neither Colonel Allan D. MacLean nor any of his cast in this drama will ever become fully aware of their sole, role selection for their participation in the upcoming Frozen Changjin Drama. These men are preoccupied with their present existing mission to patrol this area within their division area of responsibility around Untaek and between Kapsan and Pungsan, and this added Marine Division area, well to their right and northeast of the Pujon (Fusen) Reservoir. This reservoir is located within a different province than the Changjin Reservoir. The Pujon Reservoir is located within the province of Yang-gang, whereas the Changjin Reservoir is located within that region of South Hamg-yong. The Pujon Reservoir is some 40 air miles east of Changjin Reservoir. This eastern reservoir is a long narrow lake approximately 10 miles long whereas the Changjin is approximately 12 miles north to south. The Changjin Reservoir has a branch basin jutting towards Yudam-ni, its southern tip towards Hagaru-ri. Neither of these reservoirs maybe approached directly by road between east and west. However, CCF forces will be identified as being in this area after the 31st-RCT is on the east shore of the Changjin reservoir; two unidentified units are listed on the map of the special report by X Corps, as being east of the Pujon Reservoir as well! A strong indication that had we remained there we would have engaged this Chinese force moving around this reservoir and filtering southward below the Pujon reservoir, but since it was never identified per unit or division that information was lacking. But, it does show this enemy force following the river toward Oro-ri in an attempt to reach this junction and cut that road at Oro-ri, ending point on the maps, parallel to but above Chinhung-ni. See Navy > MAP 19-Dec. 1950 <

The significant point being that 31-RCT Operational Orders #24, will remove us from OPN O #23, our real and present location east of the Pujon Reservoir. The inference in marine history was therefore made that when General Almond rushed his nearest available forces into Chosin that statement highlighted a crisis forcing him to relocate MacLean and Faith both of which were east of the Pujon. A

crisis the Marines claim did not exist! Indicating there was no major crisis here to rush any additional forces into Changjin. In spite of General Smith's opposing view! That the Marines could handle their own area assignment regardless of their slow movement, that their own placement by their own G-3 was militarily efficient to hold each area individually on each side of Changjin Reservoir. Thus there was no reason to remove MacLean from his mission to the rear of our own division within our assigned area of operation. Since this was the perceived scenario it was a short step to claim Changjin as a sole Marine Mission! That we would not be needed within any area of the marines that we could contribute absolutely nothing to their defensive position set into place around and above Hudong-ni. That an additional 4,000 army men in the Changjin zone was over kill and never needed, since our presence there, after the fact, was underplayed by the marines, indicating that General Almond was overreacting to this situation. This being only one day (22 Nov) after our Seventh Division forces achieved our assigned mission in reaching Hyesanjin. The only American Division to reach the Yalu River! While this achievement was well publicized, it however created a need for the spotlight to be turned back to the marine zone of operations. That, this would be of such an importance in this issue, is one cause to codify Operation Orders 23 & 24, and 25, a "Secret". That may be the reason for their secrecy -in my opinion -it would be hard- to imagine any other. Yet, the 7th Division has created their own history by obtaining their assigned objective in reaching its objective -on the 21st at Hyesanjin.

The Pujon Reservoirs' most southern point is approximately equal to the foremost point reached by Task Force Faith at Changjin, so we are well above that reservoir area—operating on a line parallel to the town of Changjin. It would seem logical that Almond would give the mission to occupy the two reservoirs to the marine's, for after all isn't that their maritime named function, as they have the amphibious (amtrak's) equipment to cross either reservoir with ease as required? Thus while the marine commander will not move upward toward that point we will be required to descend downward that same distance, and then to begin our fateful journey to that marine area of operations. The 31st-RCT was ordered to replace the Marine division mission at this Pujon (Fusen) reservoir as well, as the marines could not find a road leading around it! "The Fusen Reservoir was about opposite the Chosin Reservoir, and we went out that way and had reconnaissance patrols go out and there was no road from our side going to the Reservoir. The road came in from Gen. Barr's side, where the 7th Division was. I finally talked Gen. Almond into letting us off the hook on that, so the 5th could follow up the 7th."<sup>89</sup> A re-check of Map 5 will show how this 7th Division expanded zone, narrows (and makes an early commitment too) the Marine Zone on the eastside of the Changjin Reservoir as well! Thus the connection to that event at Seoul and Chinhung-ni where the Army 7th and 3rd Division, will be "requested" by Smith to execute "previously assigned missions" of the Marine division objectives! This is that scenario setting for placing our 31st-RCT in line to be that force closest to the Changjin Reservoir, so that 4F- axiom: "fucked by the fickle finger of fate" was working against this RCT from the very beginning, and it had General Smith's stamp of approval all over it! It is hard to believe the hold and influence General O.P. Smith had over General Almond's X-Corps command! But this was the first distortion of our mission, as a "force closest to the Changjin Reservoir." While that was true, if one uses air miles instead of road miles, there was a difference between the two! The air miles—"as the crow flies"—was indeed short if we were going by that method or being dropped by parachute, but those 40 miles was not the reality. The road network was more likely 140-160 miles as we backtrack to the MSR-through Untaek junction to Chori, then southeastward away from the Changjin Reservoir into

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<sup>89</sup> Smith Interview by Benis Frank: USMC Historian; (1969) 7th Division zone bend inward from its straight line to include the Pujon Reservoir. Review map in Chapter 7.

Pukchong, to the coastal route leading through Hongwon then connect at Hamhung past Oro-ri upward to Hagaru-ri and extra miles to the end point at Sinhung-ni. But that will be days later. Thus unaware of our selection which would require our rapid redeployment effort to load all supplies, tons of equipment and ammo, for that redeployment, we were continuing our mission assigned within, the Hamgyong Mountain range which separate the province of North Hamgyong and Yang-gang. Yet here, there were few inland roads –unlike those in Eighth Army’s area. Those that were so designated as roads were in reality listed as “cow trails” narrow pathways through valleys and edges of hills, around steep drop off gorges, scarily able at times to support a jeep. Men would obtain use of local oxen and carts to shift ammo and supplies inward from the road area.

But here–no stranger–in this foreign land was the 31st Regiment unit designated as the “Foreign Legion of the United States Army”.<sup>90</sup> An exclusive title because this Regiment of the 31st Infantry was born outside of and had never yet served within the continental limits of the United States-The 31st Infantry Regiment. It was supported by Ray Embree’s 57th Field Artillery Battalion and units of the 15th Anti-Aircraft-Artillery-Automatic Weapons Battalion, Self-propelled units. As the 31st Regimental Combat Team (31st RCT) moves northward on the left and right of Pungsan, it established its headquarters there. Roads were non-existent, and the regiment was spread out, mostly on foot into the mountains either “holding” or “advancing” in the division center. The 3rd Battalion was commanded by a combat experienced West Pointer–1939– William R. Reilly. This battalion-as all others-would encounter a few CCF troops, the first Chinese the 7th Division had met. The Chinese fought desultorily or not at all, leading MacLean, Reilly and other leaders in the 31st Infantry unwisely to regard all Chinese with contempt. After chasing them into the hills, MacLean and Reilly later viewed their actions as those of stragglers from the CCF 124th Division, it was later learned they were of a sister division of that force, the 126th, ordered to avoid combat.

As the 31st Infantry moves forward into the mountains. It seemed at times that the very clouds themselves would have to be pushed aside to see. The air was getting thin at this high elevation. Sleeping bags were your best protection against the bitter night winds and the cold. Frostbite became common to all too some degree. Letter writing home to family, wife are sweetheart, was ebbing and tapering off, little daylight contributing to our numerous problems. Trucks were difficult to start, weapon problems were beginning to surface, and so were the Chinese forces. The old water hole-that (lithe) water-bag was frozen and out of action for the winter, only one or two in the mess tent area, or inside warming tents. Still the mission was primal. General Barr did not like his mission, but he had no choice, neither did any of his soldier’s, but after all that was why we were getting those big bucks, each month! Almond’s orders for those army subordinate commanders had to be carried out, your duty, this was never a pick and choose situation in the 7th Division ranks. Those mythical TS (Tough Shit) Cards were being punched daily.[One punch for each complaint-problem heard-who cares?] In one 22 November report by MacLean, he would state that “any combined resistance within the 7th Division line of action is isolated events of battalion size... the enemy has been easily dislodged with artillery and mortar fire. Guerrilla bands operating from mountain villages that are isolated from our main routes will harass our supply lines and attack small groups operating in those areas. These assaults can be initially carried out using North Korean Army supplies carried into the area, or previously stashed.” (Archives)

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<sup>90</sup> See chapter end note.

The 31st Infantry RCT will continue to patrol locally: “The 3rd Battalion will: 1) Report route and bridge conditions which will affect the rapidity of advancing support units. 2) Report location of all obstacles, both natural and manmade that hinders our advance, include what equipment may be necessary to remove repair or by pass same. 3) Report location of turn-round’s and air strips. 4) Report strength, location, organization, movement, identification and combat efficiency of enemy forces contacted within the zone of action. 5) Report attitude of the native population, guerrilla operations, passive resistance, subversive activity and/or sabotage. 6) Report any evidence of Soviet or Chinese Communist participation. 7) Report all attacks by aircraft etc. 8) Reconnoiter rail lines, report condition of same, list locomotives, rolling stock etc. 9) Towns and villages; a) Search out and capture or kill all NK Troops. b) Instruct all civilians to remain off the MSR. c) Instruct civilians that curfew will be 1700 to 0700 hrs. d) All civilian communications will be suspended; all mail, telephone, telegraph, cable newspaper and radio broadcasting stations, receiving sets in the hands of civilians will not be disturbed. DO NOT destroy overhead wire lines—we will use them. Pigeon lofts and contents will be destroyed. All firearms, weapons, explosions, binoculars and cameras will be collected from civilians, they are forbidden by law to retain any of these. Prisoner identification will be a matter of highest priority; reports will be made to S-2, captured enemy equipment believed to be of cryptographic nature will be delivered to S-2 by the most expeditious means.” So orders MacLean. If need be our ROK’s attached could be of great service in this reconnoitering, they can be briefed, and used to relay this information to the North Koreans. Here the 31st patrolled its area of operations, to pursue and capture North Korean forces bypassed or those scattered forces fleeing north, being driven ever northeasterly and cut off in the highest mountains regions of North Korea.

As some would state, if Korea had been ironed flat it could cover the entire world, and the country itself resembled “a sea in a heavy gale” because of the many mountains crisscrossing the peninsula. In the Taebaek Range, which extends into South Korea is Diamond Mountain, reported as famous for its scenic beauty. But undoubtedly not in the bitter cold winter months in a combat mode. It could be hard to find anything of beauty in this country. Here the ranges form, the watershed for most of the rivers which flow westward directions and empty into the Yellow Sea; depositing that yellowish silt which flow from China into the Yellow Sea which derived its name from that once named yellow land. That yellow dust in the air swirling around these high mountains carries it aloft to every region. North Korea has four distinct seasons. Long winters bring about bitter cold and clear weather interspersed with snow storms as a result of northern and northeastern winds that blow in from Siberia. Average snowfall is 37 days. During the winter the weather is extremely harsh within the mountainous regions. And like it or not that is our position as the winter winds would increase; seeming by the hour.

One had to be extremely cautious in the wire section, those daily trips to repair broken wires would subject you to sudden ambush tactics, the enemy would at time break the wire and lie in wait. This required shotgun riders to be always on the alert for that tactic. These attacks also conducted against our supply lines for rations, clothing, arms and ammunition. As required a reconnaissance squad would be required too conducted and identify units in combat, our approximate time distance to a supply point; was seven hours. So the problems were many, the American crews few in the 7th Division.

On November 16 through the 20th, a patrol of nine men led by 1st Lt. Penney W. Wales, of C, Co. 31st Infantry, with rations for two days would begin a search for a downed plane. The civilians had stated having heard a plane crash to the west. This patrol proceeded by compass due to the non-existence of trails. While passing a designed point four men were involved in a short fire fight with

two guerrillas, they felt they had wounded one from the stains in the snow. The patrol in the meantime had moved to the next position, set up their poncho's as a wind break and built a fire, the next morning there were no trails whatsoever, his patrol had to rely entirely on the compass with no way to get a reading from a map due to the dense timber and undergrowth. On the 20th at 1130 hours the patrol reached the scene of the crash. The pilot's body had been placed in a cellar and covered with brush by local civilians. The fuselage number VMF 212, and other numbers were reported,-F4U-5, 122081, Engine Cowling; No.22. An inspection of the area indicated one wing still contained rockets and ammunition, the other one had exploded on impact, this area was covered with six inches of snow; they found no documents or dog tags, wallet nor watch. The patrol commandeered an ox and sled, they returned the body to the 3rd Battalion, GRO (Grave Registration ) These men had eaten only four meals between 18 November and the 20th, they had walked over 50 miles through the roughest terrain in Korea, sliding down steep snow covered slopes and crawling under or over acres of fallen timbers .(Archives) In one other report MacLean would state; "Pertinent intelligence factors not otherwise covered: Frankly I don't know what the hell they (enemy) plan to do." And still under enemy capabilities he states: "The enemy will not defend in this area. He is not capable of launching an organized attack. Military terminology is not suitable to describe what he may do" (Archives)

Around the area all caves will continuously be searched, the 31st found cases of ammo and supplies with both Korean and Russian marking on the crates, but no big deal as we were closer to the Soviet border here. So the 31st was busy with its continual mission. If one were to draw a straight line between Manpo'jin to the area of Kapsan we would be on that line! As this -23 November- day draws to a close, the 1st Marine Division has just activated Draft two of Plan 8, from Almond's newly drawn "line of departure" from Hagaru-ri to Yudam-ni, being moved back from Yudam-ni 14 miles into where the marines have refused to move! Smith now finally orders his two regiments to press towards their X Corps missions. The 7th Marine Regiment to advance and set up a road block at Yudam-ni. The 5th Marines -finally- to head up the east side of the reservoir and seize the Town of Changjin, then advance to the Yalu River -ending at Singalpajin, just west of the 7th Division northern zone of operations.

-Important Changes begin.-

240900 November 1950, at this hour unknown to us, General Almond & Division Commander David Barr, has rerouted Lieutenant Colonel Don C, Faith's 1st Battalion 32 Infantry to shift his battalion to the Changjin Reservoir! An abnormal change too our 31 RCT begins here.

-242400I November 1950-Day One-AN IMPORTANT PHONE CALL!-

While Division has assigned the 3rd Battalion too continue their assigned mission on the late hours into this Friday night of 24 November, our regimental commander is about to receive a very important and urgent phone call from Major General David Barr-the division commander. Just as in family life an urgent phone call in the middle of the night usually spells danger, or some past disaster, this one can not spell out all of the underlining doom, and disaster that is to come from this one call to Colonel MacLean, nor the political fall-out of its orders to be pulled and too bury so many men from history! It can only be surmised that the anticipated casualties calculated for this X Corps move into Eighth Army zone has already been tallied and they were estimated as low for this smaller force to lead off from Changjin or Yudam-ni under a new Draft #3. Although that loss will be transferred along with this mission to Colonel MacLean, those anticipated losses have to be moved over to his column of men to be lost. Colonel MacLean is to assemble his available forces for a relocation movement to be designated as time will unfold. It will include his entire tank command-a rare occurrence-this order is



to be executed ASAP. (As Soon As Possible) Whatever units can be assembled immediately will be ordered to form a road march into an assembly area at Pukchong railroad station. Time line; eight hours to activate the road march; There will be further details as they become available. So Colonel MacLean swings into action, he issues Order #24 for precisely the midnight hour; (242400I) that final dividing second which separates and defines days. MacLean will follow-up with other units as he collects information of his mission and what fire power will be required as this “Hourglass Division” has been alerted, turned and reset to activate whatever time frame that fate will allot to this 31-RCT drama. [“Hourglass;” The division nickname is defined by its insignia: The numeral 7 with each end joined by another inverted 7, creating an hourglass effect, the upper and lower globe filled in black, then placed in the center of a red circle background.]

As MacLean gathers orders, his force is defined within the March table of OPN Order #24. It will be three more days before the next OPN Order #25 is issued. Between these two orders the forces assembled, on this night alone some 150 road miles-approximately 40 air miles- relocated to the east side of the Changjin Reservoir. This force will also be close kin to the first Task Force (Brad) Smith in South Korea months earlier, also a total of at least twenty-three (like) task forces since Task Force Smith in July '50. MacLean will attempt to consolidate two infantry battalions,—will only have his one 3/31 Battalion— supported by his 57th Field Artillery Battalion, (–C Battery) and Battery D from the 15th AAA-AW Battalion. Other units will have to be picked up as their positions become important to the overall mission; at this time other units were not yet fully known nor revealed to MacLean. Those units not listed here on this midnight hour, but listed on the following Order #25. Those units so named and assigned a precise objective at the reservoir, in reality, will never arrive in time for this mission. (2nd Battalion and B-Battery of 155mm artillery-from the 31st Field Artillery) Only those units on the March Table of Order 24 will be inclusive of MacLean’s Task Force. The time line was just too short for all these other units to be involved to reach the reservoir. MacLean will only end up with his 3rd Battalion. The other two battalions (1st & 2nd) at this hour are too; “continue their present mission.” All that MacLean will have time for is to alert his battalion commanders, Reilly and Embree, and Drake of the tank command for a stand-by move, to assemble those units he lists under Order 24. Further orders will be issued to these commanders at the railroad station at Pukchong. But these units will be assembled to lead off to the rail station at 250800 hours this morning.

Saturday–25 November 1950=Day two for Lt. Colonel Faith–Day one for MacLean’s forces:

#### -A KOREAN ALAMO AT CHOSIN-

Forgotten, and buried deep within American military history; is this upcoming forgotten battle, in a truly named; “Forgotten War” concerning a unit of the United States Army! The 7th Infantry Division, battle at Changjin, that battle east of a reservoir, in North Korea. Related: to this body of water as no, other in the history of that area. For 5 bitter cold days and 12 miles, this battle touches the very banks of that reservoir itself. Yet, history failed miserably to include this battle in American military history until the 1980’s. That was some 30 years too late, for others had already capitalized upon this battle area as their own; neglecting those that died on the east side of that reservoir that bears and supports the Japanese name of “Chosin” The very name itself, long viewed by both North and South Koreans—liberated in World War II—from Japanese occupation, as an insult to their native language. The correct Korean name is “Changjin” But the one constant in history, once performed as history, the truth, will sooner or later surface and the historical facts come forth. As those facts emerge although three to five decades later, they reveal history, as it should have been written in the first place, and at the time it became history. Its neglect, hidden under the legendary exaggeration of the 1st Marine Division; and their claim to being the sole participant of that action!

However, no other force at The Changjin Reservoir, had earned the right to part of that region, and the eastern banks of that reservoir as those Army men that also fought there, each mile of those twelve were blooded, by American and “attached” South Koreans, together their life blood staining and draining into the frozen waters of that reservoir. Both are still buried there to this day—some one thousand or more soldiers. Yet, as follows through these additional pages, every effort was made to down play and remove the action and the Army task force assembled there on short notice to face the Chinese forces, the days, between-27th November-2 December 1950.

As General Santa Anna could well have avoided—skirted—the Texas Alamo, so too, the Chinese commander, Marshal Peng (MacArthur’s -equivalent) could have avoided and ordered his forces around this army task force east of Changjin...as MacArthur would have done! But neither man seized his one time opportunity, and that mistake cost them a major victory! I and other survivors are alive today—after that last road block due to Marshal Peng’s latter mistakes! Likewise as General Santa Anna, may well have avoided the Texas Alamo. So too in North Korea, Marshal Peng could have avoided and ordered his forces around the task force east of Changjin. Since Hagaru-ri was now a weaker garrison of men than the number on Army soldiers of the 31st RCT. Had he at least practically ignored us, he could easily have taken Hagaru-ri, a prize—hub and garrison—left weak by the sudden shift of the 1st Marine Division commander to change his past obsession for delays, now relocating his forces, too bunch them in haste at Yudam-ni some fourteen miles westward from Hagaru-ri, leaving this vital center >Y< hub weak and undefended. That center hub, now with a vital airstrip carved out. The Marine commander, realized his own mistake the very next day, and ordered a task force of men—Colonel Drysdale—to relocate from a distance of eleven miles south to break through enemy lines “at all cost” to “reinforce Hagaru-ri”—still needing more support he orders our tank command back to Hagaru-ri as well. So this Chinese commander, could have, but did not, order his dominate force around this obtainable prize objective, he wanted this mixed American-ROK force, and that huge egotistical mistake cost him the whole major victory. Those Army Quad 50 caliber machine guns were a source of elimination to his forces still he sent in reserves forces rather than ignore this arena. This mixed army force, lost their battle due to their own lack of ammunition defeating them; and the weather defeating them, not too their own inbred tenacity!

#### —THE AMERICAN ALAMO—

It was originally the chapel of a Franciscan mission -San Antonio de Valero that was founded in 1718: by 1783 it was no longer used for religious purposes. In the Texas struggle for its independence from Mexico -as a fort- it was besieged from February 23 until March 6, 1836, by President-General Santa Anna and his army of several thousand men. The mission being defended by only 187 men, under the command of William Barret Travis; it included within its defenders noted names as Jim Bowie and Davy Crockett. [The Alamo rich in legendary lore]

The defenders held the mission for those 13 days, to the last man allowing Sam Houston to use those 13 additional days to build and train his force. “Remember the Alamo” was the war cry his force used for victory of San Jacinta on April 1836. Here General Santa Anna, the head honcho, could well have avoided this time delay; by pass this mission, and proceed to San Jacinta with his future plan of attack. But again, he did not and he failed to defeat Sam Houston partly due to that delay at the Alamo.

#### —GETTEYSBURG—

General Robert E. Lee in 1863—also—could well have avoided Gettysburg; but he did not. His decision to fight there four days cost him dearly with his Virginia forces and the loss of valuable officers and men.

–BATAAN–

General Masaharu Homma of the Japanese army could have avoided a prolonged fight with the weakened force at Bataan in 1941-1942, but, he did not, and that cost him valuable time! There at Bataan his force will face those of the 31st Infantry Regiment—now at the North Korean reservoir—this very same regiment facing the Chinese at the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir, this very same regiment called upon to fight a delaying action in both areas; almost nine years apart. Each time severely discredited—not for their commitment to defending an area: but for the overwhelming defeat at those areas. The time gained of no credited concern, but was effectively used to hold and defend other areas! What is the lesson above? In history man has failed to learn from the animal kingdom, that the object of confrontation is to wound and drive away your invading enemy, not to continue for the entire kill. American diplomacy is finally coming full circle to that realization. Desert Storm’s cease fire on our time table being that realization. Total war does not totally solve the entire problem. In North Korea we were going to solve the entire problem by force, but we could not find the North Korean government. Once capture of their capital city the political solution was not going to revert to the South Korean government by default, as the one sole government of Korea. It would be up to the United Nations; even if we had won a complete victory, and China had not interfered, there were diplomatic problems beyond the force assembled to reach the border and end this war. I am not a diplomat, and not educated to debate that issue of a united Korean government. But I believe through hindsight—which has no merit—which we should have held at the 38th Parallel, at least long enough to study the situation in depth. But with those men above; their mistakes—we could have—but we did not!

The Chosin Campaign was raised and praised, in the press, and by all earlier authors as a sole marine mission, to a Historical “Legendary” Event! I fail to concur with that assessment. Had the 1st Marine Division reversed that retrograde movement, out of North Korea, that indeed would have been; a historical event in North Korean history. But as redundant as I maybe, they did not. And that historical event is only an illusion and not a fact. President Truman had stated that: “History is written by the winners.” We were not the winners in North Korea, by any means. Thus these events of the Changjin Campaign have become part of American military history, though not complete, I intend to restate some of what history failed to record within these remaining pages of this book.

What the 7<sup>th</sup> Division is recording at the time?

22 Nov 50;

Division mission continues same: 17th RCT to attack west from HYESANJIN; 32d RCT to attack northwest and seize SAMSU; 31st RCT secure MSR and division installations in zone. Patrols from 17th and 32d RCT's had enemy contact. Weather continued cold, reaching a minimum of 20 degrees F in the northern sectors. Snow flurries began.

“Division mission of clearing area continues, 1300 hours: mission received from Division CG at X Corps: eastern portion of the division zone will be turned over to I ROK Corps Division, to move west and take over a portion of the 1st Marine Division zone, area unknown. The 17th RCT continues attack westward along the YALU: progress slow because of increased enemy resistance and road blocks.

RCT to send patrols to the east to determine the condition for road and railroads: for possible supply and withdrawal routes. 31st RCT conducted individual and unit firing and maintenance of vehicles.”<sup>91</sup>

Only one route opens at present to HAMHUNG. HYESANJIN - KAPSAN - PUNGSAN - PUKCHON - HAMHUNG: mostly one way road partially covered in hill areas by snow and ice, Railroad from PUKCHONG to HAMHUNG. Capabilities of railroad from SILLYONG east to coast at TANCHON and then south along coast are being investigated. [Daily report—However, missing from report are the next two days 23 Nov, 24, Nov. End]

–25 November—Christmas Day—one month away.–

MacLean collects: his Task Force.

But before we can move out we should identify the position of MacLean and his forces through his mission prior to its relocation. That order that history failed to record was removed from history at this time and at this place, being some 150 plus miles by road network between the two areas. For that information we must turn to and consider Operational Order #23. The date of this order by MacLean is 222400I Nov 50, its location is Vic. Untaek, Korea.

MAP #5. > Ebb & Flow > [http://www.koreanwar.org/html/maps/map5\\_full.jpg](http://www.koreanwar.org/html/maps/map5_full.jpg) < Note the absence of any 31st-RCT forces anywhere on this map! Its date is 26 November. After all this IS Army history, and should locate Army locations on this map! The 31st RCT is within route to the Reservoir on this date and all boundary lines between the 1st Marine Division in X Corps have been eliminated!

MAP D,<sup>92</sup> > D 25–26 November > Places, The RCT-31 at Pukchong, Faith’s 1/32 Battalion at Chinhung-ni.

25 Nov 50; [Note, No 23, 24 reports listed!]

25 Nov 50 [Draft Three active-242400I]

Dispositions - See overlay - 25 Nov 50; overlay’s not included]

Division mission to assume new zone of action in CHOSIN Reservoir area with movement of 31st RCT and to continue attacks in present zones of 17th and 32d RCT's; assume command of 26th ROK regiment as it arrives in area to relieve divisional units. 26th ROK regiment to occupy HYESANJIN area, releasing 17th RCT for movement to new zone. 17th continues attack to west, prepare to occupy SAMSU - KAPSAN - PUNGSAN area and reconnoiter in force the road from HYESANJIN to SAMSU. 31st RCT preparing to move to new zone of action in CHOSIN Reservoir Area, be division reserve; protect MSR and division installations in zone. The 32d RCT continue present mission; patrol to N, S and W of SAMSU; reconnoiter in force northwest from SAMSU to YALU River; reconnoiter in force southwest to WODONG-NI. Both 17th and 32d RCT patrols encountered intense enemy fire in YALU area. High flying reconnaissance plane from north of YALU River sighted south of river. 1st Bn 32d Inf spent night 24-25 Nov at CV-5381, south of CHOSIN Reservoir. Moved to CHONGJIN

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<sup>91</sup> 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION OPERATIONS -21 November - 21 December. HYESANJIN - CHOSIN RESERVOIR - HUNGNAM (p.1) Note: Original Classification Stamped as SECRET. Tabbed by DLS (Donald Singer) on 5/13/03 and copied by Charles E. Shaw on 7/28/03. MASTER No. 889 538. Special thanks to Chuck for providing me with this copy.

<sup>92</sup> A Thesis: –by Major Robert M. Coombs, USA. p.68:–Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir, Korea-1950.

(south of HAGARU-RI) today. 3d Bn 31st Inf in route to HAGARU-RI via PUKCHONG and HAMHUNG.

Temperature in the mountain areas of the division zone dropped to below zero F.

Order of movement of RCT's will be 31st, 32d, and 17th (after relief by 26th ROK regt.). 185th Engineer Bn was detached from division. [Note: Order of movement lists all three regiments to be in motion toward the Changjin reservoir. End 25 Nov.]

26 Nov 50

Dispositions - See overlay 26 Nov 50.

Division continues present mission of moving to new area east of CHOSIN Reservoir and relieving 1st Mar Div and continues clearing of HYESANJIN area west until relieved by I ROK Corps. (See O #26 HQ 7th Inf Div, 25 50, attch).

Co A, 185th Engr Bn remains attached to division.

-PAGE 3-

The 31st Infantry Regiment with supporting units was under MacLean's direct command. (The 1st Battalion being placed under X Corps direct control under a late warning order by General Barr, to guard the flanks of the division.) Many problems have to be considered here for the rear support of the two other regiments—17th & 32nd—so far ahead at the Yalu. These forward units are therefore losing their rear guard defensive units and the required triangular purpose of a three regimental division support unit—eroded by these moves. Those elements connected—or attached—as a complete RCT were also subject to his command for direct support of his infantry units; thus the designation of the following 31st Regiment will be inclusive of those support units within his designed Task Force, on this date not yet connected with Faith's 1/32nd Battalion already en-route towards Changjin but not yet directly under MacLean's command. As stated earlier, a regiment is a fixed unit, any disconnection of battalions outside of that "normal" organizational unity decreases this to one of those twenty-three Ad Hoc Task Forces. These support units through separate commanders yet integrated as a unit within that RCT or Task Force. One of the difficulties of my sons finding the information in the National Archives was in understanding that I was with the 57th Field Artillery Battalion and that orders for our movements are intertwined with the 31st RCT, or/and in this case Task Force MacLean—Faith. Yet, these units were separate ones, under their own commander. In this case of the 57th Field Artillery Battalion; (—) its commander was Lieutenant Colonel Ray O. Embree. The artillery had three firing batteries, A, B, (- C) with six 105mm howitzers each. (The reason for the separation of C-Battery is not clear as this unit was never a part of our original two batteries at Sapporo, Japan prior to orders for Inchon! (A report exists to this battery added just prior to the Inchon landing.)

Separate commanders were over the Tank Command; Captain Robert E. Drake; a graduate of West Point (Armor, Class of '44) it had four platoons of five M 4A4 tanks each, all armed with 76mm guns. Two additional tanks in the command section were armed with 105mm howitzers making a total of 22 tanks. "In Korea seldom did a tank company operate as a unit; usually it was employed in platoons or sections but at Changjin Drake's company was employed as a complete unit."<sup>93</sup> This was therefore a powerful force of mobility and of high importance to our mission. Usually one or more of these tanks

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<sup>93</sup> Appleman East of Chosin, (p.39)

would be employed in forward reconnaissance work. They would not be in position for that task at the reservoir. In reality, they will bring up the rear in this convoy. The 15th AAA-AW, D Battery (minus the 2nd Platoon) was attached to the 57th Field Artillery Battalion, Commanded by Captain James R. McClymont; it includes eight weapon carriers; four M19 (dual 40-mm) full-track gun carriages, each equipped with two 40 mm– antiaircraft guns. Also four M16 (quad -50) half-tracks, each of these units equipped with four .50-caliber machine guns, with heavy (M-2) barrels, on all of these units, these guns were mounted on 360<sup>0</sup> revolving turrets; Fire power of the M19: a bursting shell, with a firing rate of 240 round per minute, distance up to 3 miles. M16's could fire all four barrels on automatic at the rate of 1,800 rounds a minute. That is massive fire power but also massive requirement of supply ammo and extra supply of barrels. Organically attached to artillery for defensive protection against air attacks, the battery carried double its normal load of ammunition. Of special note in this drama to follow will be that separation of the tank command from the Task Force–cut off from MacLean by a road block–would make it an independent command, yet its units still under its last command order by MacLean-too proceed forward, until rescinded by some higher authority. Those orders will be of special note in this drama to follow explicitly, its jumbled orders and importance of its valued firepower and mobility.

The 1st Battalion of the 31st was separated from the Changjin mission by MacLean's orders–“to continue its present mission.” In reality 1/31 was assigned to X Corps control. While one [“1/B/31”] company will-somehow be mixed and ahead of the 2nd Battalion en-route to Changjin; is not fully explained nor important to Task Force MacLean–Faith drama. It was however very important to Task Force Drysdale's attempt to reinforce Hagaru on the afternoon of the 29th of November, it suffered many casualties in that attempt, and ordered to surrender by one marine officer. (A story by itself) Relates to a later time-line also by a marine officers' suggestion, for an Army officer–to surrender over 1,000 survivors'–with me included! So its importance within the overall drama cannot be totally isolated. Yet, it is isolated from Task Force MacLean–Faith as was the Tank Command–both units being transferred to the Marine Commander Oliver P. Smith, USMC, by order of General Almond! Indicating our fate and survival was not dependent on enemy action alone!

–Surrender–was never a group option!–

“Two nights earlier Major John McLaughlin [USMC] did exactly that when his portion of the Drysdale task force was cut off, isolated, surrounded and encumbered with a large number of wounded. McLaughlin could have gotten away himself. Instead he chose to surrender on the agreement of the Chinese that they would take care of the wounded. The Chinese reneged on their agreement, but some of the lesser wounded did manage to escape.”<sup>94</sup> This second paragraph seems to confirm no change in the enemy agreement, too disregard their agreement, and totally neglect the wounded. Result would have been over 1,000 walking wounded and 385 able bodied troops becoming POW's. This would have exonerated this Marine Corps action by this larger Army force.

31st Infantry  
Present Mission- Prior to Day Two  
Order # 23  
222400 NOV 50

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<sup>94</sup> Patrick Roe, USMC. Death of RCT31: Part V. (<http://www.chosinreservoir.com/>) in five parts.

- 2. a. RCT 31, b Division Res. (Division Reserve) secures MSR (Main Supply Route)
- 3. b. 1st Bn. Atchd USAF TACP No. 7
  - (1) Block en movement into Z (Zone) from W (West) Occupy blocking position vicinity S and Y.
  - (2) Be prepared to reinforce 3rd and 2nd Battalions.
- 3, b. 2nd Battalion: Attached: 2nd Platoon 31st Heavy Mortar Company.
  - (1) Division control N/C
  - (2) Upon release to RCT 31 control, block enemy movement into zone vicinity Pung-san. Prepare to reinforce 1st and 3rd Battalion.
- e. 3rd battalion (Will become Task Force MacLean's next operational order number, this places and dates its prior position) continue its present mission.
  - (1) Blocks enemy movement into zone from S (South) and E (East)
  - (2) Prepare to reinforce 1st and 2nd Battalion.
- d. 57th Field Artillery Battalion. D/S (Direct Support) RCT 31
- e. 31st Heavy Mortar Company
  - (1) 2nd Platoon attached 2nd Battalion.
- f. 31st Tank Company, Provides local security MSR, vicinity assembly area.
  - (2) Prepare for employment N on O (North on Order)

This order-as #22 also marked "Secret" –through OPN O #25– it locates the RCT-31 east of the Pujon Reservoir 40 air miles east of Chosin Reservoir, with orders to proceed north upwards towards the Yalu River within our boundary zone set by General Almond on November 11, 1950. It will "Block" enemy movement into zone South and East, this being further towards the Pujon Reservoir between Pungsan and the eastern boundary limits southeasterly downward from Samsu, and Hapsu into Iwon, to the Sea of Japan. This order #23 time frame 48 Hours prior to order #24!

One of the confusing things about Faith meeting with the Marines was their varying reports of the enemy activities in their area. RCT-5 reported three enemy divisions were located around the reservoir area. As Navy Map 19 will verify two divisions of CCF on the east side of the Pujon (Fusen) Reservoir! The enemy divisions of the 76th & 77th's were already east of the Pujon reservoir and seeking a path for crossing over into this new Army area yet unknown but executed before a Navy Map 19 (lower left section) locates them south of Hagaru-ri on 3 December.

-Task Force MacLean's enters the trap.-

November 27, 1950

-MARINES-

Yudam-ni; West of Chosin

As these two regiments moved out, they were rapped hard by the long-concealed Chinese. It was then that Murray and Litzenberg decided on their own, without consulting Smith, to call off the attack and go on the defensive, disregarding Almond's orders, as they figured the show was hopeless." [Ridgway] However, General Smith states; this was his order, [27 Nov.] "Murray made, as I said, about 2,000 yards, and 'I halted the attack,' because it was manifest that we were up against a massive force out there." Interview with Benis Frank: [June 1969] Red Flag: Litzenberg not Murray "made" about 2,000 yards; See Ebb & Flow, Army History, we have a contradiction! However, regardless of the contradictions on the marine western side of the reservoir, the 31st Regiment was now in motion

awaiting the balance of the Marine two battalions' [1/5 and 3/5] to clear the road out from Hudong-ni. The main point here: The marine mission under Opn O 7–Draft three, has been aborted by the Marine Division G-3! RCT-5-remaining two battalions are in motion moving from the east side of the reservoir to the west side.

–A REQUIRED SAFETY VALVE TO SECURE HAGARU-RI–

-ARMY-

East of Chosin

Colonel MacLean has postponed his scheduled W/O Delay attack, by 24 hours.

DAY THREE: Monday, 27th, of November was another clear, cold day, on the east side of reservoir. Marine trucks were on the road soon after dawn shuttling troops south. By noon, when the road was clear again (Approximately some 5 hours of road traffic delay) MacLean was never informed of any clash of marine forces against this “massive force” of CCF now underway, and just being aborted, nor of the enemy attack the night (26 November) before. Nor strangely did either clash effect the relocation of the 5th Marine movement to Yudam-ni. Within two hours, of this same day, the westward move out of Yudam-ni will be called off, against “a massive force out there.” The rest of Colonel MacLean's forces moved into position about four miles south of Faith's battalion. Colonel Faith had requested to move his battalion north into that forward area just vacated by the 5th Marine Regiment, 3rd Battalion. However, this is completely irrelevant now as the westward marine offensive is delayed, and completely stalled at 1430hrs. [2:30 pm]

Our artillery battalion was a leading element in front of Captain Drake's tank force on the road leading here, otherwise-the tank force could have been forward with and directly between MacLean's and Faith's (3/31 & 1/32) Infantry Battalions. This afternoon of the 27th, the 57th Field Artillery Battalion was delayed —five hours— just outside of Hagaru-ironically around East Hill. We had our last barrel fire break here, waiting for the marines too clear the area of this junction which leads into Hudong-ni. Our efforts and the 15th AAA-AW units to relocate and close within this area south of the 31st Infantry perimeter, was under pressure of dusk, night comes early in this northern region in winter months, about 1600 [4:00 PM] hours, it's totally dark. So most of our work has to be done under cover of this night while we are preparing our defensive lines, setting up switchboards, erecting tents, unloading supplies, seeking some warmth, and food. There was much to be done in a short span of time. Unknown to us at the time the Chinese had much more to do, but they were prepared. As they manned those machine guns and mortar positions, cutting off our rear MSR, from our tank company later arrival at Hudong-ni. The enemy appears under total confusion as to the logic of this exchange of forces to the over-all mission! Had the enemy been flexible enough to attack while all our forces were exposed during this five hour delay, all late arriving army and the two marine battalions would have been caught unprepared while aboard transport trucks, therefore susceptible to surprise attack, giving our forces no immediate defensive position except roadside ditch's or culvert pipes. It could well be renaissance of the upcoming Task Force Drysdale chaos between Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri.

As night closed in on 27 November, the first order of business was defense, although a continuation of the northward drive the marines had just aborted on the west side. **Our** drive is planned for the next day (would be offset by the delay, for 24 Hrs. from Order #25- **Division** attack westward at 270800 Nov.) Lending greater force to common knowledge “that Chinese forces in undetermined strength, were roaming the mountains in the vicinity of Chosin Reservoir,” the marines had reported the presence of three fresh divisions operating in this area east of the reservoir. They had told this to Faith on the 26th. The marines had captured several Chinese prisoners. Their mission, the prisoners had said, was to sever the American supply route. As Colonel MacLean orders only minimum amount of



night movement outside of our defensive perimeter. This could possible account in the marines refusal to move its two other battalions, southward through our forces the night before. While it had been implied that Faith's force has been left alone for some time within this area that does not seem the case as the unit left with him (5th Marines) would not leave until this morning. This in reality denied Colonel MacLean to freely assign his units to these vacated slots prior to their withdrawal! Yet it still raised that red flag, why would those remaining two battalions from 5th Marines, by-pass Hagaru, to pass through the 7th Marines on the west side of the reservoir? Especially while that mission is being aborted in its totality! That was a danger sign in this area. However the marine assigned area, was none of my business. None of my business *unless* that affected me—unfortunately here is an overlap of events: If one side misses his cue, than disaster overwhelms them both. One can but wonder here, had that Marine delay in movement backward those four hours denied us that use of those daylight hours as well, or was that the reason MacLean did not move the tank force forward after dark? But, tanks require regular maintenance and the rapid push to get here they needed attention and big time maintenance. It is indeed a miracle that all twenty-two of those tanks arrived intact, given the mileage and wear and tear on the tank threads.

The importance of this date is the 27th, yet, marine history reported that those Chinese taken prisoner on the day before (26th attack on 1/7 Marines) on the other side of the reservoir had stated their force also contained some three enemy divisions, this would have been time for the marine commander, with his stated caution, to pull this remaining two battalion force of RCT-5 into Hagaru at least until more reconnaissance information was obtained from that fire fight the night before. The enemy was ready with a road block south of the 57th FA. Bn. This enemy force waiting until around 2000 hours (8:00 p.m.) to close the single road at that hairpin turn around the most easterly slope of Hill 1221, located about two miles north at a schoolhouse in Hudong-ni. Our tank company was there in its entirety, with MacLean's rear command post, our medical team and the service company. All supplies over and above what our forward force had brought with them were located here in a supply dump of ammo, food, and tires and replacement parts, barrels of gas, and diesel fuel, plus antifreeze and oil would be dumped here for our re-supply. It is recorded by Appleman that the supply dump at Hudong-ni contained some 260 tons of supplies. There will be no more supplies added to this dump,<sup>95</sup> and what remained on the afternoon of 30 November will be blown skyward, and destroyed with no further benefit to our forward troops.

With the tank command was our medical collection team with most of their medical transport ambulances located here as well, as this group drove forward towards that hairpin turn, its movement would trigger the road block action. The red crosses painted on the sides of those ambulances grant no immunity to this medical group. This would be the other group of casualties second to our, I&R platoon sent out for reconnaissance of the road north toward Changjin. The medical company will be stopped cold at this road block. No medical personnel from this company—other than those corpsman and doctors already forward with the infantry units—will get through to us, nor past this road block, further, solidified by two of our tanks being knocked out by bazooka fire in this area. It is of value to note here, the difference between this Army medical units being from our own division. Unlike the Marine Corps having their combat needs provided by Navy-Corpsmen-personnel.

So our rear road was closed-27 November-and will remain closed until the late night of December 1-2, when Faith's own force must dislodge the Chinese holding that area. So all forces south to Hudong-ni were cut off from the 31st RCT forward units, the tank company will fail to break the road block and

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<sup>95</sup> Other than air dropped supplies intended for Task Force Faith.

return to Hudong-ni. That slight grade upwards around Hill 1221 was entirely too slick to negotiate for those tanks. It is difficult to place any blame between the hours of this road block remaining in place until the attempted breakout of Faith's force, with the exception of the early withdrawal order to the tank commander, and no orders to Faith to withdraw his force southward back into Hagaru-ri. This is the big issue, not that those tanks were ordered to withdraw but there never was a unified order issued for both forces to unite as one to complete the withdrawal back into Hagaru; *Together, together*. The larger units of Task Force Faith, falling back towards Hudong-ni and collecting and merging forces with the Tank Command, That could have happened, but sadly, it did not.


Colonel Faith and MacLean unaware of this event south of their perimeter placed their forces in position for the night. During the late afternoon the companies dug in for the night, cutting fields of fire through some brush on the hills. After breaking through some eight or ten inches of frozen earth, the digging became just a little easier. Colonel Faith set up his Command Post, in a few farm houses in a small valley back of the area; placed his perimeter across the road facing north, with the right flank bent south to face mountains that loomed high in the east. Faith's CP was located less than a thousand yards behind the front lines. Come early light, he would lead his force toward that objective soon to be outlined by MacLean.

Back in the artillery area telephone trunk lines were laid for the fire direction center and to each firing battery. Those connections to the forward observer overlooking the entire infantry advance area. This of vital importance to the mission, the forward observer—situated ahead on some high ground above the infantry units must maintain a cover fire in front of the infantry as they advance forward into enemy territory. To do that they call in information to the fire direction center (FDC) which in turn plots the co-ordinates and sends the firing batteries the final orders, as too elevation of the barrels, fuse projectile requirements, rather anti-tank, set shell charge for quick or delayed burst-air or ground. Those power requirements within the shell casing-powder bags-to get the projectile to that accurate point of impact. And that requires radio and wire back-up communications. The point here, those lines forward will be a priority in case of sudden enemy attack. Those lines to the rear secondary, to the rear CP. Those lines would be routed in the morning, as there may be some existing telephone lines overhead we can use or tap into. Radio can be used for back-up here by jeep back and forth if needed. Our trucks would have to use that road forward to lay those lines. Other trucks -supply- would be pulled off the main supply road for passage of other units, those expected tanks, the service company, and the medical crew with the ambulances to provide free excess to pass through our area. But our - wire section- area assigned was a mistake, it was in the lowest part of the perimeter, a huge error, for it was the equivalent of being placed in the bottom of a bowl, but artillery orders, my earlier (1st Calvary Division) infantry training sensed it was wrong-but that doesn't overrule orders-it was below and surrounded by the elevation of the road, railroad track, and the upper shelf level of Hill 1456, with slick elevation on all sides, just below the battalion CP. and fire direction center. As these lines were activated the forward observer will want to zero in on an area to align his position. It got dark early but the next hour or two after dark bright flashes would light up the sky, there were sounds of shell bursts around the perimeter since the forward observers had not completed the registration of artillery and mortar fire before dark. For another hour or two, until 2200, then it was quiet.

THAT WOULD BE THE LAST OF THAT QUIET. The battalion adjutant, having driven a hundred and fifty miles that day from division headquarters, arrived with two weeks of mail. A few minutes later, an officer from MacLean's headquarters brought the operation order for the attack scheduled for

dawn the next morning. Faith called his company commanders and asked them to bring their mail orderlies and to report to his command post for the attack order. THE ENEMY ATTACK'S WHILE THE MEETING WAS IN PROGRESS.

MAP 6



From: Ebb And Flow, November 1950-July 1951  
Center of Military History, 1990  
By Billy C. Mossman

MAP 6

FAITH'S PERIMETER: Probing actions enemy patrols came first in Faith's area, the first one appearing in front of a platoon near the road. When the friendly platoon opened fire Company A's executive officer (Lt. Cecil G. Smith) suspecting that the enemy was a reconnaissance patrol sent to locate specific American positions, tried to stop the fire. By the time he succeeded, the enemy had evidently discovered, or uncovered what it needed to know and melted away into the darkness. A few minutes later, after midnight the enemy patrolling gave way to determined attack. While the Chinese company struck south along the road, another plunged out of the darkness from the east to strike the boundary between the two rifle companies that were east of the road. The 32nd Infantry defense perimeter began to blaze with fire. In addition to directing steady mortar fire plus small-arms fire against Colonel Faith's battalion, the Chinese kept maneuvering small groups, (30-40 men) around the perimeter to break the line. As one enemy group climbed a steep ridge toward a heavy machine gun operated from a high elevation, as it could not be depressed enough to hit the enemy, the gunner picked up the weapon, tripod and all, and beat off the attack.

November 28, 1950

-MARINES-

Yudam-ni; West of Chosin

Colonel Litzenberg, 7th Marines, was *ordered* to "clear the road back to Hagaru, and 'rescue' Fox Company."

Smith: "On this redeployment of a regiment, I'd already told Litzenberg to use as much of his regiment as he could to try to clear the road back to Hagaru-ri...I had Murray come back to Yudam-ni -to come back the 2,000 yards -to relieve the 7th Marines on the hills they were defending in the vicinity of Yudam-ni. Then they defended there." [Same interview as above] 7th Marines now ordered to "redeploy" to clear the withdrawal route back to Hagaru. Smith had Murray come back. Here is the confusion of the issue. How did Murray 5th Marines get in front of Litzenberg's 7th Marines as the lead off unit? This is contrary to Mossman's version in "Ebb & Flow" All indications are that the 7th Marines were in stationary position, and had nothing to do with this mission except as indicated by Mossman in Ebb & Flow.

Chapter end note:

History of: The Polar Bears

© 31st Infantry Regiment Association

The Beginning

The 31st Infantry Regiment was formed at Ft William McKinley, Philippine Islands on August 13, 1916. In the spring of 1918, the 31st moved from Manila's tropics to the bitter cold of Siberia. Its mission, left vague by a deeply divided administration, was ostensibly to prevent allied war material left sitting on Vladivostock's docks from being looted. For the next 2 years, the 31st and its sister regiment, the 27th Infantry, fought off bands of Manchurian and Cossack bandits and Red revolutionaries plundering the Siberian countryside and trying to gain control of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. They also dissuaded their 40,000 Japanese "allies" from taking control of Russian territory. When the smoke cleared, 16 members of the 31st had earned the Distinguished Service Cross and 32 were killed in action in a two-year war few Americans even knew was being fought. For its Service in Siberia, the 31st Infantry became known as "the Polar Bear regiment", adopting a silver polar bear as its insignia.

## -Chapter 8-

COMMAND REPORT - CHOSIN RESERVOIR: period 27 November 1950 to 12 December 1950.<sup>96</sup>

“The only route for the Division to move to the new zone to the west was the narrow HYESANJIN, KAPSAN, PUNGSAN, PUKCHONG, HAMHUNG road and the PUKCHONG - HAMHUNG railroad. The narrow road, with no alternate or parallel routes, forced all movements to be made in columns. Speed in columns averaged approximately ten miles per hour because of the narrow tortuous roads, snow and ice conditions, and lack of pull-off areas for passing.

Because of the time element involved in moving the division, security could best be maintained by having the northern units in contact with the enemy to continue the attack until time for the unit to move out. By moving southern most units first, relief of northern most units by the 26th ROK Regiment would be accompanied before contact with the enemy was broken.

On 26 November 1950, the 31st RCT, commanded by Colonel Allan D. MacLean, was ordered to move from the vicinity of UNTAEK DV1258 to the east side of the CHOSIN Reservoir. The mission of the regiment was to relieve the Marine units in that vicinity and then advance north to the Manchurian Border. Initially, Col MacLean had at his disposal the 3d Bn, 31st RCT, commanded by Lt Col William Reilly, 1st Bn, 32d Infantry, commanded by Lt Col Don C. Faith, and the 57th Field Artillery Bn ( - C Battery ) commanded by Lt Col Ray C. Embree.

27 Nov. The 1st Bn, 32d Infantry had preceded the balance of the 31st RCT and was assembled on the east bank of the reservoir approximately three miles north of HUDONG-NI. (See "K" Strip Map)

At 0800 on 27 November, Col MacLean and part of his staff arrived at the command post of the 1st Bn, 32d Infantry. He and Lt Col Faith immediately made a reconnaissance of the forward outposts vacated by the marines who were moving without an actual relief on the positions of the 1st Bn, 32d Infantry. No contact with the enemy had been reported in the area and all had been quiet on the east side of the reservoir.

Col MacLean directed the 1st Bn, 32d Infantry to go into the positions vacated by the Marines on the northeastern tip of the reservoir (See "A", strip map). The 3d Bn, 31st Infantry established positions about four miles south of the 1st Bn, 32d Infantry positions (See "B", strip map). The Forward Regimental Command post was established about halfway between the two battalions. (See "A", strip map)

By 1600 hours 27 November 1950, the 1st Bn, 32d Infantry, 3d Bn, 31st Infantry and 57th Field Artillery Bn had occupied their positions, perimeter was established, reconnaissance patrols sent out and outposts manned. The 2d Bn, 31st Infantry (-E Co) was enroute to the reservoir area and had arrived in HAMHUNG. The 31st Tank Company, also enroute had arrived at HAMHUNG, (See "E", strip map) and halted for the night at the Regimental Command Post (Rear) established there.

At 2250 hours, 27 November 1950, the enemy began persistent probing attacks against the 1st Bn, 32d Infantry perimeter. At 0030 hours 27 November 1950, the Chinese launched a coordinated attack. This attack initially penetrated the outpost positions of "B" Company. The positions were immediately

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<sup>96</sup> Note: Original Classification Stamped SECRET. Tabbed by DLS (Donald Singer) on 5/13/03 and copied on 7/28/03 by Charles E. Shaw. MASTER No. 889 538. Again, Special thanks to Chuck for providing me with this copy.

restored by a counterattack launched by command post personnel. "A" Company on the left flank was overrun. A second counterattack drove the enemy back and the positions restored.

The attack continued against the left flank of "C" Company throughout the next morning. A counterattack by "C" Company, established by an air-strike forced the enemy to withdraw about 1600 hours. Friendly casualties were heavy, with about 100 passing through the aid station. Enemy casualties were estimated between 600 - 1,000 attesting to the size of the attacks.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Bn, 31st Infantry had also been subjected to coordinated attacks from all sides. (See "B", strip map) At 0130 hours 28 November 1950, a heavy attack was launched against the positions of "K" and "I" Company. The enemy broke through and overran Company "K". Close-in fighting resulted in "K" Company being caught between enemy and friendly forces and forcing it to withdraw to the positions of "A" Battery, 57th FA Bn. These positions were in turn abandoned, after the battery had run out of ammunition firing direct fire into the enemy. Both "K" Company and "A" Battery withdrew to "B" Battery positions and consolidated with: I: Company. In these positions the combined unit held the enemy off until he withdrew at daylight. All other companies around the perimeter had suffered heavily but had not been forced from their positions. After the enemy withdrew, a check revealed a heavy loss in men and officers. Lt Col Reilly, CO 3d Bn, 31st Infantry and Lt Col Embree, CO 57th FA Bn, were both casualties, though only wounded. The 57th FA Bn hastily regrouped and moved into the perimeter of the 3rd Bn, 31st Infantry. "A" Battery had recaptured its abandoned guns through hard infantry tactics." End-Command Report for: 27th into 28th.

-ARMY-

28 November 1950

Sinhung-ni; East of Chosin


-DAY FOUR-

The 57th Field Artillery became aware of the 27-28 night attack on the artillery batteries forward one mile north of Headquarters/Headquarters Battery 57th Field Artillery-yet our perimeter was free from any enemy attack throughout the prior night, HQ was being called in for fire missions from the two forward perimeters. The two firing batteries A & B were being overrun at the same time and could not respond to the fire mission requests due to their own survival! As daylight approached HQ's would also be hit as well. I climbed up the steep bank out

of that bowl we were in, to the truck parked on the upper road. Inside the bed I grabbed an extra barrel for a 50 caliber machine gun set up by the switchboard location dug into the train trestle. Before I could get out small holes were appearing in the tarp overhead. Taking the extra barrel and an extra can of 50 caliber ammunition, I jumped to the ground, and slid back down the bank. Unable to see the enemy above. Returning to the truck I took a position around the front tire of the trunk to fire on the enemy moving along the edge of the reservoir, they returned the fire. In this exchange I was wounded in the upper right arm, and again slid back down the hill heading for the FDC tent-a thrown grenade exploded behind me sending a smaller fragment below the bullet wound just received-before getting there the blood dripping from my wounds was jelling from the cold making frozen icicles dripping from the tip of my fingers! This sealed the wound with just the aid of the combat bandage.

MAP 7





MAP 7

From: Ebb And Flow, November 1950-July 1951  
Center of Military History, 1990  
By Billy C. Mossman

Colonel MacLean orders, Lieutenant Colonel Embree's rear force to consolidate in the center (Inlet) perimeter at Sinhung-ni. Later this night, this order will apply to Lieutenant Colonel Faith to move south, as Embree HQ's Battery moves north, thus three positions now consolidating into one defensive perimeter. As the night advanced onward into the 29th, not every position along the perimeter held firm. This would be the standard procedure for our entrapment, nothing of any earth shattering news however. One of those standard things was the requirement of the frontal yardage each man was

required to cover in this war, from day one, difficult areas that would be hard to maintain, and to stop the enemy from breaking through to your sector. Here was the height of the defensive positions, here was the bulk of our defense, here was the start of that erosion of that defense, and the depletion of our ammo, here is where those assigned would have no back-up force or reserves, or reinforcements to support the outer perimeter. Every man lost rather by death or wounds was a man totally lost with no replacement in reserve. Remember, this is a budget war, and we are not using money as, the standard reference by any means. In this battle just beginning, someone is going to “cook the books” as this force is going to be lost in the audit of military budgets. Recall to mind that these events are not real-fictitious –“some of these men” will be recorded as “Being in the open” some five days.<sup>97</sup> Here is some of what they did with those five days. There will be only vague reports of the numbers involved or lost in these battles. Our tally of men would only diminish the force trapped within this area. One man lost was one man less to defend this area. No one knew this better than Colonel’s MacLean and Faith, but at this time no one knew as well the situation at the rear. That in reality, we were totally isolated and alone. With no method of resupply of any needed essentials, food, medical supply, ammo, gasoline, etc. All that we have on hand is what we had brought with us on this road march; anything added would have to be air dropped to us! Those final days were fixed by Colonel Faith, and fate itself. He will later issue his own directive to withdraw. After that time he has no choices left:—available water supplies were frozen, and running out, thank God for the snow drifts for this need. He simply has to cut our losses. Food was no longer available from the mess units, all rations have to be from those frozen C-rations. This will add to indigestion problems, stomach cramps, and lowering of your body temperature to compensate for digesting that frozen food.

This early morning of the 28th, as the morning fog and dampness sets in, within the next two or three hours after the first enemy attack, the Chinese had seized and organized the highest point on the two ridge lines that had belonged to the two companies on the east side of the road. Loss of this ground seriously weakened the defense line of each company. It also permitted the enemy to fire into a native house which was now the command post. This Command Post was forced to vacate. Its weapons platoon and command group moved into the front lines to help defend what ground it had left. On the extreme right flank the Chinese had forced two platoons out of position, setting fire to those few tents in the area. On the left side of the road they circle wide around the left flank and seized a mortar position. Here wire communications with MacLean's HQ and the 57th Field Artillery Battalion went out soon after the attack started. After establishing radio communications, which were never satisfactory in the first place, Faith learned that the Chinese were also attacking the other units of MacLean's force. This explained why the artillery was involved with the more immediate necessity of defending its own –battery– position and perimeter, making it unable to directly support Faith's battalion.

These units of the artillery were those two firing batteries, A & B. Headquarters Battery located at the far tail end of the area will not be hit until daybreak, but its fire direction center would be useless without those firing batteries free to accept and fire any requested missions. Once again, all during the Korean “Conflict” from its opening shots, rear units were being attacked, usually these units in other wars; those subject to long range air attacks, but in Korea they would all have to serve as infantry some times. That greatly diminishes their efficiency as a support unit due to its very nature. Indeed the 15th AAA-AW was with us to keep us free of air attack.

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<sup>97</sup> Stars and Stripes: January 1951 issue.



“During the day of 28 November 1950, action was relatively quiet with all units tightening their perimeters and consolidating positions. It was discovered that the enemy had roadblocks between the 1st Bn, 32d Infantry and the 3d Bn, 31st Infantry; also that roadblocks had been established between the 3d Bn, 31st Infantry and the Regimental Command Post at HUDONG-NI, about six miles to the south. Col MacLean had moved his staff and command post into the perimeter of the 1st Bn, 32d Infantry during the early morning hours. It was also learned that the 31st Medical Company moving north from HAGARU-RI, was attacked north of HUDONG-NI (See strip map). Some personnel fought on through and others returned to HAGARU-RI.

Major General Almond, Commanding General, X Corps visited the 1st Bn 32d Infantry during the early morning hours of 28 November 1950 and awarded Lt Col Don C. Faith the Silver Star for gallantry in action. At 1000 hours on 28 November, the 31st Tank Company with a composite infantry platoon from "C" Company, 13th Engineer Bn, 31 AT Platoon, and Headquarters personnel, attacked north from HUDONG-NI, with the mission of opening up a route to the 3d Bn, 31st Infantry. This Task Force accompanied by Gen Hodes, Assistant Division Commander, hit an estimated enemy battalion north of HUDONG-NI. (See "D", strip map) The infantry was not strong enough to hold the high ground to assist the advance of the tanks. The enemy using bazookas (3.5 rocket launchers) and AT guns forced the Task Force to withdraw with loss of four tanks and many casualties.

The 2d Bn, 31st Infantry, stopped at HAMHUNG, was ordered by X Corps to proceed to MAJONDONG on 29 November and to continue north to clear the MSR and to rejoin the 31st Infantry east of the CHOSIN Reservoir.

In the area of the 3d Bn, 31st Infantry the enemy renewed his attacks at approximately 1800 hours on 28 November. The attacks were directed at various spots around the perimeter and lasted all night. Several penetrations were made but successful counterattacks drove the enemy out. "K" and "I" Companies were combined due to losses incurred. By 0600 hours 29 November, the enemy had withdrawn and the positions were still intact, however, ammunition and supplies were running dangerously low.” End:—Command Report for 28th.

Colonel Faith's battalion was still in place when daylight came on the 28th however, there were serious gaps in the line. Although he had been issued orders to launch his attack at dawn when that time came Colonel Faith had his hands full trying to hold onto his perimeter and regain ground already lost during the night. This attack had been costly, —both in officers and NCO, casualties, and morale. When it moved to the Changjin Reservoir, Faith's battalion—as MacLean's and Embree's—had about ninety per cent of its authorized strength plus 30 to 50 ROK soldiers attached to —each— company or battery. Morale had however been good, all things considered. But although the casualties during the night, had not been alarming high, a disproportionately high number of officers and noncoms had been put out of action. In Company A, for instance, when Lt. Raymond C. Denchfield was wounded in the knee, his company commander (Captain Edward B. Scullion) set out to temporarily take charge of Denchfield platoon. An enemy grenade killed Scullion.<sup>98</sup> Colonel Faith then sent his assistant S-3 (Capt. Robert F. Haynes) to take command of Company A. He was in turn killed by infiltrators before he reached the front lines. Faith telephoned the executive officer (Lt. Smith) and told him to take command of the company.

A DISCREPANCY, --OR TWO!

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<sup>98</sup> Captain Scullion's remains were recovered by a Joint research team in North Korea, and returned to his family for proper burial in 2008.

In Appleman's account: The importance of Captain Edward P. Stamford, is highlighted within this event; he being a marine officer. "He found that Lt. Raymond C. Denchfield, the platoon leader, had been wounded. Stamford asked for—Lt. Cecil Smith—the company executive officer, and was told he was directing the troops near the CP." First Lieutenant Carlos J. Ortenzi, 'A' Company mortar officer, came up to Stamford and informed him that "as next senior man he would have to take the company"<sup>99</sup> This latter is the discrepancy! (This will be highlighted by reference in Chapter 20!)

Recap "An enemy grenade killed Scullion." Colonel Faith then sent his assistant S-3 (Captain Robert F. Haynes) to take command of Company A. He was killed by infiltrates before he reached the front lines. Colonel Faith telephoned the executive officer (Lieutenant Smith) and told him to take command of the company. "It's your baby now," Faith told him" (Gugeler. 59-60) these two accounts seem at odds with each other! If there is one outstanding point in this entire book; it is the responsibility of the chain of command. That Chain of Command—at least in the army, flows from the top rank downward. This points too several facts.

- 1) Colonel Faith appoints and assigns Lt. Smith as new CO of A Company. All positions will be assigned by him, from the personnel already assigned within that company. Thus he can appoint any one to lead any platoon or squad within that company. The logic point, as these men know each other!
- 2) Since the chain of command within this company has already been depleted of higher ranking officers, already below the rank of Captain, it would indicate that any one appointed would now be equal to or below the rank of a First Lieutenant.
- 3) There is no indication—even from Stamford's—account— that he interacted with Lt. Smith, that Company Commander.
- 4) It is apparent that Captain Stamford is not performing his immediate TACP mission to call in **night fighters!**<sup>100</sup>

Captain Stamford's independent attitude to oppose Colonel Faith's directives that he remain at the CP (rather his personal opinion that he should "be up front") to direct (his own) air strikes, disproves his self-proclaimed infantry expert status. His proper place was as Colonel Faith directed—the CP as any infantry or artillery man knows that is the Command Post, are the Central Zone of operations, all information from the various locations as squads and company, must be routed through this CP otherwise Stamford would never be linked with all phases, needing assistance, only his vision to cover the air strikes needed! Therefore any and all praise that was given to him was deflected from Colonel Faith's prior commands being enforced by Stamford receiving information at that CP via telephone and radio requests from this central point of operations and not where he claimed to be! It is regretful that Captain Stamford's views were openly voiced by Captain Bigger's validation of the same event's degrading Colonel MacLean and Faith's direct commands, filtering down through other degrading (found dead in their sleeping bags) remarks about MacLean's 3/31st Battalion as well! Neither man was in this lower perimeter at the time of its attack, but four miles above it. My later Chapter 21 will detail Captain Stamford escaped this same fate in that forward area! This seems a convenient cover-up for a 1st Marine Regiment event at Kojo-ri.<sup>101</sup> "Some of the men (Marines) had been bayoneted in their sleeping bags." [Give me one Army event, and I'll show you one to match it on the Marine side.]

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<sup>99</sup> Appleman: East of Chosin, Page 69.

<sup>100</sup> His problem—lacking the frequency to the Hagaru controller—is outlined in a later Communications Chapter 21.

<sup>101</sup> William B. Hopkins: One Bugle, No Drums, p.58, Avon Books N.Y.

It is a well promulgated fact, that a Master Sergeant is more valuable to a company survival, than the Commanding officer of any company. When it comes down to fire power, the platoons, and squads are the important units, and who commands them, not the company CO. If one reviews our cast in this phantom drama those listed as KIA/MIA's one may over look the fact that a total of 241 of those names so listed had the rank of sergeant, 31 of them were Master Sergeants, 59 of those were First Sergeants, and 151 of them were listed as the lowest only as Sergeant. These were the individuals that placed these men in front line defensive positions these were the men that had the years in grade. These were the line leaders of a platoon or squad. These were those men exposing themselves to the enemy within the line of fire! In the Army the Captain rarely interacted with the lowest man on line. Indeed, the Master Sergeant was the one reporting the whereabouts of his command, on the morning report he was the one that reported "The all present or accounted for." He is the one listing the duty rosters and being the one that accounts for that man not present at assembly. That man that he knows about, rather, on KP, guard duty, leave, or sick and excused from duty. He passes that information up the line to the captain of that unit.

The Sergeant is the one that kept track of those ROK's through his unit leaders. These were the veterans of unit placement on line. It had been stated many times that many a Master Sergeant saved the ass and command of a CO more so that the other way around. These NCO's knew the rule book and many times challenged the CO on his errors within the company. That sergeant is the top echelon non-commission officer his rank separates him from that 2nd Lieutenant in the commissioned officer ranks. To appoint someone outside of his branch of service over him, could well invite protest to higher up command to clarify a strange situation. That could very easily have been the case here requiring Major Miller's intervention to clarify a point of order in 'A' Company. We don't know the end result of who Lt. Smith placed in charge of his units after he was verified in full command! Rather he challenged this or a section leader, one or the other was somehow involved here in a dispute over a command position under a combat setting. These men had enough to do with the ROK's manning the lines they did not need further aggravation to unravel who was in charge here.

\*Note: One degrading thing concerning these listed on the KIA/MIA list is that you will not find the old familiar STAFF SERGEANT listed. We go from Sergeant' First Class to plain Sergeant. Some background needs clarified; while the three grades are referred to as sergeants, we must understand the new ranking at that time. Due to budget cuts after WWII: The Buck Sergeant-three striper-was gone! The Corporal was his equivalent to the Buck Sergeant-thus his rank was gone-no matter what you saw on Mash TV. The Staff Sergeant did not change, he still -as now all staff sergeants-had one rockers under those three stripes. Too retain a three striper would be to reduce the higher ranking Staff Sergeant by one grade, while at the same time elevating the Corporal one grade. Those of us that respected rank-would still state that four striper was also a Staff Sergeant as well. The addition was at the bottom; the Private was now a "Recruit" with upgrades to Private, then to Private First Class, the NCO's classes! Corporal: then directly to a Staff Sergeant.<sup>102</sup>

29 November

"In the 1st Bn 32d Infantry area, just four miles north of the 3d Bn 31st Infantry, the usual probing attacks began shortly after midnight. About 0100 hours on 29 November, the enemy attacks had increased in tempo until the full force of their weight was being felt by the entire battalion. All

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<sup>102</sup> Regarding posthumous promotions, the KIA listing elevates some of these men to a rank above that held at the reservoir! Example: PFC's elevated to Corporals, Private too Private First Class, Etc.

companies were receiving savage attacks. The Chinese were attacking with rushes of men, heedless of the losses inflicted by our units. "B" Company positions were penetrated but a counterattack restored the lines.

At 0300 hours, with ammunition beginning to run low, Col. MacLean ordered that battalion to prepare to attack south to join the 3d Bn 31st Infantry. The orders were to unload all trucks regardless of cargo and to load on the wounded. This preparation was done under complete blackout conditions and eliminated the possibility of destroying the equipment of being left behind. The preparations were completed and the column moved out at 0430 hours. Some vehicles were left behind, but none of the wounded were without transportation.

The column proceeded without incident until halted by a road block of logs at approximately the position of the old Forward Command Post. During, the attack to reduce the road block, fire was received from the vicinity of the 3d Bn 31st Infantry position across the finger of the reservoir. Thinking it was fire from friendly troops and without communications, Col MacLean personally started across the ice to halt the fire. It was observed that he was hit several times in crossing but made it to the other shore and disappeared. Portions of "A" and "B" Companies attacked across the ice, driving out the Chinese forces dug-in there.

After the road block was reduced, the column proceeded into the perimeter of the 3d Bn 31st Infantry at 1230 hours, 29 November 1950. a search of the area revealed no trace of Col MacLean, and personnel within the friendly perimeter had not seen him.

During the rest of the day units were consolidated, commands constituted and a Task Force organized with Lt Col Faith Commanding. 1st Bn 32 Infantry, Major Miller Commanding; 3d Bn 31st Infantry Major Storms Commanding; 57 FA Bn (-), Lt Col Tolley Commanding.

At approximately 1530 hours, 29 November, two air drops were received. These drops were only partially recovered because portions were dropped into enemy held areas. Only 40 rounds of 105mm artillery ammo were received.

At approximately 1630, two helicopters landed within the perimeter and a few of the seriously more wounded were flown out to HAGARU-RI, but darkness prevented them from making but two trips out and back.

-PAGE 6-

Further to the south at HUDONG-NI the Tank Co (-), supported by a composite rifle company, again attacked north at 0800 hours 29 November in an attempt to open the MSR to the beleaguered 3d Bn 31st Infantry and 1st Bn 32d Infantry, a scant eight miles to the north. This attack was again repulsed at the same point as the previous day after an intense fight with two enemy battalions. This force withdrew to HUDONG-NI. At 0900 another tank force attempted a cross country reconnaissance of a route to the north. This attempt also met with failure as no feasible route was found, and the officer platoon leader was killed. An attack by the enemy resulted in the loss of two tanks.

The 2d Bn 31st Infantry enroute from HAMHUNG arrived in MAJON-DONG at 1200 hours 29 November, and was ordered to wait there until X Corps gave permission to proceed.

"B" Company 31st Infantry had arrived at KOTO-RI (\*) on 28 November and placed under the command of the 1st Marine Regiment. On 29 November, company "B" 31st Infantry was attached to a British Royal Marine Commando unit with the mission of clearing the MSR from KOTO-RI to HAGARU-RI. The MSR had been closed by several enemy roadblocks. At 1800 hours, Company "B"

column was hit by the enemy, splitting the force into two groups. These groups formed two perimeters and repulsed several enemy attacks, including three "Banzai" charges during the night. By 0600 hours 29 November, Company "B" had regrouped and fought its way over the hills to KOTO-RI. Heavy losses were incurred in the fight to KOTO-RI. [(\*) Part of Task Force Drysdale]

Back to the north in the perimeter formed by the 1st Bn 32d Infantry and 3d Bn 31st Infantry, the night of 29 November was fairly quiet after one frenzied attack by the Chinese against the strengthened perimeter." End: Command Report for 29th.

The strength and determination of the enemy attack was also a blow to morale. It now appeared to Faith's men that, in addition to the severe weather, their troubles were to be compounded by fresh enemy troops. The defeat of the North Korean Army had made this a mopping up operation, one could take the weather conditions knowing that the enemy we were in pursuit of was only remnants of a once fairly strong force invading South Korea. But we were in no shape to face a new army with fresh forces, knowing whatever we had on line at this time was as good as it was ever going to get. After all MacArthur had stated we "should be home by Christmas" forget that; we weren't going to even make it in a box by that time, under the condition we now find ourselves in. The cold weather was enough, especially as there were no warming tents within this forward perimeter. During the night, when they were not engaging in beating off the enemy attacks, the men could do nothing for relief from the cold but pull their sleeping bags up to their waists and sit quietly in their holes watching for another attack, or for morning whichever came first in order.

#### A PHANTOM FORCE-A SAFETY VALVE FOR HAGARU!

As a safety control device, it must remain in place as long as possible!

November 29, 1950

MARINES

Yudam-ni; West of Chosin

Litzenberg, [29th] 7th Marines ordered to "clear the road back to Hagaru, 'rescue' Fox Company." Now in violation of his division direct order. Holding: at Yudam-ni Joint Command CP.

Sinhung-ni; East of Chosin

ARMY

Day Five

Both units: 1/32nd and HQ's 57th, complete realignment into 3/31st inlet perimeter.

Faith moves his forces under cover of darkness, early morning hours. Rear CP and tank command notified—before midnight—under marine operational control: Between—292047—292400. Our 31st RCT tanks command and attached units of the rear CP are ordered back to Hagaru. Colonel MacLean is hit by enemy fire, and is missing in action

Morning of the 29th:

Wednesday

The planes are back, we can have barrel fires while they work the hills, A few mortar shells are whistling into the area but not many. The enemy is expert in lobbing those shells into our perimeter. We had so many coming in that we can pin point where they will land by the sound passing, a distant whistle and whine, but like the old maxim states, "You never hear the one that gets you."

Early morning of the 29th MacLean orders Lt. Colonel. Faith's to fall back into his perimeter the original miles that Faith had moved into after the Marine pull-out. The vehicles were ordered to be immobilized [i.e. collect distributor rotors] but not destroyed implying that MacLean has intentions of regaining that position when the rear tank and service company moved forward with the 2nd Battalion, His X Corps orders were never rescinded, Captain Drake was still to advance his Tanks to the Yalu via Changjin, and this seemed just a temporary set-back for MacLean. That is what is so unusual that others, would write us off so early in the game, we were just in the first half, the move of Faith into MacLean's position was a reinforcement decision, regrouping, and not done in panic, it was even done in darkness without air cover, so it was not done out of a dire necessity yet. There was no reason for MacLean to doubt that the 2nd Battalion would arrive at any time. Indeed from reports of those forward with MacLean, as a column of troops approached his perimeter of the 31st from the south along the road. MacLean erroneously has mistaken this group as his 2nd Battalion, as they were firing on the forward group, MacLean went forward to stop them, MacLean will be shot and reported as being pulled into the brush near the edge of the reservoir. Lt. Colonel Faith had relayed this to General Barr on his visit that MacLean had fallen four times, and he ordered a search team to find him, that search produced no trace of MacLean.

There is so much confusion over dates, reported after the fact it is indeed difficult to decipher the facts as to the correct date. In Appleman's report, (E/C-P.165) Hodes reported to Smith as early as the 28th, the Marines history as the 29th, the latter has to be the right date, as it refers to Faith back in MacLean's perimeter. But even that date was too early to count Faith out of the picture as being a liability and responsibility to others to extricate him from east of Chosin. If MacLean had not given up on the 2nd Battalion arrival surely Faith could logically expect then also, this force combined with the rear guard could easily punch their way through the road block at Hudong-ni. I am taking the Marine reported dates as authentic ones, because Faith was still forward on the 28th. Few men could instantly tell you what date it was, the cold weather was taking its toll on the date of your misery, it was no big concern that was for those making reports in warm tents somewhere.

#### RIFLES AND GLOVES

Although the snow was *dry* it posed problems with the M-1 rifle, after firing the raise in temperature and the condition of the shortage of time to reload, meant that eight round clip ejected after that last round was fired, you were required to reload, frantic actions and movements destroyed many of these clips, snow and dirt and ice packed, deformed them for further use, those trampled on, the snow accumulating between new rounds being inserted, the care required to keep the gas port free to the ejection (spring) chamber. In other words this weapon was more of a summer time one. But reminiscence of Valley Forge, the old muzzle loader, rod and ball concept of past wars that time delay under pressure to reload was no different here. But, the one advantage it applied to both sides.

Same problem for the carbine, lint and foreign material -as I learned -in pocket of field jacket wedging into the 15 or 30 round clip contributed to jamming. Some problems balanced out, the 'dry' snow reduced somewhat the fingers sticking to the 'moist' steel surface of the rifle. What one must understand is that you have to reload the M-1 rifle after every eight rounds, that means inserting the new clip into the open chamber, use your thumb to depress the new clip and the compression spring to the bottom of the chamber, and release the bolt, then retract the bolt to insert the first round in the barrel. That cannot be done wearing gloves-at least I could not do it in a timely fashion- with the

mitten with their wool inserts. Nor will the trigger finger of the mitten with the leather glove over its liner, fit into the trigger housing with ease. The principle was good but the reality was not. The mitten-concept to the glove; your fingers were together fingers together, though warmer, is inefficient, mitten had to be removed too many times for too many functions. To save them you had to tie a string around your neck, through the field jacket shoulder straps, otherwise you would lose them. By their bulk -to the elbow, they would not fit securely in your jacket pocket. Their use to the wire section was a burden, of no use to cut, splice and tape broken wires.

But the single use of transporting 105 mm howitzer shells by those rope handles were well constructed for that purpose and use. However, the Chinese had the advantage of rapid fire weapons. Our Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) had its clip inserted from below, had the M-1 been designed in that fashion it could have been more combat ready under Changjin frozen conditions. Realizing of course its difficulty to sling across your back with a clip inserted. But again as well one cannot have it all in a combat situation. With my upper arm injured, whatever vessels were cut by that missile has restricted the blood flow to my lower arm and fingers. My hand is becoming severely frostbitten, it is effectively slowing movement to my fingers, the arm is becoming ridged and stiff, and I'll stick with the carbine rifle and its ease of loading that clip.

Our shortage list now includes the 40mm shells for those twin 40's a powerful weapon we could surely use on the way out of here to dislodge road blocks, mortar shells are the next on the list of items gone, those 40mm replacement shells have been dropped at Hudong-ni by mistake, they would have no use for them, to be destroyed with other ammo stored there. Those 40mm pumping action barrels would be silent, a powerful weapon is now silent, our area is already sending out less rounds into the enemy area, but their reciprocal needs are balancing out the enemies supplies as well, unknown to us he is having his problems as well, those power weapons have kept him from us, what he has left we are totally unaware of. The information we received on the consolidation of our units, that the day before, the center force has received ammo drops (16 Tons reported, some drifted into enemy territory.) We will receive some more ammo drops today. But also unknown to us, only one more day's drops, will be the last and final drop (30 November) for us on this side of the reservoir. Add to this the Tank Company orders to withdraw to Hagaru, completely and totally severs our umbilical cord to any rear forces at Hagaru.

Our need for ammo is causing problems, those eight round clips ejected from the M-1's must be collected and reloaded as drops of preloaded ones are scarce, must steal some shells from the machine gun ribbon belts to reload, reducing 30 caliber machine gun supply, but distribution is important at this stage of the play. Clips for the carbine rifle, is easier to load, ammo trailers that have survived fires and explosions, or rapidly empty of supply. I'm having crazy thoughts again, I wonder what my body temp is, surely it can't be 98.6, I've lost blood, I'm thirsty must gather snow, to quench this thirst, it's becoming tainted from area destruction, being so dry, it blows away, only a thin layer under foot, but it accumulates against ridges, it's slick in spots, gas and oil, anti-freeze has tainted it as well, blood and vomit has made our area a sewer. However, would be worse if warmer! We can only thank God for the smaller blessing!

We had pulled into this area at rapid speed, we were not familiar, with the road out in any great detail, and no one has made return trips back into Hagaru, most of us had bypassed the area completely on the way in, and. road runners between Hagaru and our area were not established before the road blocks

were built. So each man was informed of the reference point to Hagaru, as being the southern tip of the reservoir. By now if you didn't know north from south you were in deep trouble. As with all things in life there are exceptions to the rules. Years from now, far from this action, most withdrawal events were labeled; shameful, cowardly, while only one would be elevated to "Historical" yet within that time frame of MacArthur's command! Again that would go to a "out of their element" force under the Department of the Navy, far, far removed from that historical event so far inland, and the army ground forces "within their element" and so criticized so vigorously by that departmental body. The Marines' claim to fame that so many escaped the trap, rather they praise those men lost by buying time to allow that escape. That any guilt would be erased by the glorious retreat, cannot be erased by that PR Campaign which forever haunts those Army men that survived east of the reservoir!

A verbal order is issued, we take no prisoners, we have no room for them, nor men to guard them, Have no idea of the enemy prisoner policy at this time, probable the same as ours. Most are wounded too critically to bother with anyway, our medic surgeon has been added to the shortage list, so our own wounded have trouble to receive needed care. The "Hourglass" is about empty, for at the top, few grains of sand are still left to fall, we can't stay here much longer. Why haven't we been authorized to leave? The reality in this latest order hits you like a hammer blow to your head. "We take no prisoners." This order brings home to you the urgency and reality of top command. This is now totally and fully a fight to the finish. Too hell with all the Geneva Convention rules of war, we're all fighting for survival here! Reminiscence of the Texas Alamo, there General Santa Anna requested and ordered that force to surrender, a onetime offer, if it were refused, there would be no quarter granted to any prisoner taken, they would be shot anyway after capture. Likewise, here east of Chosin, this was now all or nothing. If this doesn't drive home the urgency of this entrapment, then no one can explain the reality of life and death to you.

Those calls for the corpsman are going unanswered our medic surgeon now added to our shortage list, the hourglass is about empty, we can't maintain this perimeter much longer. Those calls for the corpsman, they are overworked, and have nothing to work with. Hypothermia and shock are silent enemies of the cold, men just drift slowly off to sleep, never to wake again, a peaceful kind of death in this God forsaken frigid land. One of the medic's trying to recruit others to help, save time by locating the wounds among all the clothing, cut a path to reveal it for care, but the weather is a healing partner, with its jelling method of clotting the wounds. By the time I got to the aid station after being hit in the upper arm, my blood was already jelling from the cold weather! One of the bits of useful information I got from one of these corpsman, is something that would assist me throughout my lifetime for a small cut or wound. You carry your own supply of antibiotic with you at all time-your saliva-drench your cut or wound with your spit, it contains the antibiotic's you need. Made sense when one considers how soon a tooth socket heals in your mouth, it is a front line of defense against a cut on your own body, it will protect and heal, and you learn to improvise, again use whatever you have at your disposal.

But one thing for sure, this is not going to be another Bataan. While we are a band of brothers akin to that 31st Infantry force, in their motto of that war era: Those "Battling Bastards of Bataan, no mama, no papa, no Uncle Sam," we were not going to accept that same fate. The anticipated airdrops should give us enough firepower to sustain us until an order is issued to break out of here. That death march was well known to the 31st Infantry, we would not add to that fate again in the Far East here at Changjin. That no prisoner rule was more of a wake-up call for us more so than the Chinese. We were



going to break out of here, the only unanswered question was: when? There would be no RCT surrender.

Still, while Faith's men didn't know all the decisions of higher command: as the command was now changed this evening to OPCON and to General Smith -of the Marines- for it would have been of no earthshaking news to us, at least-had it been known-we could be secure in the knowledge, that "if" General Smith, whoever he was "could not" help us, he would surely not hurt us. Had any of us known are thought that: We would have been wrong; DEAD WRONG!

Evening of 29 November

31st RCT, OPCON-at 292047-operational control passes to General Smith's 1st Marine Division. Our Tank Company at Hudong-ni is immediately ordered into Hagaru-ri. Our embolic cord is severed from the rear units! We are now totally aborted, expendable, orphaned and abandoned.

\*\*\*\*\*

30 November

"On the morning of 30 November 1950, the surrounded unit received another air drop of much needed supplies: but were still short of ammunition. Major General Barr, CG 7th Division visited the beleaguered group. [This would be the last drops of any ammunition are supplies we so desperately needed.]

As of 0800 30 November 1950, all 7th Division units in the CHOSIN Reservoir area were attached to the 1st Marine Division. [Note: time error here, Almonds' OI 19, was immediate; 292047 November.]  
-PAGE 7-

To the south at HUDONG-NI the enemy buildup continued around the Rear Command post and probing attacks were initiated by the enemy. At 1100 hours 30 November, this group was ordered to move to HAGARU-RI. The 31st Tank Company was the point and rear guard of this group. The column arrived at HAGARU-RI at 1730 hours 30 November after having fought a heavy rear guard action. The units were immediately assigned sectors and participated in the defense of HAGARU-RI.

At approximately 2000 hours 30 November, the Chinese renewed their attacks supported by 120mm mortars and light artillery. All night long the enemy flung waves of troops at the perimeter, but were held off. The machine guns were taking a terrific toll of the enemy and the artillery, having lowered its guns to fire point blank, ripped huge holes in their ranks. Only a few Chinese penetrated the perimeter and were immediately killed. At daylight, although the Chinese withdrew from the edge of the perimeter they still kept up a harassing fire into the area and casualties among the friendly troops continued as this fire took its toll .End; Command report Nov.30.

At MAJON-DONG the 2d Bn 31st Infantry was released by order of X Corps to continue north to join the 31st RCT on 30 November. The battalion moved out of MAJON-DONG at 2300 hours. At 0100 hours 1 December the battalion received a heavy attack two miles south of KOTO-RI. "K", "G", part of "H" Company and the Battalion Command Group fought forward to KOTO-RI at 0245 hours. The balance of the battalion fought through at 0900 hours. The 2d Bn 31st Infantry was immediately attached to the 1st Marine Regiment. The battalion also assumed control of all Army units within the KOTO-RI area including "B" Company 31st Infantry, secured the high in its assigned area, and set up defenses against continuing enemy attacks." End: Combat Report-30th.

-November 30, 1950-

MARINES

Yudam-ni; West of Chosin

Litzenberg, [28th] 7th Marines ordered to “clear the road back to Hagaru.” 7th Marines still at Yudam-ni, 30 Nov. Smith orders both regiments back to Hagaru. Will require an extra day to realign both regiments!

At Joint Command CP. MG Smith issues second withdrawal order, three Marine regiments to withdraw back to Hagaru, however, since no separate movement had been made by the 7th Marines (over 2 days) to do that, it will require an “extra day” to realign both units, still at Yudam-ni. Using only one battalion (Reinf) to open the road, and ‘rescue Fox Company.’ “Smith placed neither Colonel Litzenberg nor Colonel Murray in charge but merely directed both to...Expedite . . . movement RCT-5 and RCT-7 to Hagaru. Red Flag: Why is Smith not taking charge here?

Sinhung-ni; East of Chosin

ARMY

Task Force Faith; holding positions

All Army units, now under the operational control of MG Smith:7th Division Tank command and rear CP again ordered back to Hagaru.

-November 30-

Thursday

-DAY SIX-

The day of decision-the final act comes into play!

This was now the morning of the 30th and the events of the day yet to be played out on this scene of our play along these remaining eight miles along the banks of this reservoir, northeast of Hagaru. Our tanks were still here, plus that ammo dump, at least for a few more hours. Either way that did not affect us directly at this point in time. Rumors of their efforts to break through to us still repeated; “Bullshit,” we’ve heard that many times before. Early morning light will reveal the night time destruction from the last battle, that destruction was wide spread, burned out trucks, trailers, dead bodies stacked on piles to one side, these truly reminiscence of lead soldiers, only in life size, but the forms were all there, sitting, prone, many with rifles still held in a firing position, grotesque figures, frozen in an instant of time. All that was truly needed were platforms to stand them upright. Thoughts of playing war games as a child in a warm bedroom somewhere in the days and time long past, playing with lead soldiers with trucks and tanks, an other than the latter everything was here. If only one could determine the winning side, but for us to be the winners here, would take all the childhood imagination, faith and fantasy, to have our side come out the big victor will require more ammo air drops of supplies to sustain us in all things in this ever increasing desolate situation.

Yet, as depressing as the situation was, humor was still around, the men that could still laugh at a situation that seemed so hopeless, made one truly wonder where all of the inner strength was coming from. The average age was about 21, (around my age,) and their teen years had been the latter part of the Second World War, depression babies, knowing that era of ration stamps, meatless Tuesday's. The scrap drives, the bond drives. Somewhere, somehow, that Second World War had touched their lives, as young telegram boys on bicycles -some of these very men- delivering those fatal death notice telegrams to a family member of those killed in action at some faraway place. As one such area soldier would recall: I hated that delivery, more so now when I truly realize its impact, that those telegrams will be moving again in my home town, that memory of the ghostly face of a family member when I rode up, I didn't know if the message was a Happy Birthday greeting or the announcement of a new

baby, but they always seemed to sense it was bad news, and I was going to be screwed out of a tip, now, I fully understand.

And: I was supposed to be discharged in September, but was extended by this Truman year. I would be home shopping right now buying all those Christmas presents, so you guys that are bitching so much, knock it off: There are a few draftee's with you, and believe me, I wouldn't have enlisted for anything in this world, but here I am.


And Again: Same here, My enlistment ended in August, and I was to be best man at my brother's wedding in September, I wasn't even allowed by time to send a present, but he got hitched without me, he had a friend stand in for me.

Some of these men just now caught up on their latest piece of mail held over from a few days before. On the night of the 27th, just before the road block was set in place, the battalion adjutant had driven over 150 miles from division headquarters with some two weeks of mail. Since it took more than ten days to receive an airmail reply to your last letter to the states, mail was still a welcome source of bolstering morale. But here; were these last letters some of these men would ever receive, or answer, were within this stack of letters, but these would not be as big a morale booster as in the past, for while these letters would refer to things to come: Thanksgiving and Christmas, the realization that Thanksgiving was now past history, and signaled the move to our present position here, many of us had no chance to write home about that day in this frozen wasteland, writing material was scarce, postage was free, but of no value without envelopes and paper. That aside, Thanksgiving was past, and Christmas was in doubt for us at least. Regardless of the outcome we were not going to be home for this one. But there were precious items –passed around -from those letters, follow-up pictures of that wedding the one brother missed, a picture to a dad of his kids, from a wife, mother, sister, brother, friend or a sweetheart. The next batch of letters being addressed at this very hour in the states, those dated the 27, 28, 29, or 30th of November, addressed to some of these men already stacked aside with the dead, will have pictures enclosed of the family around the Thanksgiving table, and for a few of his precious son or daughter sitting on Santa's lap, a very special picture for daddy, with a notation from mom, "hope to see you soon." The picture of an old flame, long burned out after letter writing for over two years, still invoked memories of a long ago romance.

Those letters, sadly, would be returned, and that time frame would deeply hurt, for like Pearl Harbor, this news would be arriving around or right after Christmas. But it would offer false hope, as the notation would be; either; Killed or Missing in Action. Merely creating and prolonging decades of wonders. Where in all reality, were the majority of those men Killed in Action? Sadly as well many, many, far too many, will never know to this very day that their loved one died here on the banks of this reservoir.

But back to the 30th, a litter bearing helicopter made two trips into the perimeter, and the report was they had carried out four seriously wounded men, but it was known in the perimeter who one of the four men were and the one main one was Lt. Col. Embree, with leg wounds. We were led to believe that this would be a slow but continual evacuation line, and the order of priority would be certain wounds would prevail, head and gut shot first. When the helicopters -failed to follow through and the two landings evacuations would be it, there was severe resentment in the area, not a great morale booster. Only one more helicopter would set down, it brought General Barr to see Colonel Faith.

## Map 8



MAP 8

From: Ebb And Flow, November 1950-July 1951  
 Center of Military History, 1990  
 By Billy C. Mossman

General Barr just arrived for the meeting at Hagaru, with Almond and Smith. We had high hopes of some morale building news. There would be none what-so-ever. We were not officially informed what Barr told Faith. It is reported that Barr left the perimeter with “tears in his eyes”. So we remain in place with another evening of battle before us. We did not know, nor could we guess that as General Barr flew over Hudong-ni our tank force were already preparing to destroy our extra ammo and ration

supply. We had now been officially and totally and completely abandoned. This day we have also seem, our last ammo and supply drops by air, we were on our own; totally and completely alone, but the reality of the safety valve remains in place with no orders to withdraw!

The fact that General Barr, flew in via Helicopter, it should be pointed out that the 7th Division had none of them but the 1st Marine Division did! The air priority claim that we would have air cover however never included these helicopters! While their use could have been better utilized to fly in a radio, (substitute the two used by General Almond and Barr) into Colonel Faith's forward perimeter, are even to pick-up Colonel Faith up for that upcoming meeting at Hagaru, was never considered, while only four men were evacuated east of Changjin via two helicopters,(two per lift) while between 27 November to 1 December Major Gottschalk's, VMO-6 of nine helicopters and 10 light aircraft, air lifted 152 casualties would require 76 individual flights in and out (minus those army 2) 109 from Yudam-ni, 36 from Hagaru-ri and 7 from Koto-ri, not counting radio supply batteries as needed to Marine area at Yudam-ni. The fact that General Smith took issue with General Almond over Almond's use of those Marine Amtrak's at Seoul, and Smith stating they were "Marine property." predates the later use,—for the Army of any Marine equipment in North Korea! Yet, he would not hesitate to use our Tank's when his need dictated that tragic event. Likewise it could be taken for granted that if push came to shove, as too who got priority, in any emergency, after General Harris was in full command of the Air Wing after 1 December, it was going to be the Marine Corps—needs comes first. Reason: Fox Company received an air drop 1 December and Task Force Faith never did

#### SO WHAT ELSE WAS NEW??

However, the Marine Air Wing was doing one hell of a job, to look up and see those rockets dart loose from the wings into the mountains, make us at least feel we were not on the receiving end of them, the napalm exploding in that rolling yellow -orange- black mixture of fire the heat created by that assault, which 'accidentally' we would feel on our way out of this area. Call's to one's mind the saying: "If it wasn't for bad luck we would have no luck at all."

And so, well known to us the list of shortage item was growing, we have never seem the 2nd battalion, the tank company, the artillery service company, the medical company, our supply dump, our Army connection, our radio communication outside the perimeter, our regimental commander, for the artillery, our battalion commander, our mess supply -no chow-no warming tents, slim supply of ammo, what else can possibly go wrong? But this was not the finale, and we had more surprises in store for us. Rumors were all negative, no one truly interested in any of them, we keep hearing the tank company is still trying to break through, we've all heard that one before, the helicopters had dropped in with Almond, then Barr, who cares, why can't they bring equipment we need, a Air Force Ground Observer team would be a nice touch. Who the hell wants to see a general? The tank commander could have been flown in to tell us the true story reality was never going to shock-any one of us at this stage of the play. Each man surely knew he had only a 50/50 chance at best. Those wounded a 20 percent chance as the weather and frostbite was continually nipping away at your condition of blood flow to mend wounds. I had already caught that bullet, and grenade fragment with my name on it, was there another one out there someplace, who knew. But it was for sure we could not hold this position much longer.

Everyone's is on edge, hypercritical, and sensitive, nothing seems to be working right, we're just here, reacting as the situation dictates. Those frontal distances are increasing as fatalities open spaces on the

outer perimeter. It's snowing, clean snow for thirst, but blowing into rifle movable parts, it melts as rifle is fired, refreezing and jamming the parts. Trailers with little extra ammo are ablaze, critical and of no use, impossible to know all of the things that have gone wrong, or will yet, go wrong. But all that is beyond our control. You can only do so much with so little. But the problem has to be massive for the Chinese as well, or in reality more so, it's just that they seem to be multiplying in place, where the hell are they coming from? How did we walk into such a hornets net? Where in the hell was our G-2? It really does not matter here, at this time we have the problem to work through by ourselves. This war was the Air Force test; their first adventure as an individual department with new planes-the jets. General Stratemeyer earlier in the engagement had sought some operational control of all aviation operations from Japan or over Korea, except that engaged in purely naval tasks; such as patrolling by fleet Air Wing Six. Left unresolved by the unification attempt, the big winner-the Navy-Admiral Joy had resented and resisted giving over that much control of his air craft and carriers, judging that doing so could damage his commands ability to meet "other naval responsibilities." So the inefficiency and inability to resolve the unification provision, was left hanging until the next conflict -it was now-it was here-in Korea, the first crisis of command in the first air ground war we had entered into. So another compromise would be required to ward off inter-service rivalry between the navy and the air force, in support of army ground, supply and cover strikes. The army now totally without their own air force! Yet we retained our airborne units, with no responsibility to transport them anywhere under our own army command! One more of those military oxymora's!

MacArthur will have to intervene. The question begging the answer why here in battle "would compromise be essential?" MacArthur would give Stratemeyer "Coordination control" in reality a "lesser degree of authorized centralized control" in Stratemeyer, "without giving him direct control of Navy and Marine air units." Stratemeyer, in turn delegated the coordination of close support operations to the Fifth Air Force commander; Pat Partridge. Pat Partridge in turn restricted use of air to ground close in support to the X Corps, and Almond's immediate meets with him to get control from some Marine aircraft. Partridge agrees with one restriction, *excessive* need by the 1st MAW was to be cleared by and through the 5th Air Force.

Regretfully problems existed between egos of air and naval commanders over the "exact" meaning of coordination between the two departments. However, the system -as it was- was still in effect in late November. So the first day of December the inference is made that through a concession from General Smith we would be given "priority" for air cover of our withdrawal. Had General Smith been truly in charge of the Marine Air Wing, its responsibility would have passed to X Corps when Smith indicated he was ashore at Inchon, and control passed to Almond and X Corps staff. Here the "solution" I detailed by Holland Smith could have clarified who was truly in charge of what? (Via) The President, The President, could have assigned the marines totally and completely to Army command, he could have, but he did not!

## **History of United States Naval Operations: Korea**

**by James A. Field, Jr.**

**-Chapter 9: Retreat to the South-**

Part 1, 24 November–6 December: Defeat in the West

"Up on the plateau, following the attacks of the 27th and 28th, comparative quiet reined, but the enemy controlled the roads and Marine and Army units had been separated into a series of isolated perimeters.



In this situation General Harris, the Marine air commander, had strongly recommended to ComNavFE a sustained effort by the fast carriers in the X Corps zone, and *had stated that Fifth Air Force concurred in this proposal*. But an evening dispatch from FAFIK on the 29th indicated that such concurrence applied only to that day's operations, and asked, in view of the "critical condition" in the EUSAK area, a divided effort for the next few days. And a message from ComNavFE, confirming that close support had priority over all other commitments, prescribed such distribution of carrier air effort. Red Flag: The Air Force, wise to General Harris binding the Fifth Air Force in his erroneous statement to the Navy, he should have requested-as ordered-that next day authorization, from the Fifth Air Force.

The sorties of the 30th were consequently so divided, and the schedule of operations stepped up by the addition of five jet flights of four planes each. Thirty-nine sorties were sent up to the reservoir while 74, including 23 jet sorties, were dispatched on armed reconnaissance with instructions to report en route to any available Air Force control agency. As always in emergencies there were difficulties. In X Corps zone, communications were overcrowded and radio discipline poor, but the coherence of Marine units had not been broken and most flights found control. In the west, by contrast, the state of affairs was chaotic: the Fifth Air Force had already been forced out of its forward staging fields at Sinanju on the Chongchon, some advanced control parties had been overrun, irreplaceable control equipment had been lost, and evacuation of the Mosquito control planes from the Pyongyang airfields was in progress.

The effects of this situation were apparent in difficulties of aircraft control. Of four jet flights to the EUSAK zone three made no contact. Of the heavily-armed strike groups of Corsairs and Skyraiders that were dispatched to the west, one was weathered out, one failed to find a controller, and one found good control. There were delays, and when one flight came across to the west, after failing to make contact in the X Corps area, the ADs were incomprehensibly detached from attack to road reconnaissance. But control once gained was fair to excellent: the two propeller strikes which did make contact put 14 Corsairs and 5 ADs with more than 14 tons of napalm and 5 of bombs onto troop concentrations in the crucial 2nd Division area; the jet flight, after being directed against entrenched troops south of Tokchon, ran the roads north to Manpojin.

Considering the conditions under which advanced Air Force units were working this was not too bad a performance, but to Admiral Ewen, lacking detailed information on the state of affairs in the west, it seemed that the situation of early September was repeating itself. At 2230 on the 30th he informed Commander Seventh Fleet that while all missions sent to X Corps had been successful, about two-thirds of the effort in the EUSAK zone had been wasted, and asked him to pass the word to Fifth Air Force. This Struble did in a midnight emergency dispatch in which he reiterated his desire to help, stated that in view of unsatisfactory control in the west he would adjust his distribution of effort, and asked to be advised when the situation improved." [Command report, End]

So given the order, there were more support planes available if they were requested. The Fifth Air Force already involved two days with our direct survival. As recorded on November 28th, "the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron dropped supplies- 10 tons to the Marines at Yudam-ni and 16 tons to the 31st Infantry at Sinhung-ni." This seems to indicate that Almond is overriding the Marine Air Wing and going straight to Major General William H. Tunner (Berlin Airlift fame) with the situation spelled out to him, the priority of tonnage is given to our side of the reservoir, meaning, plain and simple we needed and used far more of it, than the other side at Yudam-ni. And the remarks that General Smith was the one providing "priority to us" can be taken for what it was worth -pure propaganda. By noon

on the 29th, Almond had requested that 400 tons be supplied to the cut-off regiments, but the problem the 21st Carrier Squadron faced... It could not handle that amount it was only geared for 70 tons a day. The defect in the system: The army could not package and load airborne supplies in that extensive amount. Once again the victim of a budget war.

Still 260 tons of ammo, at Hudong-ni four miles south of us would now contain some 40mm rounds of ammo -which no one but the 15th AAA-AW could use –and surely needed– had been erroneously air dropped at Hudong-ni on the 29th. No big problem we could use it when we got there. It would be destroyed there on orders by who-so-ever ordered the tank, service and medical company to withdraw, back into Hagaru. All that Faith and his forces had on hand as far as ammo was concerned will be provided by the last air drop at Sinhung-ni within the daylight hours of November 30th. We would be grateful for the canister drops of ammo on the way out, which added the extra miles into Hudong-ni, but in reality that only will delay the inevitable outcome at that final barricade, for all we had was already distributed or attached whatever extra ammo,- what the men couldn't carry-to the trucks loaded with the wounded.

So the Air Force cannot be at fault, at least they tried to support our withdrawal. The Marine Air Wing also doing more than their share, for which credit would also flow to “Smith”. The colder elevation at their altitudes also had to hinder those close in runs. Understandable those pilots were weary and depressed that they could review the situation on the ground, but akin to artillery, they needed communications between the ground crew to locate the close in areas to be hit. We had only one source of contact with the Marine Air Wing and that was through Captain Stamford of the Marines, our Tactical Air Operations team from the Air Force being casualties early on the first day of battle, as reported, and no replacements were flown in. What is unexplained at Chosin; is the one continual report that we were to remain in place pending rescue. The question is: Why? Why was this one fact, promulgated and relied upon as a statement of fact when in reality it was also pure propaganda? That our forces were totally and wholly dependent on some relief force: of some kind to rescue us. The reality was we did fight our way through the road block to reach Hudong-ni, and it is an irrefutable fact without fear of any contradiction what-so-ever, that we would have been in far better shape and condition, logically and physically, and mentally to fight our way out on any one of the days before December 1. So the fact remains we were stuck in place by lack of action from the Marine command, they were in Opcom charge of our force, but would issue no orders to us, why they [Smith] would not issue an order in timely fashion is buried in history. The Army through General Almond had issued orders to find a way out for Faith. That was never attempted, once again -a simple- withdraw order- ASAP- could be sufficient.

As air cover was working the hills we could assess the danger from the night before. The sky was clear enough to permit air support. Inside the perimeter, soldiers built fires to warm themselves and these fires drew no enemy fire. The silence and lack of mortar fire was eerie. Nothing of note incoming, what the hell was going on here, hopefully we had withstood the worst part of the enemy attacks. Maybe they had shot their wad. Maybe just maybe things were shifting in our favor, maybe that relief force had broke that rear road block and we would see those tanks roll into our southern perimeter. Unknown to any of us at the time a command conference was being held at Hagaru, this afternoon, with General's Smith and Hodes. Our fate was being tallied and reviewed, without any input from our commanders, one of them could have been picked up and flown in by helicopter to represent us and explain our conditions beyond Hudong-ni, and gather information to relay back to us. Sadly



again, that could have been, but it was not. As our script was being revised at Hagaru we were busy collecting our last air drops of some much needed supplies. Fighting off the enemy for those dropped between our two forces, some, again drifting outside our perimeter to them.

Per Marine Operations in Korea–Chosin Campaign– (PAGE 238)

-THE SCRIPT AS WRITTEN-

"...of immediate concern was the deteriorating situation of the three battalions (two infantry and one artillery) of the 7th Infantry Division east of the Chosin Reservoir. Brigadier General Henry I. Hodes, assistant division commander, informed General Smith at noon on the 29th that the Army troops had suffered approximately 400 casualties while falling back towards Hagaru and were unable to fight their way out to safety. At 2027 that night, all troops in the Chosin Reservoir area, including the three Army battalions, were placed under operational control of the Marine commander by X Corps. The 1st Marine Division was directed to *"redeploy one RCT without delay from Yudam-ni area to Hagaru area, gain contact with 7th Inf. div. E of Chosin Reservoir: co-ordinate all forces in and N of Hagaru in a perimeter defense based on Hagaru: open and secure Koto-ri MSR."* [X Corps 01–19, 29 Nov 50.]

It seems to me there is entirely too much information disseminated here! Examples: Simplify, like a World War II telegram; with those stated stops: i.e. your wife had the baby, stop, see you next week, stop, etc, etc.

"...informed General Smith at noon on the 29th that the Army troops had suffered approximately 400 casualties," stop.

2) "The 1st Marine Division was directed to "redeploy one RCT without delay from Yudam-ni area to Hagaru area," stop.

3)"...gain contact with 7th Inf. Div. E of Chosin Reservoir." stop.

4) Most important of all, covers all: "co-ordinate all forces in the N (north) of Hagaru in a perimeter defense.

Number 1) of no concern to the Marine Division, before the time line transfer to the Marines! Number 2) Delay! They would never return until the 4rd! Numbers 3 & 4 will be ignored, with the slight revision of ordering our tank company, back to Hagaru–292047I. This order was immediate, and was issued before midnight, so between 282047I and 292400 November.

Number 1, cut; "suffered 400 casualties while falling back towards Hagaru, and were unable to fight their way out to safety." The falling back remark misplaced, it was back into the Sinhung-ni perimeter! In reality the 57th Artillery Battalion would in turn pull up their tail sections –north– into that same perimeter for increased defense! Our Task Force was required to fight our own way out anyway, recorded able bodied men 385 per Marine history. Those men to assist in the Marine withdrawal to Koto-ri! Over 100 of those men will be KIA's. This is Journalistic Justice for our efforts by the Marine History; it shatters their *"Sole Mission" at Chosin*. It verifies my above header- *"A Safety Valve for Hagaru!"*

Yet, that Red Flag of deception is waving in the breeze. There is no real explanation for Task Force Faith being above the Sinhung-ni Perimeter! Why that separation, if the attempt is made to reinforce Hagaru from the north direction? Is it to be implied that Faith is the rear force coming downward from Changjin towards Hagaru, and he just got trapped there? Recall that there are no Marine G-3 orders to move these forces of MacLean into this Sinhung-ni area, yet, Faith had previously stated he was to be attached to the Marines and he had attached to his force a Marine TACP air to ground unit! So this further implies, and does not deny that Faith's command seems to have a larger force in two separate locations, one at the lower perimeter,

and one higher, some four miles. Here is what I view as Almond's revenge, he drops the ball in the Marine court, and they have no idea how it got to be their serve and duty to define positions of units they had no input in placement thereof. The Department of the Navy has one gigantic SNAFU to unravel here at Chosin! Their retribution of failing to monitor General Smith's freedom of constant delay and now committing this force to Army command has returned to haunt them! The fact that Almond died in 1979 and this same year the "Secret" documents would be declassified seems to coincide with Journalistic Justice in this drama! It has been stated that *"Revenge is sweet!"* but not in this case. It is terrible, terrible sad, and disgusting.

As below the five arrows are points of interest to objectives assigned as listed on 7th Division orders, Hyesanjin, Singalpajin, Changjin, Mupyong-ni and East side of Changjin Reservoir!

## A Phantom Force-Lost to History

by Raymond C. Vallowe

[Any and all underlining is mine.]

General Wright stressed "As the 1st Marines move toward Changjin they will tend to be extended." However, "JSPOG officers believed that if X Corps operations were to be effective in assisting Eighth Army, only one general course of action lay open. Almond should attack to the northwest, thus threatening the rear of the Chinese formation facing Eighth Army and forcing ~~them~~ their withdrawal to avoid envelopment." .... "Since the attack would probably develop on a narrow front as a struggle for control of the route of advance, concentration of forces for a co-ordinated attack would not be necessary. The attack could be launched at once using forces already in position."<sup>4</sup> Those forces "already in place" were the Marines.

Plan 8, Draft #2. "The enemy supply routes were to be cut at the village of Mup'yong-ni, fifty-five miles west of Yudam-ni and forty miles north of Huich'on. Almond intended that the 1st Marine Division make the westward effort into Mup'yong-ni and then press an attack northwestward to the Yalu, pinching out in the process the ROK II Corps on the Eighth Army right. MacArthur agreed to the change and instructed Almond to begin the attack as soon as possible." [Ebb & Flow, p.48] Smith objects; Almond, sends his G-3 to Tokyo for a face to face meeting with MacArthur.

Results. "Almond set the 27th as the opening date. The 7th Division meanwhile was to expand its zone westward, placing forces on the east side of the Changjin Reservoir for an advance to the Yalu through the zone previously assigned to the marines. The ROK I Corps was to continue to the border from Hapsu and Ch'ongjin while Almond's remaining major units, the U.S. 3d Division and 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment, secured the corps rear area between Wonsan and Hungnam." [Ebb & Flow, p.48]



<sup>4</sup> P&D p. 261; (Note on Staff study JSPOG)

## -Chapter 9-

### A PHANTOM FORCE-A SAFETY VALVE FOR HAGARU!

As a safety control device, it must remain in place as long as possible!

### A PHANTOM FORCE-DISINTEGRATE'S AS OF 30 NOVEMBER 1950

A Disclaimer: What is the purpose of this book? Or more so what it is not!

It is not its purpose to devalue any man's life or single achievement. Each and every man involved in North Korea, experienced his own private hell. His own mind records those events, but they are private ones to that man alone. No one in the entire world can duplicate what each man experienced. No one could ever recreate the fear and that pain each man suffered. Yet, it is a flaw in human nature to try to embellish what one battle event was worth in human lives. We hear of men that are affected because it is written that their experience was beyond belief, that the unit he served with suffered tremendous loss of lives, that his squad, or platoon, or even his entire company was destroyed. In relationship to some twelve, forty-eight, or even two hundred men of one company lost in combat. Certainly those were tragic events within the memory of each man within those units. But the danger of numbers is in the relationship to our math tables, they can be multiplied many times over. As I have stated about Changjin, it was by no means the bloodiest battle in North Korea. By no means! The 2nd Infantry Division holds that tragic distinction! Still no event exceeds "Gettysburg" in the Civil War, as to lives lost there. That regardless of your own unit losses, there is a bigger one, somewhere in our history.

One man without knowing it could relate his combat experience to any one that served at that time with the Indianhead-2nd Division-Division, but his experience can-not compete with that of that division, total losses. While this seems more about the Marines at Changjin than Army forces there, that is only because of the scenario just stated. I do not believe that the individual Marine was so engrossed within the embellishment of his own individual action to that of the division. Certainly division pride is common place. But the division is not as important as the individual regiment, on down through squads. What the purpose of this book is: In shifting that individual honor back to the regimental -individual-level that earned it. That individual praise for: "General Smith" being blown out of all proportions. He, it seems could not resist that urge to heap the highest praise on his own-1st Marine Division-achievements. But as stated above, that over laps into the 7th Division territory. Due to circumstance that was allowed to not only continue but increase in tempo as the years passed. Regretfully that was allowed to flourish because of the lack of information available by the Army itself.

Therefore this accounting will seem to have stinging affects on the relationship between these two divisions of X Corps at the Changjin Reservoir, even though the remnants of the 3rd Divisions were also there, their actions were not singled out as such as is the case of Task Force Faith. That Motto of: "*If you can't say anything nice, say nothing at all,*" in this event has been stretched and expanded beyond the limits. The leaks did not come from the Army; to the contrary they provide little if any information of our being-East of Changjin, or the number of enemy we killed on our side of the reservoir. We never had the freedom to count them! So the accounting of Army influence must lie elsewhere, within the Marine Corps itself, **that institution**-and **not their men**. As I have pointed out to compare two forces you can only get an average of both. Hypothetically if one are 125% effective and the other only 75%-divided by 2=100% or both equal! Why would a -self-proclaimed- - quality force want to be compared to an inefficient one, as General Smith had officially labeled the

7th Division? Why degrade your own force with that comparison. But therein contains the mystery, why would “Smith” make any such statements at all?

### November 30—the last of our Air Drops

As the Corsairs worked the hills, air cargo planes dropped more supplies, some of which again fell to the enemy, for God's sake all that effort just makes us even at best. But as the afternoon wore on it was becoming increasingly clear that no relief column was coming into our area on this day. Those brightly colored parachutes looked like Christmas presents from the sky, but whatever was dropped would not be enough for the coming day. However, we don't know this is our last drop of supplies by air! Before this night ends, we will have to ration ammo, shut down one-half fire power of those (M-16) quad-fifty's, and now running out of M-19, 40mm rounds. The rule was to conserve as much as possible. We had to anticipate as much enemy opposition again tonight as we had thrown against us the other three nights. Surely the enemy had to be hurting for supplies as well. This battle east of Changjin had to come to some kind of a conclusion and solution in a short time. But the question remained: Why the hell were we unable to make any head way into this enemy force with the amount of ammo outgoing from our perimeter?

As darkness settled in for another sixteen-hour-long night, commanders tried to encourage their troops:—Hold out one more night and we've got it made—Some of those officers must have some information that is not readily available to us. But the reality is we are here for this night. What it will bring we can only review in the daylight tomorrow. The infantry has organized a group of men to serve as a counterattack force to repel any Chinese penetration that might occur during the coming night.

On this morning our 2nd Battalion would move, and come under attack below Koto-ri until the 1st of December, it will hold there when reaching Koto-ri. Now under threats of friendly fire from Colonel “Chesty” Puller! It was now also under Smith's command, and it was entirely too late and too many miles away to help Faith and his force ahead. But the force at Koto-ri, the 1st Marine Regiment now had additional troops. And we have no knowledge of this fact. That knowledge may have added some morale to our situation knowing that a force was advancing to reinforce our position. A fact overlooked, we had no direct knowledge—until the tank withdrawal—that the Marines were still at Hagaru, or if they—as rumored—had been ordered back to the coast! Apparently there was little if any exchange—between CINCFE and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington over the two Army division missions now involved at the reservoir, under the newly ordered and activated Draft three. The JCS,—having little knowledge as to exact placement of divisions, at the reservoir.<sup>103</sup> Likewise any statement made by General Ridgeway, had to be, from his lack of knowledge at the time, as he is at JCS in Washington, and has no direct knowledge of the events there—nor any Army divisions involved at the reservoir. Given the fact that the head of the JCS also lacked this knowledge!

As the men collected and distributed ammo that the air drop has provided, fatigue and morale was turning to an all time low, while an hour or so before things seemed to be just a tiny bit better, but as the dusk was settling in we knew that this night once again we were on our own, the tank

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<sup>103</sup> This could justify General Collins's question to General Almond, “Collins asked Almond why the Marines happened to be involved in the Chosin Reservoir area, implying it would seem, that it was no place for them to be.” Appleman: “Escaping the Trap” p. 284. A copy of the CINCFE “Top Secret” 2400251 document—creating Draft three—was never sent directly to the JCS. Likewise, Colonel Forney USMC, Concern: “that the Marine Division was on loan from the Joint Chiefs of Staff as US strategic reserve for the Pacific. If it was used up the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] should first be notified that there was a serious chance of this happening.” Appleman: “East of Chosin” p.11.

breakthrough, redundant rumors were recycled in an attempt to hold out some hope. But that was old and tired news, no one was buying into it, we needed results, a time line to see them. If they had not broken through before dark, it's damn well sure they will not make it after dark, unless this situation has completely changed to our advantage. There is no indication of that fact whatsoever—at least from our positions and points of observation.

There are few answers to much asked questions; what will we do as ammo runs out? Answer likely as not, you die, If already out; how do you get more ammo? Answer; remember those 4 morning "s" in camp? Shit, Shower, Shave and Shampoo? You modify them; you either scourge—steal, from the enemy, or you better shit, or spit your own ammo. Where the hell do you think it's coming from? If no more ammunition falls from the sky, we're screwed big time. It's extremely difficult to ask a man on line to hold his fire against the enemy “until he sees the white of their eyes”. As they attack in groups of 30-40, and you have an 8 round clip in your M-1 rifle, that doesn't give much of a time line to reload, to get half of that group requires at least 3 reloads, and your enemy may have a fully loaded Thompson machine gun. Your back-up may have the M-2 Carbine with a banana clip of 30 rounds, same caliber .30, but smaller in size and shells are not interchangeable between those two weapons. We only have hope that we get another air supply drop, no matter how small. Also that it will be of sufficient mix for all weapons. Whatever, that will bring, will not be enough for long. So going into this night of the 30th, twenty-five days from Christmas Eve, we would be on our own to totally fight our way out, if we intend to get out—it is a night for each man to gather his own thoughts. But the precedent for our being trapped had been set long before in history, this was not the first event, in military history of withdrawing from a forward unit, nor would it be the last here in Korea. For indeed, as far back in history into the pages of Scripture, King David in an effort to cover a past discretion, with the wife of Urias, will order his commander: “Set ye Urias in the front of the hottest battle, and withdraw from him...”<sup>104</sup> So, likewise all support forces will be withdrawn from us.

Men are checking and cleaning their weapons for the night hours. Some have checked out those of the Chinese, lost here within the perimeter. They field strip them to understand how to load and fire them, that ammo is backup ammo for us. Load those Thompson sub-machine gun ammo holders, set aside for later use. Extra weapons are available as fatalities free them, a choice of M-1's, BAR's or Carbines are available, Your choice to choose, the Carbine is one half the weight of the 11 pound M-1, its .30 caliber smaller in size, it has a 15 or 30 round clip of ammo, Banana clip holds 30 rounds, plus the M-2 Carbine can fire both modes -either semi-automatic, or fully automatic, whereas the M-1, rifle has that eight round clip. No one will court-martial you by not having the same weapon you were assigned too. Under these types of combat conditions how many men can claim they kept the same weapon? Stupid to worry about anyway, on board ship I had a Carbine rifle strapped to the rail of the ship, it disappeared, someone had, replaced it with an M-1 rifle, and so I kept that one and picked up a back pack of ammo for it as I went along. I had carried an M-1 in the 1st Cavalry for seven months of advanced infantry training, so I had no problem, in operating and firing it. My being lucky to have a truck assigned to our section, I could store it there, however, I replaced my issued Carbine anyway, as that was the weapon of our trade. For those that don't understand, the infantry tool of the trade was the M-1, but the Carbine had a side mounted shoulder strap easily slung across your back without that trigger guard digging in, it was for those support troops: as artillery, wire section crews etc. It allowed you to climb telephone poles with it slung across your back and allowed freedom of your hands, yet

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<sup>104</sup> Holy Scriptures: 2 Kings, 14: Biblical Scripture.

you keep track of your weapon. While not as accurate as the M-1 in distance, that 30 round clip is the thing here, rather than reload every eight rounds; close in fighting makes it as effective as the M-1.

That worry about ammo never left your mind, for ammo was decreasing rapidly by the night hours, and our fate was only playing into the law of average with the Chinese forces –are they having the same problems we were having with ammo? Our only hope, for the one fact we knew, they had to have much more manpower, and we knew they had our ammo that was dropped by plane, to fit the American weapon given to them after World War II. It was just a matter of time in the law of average, that there will be more arm and leg wounds, because of the fact that those extremities were moving about more; catching the bullets–so to speak–that those men not wounded now, soon would be. Any leg wounds however, unknown at this moment in time was a signed invitation of death, as your wound bound you by fate to travel via those other non-walking wounded in the cargo bed of a truck.

None of the men had washed, shaved or changed clothes since leaving Kapsan over a hundred miles away at 0800 of the 25th. We were dirty, grimy, frostbitten, miserable, hungry, tired, wounded, destitute, and every hour that passed more hopeless of a truly fighting chance to break out but, a decision to that effect was not known for sure.

It seems we were set-up for some reason; a North Korean Alamo: We were the lowest fruit hanging on the tree ready to be picked off at will by the enemy. We will receive those later air drops, like drops of rain on parched earth, but no nourishment from the roots of the tree back at Hagaru. it seemed that the army had truly deserted us, but we had no way at this time to know what the situation was back there, all communication we're out to Hagaru, or so reported–all we knew for sure was we needed the 2nd Battalion, why are our tanks delayed? We needed that extra ammo at the rear CP, where was it?

We were going into that fourth night, of bloodletting, by some miracle; this group had held together. There were heroic acts all around, one man saving another, another risking his life to save another–a moot point–both to be blown away another day, yet this was not that check your buddy for a medal week. There were no objectives to be seized, it was a battle for survival and time, and the latter was running out fast. The Hourglass had been running the sand ever downward. We were fast approaching the final act of the play, there was to be no more intermissions. For from dusk on, this evening of the 30th, until dawn on the 2nd of December, this drama will be played out over the remaining four miles, between this area and Hudong-ni. A final conclusion and solution will be delayed within the next 30 years of United States recorded military history. Its solution lost within the overall casualty chart for the North Korean Campaign.

Christmas just those 25 days away, will be my third away from the states, crazy thoughts again, what are people buying for Christmas? My mind turns toward my friend –Eldon Ervin and his family at home, they don't know about his–28 November–death, it will be some time yet before they do, well over two weeks, that will put it right at Christmas time. But American's at home are filling the stores, unaware of what is happening in these high hills of North Korea–do they really care? If I don't make it out of here, how will the family take the news? For now forget those thoughts, it is beyond your power, move on into this night, tomorrow is another one waiting–Tomorrow–“is” the big one, “if” you make it through this night.

Christmas season is well under way in the good old USA. Macy's Christmas Parade: Thanksgiving Day now history. Children's eyes are all aglow with glee. Veterans of World War II, enjoying those years

missed by this fifth year aftermath of that war. We were all involved deeply in that war as teenagers; do they really care about ours? Some of those men from that war are still here, having re-enlisted, Sergeant Berry for one: His fatal mistake. Americans shopping the stores brightly lit with decorated trees and ornaments. From LA to Chicago and NY, Yule Tide greetings of all kinds are exchanged in these cities and others.

But that scene is far removed from reality here at Changjin. The landscape has a light dusting of snow, the reservoir has solidly skinned over and a light layer of snow swirls around and across its covered surface, creating whirlpools like dust devils in the middle states of American farm lands in spring and fall. The bleak and barren hillside closes around the east side of the reservoir banks. Those Manchurian winds are sharp and stinging to your face. You feel as if your exposed flesh is like a pane of glass, ready to shatter if struck by any blunt object. You feel trapped within a body that is emitting warmth and heat to the atmosphere enclosing you. The loss of body heat draining your strength: of whatever is left within you. Years of age have descended upon these men for each additional day, as they seem to have sapped extra years from your life.

The gray and overcast sky creates gloom and despair on this fifth day in this area. Intermittent sun rays brighten the area but not your spirit, for daylight is extremely short, with or without sunlight. You shiver at times as goose bumps travel up and down your flesh, due either by the cold weather, thoughts of death, or worse of capture. The latter would be a living death within this frigid God forsaken land. You feel a link to those men at Valley Forge with George Washington in 1776. So you are not alone in military history of our country.

Yet you cannot reason the logic of your being locked in place with an assigned mission that is going nowhere. Surely we are waiting for replacements or reinforcements; it never crosses your mind that you would be totally abandoned here in this forward region. General Barr, the division commander had set down by helicopter shortly before to meet with Colonel Faith. As he leaves the area, maybe things will change somewhat in our favor. Maybe we will be briefed on the situation we face. Maybe we will receive more ammo by air drop, more food rations as well. Maybe the rear forces will break through with the 2nd Battalion, and those much needed tanks. Maybe, but then again: maybe not. Another gamble at the dice table: another roll of the dice. But we were losing—our supply of chips—lives, heavily in this game of chance,

1 December 1950

This December 1, 1950 would dawn as other days within our worldly planet!

Skies here would be as everywhere, Clouds; one of a kind—in the entire universe, never again would the exact pattern designs appear at the precise moment in time in the world. Here gray misty clouds carrying snow to be dropped in various places at varying times move rapidly within clouds high adrift. Likewise what is to transpire within the next Twenty-Four hours will not be duplicated in kind in any other battle in North Korea, each battle being as unique as those clouds.

Various reasons of our withdrawal are recalled through personal notes about this event. None are entirely accurate, as all are from different points of view and angles from the truck convoy stretched some one to two miles beyond separated points! I have mixed these together in this chapter. Like the Holy Scriptures—The Gospels—where there are four versions from four different men. (Matthew, Mark, Luke and John) some in more detail and accepted and repeated more so than others. My intent is to place as much as possible of these within this accounting, remaining within the frame work of the Army History—as these total events contain. Most of these, an overall review of the entire event. My version at this late date in time could



only be embellished so I attempt to shy away from it. I am not the main character—or player—in this drama or event.

#### Continued Command Report—Chosin Reservoir

“At 1100 hours on 1 December, the surrounded Task Force, commanded by Lt Col Don C. Faith, was ordered by the CG 1st Marine Division to fight south to affect a junction with the 1st Marine Division forces at HAGARU-RI at the south end of the CHOSIN Reservoir. The shortage of ammunition, food, and increasing casualties made the possibility of holding the perimeter tenuous.

Plans were made and the attack south was to start at 1300 hours. Gasoline was drained from all immobilized vehicles and the vehicles destroyed. All wounded were loaded on serviceable vehicles. Equipment that could not be carried was burned or destroyed.

At 1300 hours, 1 December 1950, the Task Force attacked south under the command of Lt Col Don C. Faith. Order of march; 1st Bn 32d Infantry, Major Miller, Commanding; 57th field Artillery Bn, Lt Col Tolley, Commanding; Heavy Mortar Co, 31st Infantry, 3d Bn 31st Infantry, Major Storms, Commanding; D Battery 15th AAA (AW) Bn was interspersed throughout the column. All wounded in vehicles, all others marching.

As the Task force moved out it was immediately hit by heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. Lead elements dispersed and overran the enemy in their fox-holes. The column proceeded under constant enemy fire. Some vehicles were knocked out. The wounded were immediately transferred to other vehicles and the knocked out vehicles cleared from the road and destroyed. [Missing is that short drop of Napalm on our lead out force taking out the leading M-19 40mm vehicle, and killing several men.]

Approaching a destroyed bridge (see "Z", strip map) the column was halted by an enemy force covering the bridge. The infantry had to force the enemy beyond small arms range before the column could proceed, as all M-16s and M-19's were out of ammunition. [Both of these were powerful self propelled weapons; The M-19 full track, had twin 40mm guns with three mile range—the M-16 half-track, had Four (Quad) 50 caliber machine guns, with the ability to fire all four (1800 rounds per minute) at one time—due to waning supply of ammo, these units had shut down two barrels of fire the night before, now both completely without ammunition!]

At 1730 hours, the column was stopped by a roadblock of two machine guns and supporting troops at CV547787. (See "D" strip map) The column was also receiving heavy small arms fire from both flanks. Lt Col Faith and other officers led groups of men to the high ground (See "C", strip map) to destroy the enemy strong points covering the roadblock and the road leading up to it. Col Faith was severely wounded by a hand grenade in the attack on the road block

Another group fought over the hill mass to the south and knocked out additional roadblock positions along the road to the south. (See "D", strip map). After this was accomplished, word was sent back for the trucks to continue. Without waiting for the trucks the group continued across country to the south. Heavy enemy fire forced them to the reservoir and then out on the ice. Most of this group made their way over the ice to HAGARU-RI.

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At the truck column, word was passed that the roadblock could not be passed; for groups to fight their way south to HAGARU-RI. A few groups worked south on the road to CV538782. (See "D", strip

map). At this point the road was effectively blocked by burned out tanks. a small foot column of approximately 100 continued on the road to CV 537764, (see "B", strip map) then crossed to the railroad tracks and continued along these to POKK-CHI CV 529743. (See "F", strip map).

At approximately 2400 hours, the column was broken when attacked by an undetermined number of enemy employing automatic weapons. Small groups made their way overland and over the ice of the reservoir to HAGARU-RI. Note strip maps in reference were not attached to these reports.

At 1800 hours on 1 December, the first groups started arriving at HAGARU-RI and continued to arrive through 2 December 1950.” End: Command Report 1–2 Dec.

This above, combat reports seem far too simplistic to cover all of those events yet to come in this drama of human life.

1 DECEMBER 1950

SO THE DRAMA WILL CONTINUE

ANOTHER RED FLAG

“Faith could not order a withdrawal without orders from higher authority. An unauthorized withdrawal might be seen as a cowardly act which could lead to his relief. He therefore prepared for a Custer's last stand.”<sup>105</sup>

“By dawn on December 1, Lt. Colonel Don Faith had concluded that the task force could not survive another major attack. There was not sufficient ammo of any kind; his hundreds of wounded desperately required greater care than he could give them. Although he had not received orders (by airdrop or other means) from Marine headquarters to withdraw, Faith summoned his staff and commanders and told them to prepare to move out about noon.” “The four-mile route south to Hudong, where Faith expected to find support from the 31st headquarters contingent, and Drake's tank company, would be an easy run.”<sup>106</sup>

One could only surmise the dilemma Colonel Faith now faced.

-Army motto: DUTY- HONOR- COUNTRY-  
DUTY

Which of these three carried the most weight? Could his withdrawal be a dereliction of his duty –a failure on his part? Certainly his forces had invested heavily in human cost to this area. Was it worth more, or should he cut his losses? In the dictionary (Webster's) the word itself "dereliction" has broad meaning, "1: the act of abandoning; the state of being abandoned. 2: a failure in duty: Delinquency. The standing order to seize Changjin had been abandoned before it was ever started—not on the 27th but on the 24th, before we were ever ordered into this area. So in that respect Colonel Faith was not abandoning any mission. So why should he remain in place? Unknown to him, General Almond had ordered—via the Marine commander—to consolidate and relocate all forward units back into Hagaru, then to return to Hungnam on the coast. Yet, Faith as a professional soldier needed that authorization. But now the command had passed to the Marines. Rather Faith was fully informed of that fact is not crystal clear by any means; in fact it is highly doubtful that he had been informed of that change.

Here we have the danger of a Catch 22, to dispute that fact. For the redundant reports “That all communications were out to him from marine command,” (a myth) His command being through the

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<sup>105</sup> Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: p.508.

<sup>106</sup> Clay Blair, p.514.

Marine Air Wing (MAW) that he was coming out, being through that ground to air radio communications only.

### HONOR

One Marine Officer with the 1st Marine Regiment at Koto-ri posed this question of his commanding officer; (M.G. Smith). “What does a military commander do when ordered to do something he knows to be wrong? Does he owe his first allegiance to his superior or to his troops?” This was Oliver Smith's dilemma.<sup>107</sup>

In my opinion, this indicates that General Smith—after all this time—had not yet arrived at a conclusion of exactly where his own loyalty belonged, between his Duty and his loyalty to his mission, that he has failed to sort out his own final decision between the commanders level of where his own loyalty would lie. General Smith had now been in charge of the three Army battalions east of the reservoir on that night of the 292047, (8:47pm) it is now the morning of the 1st, and he has issued no orders of any kind to his troops, in disregard to his superiors’ (General Almond) given orders, to bring us back to Hagaru. Apparently he has yet to sort out that dilemma.

It would be disputed as to the time of General Smith’s decision—to issue a withdrawal order to Faith, that order being either/or-300800 Nov, or 011100 Dec, or 011300 Dec. or the latest at 011500 December.

But Honor is part of the code of the Army Military Academy, their motto—its middle one—and Don Faith—while never attending West Point, had that dilemma to weigh to his own Army career. This could be a serious setback to it, or it could—if successful propel him upward. He had met with General Barr the day before, and only he knew what was said to him about his situation here east of the reservoir. Any action he took would be judged by the Army, not the Marines, the Army, being his final judge on his final actions. Only Faith could weigh the question of Honor in his upcoming decision to break out of here. Certainly he had the support of every one of his men trapped with him. So was it his duty to issue his own withdrawal notice, and was it the most honorable thing to do?

### Country

As for the third part of the motto—Country—while this situation had no affected relationship whatsoever on the survival of our country. However that was not our call to make! For unlike General Smith’s dilemma, we were following *our orders* to be where we are; as ordered to be. A source of pride and arrogance on our part this being *our claim* to any fame: The 1st Marine Division has no claim to *this* fame! Had the Marines’ followed X Corps orders, we would never have been at the reservoir as our area was already larger than theirs, due to reassignment of the Pujon Reservoir days earlier!

*Colonel’s Maclean and Faith had—instantly obeyed—their top commander’s orders to be here!* To paraphrase the final line of Alan Seeger: —his poem—and our final night east of the reservoir:<sup>108</sup> “And I to my pledged word am true, I shall not fail that rendezvous.” For Death was indeed waiting for us here—and expectedly for Lieutenant Colonel Don Faith himself—a few hours distant—at the reservoir and Death would claim his prize(s) many, many times over. Others by the hands of fate would escape his sting, to live another day. But the guilt trip of doing so will remain within their memory for the remainder of their lifetime, only to submit to him again at that final hour, of a distant trumpet blowing taps.

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<sup>107</sup> William B. Hopkins - One Bugle, No Drums, page 92.

<sup>108</sup> “Rendezvous with Death”, Poem by Alan Seeger:

So Lieutenant Colonel Don Carlos Faith Jr. an honorable officer would weigh his options—there was only one—and his own dilemma. Surely thoughts of his father crossed his mind as he weighed this heavy decision. His father was a Brigadier General, so he had been raised early under the military code. Would he view this withdrawal as a blot on his own father’s career? We can never know. But somehow and sometime during the battle of the evening of the 30th it would be time to throw in the towel, cut his losses, and withdraw south only four miles to our tank company at Hudong-ni.

Tomorrow will be the day to withdraw from here, from every prior reports Faith did not know that the tank company was already back at Hagaru. The dereliction of duty, now a non-issue—he being exonerated within that meaning of: “the state of being abandoned.” the removal of that tank force solidified that point. Rather known or not at that time!

So Colonel Faith has made his decision, we will break out of here. Sometime during this date 1 December, 1950, on the last day of his life, he would issue that verbal order. It would be an eventful day for all concerned too many men will lose their lives on this date, and into those early morning hours of 2 December, 1950.<sup>109</sup> No one could know nor remotely guess within our wildest dreams that we would be totally and completely removed and buried in the National Archives as this would all end at our drama’s final battle at Hudong-ni, within the next 24 hours.

#### MORE RED FLAGS TO COME

This is a red letter day; the day of decision for Colonel Faith, the one in charge. As far as we know he has no official orders from any one in higher command to withdraw this force, what will he do? As he looks around the area one can only wonder of his thoughts. Almond had earlier given him a Silver Star, it is reported he mumbled something ripped off the Silver Star and threw it in the snow. This award would later be elevated to a Medal of Honor. Degraded by the Marine Public Relations Officer—*again of which this author has yet to take issue.*

General Barr apparently gave Faith the extremely bad news, but nothing really new, we were on our own, no one can help us, if we want out we had better find a way. Faith has some hard choices, he knows about that road block being forward of the tank company position—powerful enough to block their path to us—so at least one is known to exist, like that great ship the Titanic knew the ice bergs were somewhere, so too we had no idea where hidden and moveable road blocks were, or how many were out there. We would have to take things as they come. While Faith’s, last night was assessing his requirements for a breakout, 1 December—above the early fog— daylight would dawn this day of his decision. Colonel Faith would take it upon himself to withdraw to Hagaru. The original plan which neither he nor anyone forward knew, the decision has already been made by General Smith, on the night of the 29th, that we would remain in place until a RCT from Yudam-ni arrived back at Hagaru - then- maybe they could help us. That would require three additional days, until 4 December—for us to remain in place and wait!

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<sup>109</sup> *Killed in Action - Casualties after the tank withdrawal:*

Day Seven - 11/30/50: 82

Day Eight - 12/1/50: 114

Day Nine - 12/2/50: 333

Final Night of Lt. Colonel Faith's task force battle: total destruction of our column of wounded and the final demise of the task force.

Faith's decision, we would break out *this morning*. We have to cut our losses, ammo was always scarce, he knew there was a possibility we could not hold until daybreak. Being we did, at least now, we were going to have a fighting chance to get out of here. That decision was not coming too soon. About 2200 hours on November 30, the Chinese made another dishearteningly attack. From the beginning it showed more determination than those of the two previous nights, although it did not appear to be well coordinated, nor concentrated in any one area. Captain Erwin B. Bigger CO, Company D in an attempt to confuse the Chinese, hit upon the idea of firing a different-colored flare every time the enemy fired one, and blowing a whistle whenever the enemy blew one. Soon after midnight, when the enemy attack was most intense, a small group of Chinese broke into the perimeter at one end. Faith sent his counterattack force to patch up the line. From then until morning there were five different penetrations, and as many counterattacks. One of the penetrations, just before first light on 1 December, resulted in enemy seizure of a small hill within the perimeter, thus endangering the defenses. Battalion headquarters called Company D to ask if someone there could get enough men together to counterattack and dislodge the Chinese. Lt. Robert D Wilson, a platoon leader volunteered for the job. "Come on, all you fighting men!" he called out. "We've got a counterattack to make."

During the night Lt. Wilson had directed mortar fire, but the ammunition was gone by this time. Assembling a force of 20 or 25 men he waited a few minutes until there was enough light. His force was short of other ammunition—completely out of rifle grenades and having only small-arms ammunition and three hand grenades. Lt. Wilson carried a captured Tommy gun. When daylight came the men moved out. Wilson was out in front, leading. Near the objective an enemy bullet struck his arm, knocking him to the ground. He got up and went on, another bullet struck him in the arm and chest. "That one bit," he said continuing. A second or two later, another bullet struck him in the forehead and killed him. SFC Fred Suga took charge and was in turn killed within a few minutes. Eventually, the remaining men drove the Chinese out of the perimeter.

Even after daylight, which usually ended the enemy attacks, the Chinese made one more attempt to knock out a 75mm recoilless rifle that guarded the road to the south. A new counterattack beat this one off as well.

Task Force Faith had been under attack for eighty hours in sub-zero weather. Frozen feet and hands were common to all. And worst of all, the weather appeared to be getting worse, threatening air support and aerial re-supply. Few men believed they could hold out another night against determined attacks.

Aid men made improvised litters from ponchos and field jackets. One splint set was on-hand, however, and there was plenty-of blood plasma, but frozen and no way to warm it to body temperature. Having lost a No. 2 medical chest, they had one No.1 complete chest. When bandages were gone, aid men used personal linens, handkerchiefs, undershirts, and towels. They also gathered the parachutes from the airdrop bundles, using the white ones for dressings and the colored ones to cover the wounded and keep them warm. The kitchen crew had managed to keep two stoves warm, coffee and some cans of soup. These stoves were set-up in the aid station, and the seriously wounded got hot soup or coffee.

\*This page is more of a report by Russell A. Gugeler, Chapter six: "Combat Actions in Korea."

While it is not my personal attempt to highlight any one individual action as such, this one to highlight the burden of that ever recurring remark: "Short of Ammo." Groups were continually running out on attacks or counterattacks. One must remember the various caliber of ammo needed, from small arms

weapons to the 105mm howitzers, shortage, would occur. There could be no fair distribution to those hit the hardest on line, only back-up support saved the front lines at times, the inner perimeter reinforcing that front line force. All forces helped, I still highlight those truck drivers as they were the final line on the final hour of the final battle. Each one of these could have and would have save-at least 20-30 men stacked in those trucks. Although one can easily see the merit of the Medic going well: "Above & Beyond" his duty.

Appleman has a Chapter in his book, "East of Chosin."

"Could Task Force Faith Have Been Saved?"

In that chapter he states;

"The fate that overtook Task Force Faith was one of the worst disasters for American soldiers in the Korean War. Could it have been avoided?"

His answer is a speculative Yes. To which I firmly agree, but totally from a different perspective, and entirely different date.

He lists eight factors against us;

- 1) Lack of communications
- 2) Lack of air reconnaissance, of physical obstacles -roadblocks
- 3) Lack of Ammo and gasoline resupply.
- 4) Short of daylight hours
- 5) Break-out plan, no options
- 6) Lack of Officers, Casualties
- 7) Troops exhausted
- 8) High command withdrawal of Tank Force

Simply put eliminate any four of the above and we may have made it intact?

All else in my opinion is highly speculative, we had no fire power to dislodge any road block effectively. There was a tremendous effort on all to prepare for the breakout; every ounce of energy would have to be used, to unload whatever was in the trucks, for the wounded. Cannibalize vehicles for parts, tires, and batteries, whatever. Destroy the rest, collect every conceivable round of ammo, then match to weapons, and load the wounded on the trucks.

Any criticism implied cannot be placed at the feet of Task Force Faith, for we were facing reality here, we were not going to have, nor were we going to receive 1/8th of the things we needed. This force as physically present was going too deteriorated by the hour in all things. This was our peak of whatever efficiency we had. No thought was given to going part way to Hudong-ni, it would be all or nothing, that final roll of the dice, it was our lives at stake, the gamble was ours alone,—and we were losing big time. There were few places for a perimeter, for we did not fully know the situation. The road was under destruction—contrast that to a construction crew on our modern interstate highway's of today and you have a vivid picture of the "bottleneck" we would face. The only area for a rest stop and night perimeter was Hudong-ni, but it now belonged to the enemy. Yet, we did not know that, as we led off for that point. There were no roadblocks going in, and no one knew that two of the bridges out had now been blown—this was information we should have had but didn't. It's a futile attempt to blame Faith's force. We tried to get out, we tried to bring our wounded out. We failed, but we tried, and we paid, there is no disgrace in that. Others can try to place blame, but it will not stick We were not a "Quality" force, never claimed to be, but we worked the problem as we saw the problem, without the full picture. Too much is made of our deficiencies as to the break-out plan. The game plan cannot be

criticized on the last play. It should be criticized long before, Constructive criticism is always best. What should have been done on the 29th?

That is the question, not what was done on the afternoon of December I.

#### IN RETROSPECT

What should have been done - Or could have been done.

After 2047 hrs, Nov, 29th, the order that was given to the forces at Yudam-ni to redeploy one RCT without delay from Yudam-ni to Hagaru area, should have been given to Task Force Faith as well, since it was never at any time a complete RCT.

Had that been done the rear CP. with its tank force column, and air cover, dropping napalm along the road side and hills, and Task Force Faith attempting to break out to the south, with the tanks attacking north, could have been enjoined and effectively achieved a link up of the two groups, with Task Force Faith fighting south—as was done without rear assistance two days later—and the tank column fighting north the four miles separating the two groups could have been easily bridged. Even on the afternoon of the 30th, it could have been done with the day light and air support cover. But the rear CP. was ordered to withdraw south to the rear.

#### -EFFECTS OF THAT WITHDRAWAL-

Rear CP. Supply dump-plus rations destroyed.

Task Force Faith went on the road with small arms only, needed air drops on road in this area to re-supply. Third and last road block for Faith! Other forces needed to take to railroad track to get around the two tanks left there. There is total disaster and destruction, in this area. It would not have been so two days earlier, Faith would have much more ammo-more morale- having possibility of a link-up, less wounded from two nights before, saved additional fighting and more combined fire power. Area could have been within range of artillery—spotter plane— support from Marine lines at Hagaru to cover withdrawal, we would have radio link-up with them through the tank command, and our artillery battery had the expertise, and radio's for calling in air and fire missions on the road. Those two Tanks of the 31st, with those 105mm mounted howitzer, could have been used for our withdrawal while remained in place at Hagaru-ri!

THIS FACT REMAINS—Faith's position could NOT have been any worse than two days later when left to travel alone the extra miles further that the CP. —now— yielded to the enemy under marine command orders. Movement out of any entrapment will require as much if not more than movement forward, for as you dislodge your position the enemy is immediately at your rear and flanks, this movement was not to maintain a defensive position until the convoy moves a mile or so down the road, it is all or nothing, So reconnoitering the rear is of prime importance. What type roadblock exists? How many enemy forces are concentrated in your path—a fact unknown here in this area? What equipment will you need to remove said roadblocks—a moot point as you have none anyway—the engineering equipment is to the rear, also back at Hagaru, and of no use to us. Fact; the road block could not be breached from the south with that equipment before, how were we expected to do it? What defense can you maintain while that area barrier is being removed? How much time is allotted to leave those trucks full of wounded to remain idle with possible fire raining down from the eastern side of that roadblock? Not easy answers by any means, It's really a flip of a coin; heads you win; tails you lose, a fifty-fifty gamble at best. Remember there being no other exit out of here, only along the reservoir bank. Our options were few. This fact must be remembered: the area we had left five days before had secure roads. We had not reconnoitered those hills, and most of all we were unfamiliar

with the area. The force vacating this area had known this area well. We did not have any real feedback from our own I & R team which went out to seek that needed information. Not an excuse only fact! Even that Marine force moving into Yudam-ni had a full thirteen days to scout out–reconnoiter–that area. For the most part we had some 12 hours, and we were already inside the CCF set trap which folded in around us as we moved rapidly into this area.

Remember also those facts –believed to be fact– that the road distance was only four miles back into Hudong-ni to that ration and ammo dump, plus the rear CP, and tank company were located there as well, we had allotted all daylight hours to this withdrawal, those hours will slip away awaiting air cover due to morning fog, so at 1300 (1:00 pm) hours we had lost almost a full five hours of daylight, at a rate of 1.25 miles per hour we could be at Hudong-ni. Our daylight window of opportunity was lost. And unknown to us –four additional miles has been added to our journey. Pending air cover, the sniping fire will intensify as the enemy realized our intended plan to break out of this area. Close–in fighting between both sides would appear to prevent identification between forces. As the enemy moves ever closer to block our path out, those arriving Corsairs overhead would make a short run, and drop that napalm jellied gas on our lead truck elements, costing, lives and valuable time, plus whatever ammo was with that group. So what else was new? We will have to regroup, and stabilize and move around this destruction. The column now reduced by this event, in total morale and spirit together.

So this, being our red letter day to withdraw, each two and one half ton truck will be loaded with the non-walking wounded, weapon carriers and jeeps, about 15-20 per truck, 8-10 per carrier, seating as many as will fit in a jeep. This will allow some space between men and relieve pressure on their wounds. However as the convoy would be stuck by bullets from the hills, and trucks out of use, repacking of them will be necessary, those operable trucks will have to be tightly –double stacked– packed with those from the other ones, thus in the end some twenty or more men maybe–sardine–packed in the cargo spaces.

Task Force Faith had now been under attack for some eighty plus hours, and the weather was getting worse, overcast skies were a huge concern. The death list was raising -a listed 207 men were now dead–that amount also listed as wounded many with multi-wounds; three or more. These wounded in reality reduced by that number listed as dead-many of those had died from weather exposure after being wounded, so only one statistic on the casualty charts. (In the final total: we have already exceeded those men killed in action on the west side of the reservoir at Yudam-ni.)

Air support reported they could be on line -if- the fog, mist and clouds cleared as forecast by the weather group. They will not be on line before noon at the earliest. But that revelation cuts us short by four valuable hours of daylight. Those four miles added to all other shortages would also help doom us. It was also reported that the air wing informed Faith “there were no friendly forces on the road between Faith's perimeter and Hagaru.”\* So with this information Faith could be determined for a single dash, rather than stop over on the way out, we had to make use of every second of daylight. It was not reported if Faith had been informed of any existing road blocks on the way back towards Hudong-ni, yet he knew they were somewhere between our breakout point and Hudong-ni. He knew as well that whatever ammo we had on hand would be it, we could not be assured of any more air drops.

\* If that be true we as individuals were not informed-that the tank company had withdrawn back into Hagaru-ri. Its revelation would only lower morale still further than presently existed, maybe some



of the force had that information in advance or strong rumor to that effect, –this could be the reason some left the rear of the column in favor of the reservoir to Hagaru. Who knows for sure?

We will receive canisters of ammo dropped to us on the way out, dropped by plane, valuable, but never quite enough, these effort only prolonging the enviable. The wounded were packed into the trucks over an hour before the column could start out. All other trucks and equipment were to be destroyed as much as possible, orders to burn all other items, inclusive of the dead, we had neither the time nor the strength to bury them, and we would not leave them for the enemy. Enemy shells were dropping in, so a distance had to be maintained between these trucks in line and ready to move out. The enemy mortar shells exploding around this convoy. They were advancing toward this force to block that movement out. Faith picked his company "C" 32nd Infantry as advance guard to take the point position, supported by a 40mm full tread self-propelled unit (M-19) This unit out of ammo, there was none dropped in our area with the air drops. But there was that dropped erroneously at Hudong-ni! Those friendly planes will appear about 1300 (1 PM) hours. One thing now drove this force. We would have to keep moving. But fatigue was hard to fight, your own body was now fighting you, crying for rest, to stop, somehow rejuvenate, gain more strength, but you knew the one fact, if you doze off it will be for the last time. Air cover would be steady after the napalm mishap. But it was only a short distance to the first road block. The trucks had to stop. to bypass a blown bridge, the trucks being helped by the replaced –knocked out by napalm– lead M-19, to pull each truck down and up over the stream bed helped by that M-19 wench and cable. A time consuming task, cutting into those precious daylight hours. One truck stalled in the middle. Drivers and wounded in the trucks hit once again by enemy fire, as the trucks were winched and pulled up the stream bed to the road so the column could move again. It was now late afternoon-the sun now beginning to journey toward the west, across the Atlantic to the shore of America and New York. Those long eastern shadows were being silhouettes from the low sunset, stretching five times longer than those figures casting them, as if everything was flowing out of them across the snow and mountain side-eerie shadows as the sun was setting on the final night of tragedy for Task Force Faith –and Colonel Faith himself. When those same sun rays would again break morning light over these mountains, this force will be no more, vaporized, and annihilated, to be hidden away –for forty years– in the shadow of history. This coming night would claim many, both friend and foe.

Half a mile beyond this road block was another one! Machine gun emplacements have once again stopped this column. I remember helping set up a heavy water cooled .30 caliber machine gun on the road, those crazy thoughts again. Why the hell would the gunner worry about hooking up the Gerry can to the water jacket? He couldn't possible have that much ammo to heat that barrel to steam that anti-freeze in that can or around that barrel. But I guess that men do things out of habit, that's the way it's done, that's what training does, that's why it's so important, that's the way you're taught. But this event is remembered more so over that one lone event of disaster around us. Maybe that is what nature intends. Who knows for sure? Sparks are jumping from a high tension voltage line over the road, broken by air bombardment we're under a tower here, the sparks light as the high voltage tension line whiplashes against the ground.

Leadership has eroding due to wounds and fatalities, three trucks are out, the wounded must be transferred to next units, those dead stacked aside of the road. From midnight of November 30, through 3 AM of December 2, some 447 men will die on this road leading into Hudong-ni, these will be American dead only recorded later–orphans in an ancient land, in a forgotten place in a forgotten war. But it is not midnight yet, and we have some distance to go. Our fate in total, not known to us at

the time, only those survivors will really know “*Some*” of the facts that will be hidden away in the National Archives.

The exhausted men are now clinging to the sides of the trucks, reason of safety fleeting with fatigue and despair as they approach Hudong-ni. But there is still danger ahead as we approach that turn around the base of Hill 1221. But we reason it should end here, as we link up with our tank force... in reality it *will* all end here. A mile or two further are those burned out tanks of ours, a by-pass is made around them, it is now nearly 2100 hours, eight hours to cover three miles, seven trucks have been lost. The units are now all mixed together, Artillery with infantry, 31st and 32nd mixed together, cadre lost in the shuffle, men confused more than ever, we were approaching Hudong-ni, Here the lead truck driver is hit it swerves, and the truck overturns. Here the Chinese ground fire will have us pinned down here as a smaller group tries the railroad tracks.

It was within two hours of midnight, as the column moved through the town under enemy fire. The windshields: –bullet ridden– now frosty white spider webs. Here the column is permanently halted, and the enemy machine guns have their way, the trucks were riddled with bullets. Men now seek shelter in culvert pipes, ravines, and the reservoir itself, lines stretch toward Hagaru. But this is where our rear guard was supposed to be. Around midnight would be the end of our column, as we approached–this final and fatal road block. We had been in this convoy for some 11 hours, and had traveled only four miles,–we are only on the 50 yard line, as the goal post has been moved– and still would have four more miles to go to reach Hagaru, had these numbers been reversed we could have made it, had we left at 0800 hours instead of 1300 hours we could have made it in daylight. We could have but we did not. The gas station we were going to pull into was here at Hudong-ni was this prior area of the rear CP. All orientation was to reach this point, because those extra troops, tanks and supplies would aid this column. There would be supplies of all kind here, medical, ammo, food, gas, and additional vehicles.

–REALITY–There would be none of those. What had been a ration dump was now a rubbish dump. Dark soot covered the snow, Cordite smell of exploded ammunition, a smell so familiar over five days and so pungent to your senses now filled the air, omitting from snow blotches, and abandoned tanks blocked the road. And instead of a friendly force joining us, we will be scattered by the cross-fire between the high road blocks and the now in line fire from Hudong-ni into our line of retreat. There would be no more orders, Lieutenant Colonel Don Faith was wounded and his life was flowing away from him in this mixture of supply debris of men and material things of life. Faith had made it this far around Hill 1221 which should be his monument, the only one–Hill 1221–to this methodically annihilation of Task Force Faith. Here he will remain buried until 2004 when a Joint recover team mission [JPAC] will retrieve his remains! Not until 4 October 2012 will he is returned to his daughter, who will accept the JPAC finding–his burial delayed for Arlington Cemetery until 17 April 2013. I plan to attend.

The combat tires on the trucks, designed with ridged side walls for short duration without air had long since gone flat. Numerous drivers had brought these trucks to this point, many with shot gun riders of little value now, setting next to him and a replacement for that driver. The men losing all sense of direction during the attack, but Hagaru was at the end of the reservoir. Men would now take *off* over the ice toward it. No one could truly blame them. But those remaining with the convoy inched ever forward. Their trust that soon we would skirt the southern edge of Hill 1221, and be home free, a rest stop, maybe for the night, and maybe like a wounded puppy, lick our wounds, and regroup, assess our situation before moving forward. Grab some sleep, and refuel our bodies with a new sense of

morale—we made it. But events have altered our fate once again those hopes and prayers have not been fulfilled. Hudong-ni has been abandoned. Where the hell were our tanks and troops? All the rumors had been fabricated. Were they here at all? The evidence of our tanks blocking the road proves they were here at one time. We could have no idea when and why they were gone when we got here. However, we had no time to dwell on it, the incoming firepower from machine gun blockades were of prime concern now.

The full moon reflecting off the snow covered ground pinpointing our movements to those within their machine gun positions on the higher elevation. There is nowhere to go for defensive cover, except around the trucks or abandoned tanks –not a smart move– as luck would have it there are plenty of culvert pipes around under the road to the reservoir, large enough for a man, but again like a trapped rabbit those crowded into one would be exposed to a grenade thrown into the culvert. There are no easy choices as your mind is not fully alert to all the pending dangers. But you know you have to get out of that line of fire, if possible. Those in the convoy that split to the railroad track—my group—would realize the reservoir was a secure flank. For some reason the Chinese would avoid its ice center, yet no guarantee, just an individual judgment call. Everything still depended on our lead truck will it straddle that narrow gage track? Plus the assumption that this lead truck will not be knocked out, as there would be no path around it, once on the track you will be committed, did the truck have enough gas, who knew, who thought to check, there was no time for that, the trucks were worn out more than we were—salvaged by operation ROLL-UP months before, they had performed as well as could be expected, this convoy was recycled equipment from World War II. Few things were new. As trucks failed in the convoy for various reasons, oil pans ruptured, radiators shot, batteries insufficient power—the curse of a modern army—whatever Murphy's Law was, all of it applied to us. Had we been completely free of the convoy, having a force strong enough to lead forward and eliminate the pending danger to the truck convoy; what if? However, reality would never allow that.

The question of morale comes into play here. Each man expected a fighting chance to survive in life even if there be no guarantee as you take your first breath on this planet. Your will to survive in life is your inner strength, your wits and personal ability. Why some that have all of these survive, and others do not, cannot be totally and independently your call. But you are changed from the man you were 120 hours ago. Conditions then were not the best as far as morale was concerned everyone was highly irritated and testy. You were cold and miserable, frostbite was nipping away at your fingers and toes, and every drop of water was frozen. You do what you can to survive, to hell with morale. I'm miserable and don't attempt to make me appear happy about it. My lips are severely chapped and cracked from the cold the huge layer of clothing has restricted my movements, created a time line to eliminate body waste. That was back then, and this is now.

As the cross fire will increase, the moonlight and the snow will highlight the trail of the many footprints now leading across the ice toward Hagaru. Fresh wounds, are coloring the snow pink as fresh blood drips, and mix with the snow the bed of the reservoir area looks immense and foreboding to me, a long way to Hagaru. Men are dazed, confused, the cold weather has taken its toll, when the road block fire has ceased will the Chinese turn their fire towards those on the ice? We were by no means the first to confront a situation like this, we were just becoming new members of a brotherhood as old as the history of mankind, the, prey instead of the hunter, the tables had shifted again, the drama of the play, the continuing change in roles between both sides, but this was a different enemy, we had no pre-orientation on his tactic's, but through experience we now knew he had no long range weapons. The most powerful weapon was their mortars they were good with them, and their machine guns. After a recorded 80 hours of fire from these,

one cannot now describe the destruction to this road bound force during the final hours of the Task Force. As a few trucks take to the railroad tracks which ran parallel –around Hill 1221– to the road, an attempt was made to avoid the tanks left on the road blocking it. While some tried to get around the tanks, the railroad tracks seemed a better source, but it was narrow gage, and a narrow path, once on the tracks, we would be committed there, a dispute would take place as to the use of the tracks, not all would follow this lead, I would –however, once on the track it was the western stagecoach situation, the lead horse here was going to be shot and the coach stopped, Real combat and cowboy movies are only fantasies of the mind. Yet the sad reality of this is that those men that would forfeit their very lives on this midnight and early morning of December 1-2 would never know that the force that was here was withdrawn on orders from others outside of our division command. A shameful: “*Secret deliberately hidden*” for some forty years. Had this been known before then, this group killed within this time frame may have been center stage to require an accounting at the so called truce in 1953. The sad fact is their burial–not here–but within the history of our own nation.

Captain Kitz: version, concerning the ROK’s attached.

“It seemed that the Gooks had decided to reorganize. The next day (30 Nov) we got a little small arms fire from them and a few mortar rounds thrown in. But it was the next night (1-2 Dec)\* that all hell broke loose, the attack started. It began early in the evening and kept on going at night, there was plenty of mortars, 120s, big ones, small ones, middle ones and medium size ones. We even had some artillery on the thing. And our artillery was almost out of ammunition so it couldn't (fire) as much as we would like it to fire. And the 50s were short of Ammunition and the 40s were short of ammunition. People who fired M-1's had to conserve ammunition at this time. We just didn't have what we needed. Hand grenades were short. We needed alot (sic) of things and couldn't get them, the fourth night, mortar hit us. It keep on going until the morning and this time instead of withdrawing in the morning as they had been doing they stayed right down there in the low ground with us, stayed right down there in the perimeter and were getting alot of grazing fire. Got alot of people hit too at that time. Our Aid station was in tough shape. We got alot of wounded. I don't know how many, but a hell of alot.

About 11 O'clock (-021100 Dec)\* I was told that we were going to withdraw after an air strike. So we prepared for the withdrawal. There wasn't a hell of alot we could do to prepare for it. What we couldn't carry we put in holes and started to burn it. We took what equipment we had. Destroyed what weapons we couldn't take with us. The vehicles were stripped and broken down and the planes finally got over head and we started to withdraw. They were right down about 50 to 75 yards from the perimeter shooting into us as we were pulling out. As a result the withdrawal was a little bit disorganized, as it was awfully hard to form units as such under fire. As soon as we got out of our positions they (CCF) just started moving right in. And the people who were fighting the delaying action were driven right out of their positions. So the 32nd, which was to lead out, got on the road and they weren't out 50 to 70 yards when they got hit. They put up a fire fight. The air force was supporting them. And I know the Air Force dropped one napalm bomb on them and the Gooks, they were so close together.

Anyhow, we got going (021300 Dec)\* Got the column moving and from then on it was a matter of moving and every time you hit a nose, the Gooks were shooting at, you. So we used the ice to move out on. The ice broke threw in a couple of places. People fell in the water. Some got in and some didn't. I got in the water and was lucky to get out. The vehicles moving along the road were being shot at. After we got to the place where the big road block was, I am not sure how far it was, but it was about three miles from our position. The terrain was ideal for a road block. There was a hairpin curve, a big nose, and a

long ridge we had to go around. I was under the impression that our friendly forces were right on the other side of that ridge. Most everyone else was, I think, but we didn't realize that we had to go all the way back to Hagaru-ri to see friendly forces. So the vehicles got caught on the road on the side of the hill. We couldn't move because of this road block. The Gooks were on top shooting down and the Gooks were at the bottom shooting up. And we were caught in the middle. The vehicles were caught. The wounded were in the vehicles and alot of lead was flying .

We crossed the ridge and sent someone back to haul the rest of them up and get the vehicles moving. By this time it was almost dark (1800) There must of been alot of CCF at the bottom of the hill, so the only thing left was to take off across country, which we did. I noticed that some of the wounded got out and they were coming along with us. We couldn't carry the others because the Gooks were right behind us. The trucks couldn't move. I sent two men back to tell the trucks to come around the bend and follow us through. They never did come and we struck out across the lake. I had almost 210 men with me. Got into the Marine area around midnight (022400 Dec) and spent a couple of days there.”

\*These dates have to be wrong it is the night of the 30th–1st. This date confusion is standard throughout for the men as the time worn on and reason was tested, time of day or month was no really big concern. It reflected on all the forces within the perimeter.

#### HERE CAPTAIN KITZ COMMENTS OF THE ROK's

[But also remember they were our burden to work with.] “We had plenty of ROK's who were completely worthless. You couldn't get them to shoot. The only time you could find them was when there was something to eat around. They would run the first time a shot was fired. They would fall asleep in their holes while the Chinese were about 50 yards from the perimeter. They slept right in the holes; they weren't worth a thing to us. And also alot of our men got killed because of the ROKS, trying to push the ROKS. In my opinion, many of our casualties were caused by the failure of the ROK's to function as we expected them to. Our communications within the battalion weren't too much of a problem because we were so close together. We had wire laid in, but most of our communications were taken care of by runner. It was just a short distance. We did not have much of a problem on communication there. Our BARs were not worth much. Of 9 BARs in the company, I did have one that would fire automatically, the machine guns were alright. One of the answers of the machine gun is to fire it periodically in cold weather and keep them loosened up. But the BARs didn't fire except as single shot. The most serious shortage, of course, was the shortage of grenades. The Gooks had plenty of them. The tactics that they used, they would crawl up at night and lay there for almost two hours waiting until they made a charge. And when they made the charge they were too close to us, you couldn't do anything about it.

They were right up to you before you knew it. They were pretty good night fighters. They were able to get so close by just the excellent manner in which they moved. Of course, they had plenty of cover and when they got close what they would do is, about 150 of them would hit the spot, probably hit four or five men. The four or five just couldn't stop them. I had one Sergeant, I recall, who stacked up 20 around his hole just with his M-1 rifle, but they finally got him. It was awfully hard to determine about their leadership. It must have been good because they were able to function effectively. However you couldn't distinguish their leaders from the others because you seldom saw them. You never saw them until they were dead. We killed alot of them. In one draw, we must of had 300 stacked up. We had our 57s zeroed in. Our 57s had high explosives anti-tank ammunition which is not desirable in a case like this. What you have to do shoot it against the ground so it would detonate. Our high explosives we never got. We had about 20 rounds of that and the rest was all Antitank.

Our winter clothing was all right, you didn't freeze to death although it was extremely cold. As to the frozen feet, everyone's feet froze to a certain extent, but we couldn't change our socks as often as we should. And even if you did you couldn't light fires to warm up. It was just impossible to have fires. They just drew mortar fire. So you just changed socks one day and the next day those socks dried out and maybe they didn't, we had plenty of socks but no way to dry them out. We didn't have any fires. It was pretty hard for the CCF to miss with their mortar fire, but I don't think they inflicted too many casualties by mortar fire. I think their small arms fire was very inaccurate. They just threw so much of it that it was impossible not to hit somebody. What surprised me in the inaccuracy of it was that when we crossed these open spaces, they were covered with fire. I lay out in the lake for four minutes and they were shooting in at me all that time and they didn't hit me fatally as I was sitting in the water. It was very cold. I couldn't move. When I got out of that... of course, it was just a lucky break. A lot of people didn't get out of it.

In some cases the NCO leadership of our men was excellent. In other cases it was not so good. I had some fine NCO'S, and they did well. But the NCO's also had to prod the ROK's along, and as I said before many of our casualties were because of the ROK's failings. A man had to expose himself to get the ROK's to move. In fact I had to shoot at them, behind them, to keep them going. But what we tried to do, in a column, we tried to take the high ground that wasn't occupied by the Gooks, but you couldn't get the ROK's to go up the high ground. They were tired and just looked at you. They all had some excuse, they had sore feet, broken weapons or they didn't have any ammunition. We used the ROK's as soldiers. That was the only way we could use them. We were planning on using them as soldiers, so we did. But we spent all of our time trying to control them and trying to get them to function as soldiers.”

END OF CAPTAIN KITZ: INCLOSURE 2: A personal statement by Captain Robert J. Kitz, Company Commander of K Company, 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry.—“Inclosure” —as in the Archives original copy. This author has used only selected paragraphs from that seven page copy.

Here was a good narration of events from an infantry captain's point of view. And it is officially notated by Army sources. There are many different versions of the same events. A great amount of latitude in different versions must be allowed in this drama. I use these as they were written by those men closest to the infantry action events and before time had eroded memory of those events, again recall the dates of confusion over events that close to the event. One must remember that the infantry had that outside perimeter to defend. Within the inner perimeter—not much larger—we had a few barrel fires during the peak daylight hours. Still other views, I was not near any water that was not in a completely frozen state. But memory played its own mind game with each man in the Task Force. As for the ROK's they were victims of this budget war. One of them readily gave me his carbine when mine jabbed, as if he was glad to be rid of it. But in all fairness they had no rifle range time with that weapons use. They however were a fully functional part of that infantry unit, I can't stress that enough. Yet that is not an excuse. They were part of us, and had been since late August of 1950.

Individual actions after the destruction; each man was on his own as the convoy totally disintegrated. Each man was his own general in that respect. The path taken individually could in the end lead to Hagaru, capture, death by the enemy, or the cold! What and how will you survive, some would save at least one bullet or grenade for personal use. The grenade to take out the enemy near you and yourself with him, the lone bullet in your rifle to gourd him into taking you out before capture, by firing that last bullet, he most likely would believe you have more ammunition left and take you out before you got him. Others as I, was fortunate enough to escape without having to use one of those same— *I kept that one bullet*—options. As a teenager, I had seen too many News Reels at the Saturday matinees' of

atrocities of captured soldiers to become one of them, if at all under my own power. Going into a hut, I found others there searching for shelter over night and to wait morning light to take to the reservoir and head for Hagaru. There was one ROK (buddy) with these few other soldiers and he more or less volunteered to seek some help from the villagers. We wrote him off the minute he left the door, but he returned shortly with an elderly couple, the women made a cloth sling for my arm and did what she could for the others as well, they provided us with some warm soup, a gray type meat, we would later discover a ROK delicacy—dog soup, and a potato, the warmth from which would create the beginning of the large blisters to form on my fingers. These would later form into prisms’ of colors inside those blisters, pre-gangrene, blue, green red ones. Regretfully this elderly couple—undoubtedly—would forfeit their own lives for helping us. The ROK had some idea for us to get around the enemy, they now busy with their mopping up operations, as they have been successful in the destruction of our convoy, now collecting stragglers as prisoners of war. Helping each other by luck, being free from more attacks we took to the middle of the reservoir following the many tracks made earlier in the snow, leading into Hagaru. Dodging any of that reported “Long Range Firing” which would occasionally clip the ice around as you zigzag, now not via your infantry training to do so, but rather your weakened condition to do otherwise. You cannot recall the number of times you have falling during this night, from pure exhaustion.

## -Chapter 10-

### A PHANTOM FORCE -DISINTEGRATE'S DECEMBER 1, 1950

#### Command Report-Chosin Reservoir

1 December

At 1100 hours on 1 December, the surrounded Task Force, commanded by Lt Col Don C. Faith, was ordered by the CG 1st Marine Division to fight south to affect a junction with the 1st Marine Division forces at HAGARU-RI at the south end of the CHOSIN Reservoir. The shortage of ammunition, food, and increasing casualties made the possibility of holding the perimeter tenuous.

#### Breakout

Plans were made and the attack south was to start at 1300 hours. Gasoline was drained from all immobilized vehicles and the vehicles destroyed. All wounded were loaded on serviceable vehicles. Equipment that could not be carried was burned or destroyed.

At 1300 hours, 1 December 1950, the Task Force attacked south under the command of Lt Col Don C. Faith. Order of march; 1st Bn 32d Infantry, Major Miller, Commanding; 57th Field Artillery Bn, Lt Col Tolley, Commanding; Heavy Mortar Co, 31st Infantry, 3d Bn 31st Infantry, Major Storms, Commanding; D Battery 15th AAA (AW) Bn was interspersed throughout the column. All wounded in vehicles, all others marching.

As the Task force moved out it was immediately hit by heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. Lead elements dispersed and overran the enemy in their fox-holes. The column proceeded under constant enemy fire. Some vehicles were knocked out. The wounded were immediately transferred to other vehicles and the knocked out vehicles cleared from the road and destroyed.

Approaching a destroyed bridge (see "Z", strip map) the column was halted by an enemy force covering the bridge. The infantry had to force the enemy beyond small arms range before the column could proceed, as all M-16s and M-19's were out of ammunition. [Both of these were powerful self propelled weapons; The M-19 full track, had twin 40mm guns with three mile range-the M-16 half-track, had Four (Quad) 50 caliber machine guns, with the ability to fire all four (1800 rounds per minute) at one time-due to waning supply of ammo, these units had shut down two barrels of fire the night before!]

At 1730 hours, the column was stopped by a roadblock of two machine guns and supporting troops at CV547787. (See "D" strip map) The column was also receiving heavy small arms fire from both flanks. Lt Col Faith and other officers led groups of men to the high ground (See "C", strip map) to destroy the enemy strong points covering the roadblock and the road leading up to it. Col Faith was severely wounded by a hand grenade in the attack on the road block.

Another group fought over the hill mass to the south and knocked out additional roadblock positions along the road to the south. (See "D", strip map). After this was accomplished, word was sent back for the trucks to continue. Without waiting for the trucks the group continued across country to the south. Heavy enemy fire forced them to the reservoir and then out on the ice. Most of this group made their way over the ice to HAGARU-RI.

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At the truck column, word was passed that the roadblock could not be passed; for groups to fight their way south to HAGARU-RI. A few groups worked south on the road to CV538782. (See "D", strip



map). At this point the road was effectively blocked by burned out tanks. a small foot column of approximately 100 continued on the road to CV 537764, (see "B", strip map) then crossed to the railroad tracks and continued along these to POKK-CHI CV 529743. (See "F", strip map).

At approximately 2400 hours, the column was broken when attacked by an undetermined number of enemy employing automatic weapons. Small groups made their way overland and over the ice of the reservoir to HAGARU-RI.

At 1800 hours on 1 December, the first groups started arriving at HAGARU-RI and continued to arrive through 2 December 1950. [End: combat Report for 1 Dec.]

#### MORE ON THE ROK'S

Lieutenant Colonel Anderson; Staff Officer, RCT- 31st Infantry, (Archives: Inclosure -7, page 3.) Some of the ROK's perhaps 10 percent that I observed under fire performed very bravely and very adequately. However, usually the ones I saw would be grouped together when the fire started in a sheltered place and do nothing other than try and protect them-selves. Most of the ROK's that I saw came into that area without their weapons. At other times I frequently found them without their weapons. Later, almost without exception, it was necessary to drive them into action, particularly into attacks. And on the hill when they got cold they would actually desert their positions and wander off to the road and to the best tent they could find, they would get on convoys going to the rear, particularly as the action developed, there was more and more of that, their just pulling out. There could have been several reasons for that. It could be the people they were without or associated with earlier in units became -casualties and they just felt lost without directions. They couldn't be rapidly integrated into new units. [Note Colonel Anderson returned to Hagaru, with the tank withdrawal.]

#### END OF THIS REPORT

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This is shortened, it is only to add and detail the burden each unit commander had with those ROK's. They would indeed be totally lost if separated from their individual unit and those few Americans that they personally knew. That so called "*Buddy*" they were originally attached to.

That damn, dreaded, deadly mortar fire is dropping in around the area. There are few ambulance trucks with this group, the one near me; its rear doors will be blown off. The wounded inside ripped by concussion, and now machine gun fire coming through the steel sides to the east, but now there is inevitable reality: We all died yesterday, we just lack the good sense to lie down and admit it. There are few cry's for a corpsman, only disgust and arrogance, prayers of the dying, and defiance, one man calling out: "*Those son's of a bitch's, they got me again.*" The wounded unable to walk loaded in the trucks were true captives, the night is becoming ablaze as trucks ignite in balls of fire. There is no way to remove the wounded within the trucks. This force was eroding by the second chaos is the only small description of the carnage that ripples from one end of this convoy to the other. You feel small bursts of warmth from the blazes, more light and benefit to the enemy to light up the area as they dominate this shooting gallery.

Here was the end of the American occupation force, for like scenes were being replayed on the Eighth Army side. Plus that one division, the 2nd Infantry, sent from the states-incomplete units. But we don't know that, nor do we care, we have our own problem to work through, and your mind cannot absorb everything that is happening, instant by instant.

But somewhere our mistakes are being recorded! “*We failed in so many ways, to bring our equipment out with us, our trucks, wounded and our weapons.*” Well excuse us! Who abandoned us? We had no real control over these tactics. That is not an excuse, we don't need one; it happened! This group has nothing whatsoever to apologize for. I guess we could have pushed -or pulled those trucks the rest of the way to Hagaru. So shoot us; what the hell, else could be new to this force? You'd be late in that event-never getting a “*cherry*” as most of this force had already been “*Shot up*” before coming in across the ice to Hagaru. We had undoubtedly zigzagged through more bullets than those criticizing us used in their own defense at Hagaru.

Few men now crawl or roll out of the trucks they know the facts of life, now familiar with the face of death. These trucks are directly in a cross fire, that deadliest of all fire, an “X” pattern merging field of fire back and forth, add mortar fire, against a group with little or no ammo, and you create here that massive KIA & MIA casualty list of that 93% of all those recorded for the entire 7th Division created here and a few miles further north of here. You act without reason, again without a pre-set plan, the noise, the smells, the pain, you ignore these, like the zombie you have become you move to and fro. Once again you did not stop in this area before-merely moved through it –you're a stranger here, but the Chinese are not. They have dominated this area for at least 5 days, we can't outwit that knowledge.

The area of the tank and service position less than 30 hours before was the end of the line, Some of the vehicles had tried to get past the road block, the final one by taking to the railroad track which was immediately parallel to the road, but it was of no use, the Chinese were now on the lower level having this area to themselves for those thirty some hours, instead of firing down from the high ground they had direct in line fire into the convoy. At the edge of the Hudong-ni village the Chinese had set up automatic weapons, and small arms fire, with infantry to move in on the column of wounded, as the column moved through the village, on flat tires inching forward ever so slowly enemy fire killed the drivers of the first three trucks creating a final road block, the death of the Task Force, it was all over at this point as far as any unit resistance was concerned, if you could stand and fight with a bayonet it would just prolong the inevitable, but most of these men were not going to surrender, the memory of World War II was ingrained in many of them, of the atrocities against our troops in that war and those of the early days in South Korea.

The memories of the earlier pictures in the “*Stars and Stripes*” newspaper, of the captives with their hands tied behind their backs them shot in the head. Now those hand grenades, those kept for personal use would come into play, you could take one or two of the enemy with you, in one final act of defiance. Men now scatter as the few remaining trucks are raked with crossfire, the deadly fire from the hills and low ground. We had only assembled about 30 trucks for the breakout of the some 210 brought into the area. The remaining trucks are set afire either intentionally or by tracer bullets ripping holes into the gas tanks, the Chinese scavenges are stripping bodies of prize items, more so shoes and gloves than jewelry and watches.

Those on the road side react as their inner nature dictates and directs them most blindly follow the many footprints in the snow leading towards Hagaru. They are stretched out across the frozen snow covered reservoir, easily recognizable from the hill assault elevation in the full moon light. Sniper shots are chipping the ice around the survivors, they seem to care less, as their lives are totally within the hands of fate, any *zig-zag* actions at this point is from pure exhaustion and not necessity.

There seems to be a few enemy patrols skirting the area seeking out survivors of the road block. (Ironically they assist in some cases) For all intent and purpose, it would seem that the Chinese were content with their efforts to destroy this force, they had been successful in that mission, whatever their reasons they did not pursue these survivors, rather that decision to split forces as we did between the ice and the village cannot be analyzed as to having any affect on their choice to pursue either group. They had to be glad their forces had ended their mission. They now had full control of this area east of Changjin, and far better informed of the situation at Hagaru than any of the survivors were at that time. Yet, as later recorded the enemy were in a dire military situation themselves. They had suffered tremendous loss. They were apparently in no better shape than we were at that time. Only the fact they had ammo and we did not.

When one considers their method of fighting relied upon ammo stored around the area, their immediate resupply had to be limited. You don't search a large area without ammo supply, or a collective small group –a squad perhaps– to search for enemy forces. All of our equipment was destroyed at this road block our individual survivors were of no big threat to the Chinese forces.

Here at the break-up of the convoy your individual training comes into play, you alone must weigh the decision before you, and no one can help you decide, top leadership is gone. The position before you should you join that thin line out on the middle of the reservoir; or should you take shelter in the area and small huts around the area until daybreak? This decision is entirely yours you were totally cut loose at this moment in time. No one has the correct answer. But, this truth is one you must deal with you will have to get out on that ice in the middle of the reservoir now or later. So the single and simple question confronting you, when should you step out on that lowest of all ground around you? There now is a clear sky and full moon highlighting the reservoir, its surface frozen and covered with snow you will be silhouetted against its white moonlit, surface, while the enemy controls the night? Your seven months advance infantry training holds you back, haste has trapped us here in the first place, and you have survived so far, you have no idea whatsoever how many of the enemy were waiting along the banks further south toward Hagaru, and you did not know the situation at Hagaru. *If* defended it could be mined and could you be taken for an enemy force?

So it was your judgment call alone. No one else was responsible for your life-saving- choice. You make the decision alone in these high mountains of North Korea. Either outcome could mean death or capture, yet, you had to get to Hagaru. My decision was made and weighed at the railroad tracks. I would head for shelter within the village itself. The tracks had boot marks leading every which way-others had weighed the same decisions- you were not totally brilliant in yours. It was close to or shortly into December 2nd, the date of no interest or concern to you, you have made your decision, and its reliability would have to be played out here. You are committed to that decision; you will await day break to take to the ice. Hoping that the reservoir would still be a no-man's land-as it had been the last five days during daylight hours, when our superior air cover would be darting across the sky overhead.

Some decide –as I did– to move into the village with a few others, we would await day break, and try for Hagaru, we may make it, if the air cover support is still checking the hills maybe the Chinese are laying low during the day fearing the aircraft from around Hagaru. We should by the law of military reason be within that no man's land –an area within reach of artillery– from either side where both sides monitor but neither side securely occupies. Our only hope is that we will not be mistaken for

Chinese troops from a high elevation by our own aircraft, maybe, just maybe we will luck out, the scales are shifting ever so slowly upward in our favor, we had survived the night in the village inside a hut, the ROK with us went out for whatever help he could get, we wrote him off the minute he left, we would never see him again, but a growing pessimism was turning into a slight optimism, for the password assigned would be spoken at the door-for we had been aware that the Chinese would hurl a grenade into a hut first- here the ROK had returned with that elderly couple from the village and they helped as much as they could. I was provided with that sling for my arm and given potatoes and whatever the hell was in the broth, a gray meat, but the warm broth and potato made my frozen fingers begin to form blisters, the fingers had been chalk white before, now blisters filling with fluid.

Early morning would drag slowly towards dawn, and daylight; it still slow to arrive around eight o'clock, you are extremely jumpy at this point, but also extremely fatigued, there is no heat in the hut you select, but there are other survivors here as well, six to eight. You feel relieved with that, a small group at least. You agree to alternate watch times between the task of now watching the door for the enemy approach, you pool what little ammo, the group has about one round per man, yet, you realize your body will give way to the exhaustion built up. How much you doze off cannot be accounted for, but it is reasonable that you will drift off to sleep.

There is still gun fire faintly off in the distance toward the railroad track, dying down as the hour advances toward daylight. Strange as it seems you hear children outside, they seem to be laughing as at play-how can that be in all this carnage and bitter cold? Surely you are losing all sense of reality; your mind must be playing tricks with some repressed memory of your younger days. You don't see them but, your mind places them there. My right arm is now stiff at the shoulder, as the frostbite has crept up to the upper wound, and my fingers already forming ulcerated blisters of colors; red, black and blue streaks coloring the roof portion of them.

Daylight was the time to move out of here, for now at least you made the right call, the Chinese would be seeking cover for the daylight hours; they have avoided this hut for whatever reason, perhaps too busy with the mop-up operation during the night with the convoy, some trucks still smoldering in the distance near Hill 1221, perhaps the enemy commander was regrouping his forces and assessing the damage to his entire division. No matter; they had not found us-yet. We still had that four mile march across the ice into Hagaru ahead of us. There were still men coming from all directions onto the ice, the flow toward Hagaru would increase toward the center of the reservoir. That sniper fire from the hills is now more of a harassing nature than a killing one. Surely they could have hit all of us if that was their intention; we had no defense against them. The closer we got to Hagaru, the more distance and the more ineffective that firing at us would be, bullets over time and distance have a downward arch trajectory, that loose energy, "Long Distance" fire is not accurate and loses its force in that downward path, that is for small arms fire-unlike artillery having its impact on contact.

But our one advantage now; we could be seen in the daylight, as we approached Hagaru, any sentry, posted could direct us around mine fields and its security perimeter around Hagaru. Those of us from our hut would hit the ice around 9 o'clock; it would take a few hours to reach Hagaru. The snow cover over the ice creating a slippery surface, the ice seemed flash frozen- ribbed- as if frozen while small waves were in motion, by the sudden drop in temperature.

Somewhere during this route, you again slip and fall, you assist others and others assist you if needed, both ROK's and Americans, Those bullets now fired from long distance chip the ice around you, you could care less, you continue on your path toward Hagaru, not knowing what you will find there at that time. We had been deserted before, and had no reason or idea what the changing situation had brought to Hagaru. It had never been known for sure if Colonel Faith himself had full knowledge; since he had received no orders whatsoever from marine command, even though they were in complete charge of his force before December 1. Neither he nor his forces had ever been at Hagaru. Are did he know for a fact that any friendly force remained at Hagaru! The only single order reported issued by O.P. Smith is that withdrawal order-disputed by Appleman in “East of Chosin” - and that has cause for analysis, but later.

Those arriving at Hagaru earlier; had the advantage of some medical care, and time in warming tents, but our task force presence there was an excessive burden on the forces there, those not being, as large a force as should have been; a center hub of the >Y< someone had failed to maintain it as an important junction. But the importance of that upper V separated the east and west side of the reservoir as being *above* Hagaru and was now the only “blocking action” from east of the reservoir creating this >Y< lacking any support—to Hagaru—from the west side. We had however, increased its tank manpower affects there, although we did not realize that the enemy had revised their plans to abort another attempt to overrun Hagaru, again for whatever their reason.

Nevertheless; we were there and the Marine commander was not pleased with us—too bad; so sad—after all he had done little to assist us anyway, at least we were again united with our rear unit and tank force—or were we—another miscalculation on our part. Now for some reason, even though there was no protective flank force on the right side of the reservoir, which common military necessity would require a defensive position to create a “blocking position” to the east, again using our tank force, for some unexplained reason this was of no great need. Suddenly the east side of the reservoir was of no concern, the tanks that had been so urgently needed at Hagaru on the 30th of November while we still held the flank east of Changjin, was no longer needed to guard east of Hagaru —or Hagaru itself. Now for that unexplained reason these tanks were excessive mobile fire power. (General Smith stating that the only time he was truly worried was when the 5th and 7th Marines were fighting back from Yudam-ni.) His concern now shows through for his marines-surely if an inferior force could get out east of Changjin without his help, then his Marine force would not need assistance of Army forces to assist their withdrawal, from a lesser number of enemy —per ratio that met Task Force Faith. However he would send our tank force forward toward Yudam-ni, a distance —of some seven miles— he would not send them back to us the very day before. They were now available units—what changed? Two of our tanks had self propelled 105mm howitzers, within range to aid and assist us on our breakout, but were never used to help us.

In the Archive reports: The tank commander would state;\*

“Company arrived Hagaru-ri 301750, was attached to the 1<sup>st</sup> Tank Battalion, 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, and immediately placed in the perimeter defense of Hagaru-ri area. Attack by Chinese forces that night directed at this company’s sector, Attack was repulsed with some one hundred counted enemy dead. Tank Company sustained only one casualty.<sup>110</sup> Attack was made by estimated three companies of

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<sup>110</sup> Recall the Marine report stated earlier: The night of 30 November, “the enemy had shot their bolt” and no longer were attacking the Hagaru garrison!

enemy. On 2 December conducted patrol to assist in evacuation of 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry and 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 32<sup>nd</sup> Infantry, and recovered approximately 20 wounded. Patrol mission was hampered by heavy small arms fire and anti-tank gun fire.” [Here is where the mission changes and becomes of prime importance to move this tank force out of Hagaru toward the west side of Chosin.] “Company was attached to 5<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment on 3 December 1950. Conducted patrol mission with Royal British Marine detachment North on West shore of Chosen Reservoir to link up with 7<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiments then withdrawing from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri. Patrol was ordered to return before mission was accomplished.” (\*Inclosure 8-National Archives) [Statement by: Robert E. Drake: Captain, Armor, Commanding.]

Most of us that stayed with the column moved down to the village of SASU, a mile or more south of Hudong-ni. It seemed out of range, more so within that no-man’s land. Since, the Chinese had no long range weapons they stayed clear —by choice— of these areas, until ready to cross over them. Once again our only fear was once in this area we would be mistaken by friendly fire from overhead air support as the enemy. Be that as it may, we will wonder off, to the —center of reservoir— back towards Hagaru, as we were all out of any other options.

#### COLONEL FAITH - AND ALL OTHERS

Played the game as they saw it! They cannot be faulted for that in any way. With courage and determination they tried their best, but the tank force and its support group was at Hagaru-ri. In my recall; the repeated message throughout the perimeter, was that the tanks were still there, and each day they were trying to get through to us. Rather that was false propaganda or not, it instilled some hope and morale forward. Knowing that force was there—even though they were not-nibbling away at the road block behind us, 22 tanks, and support troops with supplies close those few miles behind us.

The tragic fact; that these tanks had been in this area—where the Task Force Faith disintegrated—only some 30 hours before and the fact that they were gone when we got there, was also hidden away in the National Archives, hidden from the very men that reached that area. For they knew now, that those tanks were gone, but unless they have read the book accounts of Clay Blair, and Roy Appleman, or have seen the Archive reports, they still do not know —to this very day how or why this force was gone, pulled away, but still lacking direct knowledge as to who ordered that withdrawal! In our mental state at that time and at that road block, the two burned out tanks at the hairpin turn could signal that the rest of the tank force had also been destroyed further south, and more road blocks of destroyed tanks were ahead.

With our communication —reported— gone long before, we were not the best informed on our own situation. While our situation was debated at Hagaru on the 29th—by BG Hodes— and the 30th, that even as the tanks were returning to Hagaru. General Almond was also unaware those tanks were being withdrawn. *On the afternoon of the 30th:* At 1410 hours his staff meeting had started, at Hagaru, Almond was leaving instructions to seek a way out for Task Force Faith. Yet 3 hours, and 40 minutes later, at 1750 hours, the tank force was already back, in that perimeter. And the lifeline to Faith and his men was severed completely.

One must remember here that situation Faith inherited, the marines knew this area —as we had known the one we left— they had moved freely back and forth into Hagaru for over ten days. Most of MacLean - Faith's men didn't pull into Hagaru, they by-passed it. By luck the reservoir was the reference point, and Hagaru was the southern tip of it. Plus many of the drivers that had brought the trucks into this area were killed, and different drivers were bringing those trucks out—only one road however—indeed those drivers would change hands due to the drivers being shot and wounded on the way toward Hudong-ni.

That napalm friendly fire incident on December 1, as we were pulling out, had utter desolation on all concerned—we move around burning trucks after loading burnt men still alive on other trucks, really nothing any one can do for them at this point. As we move south through three road blocks—no major events of special concern we've been through it all at this point in time. Whatever these units do will have no final outcome, our only hope is to circle around Hill 1221 into Hudong-ni and link-up with our rear guard: then we will be home free.

### BIG SURPRISE

No rear guard, no tank force or service companies, no ammo dump, no supplies of any kind—and no more unit order -it all unraveled here. Even “*if*” the remaining NCO's could keep the group together those damn half-stripes are not recognizable in the moon light anyway. Our staff sergeant stripes could fit inside of our division patch, it's that small. This mixed force resents any orders from those of their own ranks not alone those from those they don't know or trust. After all, every method tried has failed anyway maybe they can try their own now. Colonel Faith is morally wounded here. There is no more defense of any kind for the wounded in the trucks—there never truly was from the very beginning. We were true captive victims of Murphy's Law: “That everything that can go wrong will go wrong.” or in our case—has gone wrong. How we got as far as we did with as many trucks as we did is a mystery in its-self. Task Force Faith was indeed a proper name. For our faith was the only ammo we had left. For it was, in the end reduced to faith and fate. In the end the scales would seem to balance between both.

- Another Version -

Continuing:

Russell A. Gugeler –Chapter Five–Army Historical Series

At 0700, 1 December, as Lieutenant Campbell was telling the battalion S-4 (Capt. Raymond Vaudrevil) that everything was under control; a mortar shell landed ten feet away and knocked him down. Fragments sprayed his left side, and wounded two other men. Someone pulled Campbell under a nearby truck then helped him to the aid station. The aid - station squad tent was full, about fifty patients were inside. Another thirty-five wounded lying outside in narrow-gauge railroad cut where the aid station was located.

A single low-flying Marine fighter bomber appeared over the surrounded task force about 1000- Hrs on 1 December. Establishing radio contact with the tactical air control party, the pilot stated that if the weather improved as forecasted, he would guide more tactical aircraft into the area shortly after noon. He also stated that there were no friendly forces on the road between Faith's perimeter and Hagaru-ri.

Colonel Faith decided to try to break out of the perimeter and reach Hagaru-ri in a single dash rather than risk another night where he was. He planned to start the breakout about 1300 so that it would coincide with the air strike. He ordered the artillery batteries and the Heavy Mortar Company to shoot up all remaining ammunition before that time. He placed the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, in the lead, followed by the 57th Field Artillery Battalion, The Heavy Mortar Company, and the 3d Battalion of the 31st Infantry. Half-tracks vehicles of Battery D, 15th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion, were interspersed throughout the column. To minimize danger from enemy attack, Colonel Faith wanted the column to be as short as possible—only enough vehicles to haul out the wounded. All other men would walk. Vehicles, equipment, and supplies that could not be carried, or that were not necessary for the move, he ordered destroyed. The men selected twenty-two of the best vehicles- 2&1/2 -ton,

3/4 ton—and 1/4 ton trucks—and lined them up on the road. They drained gasoline from the other vehicles and filled the tanks of those remaining, and destroyed the rest with white phosphorus or thermite grenades, several hundred wounded were placed in the vehicles. They lay there for about an hour while final preparations for the breakout attempt were made. Enemy mortar shells began dropping in the vicinity.

Colonel Faith selected Company C, 32d Infantry, as advance guard for the column. Lieutenant Mortrude's platoon, the unit least hurt, was to take the point position for the company. Supported by a dual 40mm half-track, Company A, followed by Company B, would act as flank security east of the road. There was no danger at the beginning of the breakout from the direction of the reservoir, which was to the west.

Friendly planes appeared overhead. Mortude moved his platoon out about 1300. Lieutenant Smith led out Company A. The men of these units had walked barely out of the area that had been their defensive perimeter when enemy bullets whistled past or dug into the ground behind them. At almost the same time, four friendly planes, in close support of the breakout action, missed the target and dropped napalm bombs on the lead elements. The half-track in which Mortrude planned to ride was set ablaze. Several men were burned to death immediately. About five others, their clothes afire, tried frantically to beat out the flames. Everyone scattered. Disorganization followed.

Up to this point units had maintained organizational structure, but suddenly they began to fall apart. Intermingling in panic, they disintegrate into leaderless groups of men. Most of the squad and platoon leaders and the commanders of the rifle companies were dead or wounded. Many of the key personnel from the battalions were casualties. Capt. Harold B. Bauer (CO, Headquarters Company), Major Crosby P. Miller (battalion executive officer), Major Curtis (battalion S-3) Capt. Wayne E. Powell (battalion S-2) and Lt. Henry M. Moore (Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon leader) had all been wounded. One thought—now—drove the men: they had to keep moving if they were to get out.

Lieutenant Mortrude gathered ten men around him and proceeded to carry out his orders. Firing as they advanced, they dispersed twenty or more enemy soldiers who fled. As they ran down the road screaming obscenities at the enemy, Mortrude and his men encounter several small Chinese groups, which they killed or scattered. One such group was putting in communication lines. Another was repairing a wrecked jeep. Out of breath and hardly able to walk on his wounded leg, Mortrude and those men still with him reached a blown-out bridge two miles or more south of the starting point. Attracting: no enemy fire they stopped there to rest and wait for the column. A little later a Company A Platoon leader (Lt. Herbert E. Marshburn, Jr.) came up with a group of men and joined them. Together they crossed under the bridge and moved to the east, then south to reconnoiter. Enemy fire came in from the high ground to the northeast. Most of the men fell to the ground to take cover. Mortrude expected the column to be right behind him. As he lay on the slope of the ridge, a bullet struck him in the head and knocked him unconscious.

The main body now delayed, waited for Faith to reorganize it. Since Company C and part of Company A were disorganized by the burning napalm, he ordered Company B to take the lead and advance with marching fire to the blown-out bridge. Air cover was continuous. This truck column would be stopped at the blown-bridge where it would be necessary to construct a bypass over the rough and steep banks of the stream. A half-track towed the trucks across while able bodied men with the column took care



to prevent them from overturning. In the middle of this tediously slow process, Chinese riflemen began firing at the trucks and the men. This column moved forward as fast as the half-track could drag the trucks through the bypass. It would be late in the afternoon before the last truck was across, while this last truck was pulled up from the stream, another enemy roadblock halted the lead truck in the column at the hairpin turn a half mile beyond the blown out bridge. At least two machine guns and enemy riflemen kept the area under fire. Colonel Faith, a blanket around his shoulders, walked the area up and down the line of trucks as he organized a group to assault the enemy who was firing from positions east of the road. Each time he passed his jeep he fired several rounds from its mounted .50 caliber machine gun. Heavy enemy fire now came from the west side of the road, from the direction of the reservoir. This fire indiscriminately raked the truck column, hitting the wounded men in the trucks. Darkness was descending. Faith was trying desperately to get his men out before the Chinese closed in on them. He got some wounded into the ditch to form a base of fire and then organized several groups to assault the enemy positions.

One group of men, under Captain Bigger (CO, Company D), was to clear out the area between the road and the reservoir. Colonel Faith instructed the S-2 of the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry (Major Robert E. Jones), to gather all available men and move them into the high ground south of the hairpin curve, while he himself organized another group to move into the high ground just north of the roadblock at the hairpin turn. They would then attack from opposite directions at the same time. Captain Bigger, blinded in one eye by a mortar fragment and wounded in the leg, supported himself on a mortar aiming stake and waved his group up the hill, hobbling up himself. Like Captain Bigger, the majority of his men were also walking wounded.

It was almost dark as Major Jones and Colonel Faith, each with a hundred men or less launched their attacks against the roadblock and knocked it out. Colonel Faith, hit by grenade fragments, was mortally wounded. A man next to him, hit by the same fragments of the same grenade, tried to help him down to the road, but was unable to do so. Some other men carried him down to the road and put him in the cab of a truck.

The task force started to break up early in the afternoon after the napalm event, each event added to its final demise, disintegration was now complete as battalion, companies, and platoon leaders were wounded so severely they could no longer exercise control. The force crumbled into individual groups of twenty or smaller groups. Major Jones took charge of the larger groups of men remaining -those who stayed to help with the trucks carrying the wounded, several trucks were knocked out and now blocked the column. It was now dark. Those who were able now removed all wounded from three destroyed 2&1/2-ton trucks which blocked the column, carried the wounded to other trucks, and then pushed the destroyed trucks over the cliff towards the reservoir. Someone shouted for help to gather up all men who had been wounded during the roadblock action, for half an hour the able bodied men searched both sides of the road, when the column was ready to move again the wounded were piled two deep in most of the trucks. Men rode across the hoods and on bumpers, and six or eight men hung to the sides of each truck. After re-forming the truck column with all operating vehicles, Major Jones organized as many able-bodied and walking wounded men as he could-between a hundred and two hundred men-and started south down the road. The trucks were to follow.

The group of men that had gone with Captain Bigger, after having run the Chinese off of the high ground on the west side of the road, found that there were still enemy soldiers between it and the road.

Rather than fight back to the road, Bigger led his men west and south to the reservoir shore, and then out onto the ice. Another group of about fifteen men, including Lt. Smith (who commanded Company A), Lt. Richard H. Moore (one of his platoon leaders), after knocking out one of the enemy machine guns on the same side of the road, watched Captain Bigger and his men heading towards the ice. They debated what they should do. They could see the trucks stalled along the road. They were out of ammunition. Deciding there was no reason to go back, they continued toward the reservoir ice. A group of 15 or 20 Chinese trying to head them off came as far as the reservoir bank and fired at them without effect. Six men of this group, including Smith, were wounded or had frostbitten feet. Those following Major Jones had little semblance to a military unit. Without subordinate leaders, without formulation or plan, they were a mixture of the remnants of all units, a large percentage were walking wounded. About 15 of the original 22 trucks were left.

A mile or two beyond the roadblock two burned out tanks partly blocked the road and delayed the column until men could construct a bypass, beyond that, the column made steady but slow progress for another mile or so, (consider this is beyond the tanks blocking the road.) Some of the men began to believe they were safe. There were stragglers along the road-men who had struck out for themselves during the prior delays, some of them swung on to the passing trucks. By this time it was nearly 2100 and the column having covered more than half of the approximate ten miles between the last defensive perimeter and Hagaru-ri approached Hudong-ni, the small lumber village. At the leading truck, which was some distance ahead of the rest of the column, entered the town, Chinese soldiers opened fire and killed the driver. The truck overturned and spilled out the wounded men, a few of whom managed to work back up the road to warn the rest of the column. At this point Major Jones decided it would be advisable to get away from the road and follow the railroad tracks south. The railroad paralleled the road but was closer to the reservoir shoreline. Some of the men followed him.

About 75 to 100 men stayed with the vehicles. An artillery officer collected all who could walk and fire a weapon, and led them forward. At the edge of the village they began to receive fire from rifles and at least one automatic weapon of an enemy unit of undetermined size. After returning the fire for several minutes, the group returned to the vehicles. They picked up several wounded men from the overturned truck and took them back. The truck moved a little closer to the village and halted. It was then 2200 or later, 1 December. A group of officers and men decided they would wait where they were. Word of their situation, they argued, must surely by then have gotten through to Hagaru-ri. Aid would undoubtedly arrive soon. (We had covered one half of the distance to where the tanks should have been, where were they?) \*

They waited about an hour or so until those of the column began to receive small-arms and mortar fire. Then they decided to make a run for it. Lt. Campbell was still hanging to one of the trucks. "We'll never make it through". As the column proceeded through the village, moving slowly, enemy fire killed the drivers of the first three trucks. The column halted and an enemy machine gun immediately raked it at point blank range.

\* There was not a man in the column that did not truly believe that those tanks would be at this spot when we got here. It was now some 30 hours that those tanks have returned to Hagaru-ri, three and a half miles from this point and time.

Jumping from the tailgate of the third truck, Lt. Campbell scrambled for the right side of the road where an embankment separated it from a small plot of cultivated ground eight or ten feet beneath, in the darkness he could see only outlines of the trucks on the road and the flashes of a machine gun firing from a hill on the opposite side of the road. The overturned truck, its wheels in the air, rested in the small field below the road. Someone pinned under it kept pounding on the trucks body. Wounded men scattered nearby, screaming either in pain or for help. Up on the road someone kept yelling for men to drive the trucks through. Chinese soldiers closed in on the rest of the column. Campbell saw a white phosphorus grenade explode in the rear of a truck at the end of the column. It began to snow again, a fine, powdery snow.

Someone yelled "Look out" Campbell turned one time to see a 3/4-ton truck coming over the embankment toward him. As he scrambled to one side, the truck ran over his foot, bruising the bones. Someone had decided to get the lead vehicle off the road. Pushed by the fourth, the first three trucks, jammed together, rolled off the embankment, and overturned. Wounded men inside were spilled and crushed. The frantic screams of these men seemed to Lt. Campbell like the world gone mad. He fired his last three rounds at the enemy machine gun, headed for the railroad track on the opposite side of the tiny field, and dived into a culvert underneath the railroad track.

Everyone scattered. Corporal Camoesas (company aid man) found himself in a group of about fifteen men none of whom he knew. Carrying six wounded, the group reached the reservoir. As Camoesas walked out on the ice, he looked back, several trucks were burning Lt. Campbell crawled through the culvert. He found a man wounded in the leg who could not walk. Two other soldiers came over the embankment and joined him. Dragging the wounded man, the group walked in a crouch across the rice paddy to a large lumber pile in the middle of the field. There two more soldiers joined them. At the edge of the reservoir, three quarters of a mile away, several others joined Campbell's party. Staying close to the shoreline, the men walked on the reservoir ice. Campbell was not sure where Hagaru-ri was, but he felt they would reach it if they followed the reservoir shore. The reservoir ice was not slippery. The wind had blown off most of the snow, leaving a rough-surface crust, and it was so thick that 76mm shells had ricocheted off without appreciable effect. At a North Korean house, a ROK soldier with them asked where the marines were. He was told that American jeeps came down the road every day.

Some of the group suspicious of the North Koreans, wanted to continue across the reservoir, but Lt. Campbell thought he recognized the road. He led off, and the rest followed. Two miles down the road, the group reached a Marine tank outpost, and the tankers directed them to the nearest aid station. Lt. Campbell arrived there at 0530, 2 December. The shell fragment in the roof of his mouth began to bother him.

Individuals and other groups straggled into Hagaru-ri for several days beginning on the night of 1 December. Lt. Smith and those men with him, who had left the column at the second road block, reached a Marine supply point at Hagaru-ri about 2200 that night. A plane had dropped a note in a canteen instructing them to keep away from the shoreline and continue across the ice. A little later that night, Capt. Bigger hobbled in with his group. The men who went with Major Jones, after following the railroad track for some distance, had been fired on by enemy machine gun. Many of these men took off towards the reservoir and began arriving at the Marine perimeter soon after midnight.

Most of the men who served with Task Force Faith were left where the truck column stopped near the lumber village of Hudong-ni, or were strewn along the road from there to the northernmost position. When those few men who could move had left, the others were either captured or frozen. [This is the group I was with the lumber mill was Sasu-ri with Sasu further south.]

PFC Glenn J. Finfrock (a machine gunner from Company D) became unconscious from loss of blood about the time the truck column came to its final halt. It was daylight on the morning of 2 December when he regained consciousness again. He moved down the road a short distance until he found several wounded men trying to build a fire by one of the trucks-the one in which Colonel Faith had been placed the previous evening. His frozen body was still in the cab. Since the truck appeared to be in good order, Finfrock and other man tried unsuccessfully to start it. As they were working on the truck some Chinese walked toward them from the village, and several of the men ran towards the ice. Others were captured. The Chinese gave morphine to several men, bandaged their wounds and, after caring for them several days freed them. (Our artillery S-3 officer, Lieutenant Colonel Tolley was in a like situation, rather with this identical group is not certain, but a later newspaper release I researched, -tells of his experience of being cared for.)

Lt. Mortrude, wounded in the knee and in the head, walked to Hagaru-ri from the blown-out bridge. It was 0330 on 2 December when he reached friendly lines. Corporal Camoesas (the aid man) and his group carrying six wounded men, after hiding in brush near the reservoir shore in order to rest, followed the railroad track until they came to the road leading toward Hagaru-ri. About 0800 they met a Marine tank, and three hundred yards beyond were trucks and ambulances waiting to take them to the rear. All day other men made their way back to friendly lines. On 4 December, when most of its survivors had returned, the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, counted only 181 officers and men and attached Republic of Korea troops, of the original 1,053 that had begun the operation. The other battalions in the perimeter had suffered equal losses. In his notes: Russell A Gugeler, states this account to be based on a narrative prepared in Korea by Capt. Martin Blumenson. It also contains some information from official records and some obtained by supplemental interviews in letters from men who participated in the action.

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It would seem appropriate to restate-PFC Ed Reeves' story-AFTER HIS DEATH-this June 25, 2010. Ironically, and sadly, his date coincides with the 60th Anniversary of the beginning of the Korean War. The events involving Ed Reeves [10/23/31-6/17/10] story was long hidden in the shadow of this War.

**Private Ed Reeves': A Story of Survival.  
(As portrayed by: Actor: Charles Durning.)**

“As my unit tried to flee south in the afternoon of December 1st, we were caught in a savage Chinese ambush. I had been hit by exploding mortar; my legs crippled. So I was stuck with my wounded comrades in the back of some disabled trucks. We were zipped into sleeping bags – our only protection against the unbearable cold – while the rest of the troops continued their retreat from the reservoir under heavy fire.

For hours, we waited, wounded, in pain – for support to arrive. Then, without any ammunition to defend ourselves, Chinese soldiers stormed the trucks. First they robbed us helpless GIs of our rings

and watches. Then they began to torch the trucks with us still inside. By fate, my truck was out of gas and wouldn't ignite.<sup>111</sup> That didn't stop our executioners. Two of them climbed aboard to finish us off. One of them started at the tailgate and moved toward the middle; a second Chinese soldier concentrated on the other end. Each fired a shot between the eyes of every American soldier in their path. As they advanced toward me, I lay there waiting to die – talking to the Lord and asking for peace so I could die like a man. I found out you could still sweat when it's 35 degrees below zero.

Then it was my turn. The soldier aimed his gun at my forehead. He fired, no more than three feet away. The muzzle blast was blinding... but somehow the bullet produced just a scalp wound. Then I heard the murderers leave, believing that everyone was killed. For the next three days, I lay among my dead buddies, the only one who had survived. I burrowed into my sleeping bag, a futile gesture against the numbing, bitter cold.

Every time I tried to free myself from the truck, I fainted from the pain. I was trapped. Then more Chinese came to loot the dead corpses around me. They were stealing leather boots from dead GI's. It was pure luck that I was wearing a kind of shoe that wasn't in demand. I kept myself stiff, so when the enemy poked about, they would think I was dead. More time passed...hours, perhaps days, until a Chinese soldier came along who rifled through my clothes – and felt my body heat.

He knew I was still alive. He pitched me from the truck onto the ground, where he and several other Chinese beat me with their rifle butts until they were sure I was dead. Then they tossed me on a heap of dead bodies on the side of the road. "Jesus, here I come," I muttered to myself. But my tormentors disappeared into the driving snow.

I wasn't walking anywhere. So I told myself I had to crawl before I could walk. On elbows and knees, I crept toward the frozen reservoir, each moment waiting for a Chinese sniper to shoot at me.

To keep myself going, I counted in the cadence I learned in boot camp, "One two—one two!" Then I switched to the hymns I learned when I was a boy in Sunday school. "Jesus loves me, this I know 'cause the Bible tells me so..." Another night of this hell passed. I was near death, slipping in and out of consciousness, when one of the "Ice Marines" who had volunteered to search for stragglers found me. "Tell me where you hurt most, son," he said, "so we won't hurt you more." "Please watch the legs, sir," I told him, "They really hurt." He gently lifted me up and set me in the front seat.

I was so bad off that when I reached the hospital in Japan, the doctor told the medic not to bother nursing me, since there was no way I was going to make it. I guess the Lord didn't want me to die on that road. But 400 of my wounded buddies in those trucks didn't make it. May God bless them and hold them near.


Sgt. Reeves' frostbite was so severe that doctors had to amputate his feet and all his fingers. But the courageous young man refused to give up. While Ed was still in the hospital, he married his hometown sweetheart. Together, Ed and Beverly have raised seven children – two of them Korean

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<sup>111</sup> Martin Russ: "Breakout." This event as recorded by Russ during daylight and after those trucks were already burnt! "Dairy entry, December 2, General Oliver P. Smith: "Quite a rescue operation has been in effect today in which Lt. Col. Beall has been the principal actor." (P.330) This event is discredited, as too Colonel Beall, never reaching or looking into those trucks! The survivor's had already reported (2 Dec.) what happened to the trucks, that they had been set afire by the enemy, shortly after midnight 1-2 December.



# Map 11



MAP 11

From: Ebb And Flow, November 1950-July 1951  
Center of Military History, 1990  
By Billy C. Mossman

orphans. We were privileged to have Ed and Beverly Reeves and four of their children with us that evening at the 2000 National Memorial Day Concert. Ed was in attendance in honor of the memory of his fallen friends, who gave their lives for freedom.”<sup>112</sup>

The upcoming: Stars & Stripes Article: Picks up the so called, “Rescue” effort

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<sup>112</sup> On our 2000 *National Memorial Day Concert*, distinguished actor Charles Durning, himself a recipient of the Silver Star and three Purple Hearts, shared with the audience Private Reeves’ remembrance of that horrible nightmare.

- Chapter 11-

-OUR RESCUE-

-Under Marine operational control-

**Stars and Stripes News Article –January 1951– Marines Rescue 300 Shot up GIs from Chosin Ice.** By; Charles Moore, with 1st Marine Division (UP)

Marines told Monday how they rescued some 300 GIs—most of them survivors of a Communist ambush against a convoy of wounded men—from the frozen surface of Chosin reservoir and from Korean huts along its edge. Some soldiers, horribly wounded, had been in the open as long as five days. The most fortunate had spent at least one night on the ice and almost all had frostbitten hands or feet in addition to wounds.

A handful of Marines and courageous North Koreans worked together under Chinese Communist machine-gun and rifle fire to bring in the men of the 31st and 32d Regiment of the 7th Division. The Marines were Col. Olin L. Beall, 50, of McGuenie, Texas; Lt. Fred Van Brunt of Cucamonga, California; CWO Russell J. Waggoner of Concord, California; Lt. Robert J. Hunt Jr. of Coronado, California, and PFC Ralph A. Milton of Pine Bluffs, Wyoming. All of them minimized their own part in the episode and I got the story only after being told by others what had happened.

They brought in most of the wounded Saturday, but got half a dozen more Sunday from Korean huts along the reservoir's edge and were still checking leads from the natives as to the whereabouts of others. Most of the men got out on the ice after Chinese Communists ambushed a convoy of wounded soldiers on Friday night. The Chinese riddled the trucks with submachine guns and grenades, overturned some, and set others afire with men in them.

Van Brunt said the men were located about 2 1/2 miles north of the southern tip of the reservoir. "They were scattered over the ice almost as far as I could see," he said. "It was the most horrible sight I've ever seen. Many were crying and hysterical. Some were sick and vomiting. Some had so many wounds you could hardly touch them without touching a wound. The Chinese would not shoot at the wounded on the ice, but would shoot at us when we started toward them. We drew fire all the time and water would spurt three feet high when a bullet went through the ice. The men's hands were black with frostbite. Some had no shoes. The Chinese had taken them. Some of those able to walk were so dazed they didn't know where they were and just walked in circles. Some of them were practically dismembered. One man had an eye shot away. It makes you want to cry to see our people shot up like that. All of them had been wounded before the Chinese hit them again in the convoy. We took them to a field hospital and many went directly onto planes from there. They had got hold of themselves by then and I didn't see one man make a move for a plane until told to get on."

Beall said, "We went out there, saw some men on the ice, and went ahead getting them in. All day, we got at least 300. Lot of them were in very bad shape. The Chinese had thrown grenades into the trucks and many had fresh fragment wounds. Some had their faces blown to pieces. Others had their hands or feet blown off. At least 50 of them had no shoes."

The Chinese took all their food and a lot of their clothing. "The Chinese would shoot at us if we'd pick up the wounded and start to carry them. Then we would crawl up to them and when we did that, the Chinese would not shoot. Maybe they thought we were wounded too. I saw a lot of brave men



yesterday. There was one man pulling himself along the ice with his arms. 'Don't bother with me,' he said 'get that man there. He can't move.' He could even joke about himself. He started across the ice as fast as he could go pulling himself with his arms and asked. 'Did you ever see a man double-time like this on ice?' There were men with good arms and wounded legs and men with wounded arms and good legs. They would help each other. There were Americans helping ROKs and ROKs helping Americans. There was a man with a belly wound 24-hours old and still helping his buddy. That is something I'll always carry in my heart."

For his own part in the rescue, Beall said, "I had no idea I'd find what I found. When I did I stayed until it was over. That is not something you do for the record. Anyone would have done it." Van Brunt said Beall worked until completely exhausted and paid no attention to Chinese bullets. "He worked until his legs buckled under him when he tried to pick up a wounded man."

Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith commander of the 1st Marine Division had high praise for all of them from 50-year old Beall to jeep driver Milton who drove back and forth over the ice under fire all day. Beall is commanding officer of a motor transport battalion and in Smith's words "as good an infantryman we have." END

**"I Saw a Lot of Brave Men Yesterday"** High praise indeed and it came from a Marine Colonel —a man who personally brought in some of the wounded. There was valor beyond searching for publicity. It was just something one did. It showed the ROK, mix of 38%, and Americans helping each other. "We took them to a field hospital and many went directly onto planes from there. They had got hold of themselves by then and I didn't see one man make a move for a plane until told to get on," Brunt recalled. But the Marine commander was not nearly as compassionate as these men that directly participated in the collective operation. He expressed little compassion for these men, now in his garrison. He contradicts Brunt's version by some of these "Army Joker's" General Smith's long standing (forty-nine year) denial of the Presidential Unit Citation (PUC) to this particular Army Task Force, based solely on the criterion that this force "contributed nothing" to the withdrawal of the forces from Hagaru-ri back to the coast at Hungnam!<sup>113</sup> (Navy overriding Smith's objections: PUC Awarded 1999)

Here was an event that would dominate the Reservoir action! But the immediate innuendoes and the degradation of this Army force had to be turned over to the Marine Public Relations Officer to discredit this force rather than move the Marine Corps to the back burner and glorify those highlighted by remarks to follow!

ARMY JOKER'S: Donald Knox's Account:

"What these Army jokers did" ...<sup>114</sup>

Per: Benis Frank Interview...

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<sup>113</sup> In an exchange of letters: (1/2002) Clifton La Bree; the author of *"The Gentle Warrior"* takes issue over my reference to "Army Joker's," STATING: "I researched thousands of documents in preparation for the book and have never run across the words you attribute to Smith —"Army Jokers". What is your authority for this statement? I'm not interested in hearsay, just from an authoritative source." My reply: "What these Army Jokers did..." (OH. 563, second paragraph in reference to General Smith interview, MCHC) Selected book Bibliography *on your* page 251, Knox, Donald. *The Korean War: An Oral History: from Pusan to Chosin*, New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovick, 1985." Reply, (2/2002) "I admit I was wrong about the "Army Joker" label."

<sup>114</sup> Ibid, Footnote: above.

What we were working on first were these Army casualties from this over-run Task Force Faith, you see.

Q: They were in bad shape?

Smith: I'm afraid that some got out that weren't in too bad shape. What these jokers would do, some of them might have frostbitten fingers, something like that. They would go down to the strip and get a blanket and a stretcher and the groan a bit; the corpsmen would come along and put them on a plane. The doctor came to me and he was fit to be tied because he knew how many seriously wounded he had that should be evacuated, and he knew how many had gone out by air, and it just didn't make sense. Somebody was getting out of there who wasn't seriously hurt. It was our fault probably, because the Air Force had sent up what they called an Evacuation Officer, and the doctor assumed that the Evacuation Officer would see that the proper people got aboard the planes, but that was not his function at all; he was just thinking in terms of planes, not on what was flown on the planes. After that I couldn't have gotten aboard a plane without a ticket. Nobody after that got on any plane without a ticket that showed that he was due to get out.

Q: Were any of the Marines trying to pull that stuff?

Smith: I don't think so, because they were certified by the doctors and they had spirit. I am sure no Marines. I had quite a time with those Army people - they had no spirit. We tried to help them out as best we could. We had to fly in weapons to re-arm them. They'd thrown away all their weapons. I put LtCol Anderson (of the Army) in command of them. They didn't want to put up tents - they felt it was up to us to take care of them, feed them, and put up tents for them.

We disabused them of that idea. We eventually salvaged 385 of them. As near as I can make out, that Task Force (Faith) had 2,800 men when they went up there. There were a few Army troops that were left in Hagaru-ri but as near as I can make out, 2,800 were in Task Force Faith or in Task Force McLean, the first colonel, and we evacuated 900 of them. We salvaged 385, so there must have been over 1,200 killed, captured, or what have you. The 385 we joined to what Army troops we had in Hagaru-ri and made a provisional battalion. They marched out with us. I attached them to Litzenberg, and they were pitiful. Litzenberg gave them the job of guarding the left flank, to march along the column; and when the Chinese opened up, they simply went through the column to the other side and took off. Well, Anderson was a pretty good fellow; he tried to get them under control and get them back. Litzenberg had to take on of the regular battalions to send up there to take over. Anderson brought charges later against some of the officers. According to the word I got later he was put in a psychiatric hospital in Tokyo.

Q: Anderson was?

Smith: Yes, and they never did anything about his charges. That's the story I got. I forget who told it to me - maybe Litzenberg. But they came on out with us. I am afraid that some of those 900 Army troops which were evacuated shouldn't have gone out, because over in Tokyo GHQ looked over some of those cases that were coming into the hospitals with only minor frostbite...<sup>115</sup>

Also contradicting and Van Brunt's statement: "I didn't see one man make a move for a plane until told to get on." Unfortunately, as recorded in the book *"The Gentle Warrior"* (p.166) Colonel Beall will also retreat somewhat from his earlier accounts. "Ironically, in 1953 Colonel Beall submitted a scathing report against the Army in the Chosin campaign, which calls into question his powers of observation and his integrity." Also citing: (Lt Col Raymond L. Murray, USMC (Ret) "I had known him earlier and he used to tell stories that we all agreed that he would have to have lived a thousand

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<sup>115</sup> Benis Frank: Interview, June 1969. <http://www.chosinreservoir.com/smithinterview.htm>.

years to have done all the things he claimed to have done. He was a braggart who apparently had done many of the things he claimed.” In an attempt to justify General Smith’s remarks about his refusal to approve the PUC Award, La Bree states, “...as a matter of fact, he was probably influenced by Colonel Beall (of the First Marine Mortar Transport Battalion, who had been responsible for the rescue of survivors from RCT 31)”. [p.164-165] if he was “*responsible*” indicates he was assigned that duty? If so, “*his duty*” to do so! Perhaps he had higher hopes of receiving a Medal of Honor for his efforts, which exceeded those three MOH awards for Marine Fox Company “rescue” for a smaller (240) number of men. However, that MOH would have to come from the Marine Corps, and not the Army, as the Army requires higher standards to receive a MOH!<sup>116</sup> This was *prior to* elevation of General Ridgway’s CINCFE promotion to replace General MacArthur! Ridgway then encouraging the MOH for *more living*; than dead reciprocates! There after creates various problems of validation, for at the reservoir, the majority of these awards, immediately went to Marine *officers* more so than the average individual combatant!

-The Question of-  
"OUR RESCUE"

As the Stars and Stripes article reveals -major oversights stand out, in the darkness of nights, in glowing neon lights. *These Army men had been in the open as long as five days* (With the road march it was nine) although the article reports 300, the men of the 31<sup>st</sup> and 32<sup>nd</sup> Regiment of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division it names five individual Marines, inclusive with their home towns listed, plus that ever present name Major General Oliver P. Smith. As one can readily see whom this article favors, while all 300 Army survivors, the focus is on the Marine few in the rescue. Yet, not one Army name, recorded of anyone of those men rescued from the ice. Exclusively absent is the name, and loss of the commander of the Task Force Lieutenant Colonel Don Carlos Faith Jr.

Notice; the exclusive fact between what was published worldwide in the “Stars and Stripes” and the information recorded in Marine History. “Far from hindering the escape of the Army wounded, the Chinese actually assisted in some instances, thus adding to the difficulty of understanding the Oriental mentality.”<sup>117</sup> So in reality the enemy helped in some instances, and also released some prisoners held—as Lieutenant Colonel Tolly! (See Chapter end note.)

In Marguerite Higgins book; WAR IN KOREA, [1951] she states: “I have run across only one public relations officer attached to the Marines, and he never interfered with us in any way. That was most unusual, for I have, observed that the main effect of military public-relations officers is to hamper correspondents.” Someone on the marine staff that handles their news releases, perhaps that same staff officer just referenced seems to expand on this exaggerated report to her, about that marine connection to this “rescue”. FACT; The fact that the Marine Corps was the beneficiary of our tank withdrawal leading directly to this massive tragedy, too now claim collecting these men was now a rescue is a slight hypocrisy. Any rescue operation was really needed at Hudong-ni, (where the tanks should have been when we got there) and this was just a mere aftermath of “salvage” or “recovery” of “survivors,” and not an official rescue, more of an “aid and assist” effort after the fact! However, the marines had nothing to fear from Marguerite Higgins, for if she got it wrong, in print that was not their fault, as long as it favored them. An example; as she continued: “On December third and fourth the **ten-mile-long marine caravan** finally broke out of the Yudam-ni valley....The marines had even brought some army wounded with them (?), remnants of a 7th Division unit that had been, smashed on the eastern

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<sup>116</sup> This is supported in, Martin Russ: “*Breakout*” that Colonel Beall, received only a Distinguished Service Cross but,(citing that same Public Relations Officer, perhaps) should have received that Medal of Honor awarded to Lt. Colonel Faith, as Faith was “simply doing his duty, and not very well at that.” [P.334]

<sup>117</sup> Marine History: (Volume III, page(s) 243-244.Bold type is mine! How did they escape with all their trucks?

side of the reservoir. The Chinese had attacked the ambulances, and most of the wounded spilled out onto the ice. In order 'to rescue them,' the marines had to dodge vicious enemy fire."<sup>118</sup> Beall's truck unit —having left Toktong Pass— was located at Hagaru-ri, —he—just missed being cut off from assisting the two Marine regiments trapped west at Yudam-ni! Thus Beall was unable to assist his own Yudam-ni division "rescue"! Where did this (3-4 December) vicious enemy fire come from? This Army convoy was destroyed earlier (1-2 December) around midnight. The survivors on the ice were subject, to a redundant marine term "Long Range Fire." around the reservoir and Yudam-ni. That rifle fire having no effect on the survivors on the frozen surface of the Changjin Reservoir ice! Remember most survivors were now fully in the center of the reservoir and exposed for that full four miles (via the marine commander moving our goal post, from Hudong-ni) to the Marine perimeter at Hagaru-ri. There were no reports of any one knocking out any of those snipers on the banks of the reservoir. In addition, the Army-and ROK soldiers on the ice: are now a slow moving target to hit. Most of the men on the ice experienced this long range fire as spent bullets fired, (out of range) and now at the end of their trajectory, a spent bullet (dropping in) merely chipping the ice as it ended its journey. The accuracy of this fire from the hills or ground level would require a skyward arc trajectory from a (higher-powered) wind-age—rifle setting, to be accurate. "In the typical situation, the [Marine] rifle company has temporarily been brought in check by intense automatic rifle fire from the high ground and enemy deployment is such as to indicate that the line cannot continue its advance without taking excessive losses from fire coming at it from several directions."<sup>119</sup> In other words effective fire simultaneously from the high and low ground to compensate for the (gravity arc) trajectories!

Question, how can any connection be made to the Marine Yudam-ni forces? Their wounded had to remain on their trucks, —three days— between 1 to 4 December, taking that long to return to Hagaru, are they we're unloaded each night? [Review MAP 11] Either way it added three nights in the bitter cold. Why the Marine hardship escapes highlighting the many difficult problems and danger to their wounded, escapes added glory on their part. While their killed in action rate never exceeds those of Task Force Faith, they have more wounded casualties than we did, with a 95% non-battle casualty rating, our Army force was top heavy in our Missing in Action column, those men never reaching Hagaru. Again there were few of us left in the first place, and one can only spread us so thin between "rescue" forces. As one reviews the upcoming Ebb & Flow revised casualties chart, several facts emerge, some words related to General Smith.

"Marine losses during the Chosin campaign totaled 4,418 battle casualties -604 KIA - 114 DOW (Died of wounds) 192 MIA, 3,508 WIA. In addition, there were 7,313 non-battle casualties, most of who were frostbite or indigestion cases and were soon restored to active duty."<sup>120</sup> However in order to arrive at this "official (7,313) number" some qualified corpsman or doctor must list one marine per number! Example, I was wounded (twice) and had frostbite, however, I am only ONE MAN & ONE WIA—with frostbite—and therefore ONE —WIA— BATTLE CASUALTY, and only one Purple Heart! The Marine Non-Battle casualties, were therefore in addition, and over exaggerated! Those marine, Non-Battle Casualty having absolutely no battle wounds! General Smith's, interview, stresses this count accuracy: "The doctor came to me and he was fit to be tied because he knew how many seriously wounded he had that should be evacuated, and he knew how many had gone out by air, and it just didn't make sense. Somebody was getting out of there who wasn't seriously hurt. It was our fault

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<sup>118</sup> Marguerite Higgin's: p.180.

<sup>119</sup> S.L.A. Marshall: CCF in the attack, 1951.

<sup>120</sup> (Donald Knox: "The Korean War: An Oral History". Pusan to Chosin, pages 614-15)

probably, because the Air Force had sent up what they called an Evacuation Officer, and the doctor assumed that the Evacuation Officer would see that the proper people got aboard the planes, but that was not his function at all; he was just thinking in terms of planes, not on what was flown on the planes. After that I couldn't have gotten aboard a plane without a ticket. Nobody after that got on any plane without a ticket that showed that he was due to get out.”

However, there is an expanded version of this in Eric Hammel’s book: “Chosin: Heroic Ordeal of the Korean War.”

“Then came the enormous influx of wounded from Yudam-ni added immeasurably to the confusion, for many of the injured were frostbite cases with no readily discernible symptoms. In the end, after much soul-searching, the brass decided to relax their standards. The evacuation process was running smoothly, and no authentically injured man was in danger of being excluded. In a pinch, the garrison could hold the perimeter and airstrip a day or two longer than planned. In fact, the staff quickly came to realize that men who really wanted out would find ways to get out.” Hammel continued with two Marine —cause and effect incidences, i.e. “(Sergeant Jim Friedl, of the 2nd Battalion, 5th, came within an ace of getting his hands on a sergeant who, it was said, intentionally froze his feet in order to buy a ticket out.)” and second, “(Unfortunately, deep-seated reactions placed in low regard of their peers a number of men who were authentically ill, and several promising career officers were eventually forced out of the Marine Corps because they elected to be flown out.)”<sup>121</sup>

Also missing are those remaining (385 men) “able bodied survivors” of Task Force Faith, used in that final battle—6 through 10 December—as point defense for that breakout between Hagaru-ri and Kotori. With an addition loss of these survivors as new casualties, between these two points, (118 men) as KIA’s, MIA’s and POW’s, the majority of them from the 57th Field Artillery Battalion: that third battalion of RCT-31, east of the reservoir! These men have been placed in one of three Marine “Provisional Battalions” but were still Task Force Faith survivors. Fact: all had some prior form of frostbite being trapped over five days east of the reservoir, over looked here as well!

“Another irritant was kibitzing from MacArthur's headquarters. When frostbite victims appeared in Japan hospitals, the Far East Command blamed the cases on “lack of leadership.” But, Smith’s non-battle casualties, were —twice his WIA’s, indicating his wounded were counted a second time as Non-battle casualties! “That made me mad as a hatter” Smith exclaimed, he sent an angry letter to General Cates, the marine commandant.” [My opinion would be—misdirected should have been sent to Far East Command.] “Here I have just given a Silver Star to a sergeant who pulled his mitten in order to heave a grenade, and he got frostbitten fingers. Are you going to court-martial that man for not taking proper precautions against frostbite? Are you going to court-martial his battalion commander, his regimental commander, and his division commander? [“—*heave a grenade*”?] The Army having more Silver Star Citations, exceeding more heroic events, that would dwarf those Marine MOH awards given at Changjin!

-HEY, RED FLAG-

Strange behavior, using that same terminology “frostbitten fingers” as his critique to defend, and praise his Marine forces, yet, critical defense against those “Army Jokers” that were flown out who weren't in to bad a shape; “frostbitten fingers and so forth.” The marine commander is now fully on the defensive—vacillation—over justifying the effect (completely ignoring Hammel’s version) of his

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<sup>121</sup> Eric Hammel’s: “Chosin Heroic Ordeal of the Korean War.” Vanguard Press NY: p.301.

massive non-battle casualty conditions. Here the cold weather training of the forces shines through the “Quality” of the forces. The 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry Regiment; POLAR BEARS, had extensive winter training on Hokkaido in 1949, within that northern most island of Japan. One quickly learned (from losing gloves) while working continuously in the open, you rely on your gloves or mittens, you string the gloves or mittens around your neck under the fatigue jacket shoulder flaps, buttoned down, and thus secured to stay with you at all times. The wire section crews learned this early on. You must continually remove those mittens/gloves in the field, to splice (square knots—then twist and wrap copper strips) wire, and screw the lines to switchboard terminals. You are constantly reminded that there was always that other natural enemy—even in peacetime—the weather, not on your one flank only, but always surrounding you. One should also remember that with frostbite, some are only nipped—others severely bitten. As with burns, there are degrees of frostbite, the nip, the bite, (and in my case) the blisters, *then* the gangrene, and regretfully, amputation in severe cases (PFC Edward Reeves) Frostbite at Changjin was equally dependent on the combat situation, linked directly in proportion to the ratio of Missing in Action and Killed in Action, was directly related too, your time of exposure.

That Marine force west, of the reservoir had longer days there. Your own choice between these two elements, weather and enemies must be weighed directly as too, which threatens you the most. As example, those forward observers out on a limb. Out there in high elevations overlooking the infantry perimeter below, with field glasses, radio and/or wire communications, a mountain sleeping bag, a friendly force against your bitter weather enemy, weighing any quick withdrawal, or to remaining in place—you hunker down within that sleeping bag, at least to your waist, it keeps your feet from frostbite. One of the things we learned early in Japan, to maintain circulation while sleeping in that bag—danger not withstanding you remove your boots, yet, you would find (in the snow) when wet, they would freeze outside the bag; simple solution put them inside the bag with you for the night. Your body heat may dry them out, or at least prevent them from freezing inside and out, thus preventing them from becoming brittle and stiff the next morning you tried to put them on. But this Army Regiment had their past bouts with old man winter in Siberia and Attu, and recent training in Sapporo Japan, (on the same parallel with the Changjin Reservoir and deeper snow in the winter. The marines were using untried tactics to prevent the unknown effects of frostbite as I outline below:

#### Effect of Cold<sup>122</sup>

“Operations by the 1st Marine Division north of Chinhung-ni provided one of the best opportunities for the study of effects of extreme cold on men, weapons and other equipment under actual combat conditions, of any American battle in modern times.” Red Flag: [Not entirely true, lacking adequate tent-age and a critical loss of medical supplies: and no means to warm the wounded soldiers or liquefy frozen blood plasma, Task Force Faith’s, battle had more of that reality! Be alert to those—Red Flag items missing here, to those on the west side of the reservoir.]

“A vast amount of data, covering the varying aspects of this subject, has been collected and partially collated.

It permits some broad generalizations and considerable specification.

1st Marine Division was as well clad and equipped for cold weather fighting as any US division is likely to be under existing T/E’s and issues.

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<sup>122</sup> S.L.A. Marshall: Army historian: CCF in the attack, 1951. Part two. [Part one —next chapter— will define the difference between the Eighth Army, 2nd Infantry Division attack by the CCF and the 1st Marine Division, west of the reservoir at Yudam-ni.]

Moreover its disciplines were such as to give the individual maximum chance for survival against the cold, and to spare him abnormal privation and rigor. Tent-age was taken along, and was used to the full extent permitted by the fighting situation. Troops brought in from outpost, or coming in from sustained bouts with the cold during attack beyond the defensive perimeters, were rotated through warming tents. In these tents they were enabled to dry their socks and thaw-out shoepacs. Hot coffee was served there and hot C rations, after thawing in boiling water.

The wounded were kept in warming tents. When the tents overflow, those with lesser injuries were rotated back to the line, and therefore watched, lest their condition worsen. Cases of extreme shock or exhaustion—either from the intense cold or that combined with unusual exertion—were given 24 hours rest in warming tents before being returned to duty.”<sup>123</sup>

[Red Flag: Items, and timeline stated above, were not available on the Army, east side of the reservoir! The men on the Army side of the reservoir sure could have used at least six hours of that rest on our side, as a consolation prize!]

“Such were some of the precautions taken to maintain the health and vigor of the command against the adverse weather. The results can be summarized as follows:

1. About 20 percent of the command suffered from respiratory ailments including everything from colds to pneumonia. The medical authorities considered that this figure was low in view of the conditions.”

2. “Combat fatigue” cases, in the degree that the man became permanently non-duty, were so rare as not to constitute a medical problem. Of relative frequency were shock cases in which the individual could return to duty after 24 hours rest.”

[Red Flag: Shock cases on the Army east side resulted in immediate death to the individual from wounds received and blood plasma being in a frozen state, with no additional warming tents to either warm that man, or defrost that needed blood plasma to save him. Apparently no cases reported of “*respiratory ailments including everything from colds to pneumonia.*” These were minor problem on the east side of the reservoir, as there was no method—too treat them. Thus the case of the marine treatment for shock on the west side would be that same Marines’ death warrant had he been on the east side of the reservoir! In any case one must give the enemy his due, in extreme and likewise endurance to survive the same cold on the same plane as Task Force Faith, as conditions are equal in many cases. The first case known to this author was PFC Charles J. Smith of HQ’s Battery, a shoulder wound produced shock, and he needed blood, shock per corpsman, prevent the veins, from exposure, so a moot point here. What is missing here: the care given to the same “Shock Cases” during the three day break out between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri a distance of only seven miles to Toktong Pass to have direct access to Hagaru-ri! “On December third and fourth the **ten-mile-long marine caravan** finally broke out of the Yudam-ni valley...”<sup>124</sup> How were these men cared for? Were tents erected each night –1Dec-3 Dec— to be used for warming those new “Shock Cases?]

“3. The [Marine] division had about 2700 non-battle casualty (NBC) cases, of which approximately 2000 were frostbite cases. Of the latter, about 95 percent were foot cases. Most of the hand cases were mild. The ear cases were found to be due in most instances to carelessness. However, in taking a survey of the foot cases, General Smith, his subordinate commanders, and Regimental Surgeons, after

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<sup>123</sup> Ibid

<sup>124</sup> Ibid

questioning men, platoon leaders and others, and going into attendant circumstances, arrived at the estimate that only 20 percent of these cases came of any carelessness on the part of the individuals, and 80 percent were due to the conditions of the fight and inadequacy of the footwear. (See subsequent note on shoepac.)”

[Red Flag: Too state as fact that “80 percent were due to the conditions of the fight” must also apply to those of Task Force Faith, having no warming tents, as (4) below; yet far more deplorable fighting conditions on the east side of the reservoir. We even lacked the below half frozen C rations, ours were frozen solid, and the following named, “Biscuit” rations!]

“4. A high percentage of men (uncounted) were lost because of acute intestinal disorders induced by the eating of half frozen C rations. This danger became so well known to the command that the biscuit component was at a premium. In the worst stages of the fighting men on the line ate nothing else. The criteria showed that present field rations do not supply the needs of troops on the move in combat conditions of extreme cold weather.”

### **Shock and Fatigue**

“The effects of the first cold blast, when the division was moving north, surprised some of the attending surgeons. Among troops which had been on line for several hours and then returned to the warming tents, they noted that there was a “severe shock reaction among many of the men.” It was described in the following words: “These men by the hundreds came to the aid stations in a condition similar to what you see in men under terrific mortar or artillery pounding. There was a marked tremor which was not that simply of men shivering from cold, in some cases there was a marked suppression of the respiratory rate. They responded to stimulant. In the less serious cases a shot of brandy and a little stove heat brought them back fairly quickly. While in shock, there were marked mental and physical changes in these men. Many stared into space and did not seem to understand when they were spoken to. Others sobbed for a long period, saying nothing. But over a period of days, as the units became more accustomed to the extreme temperatures, we noted the disappearance of this shock reaction.”<sup>125</sup>

[Red Flags waving:]

It is regrettable that the latter sentence was never realized as the clue to the cure! All that was needed here was the example from the Army east side of the reservoir: Since there were no warming tents, hence, no withdrawal, into any of them, and thus, out of necessity—the surviving “units became more accustomed to the extreme temperatures,” —by the natural phenomenal event, of never being removed from that—extreme temperature! The lesson to be learned, not only did your biological system have to adjust to the same—extreme temperature, if wounded (the first day—as in my case, and frozen blood could not be thawed for use, leaves your immune system to adjust—as best it could—and repair—as best it can (under these—extreme temperatures!) by your body adjustments too selected adjustments to save other vital (tissue) parts, at the expense of damage to other parts of your being!]<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> Ibid

<sup>126</sup> When the body’s core temperature decreases, the body will first respond by shivering. This is an attempt by the body to generate heat from muscle activity. Vasoconstriction will shunt blood from the skin and an increase in the patient’s metabolic rate will increase heat. If these mechanisms cannot compensate for severe temperature drops and the body’s systems begin to fail, i.e. respiratory function will deteriorate and lead to hypoxemia, or inadequate oxygen in the blood. Avoid: Rubbing the skin. • Re-warming frostbitten extremities until after the core is re-warmed to prevent vascular complications to the limb and the transportation of cold blood and detrimental byproducts to the core. [Internet: information.]



“Cold combined with acute physical exhaustion, continued, however, radically to influence the response of the individual presenting hitherto unexplained problems for the command. The absolute limit was reached by 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, in its night time attack across country to the relief of Fox Company, 7th Rgt. Its commander, Lt. Col. Davis, bears witness that in the 20-degree-below-zero weather, as his forces continue to engage CCF, he found himself almost succumbing to the desire to do nothing. The bitter cold so froze his thought that he resorted, –to checking everything two or three ways fearing that his judgments were clouded. Aware that his men had been pushed almost to their extreme physical limit, he halted them, intending to go into perimeter defense. This was near midnight. However, within a few minutes he noticed that the efforts of the cold were such that his troops were “folding completely” and he decided that the best choice was to keep moving.”

–Red Flag–

[With no warming tents here, either choice solidifies my last Red Flag! Recall–highlighting: this Marine night time attack coincides–thus shifting all focus–from Task Force Faith’s complete demise, east of Changjin! Here, one must consider the Marine wounded in their trucks, (for the next three nights) how were they kept warm? How did *they* escape from being hit by “long range enemy fire?” How did their drivers escape having their windshields shattered by “long range fire”, turning them into white spider-web patterns blocking vision, with the excessive enemy forces, how did they stop those tires from being hit and flattened? Task Force Faith, truck convoy was destroyed within 14 hours. How did the Marine–2 Regimental convoy (8000 men) escape over 3 days, (72 hours–from a massive force) what was their secret, there should be a –beneficial–manual out there somewhere to explain this?]

“The force toiled on through the deep snows past several more ridges. At the last hill short of Fox Company’s position, the command, reaching the crest, came into ground already held by CCF. Firing began, and Col. Davis made the first moves to get his people going in the attack. Yet as his companies topped the rise, under these conditions, he saw the files successively fell flat and remain motionless, like a line of dominoes going down when impulse is given to the first one. They stayed there “paying absolutely no attention to the fire breaking all around them” and they had to be vigorously shaken and otherwise manhandled by their leaders before they would rise again.” However, after winning this fight on the high ground, and resting briefly on the crest, the battalion was able again to bound forward when morning came.” [End: of my review: Part one, CCF in the attack; by S.L.A. Marshall:]

Therefore, that mountain sleeping bag–we had them in Japan, and here in Korea they were a vital item. You try to protect its outer rain repellent shell from being ripped and torn, you did not use it–as others reportedly did–as a decoys filled with snow to lure the enemy to you, to be shot up and pierced throughout, your cold weather protection gone. Results, you ended up with a wet sleeping bag, with holes through it. However, such tactic was never required to use in our area! Our enemy was continually coming after us, we never had to lure him into our area–at least on our side of the reservoir–we were in a defensive position, until fully exposed in the breakout! They were the offensive force against us. It is amazing to me, that the Marine forces at Yudam-ni could freely make three trips, a total 16 extra miles-(2)–8 miles round trips–two days–back and forth–from and back into Yudam-ni [without major incident] between their two failed attempts to “rescue” Fox Company. (The third trip 1 December required an additional seven miles, totaled, 8X2+16+7 miles+23 miles back over the same enemy territory!) As for the combat boots, we –majority– had the old WWII issue, with the thick two buckle straps, regular leather–no shoe Pac’s; if the latter posed a problem for the marines, it was by

those that supplied the Marine Corps and issued them gear. We also supplemented the combat boot with rubber (galoshes) overshoes; it is no secret that the Marines did not have adequate training for a prolonged winter offensive. Indeed General Smith stated and admitted that to his commandant when he wrote: he “believed a winter offensive in North Korea was too much to ask of the American Soldier or Marine.” In that respect, the marines were indeed “out of their element.” Their own excessive frostbite cases proved that fact. General Smith was severely underestimating the American Soldier in his letter to his Marine Commandant, the American soldier in his experience in the European War Zone in WWII, made the Army soldier no stranger to cold weather frostbite and/or trench-foot! This was experienced by the 3rd Division in Europe, plus the 7th Division had that cold weather experience at Attu, 1943, and Sapporo, Japan in 1949 and early 1950.

Those Army men on the ice; as reported in the “Stars and Stripes” that some men had no shoes. It was not that they were so macho—threw them away—nor defying the weather elements, no, the Chinese had taken them they knew the value of shoes and gloves. Those shoes and gloves were sought after items. Those sleeping bags also would have been of more value than any vehicle to the individual Chinese soldier. Our trucks destroyed with the other vehicles along with the wounded—in sleeping bags—with now dead soldiers stuffed inside them. However, keep one fact in mind that those Army dead and missing, East of Changjin—over 840 American’s + ROK’s- never reached Hagaru. Thus they were never any additional burden on the Marine’s, also that Army medical staff withdrawn with the tank command, were beneficial medical staff to those Yudam-ni arriving Marines at Hagaru-ri as well! These included those Army men of Task Force Drysdale and those survivors from Koto-ri one can see that the majority was from the Marine forces. Also: as attached to the 1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force (FMF) was a “2d Plat, 560th Med AMB Co, from the US, Army.”

TABLE 3- X CORPS BATTLE CASUALTIES, 27 NOVEMBER-10 DECEMBER 1950

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Killed in Action</i>	<i>Wounded in Action</i>	<i>Missing in Action</i>	<i>Total</i>
X Corps headquarter/service	5	20	15	40
Corps combat troops	3	8	--	11
1st Marine Division	393	2,152	76	2,621
Army attached	1	2	1	4
41st Royal Marine Commando	8	31	39	78
2d Engineer Special Brigade	--	--	--	0
1st Marine Air Wing	2	2	2	6
3d Division	50	206	147	403
ROKs attached	17	76	94	187
<b>7th Division</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>2,505</b>	<b>2,760</b>
<b>ROKs attached</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>1,560</b>	<b>1,602</b>
1st Korean Marine Corps Regt.	13	80	--	93
Headquarters, I ROK Corps	1	3	0	4
ROK Capital Division	126	318	334	778
3d ROK Division	15	127	6	148
Totals	705	3,251	4,779	8,735

Source: Personnel Section of X Corps Special Rpt, Chosin Reservoir.

Per General Smith:

“I am afraid that some of those 900 Army troops which were evacuated shouldn't have gone out, because over in Tokyo GHQ looked over some of those cases that were coming into the hospitals with only minor frostbite.” Interview Benis Frank—June 1969. Location: [<http://www.chosinreservoir.com/smithinterview.htm>] According to the above chart Task Force Faith was missing in totality as a returning force!

—Another RED FLAG—

Here General Smith unwittingly, is establishing his connecting link to Task Force Faith's survivors. His constant battle to deny any and all connection to this Army force, for that (denial) PUC award unravels here! Those 900 (of 2,505-including 1,560 ROK's) listed as MIA's on the above chart by X Corps, not only does General Smith interact and connects with these men (through that denial) he very reluctantly, evacuates them. However, here, he has the most non-battle (NBC—7,313) casualties, therefore the most frostbite cases!

Q: “You brought out all you're wounded and dead. [Same interview]

Smith: Yes. We flew out 138 bodies from Hagaru-ri. We did not want to bury them in that God-forsaken place. We had a good cemetery in Hungnam. Litzenberg's had had to bury 85 in Yudam-ni because he only had helicopters to get them out of there, and there was a field burial there. However, at Hagaru-ri, when we caught up on the wounded, we just slipped the bodies in and it was very simple—they were frozen stiff, there was no putrefaction or anything like that. The corps wanted us to quit, and Gregon Williams handled the phone on that. (Laughs) Therefore, he just stalled them. We sent them all out. We did not pay any attention. Then when we got to Koto-ri, we had a very limited strip there. We could not fly out the dead, so we buried 113 there. In addition, 96 per cent of those people identified and their remains brought back and turned over to their next of kin. Of that entire outfit, 96 per cent were identified, and I have to hand it to the North Koreans—they did an excellent job of digging up those bodies, put them in bags, and sent them to Panmunjom. They would not let us send up graves registration people to do it. They did it themselves.” [Points of interest, those buried at the cemetery at Hungnam will remain there! This last, retrieving the dead was, by no means—a North Korean favor, but regulated (and violated) by the Truce Treaty, preventing any United States recovery team efforts, in North Korea! Review Congressional reply to these MIA's, at the end of my Chapter Five!

[Note, my emphasis: *he only had helicopters*, At least he had them and prioritized them exclusively for “his Marines” Those helicopters flown into our area belonged to the Marines. He also had warming tents; likewise, the 7th Division had few to none. As for the return of the remains; The North Koreans did a sloppy job of retrieving them! They merely mixed up the remains in 208 Boxes-known as -K-208 at the JPAC lab in Hawaii- those boxes may contain some 400-450 remains—yet to be identified!] Throughout the period many emergency shipments were necessary to **supply** isolated units and to expedite the receipt of **cold-weather** clothing and equipment. Complete records are not available; however, the following activities characterized the periods **29 November 1950 - 15 tents and 30 stoves sent** to K-27 for air drop. An urgent appeal for an immediate air lift of 500 blankets to Marine Hospital South of CHOSIN Reservoir was met this date....2 December 1950 - 1,000 sets of clothing sent to K-27 for airlift to 31st RCT. Emergency **stock** of canteens, trousers, mess equipment, sweaters and mittens (about 100) established at K-27 to be used for emergency air lifts.” Missed it by 3 days, no more—Task Force Faith!

Request for airlift of clothing and equipment for Army units with 1st Mar Div\* Items delivered to K-27.

Request for airlift to 1st Mar Div the following items: 1,000 drawers, wool; 500 undershirts, wool; and 500 sweaters, wool. Items delivered to K-27.

7 December 1950 - 27,000 caps, field, pile lined, arrived by air. Immediate distribution was made as follows: 1st Marine Division 12,000, 7th Infantry Division 15,000.

8 December 1950 - 244 drums POL delivered to K-27 for airdrop.<sup>127</sup>

Here, one should also consider the Air Evacuation Statistics, (Appendix H - Marine History) Total evacuation (actual) between November 27 -December 10 from all points Hagaru-Koto-ri -Yudam-ni = 5,493 men total. Let us take the full total for the full time frame November 27- December 10, now if the total is 5,493 men and as above all 7th Division personnel were flown out—900 TF Faith men—that leaves 4,593 spaces left. However, the marines have 10,821 combined wounded & non-battle casualties plus the additional (admitted) 138 bodies flown out. It would seem that the screening process would be an exaggerated Marine problem, (3,508 + 7,313 = 10,821-138 DB) 10,821 + 138 = 10,959 - 4,593 = Leaves open spaces [for 6,366 men] However, of those 4,593 remaining open spaces aboard; minus the 3,508 Marine WIA =1,085-138=947 spaces left open for NBC's. Due to space restrictions, the Marine wounded are required to be sorted out—each man—medically, between battle wounded and non-battle wounded. No, matter how you slice it, this in no way accounts for any of the other Army units mixed with the Marines at all three locations. It would appear someone is highly exaggerating his casualties, and why would one want to do that?

“Weather was destined to play an important role. The rate of non-battle casualties from frost-bite, neuro-psychiatric and self-inflicted wounds was expected to rise sharply. During the period 24 November to 26 November inclusive, casualties were evacuated by ambulance, hospital trains, Corps and divisional light aircraft, and helicopters. No helicopters were specifically assigned to Army control as the only machines belonged to the 1st Marine Division and were intended primarily for tactical purposes.” (Special report, X-Corp, p.90: Medical Report; Chosin Reservoir, 27 Nov - 10 Dec.)

[Red Flag: Strange arrangement; The Army lost their Air Corps, in 1947, being the largest of the fighting divisions, why would they be deprived of helicopters?]

Department of the Navy accounting: [Source]  
History of United States Naval Operations: Korea

By: James A. Field, Jr.

Chapter 9: Retreat to the South

Part 5, 7 December 1950–25 January 1951: The Second Chinese Offensive

Quote: “This is not to say that the campaign was cheap. With a strength slightly exceeding 25,000, the Marine Division between 27 November and 11 December suffered 556 killed, 182 missing, 2,872 wounded, and 3,648 non-battle casualties, the last largely from frostbite. But for the Chinese Third Field Army the campaign was a disaster. The 60,000 men of the eight divisions committed by the *9th Army Group* were later estimated by the Marine Corps to have suffered 37,500 combat casualties, a little over half inflicted by the ground forces and the rest by air attack.[Less than a 2:1 ratio!] Of estimates such as these everyone must be his own judge, but the order of magnitude appears not far

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<sup>127</sup> QUARTERMASTER REPORT CHOSIN RESERVOIR 27 Nov —10 Dec

from the mark.” [End] Seems we have (a lack of) a 50% NBC exaggeration between the Marine Corps and the Navy records!]

Before moving on with the rescue highest praise is due to those that carved out that air strip at Hagaru, that crew that worked through the bitter cold nights, in the snow, under floodlights, amid sniper fire, plowing those dozers ever forward, cutting and leveling that strip. It would be the means of life and death to those evacuated, over 4,000 at Hagaru alone. While the praise for those that did the work or only slightly remembered, those surviving because of the efforts of those men assisting, cannot ever be forgotten. While controversy would center around who authorized the strip in the first place, a total moot point, It should have been built of necessity, just as rail lines are rebuilt, by necessity to haul needed supplies into the combat area. Those fliers that piloted into that danger, of sliding into that area, likewise deserve highest praise from all. Replacement personnel flown in for the marines (500) and extra needed medical supplies. Their value likewise, never, to be ignored. There were entirely too many men that escaped notice of valor in their every day run of the mill, their job. Without support forces those on the firing lines or bastard children, cut off from lifelines of supplies.

It is unlikely that Almond opposed building the airstrip—since X Corps planners ordered it completed at Hagaru, on 1 December—since Almond was also moving his forward CP there as well! It was General Smith that was against developing the landing strip, declaring he did not have the forces to create one; that it was X Corps responsibility—not his to carve out that airstrip. In the end the pressure to deny this airstrip for his division was now overrode by necessity, and he orders it completed by his Marine forces. That the Army would use it as well was reminiscing of his earlier irritation over the 32nd Infantry use of his Amtrac’s at Seoul!

Whoever authorized its construction, the trip back to Koto-ri cannot be totally creditable with the ground forces alone without appreciation to those that re-supply you, the air drops to Faith were critical, unfortunately the force still did not receive enough, that is not the fault of the pilots, they could only air lift what was supplied to them. For whatever its worth, I salute those men for their efforts. Also not reported, in detail, was that the marines were reinforced at Hagaru, these were fresh forces, (The Marines had some 10,000 of these to draw from, at Hungnam; those neither at Changjin nor Koto-ri! Total Marines evacuated and, those from Hungnam-to South Korea- were 22,000 plus.) So one must know here at Changjin after that first plane landed, Smith had 385 additional Army Task Force exhausted soldiers, and his marines, added for the attack south to Koto-ri, and those 500 replacement Marine’s who had not fought in the Changjin area north of Hagaru, -Yudam-ni and Koto-ri as recorded by Smith. According to General Smith; those replacements were the prime reason to fight their way out of Hagaru-rather than be flown out. Since 500 marines or flown into Hagaru, he could see no good reason "to fly them out again." That response to the combat Cargo Commander Major General William H. Tunner, (Berlin Airlift fame) his offer to evacuate all the forces at Hagaru by air, this did not include equipment, which Almond had authorized to be destroyed if necessary. This depleted those survivors from Task Force Faith to become KIA’s and MIA’s between Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri.

As the planes landed, and filled with wounded, and take off again, more survivors were coming into Hagaru. Checkpoints having been set up for the walking wounded, the medical staff had set up folding tables, with chairs, while checking condition of the walking wounded. Some of the medical staff was those men from our RCT-31 Army medical collection company. The others were Navy corpsman,

Since the blisters on my fingers were plainly visible, the arm wound (cause of blisters) was secondary, still one question would be asked—a dual one— are you right are left handed? Since I was right handed I was routed to the first, of two trucks, this first one—unknown to me— for evacuation to Japan, the second in line for closer points in Korea. Reason being the length of time assigned to fully recover for duty, classed as over 30 days as opposed to under 30 days recovery. For the Army there were still no immediate replacements available, the men of the occupation era would merely be required to be recycled. This the result of the Chinese forces in the war, each of the four MacArthur's army divisions had lacked about 30 percent of its men and officers. This weakness was acceptable during operations against an inferior number of enemy troops, now intolerable with the massive strength in additional enemy fighters. MacArthur as of the 28th appealed for more than double the number of replacements then scheduled. He was advised 33,000 would come in December. He had requested 74,000 to compensate for losses now already suffered in the enemy offensive. This amount did not include those losses expected in January.

The Department of the Army -sorry- but even the promised 33,000 cannot be totally provided, at best, he can have 23,000, here is where MacArthur creates those waves that will sweep his career out from under him. He needs reinforcements, and replacements, and he needed them, yesterday, or the day before, he requests assistance from the Chinese forces on the island of Formosa. That those Formosa forces or available in two weeks to supplement his command. Since they were available and offered – –as he did earlier with the marines— he would accept them. This assistance immediately vetoed by the State Department; —someone did not want to irritate China. However, they would not supply any reinforcements on their own, after all everyone already knew the war was almost over, and the State Department was not even aware one was going on at the time. Were they really and truly and deeply concerned, there would have been a Declaration of a National Emergency issued by the President, but, now, one was getting (16 December) closer to being issued, just shy of the six month opening after the first shots of the invasion date.

As our casualties and those of the Eighth Army flooded the medical facilities in Japan, Pusan, and the hospital ship —Consolation— off shore of Hungnam- those facilities or overtaxed from this offensive by the Chinese. There were only four MASH units, not enough for each division, each of these as set-up or originally designed as a 60-bed unit. This would be expanded to 150 beds to meet the requirements, but they would also be required to keep patients longer, Even those not requiring surgery, because lack of evacuation hospitals and other means of distribution of the wounded. In my case, it would take 30 days of hospital stay in Japan before the decision to return me state side (ZI)-zone of interior. That was over a full six months of the war and still facilities were not adequate for the wounded. Surely, the American public, were never, fully aware of all these problems during those six months. Did anyone really care? As long as a National State of Emergency, was never requested, how could the public, really know? Certainly, the press gave no clue, our military problems in North Korea or self-created as reported by most newspapers.

That lonely Dog-Face in the hills could just lick his wounds and trod onward, ever onward, higher and higher into those mountains in North Korea, carving images into them by explosives shells and their own flesh and blood splattered around them. When the winning tide of battle, turned, they had to fight their way back beyond the starting point of this war. Still America, made no outstanding effort to assist in the first six months, after all the majority were occupation forces—leading that good life in Japan— it was merely payback time for all the good times the tax payer was affording us. Ever forgetting that

this force were also tax payers, (1949) a new concept in a war, the soldier also paying taxes, without benefit of seeing any new equipment we were helping to pay for. But the conscious of the powers that be, will yield to a rebate, for those men that survived and could file a return for your time spent in combat, to be refunded to them!

The MASH -units (Mobile Army Surgical Hospital) were also responsible for decreasing the fatality rates from World War II, there, it had reached 4.5 percent, and here in Korea it reduced to 2.5 percent, thus releasing more replacements for the line to be recycled. America again, you received far more than you gave to your Armed Forces, and I use the term “Armed” extremely loosely. This did eventually change in 1951.

Ironically, while forces were being decimated in North Korea on 29 November, that date would coincide with an increase in the units on line, effective that date, authorized war strength of army infantry divisions would be 18,855, more than 4,000 greater than that of a World War II division. This would increase the firepower in pieces of artillery and tanks, “that had not been included in a divisions own arsenal”. (P&D 30) After all, you had to find some place for those 2 percent extra replacement that the MASH units were returning to combat. They still had life left in them! (Helicopter units from the 3d Air Rescue Squadron had been in operation since July of 1950, the 2nd Detachment did not arrive until 22 Nov. (Mossman GPO, p.32)

However, on this same date (29th) at Hagaru, the airstrip crew grades ahead, the airstrip almost ready, and by December 6, some 4,344 men were flown out on C-47's. - the final figure on December 6, being 137, ironically one short of the dead Smith “slipped in” their being no more casualties meriting evacuation on that date, or so it would seem.

As I was on the plane, the crewmember gave me his jump seat, in the cockpit itself. This plane was as bitter cold as the surrounding area temperature, colder as the plane climbed higher to clear the mountains. On 3 December, I arrived in Japan, the hospital on the lower island of Kyushu There I would be treated (?) The hospital was warm and I started the thawing out process, a warm shower was refreshing in that process, but, did not help the blisters on my fingers. The doctors did not fully understand frostbite to the degrees that were coming into the medical centers. Right at the start, I heard I would probably lose my thumb and trigger finger, due to the severity of the frostbite, yet, one doctor would turn to the other and state he was not sure if he should lance those blisters. As luck had it, I was transferred to the main island of Honshu, the doctor there raised hell about my not having those blister lanced, he immediately did that! I will be sent back stateside to Camp Atterbury (Indiana) Hospital in early January 1951, and not be released back for duty until July 1, 1951. It seems I was to be their –experiential– poster boy for frostbite at that time! My arm wound and/or resulting frostbite had damaged the sympathetic nerves in the right arm and would create muscle cramps in my right arm. A major surgery to cut loose that damaged section from the nervous system (in my chest) resulted in addition problems the rest of my life!

#### –THE ARMY JOKER'S AT HAGARU-RI–

General Smith's concern over the “space” available on evacuation planes must be considered, as a separate issue. How scarce were the planes at Hagaru-ri, and who would be in charge of what flew in them, in or out of Hagaru? Did the Air Force, severely limit their planes? These two questions are the main issue. If they were restricted then the lack of reinforcements and supplies to Smith will be

severely curtailed, and affect the retrograde movement back into Koto-ri. Meaning the supplies on hand or severely rationed. Few evacuation planes would make it difficult to evacuate the wounded let alone the dead. Therefore, the restrictions General Smith –in charge– had set would override the evacuation procedures of the Air Force—their command; not his, is questionable and highly suspicious. Therefore, we must look closely into the Air Cargo Command. Was it really rationing the number of planes at Hagaru? Certainly, the hazard of landing there had to be concerned of the number of planes in and out of there.

We must review, if the situation was truly critical between these dates, December 1-7. On December 4, the Marines have returned to Hagaru from Yudam-ni, but the first plane had landed on 1 December at Hagaru. Also reported, that another noted general commanding the Air Cargo Command also set down on that airstrip. This General was well experienced in moving cargo of all kinds; He had been in charge of the Berlin Air Lift operations in late 1948 in Germany, flying in supplies to maintain some two million Germans, cut off by the Russians after World War II. This man was General William Tunner, USAF. Another Major General, equal in rank to Smith. He also “controlled the operations of a U.S. Marine squadron flying R5D’s.”

Here one should fast forward ahead to Koto-ri, that bridge span which within a few days requires this same command to fly in those much needed (Funchilin Pass) extension spans by air and drop them as close to that site as possible. Those sections, required bridging a gap created by the Chinese actions, to destroy that bridge, hit several times before and three attempts were to fix it. However, General Tunner—prior to this span being secured to cross—had offered to fly out Smith's entire command from Hagaru, but that would be at the expense of all heavy equipment. It is reported that his offer was met with “an icy stare from Smith” rejected outright! The point being the offer was made, the planes were surely calculated for the needs, in other words there were no shortage of planes from the Air Cargo Command to evacuate the lesser amount—the wounded. It would not be General Tunner responsibility to dispute Smith's authority. General Tunner placed the offer, it was on the table. General Smith rejected it—so be it. However, the planes belonged exclusively to the Air Force, Smith’s expertise of their evacuation officer warped sense of duty, “He thought only in terms of planes, not what flew in them.” Yet those planes brought in his replacements, and he was going to be selective as to those that flew out of Hagaru. Still he reasoned since they had been flown in he could see no reason why they should “be flown back out again.” As for as his wounded was concerned, Smith’s ego; needed every available man to fight his way out to Koto-ri. However, less we forget, had he obeyed his orders to be within his assigned zone of operations, “north of Hagaru” he would have no concern to consider Funchilin Pass or Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni!

Still Historian Clay Blair records: “The airlift to Hagaru was another blessing. It brought in 500 Marine replacements and tons of ammunition and supplies. The outgoing aircraft had evacuated a total of 4,300 wounded, thereby relieving Smith of that great burden.”<sup>128</sup>

However, Smith has (10,000) fresh Marine (all Infantry?) forces at Hungnam and the authority to orders many hundred or more marines to reinforce his weary units for that trip to Koto-ri! Remember this fact; General Smith himself would fly out of Hagaru! Regretfully, the Army Provisional Battalion of those 385 survivors’ was the ones used for the breakout between Hagaru and Koto-ri.

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<sup>128</sup> Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War*: p.534.



A clarification about:  
Who ordered the airstrip built at Hagaru-ri — General Almond or Smith?

The answer: It was ordered under X Corps: Annex D. Logistic Plan to OPN PLAN No.8 (Draft No.3) Declassified from TOP SECRET—via R6-38.B.6.F.6 “Chronology”: [MacArthur Memorial’ Norfolk. VA. This author has a copy!]<sup>129</sup>

“This plan outlines the logistic operations necessary to support Opn Order No. 8.

- 4. Operations to be initiated:
  - b. 1st Mar Div
- (2) Develop HAGARU-RI Afld for emergency support by C-47 type aircraft.

[Also]:

- 7th Inf Div (-)
  - (2) Develop PUNGSAN Afld for emergency support by C-47 type aircraft.”
- It was implied that General Almond was opposed to building the airstrip at Hagaru! Not true!

–POINT–Conclusion,

**IT APPEARS: THERE WAS NO SHORTAGE OF AIRCRAFT**

**FACT:** The Marine evacuation report lists 137 men flown out of Hagaru on December 6, that being one shy of the 138 dead Marines General Smith is reported as shipped out of Hagaru, “We just slipped the bodies in, and it was very simple-they were frozen stiff, there was no putrefaction or anything like that. We sent them all out, 138 in all.” The Army X Corps critical of this practice. What was Smith trying to prove? Was it his —own contradiction, that there was really no shortage of planes, or what was flown out in them?

Here General Smith was extending his command influence. He was never in charge of any planes landing and taking off at Hagaru. That was the new Department of the Air Force responsibility. The evacuations officer should have told him to “Kiss my ass or butt out” it was their planes and they were not in short supply to evacuate wounded troops. The Army forces were already getting testy with him as well, all this, to highlight his crisis of command between, the Air Force and this command required a full investigation. Again, a strategy, that could have, and should have, but never did, really materialize. There well could be more hostility, toward the marine commander by these Army survivors, had they known the facts of this command situation at Hagaru. It appears the only officers that knew of Smith's command control were those recalled back to Hagaru from Hudong-ni on the afternoon of the 30th. Those officers of the RCT-31, tank and service units, their orders and reports list that change, those orders that rescinded their prior order from Colonel MacLean. Reassigning them to the 1st Marine Division commander, But our tank commander was getting wise to this top command situation.

“On 2 December, Lieutenant Colonel Binkley, X Corps Surgeon's office, and 1st Lieutenant McGinley, FEAF Air Evacuation Officer, flew to HAGARURI to establish a systematic scheme of evacuating patients after Initial screening by the collecting and clearing companies of the Marine

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<sup>129</sup> Provided by: James W. Zobel: 14 May 2009.

Medical Battalion. At this time, X Corps requested FEAF to investigate the possibility of landing planes on the frozen surface of the reservoir, but this was considered unfeasible”

RED FLAGS—Meeting timeline 301410-301530—31st-RCT Tank & Service Battery arrive Hagaru-301730!

General Smith's rejection of General Almond's instructions on the afternoon meeting at Hagaru on 30th November (Almond) was given a firsthand account that morning by the senior Marine officer on the X Corps staff, Colonel Edward H. Forney, USMC, who had just returned from Koto-ri. (Marine history page 239) The situation here, that Almond was fully aware of the road conditions between Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri. Colonel Forney in turn, “much concerned about the attack on the Marine MSR.” In Almond “stressing the necessity for speed in falling back toward Hamhung, he promised Smith re-supply by air (after authorizing him) to burn or destroy all equipment which would *delay* his withdrawal to the seacoast.”

One should keep in mind here this command conference is early afternoon on the 30th, at Hagaru! Almond is never given that vital information concerning General Smith's standing withdrawal order – too MacLean's prior order- for his tank command too advance north, has already been rescinded, (between 292047 and 292400 hours) and those army tanks were clanking their way back into Hagaru, as Almond orders Smith to submit his plan —to assist Task Force Faith breakout—prior to his departure from Hagaru, to return to his HQ's....

–THE CONDITIONS AT THAT TIME– 30 November 1950.

.....The tank company of the 31st RCT was destroying the supply, rations, and ammo dump (260 tons, on orders) four miles behind Faith's Forces, in the process of withdrawal to Hagaru. The 5th, 7th, & 11th Marines or hemmed in at Yudam-ni by "F" Company rear guard totally blocked by the *59th Chinese Division*; they remain so for two more days—none of their force to enter into Hagaru until 3-4 December. The airstrip is just about ready to receive the first C-47 cargo planes. (Dec. 1) Yet, as recorded in Marine history, on this day, at this place, at this hour, under these unknown conditions, “The Marine general replied that his movements must be governed by his ability to evacuate his wounded. He would have to fight his way out he added, and could not afford to discard equipment; it was *his intention* therefore to bring out the bulk of it.

–TWO THINGS HERE–

The latter *unknown factor* part: how many wounded from Yudam-ni will cripple that force. Since General Smith knows not their condition, nor that number, even on this earliest date, he has already written off Task Force Faith and its force of men above Hagaru, prior to his force returning there from Yudam-ni. This -again- will seem to irritate him to no end. He resented the ability to evacuate these Army wounded before his wounded would arrive from Yudam-ni. Even though Smith pre-empts, Almond's (292047 Nov.) order for that Yudam-ni force to withdraw from there on the 28th, his Yudam-ni regimental commanders, failed to comply with his direct order! Here is 2 December, and they were not back at Hagaru; but these Army Jokers were. Somehow, these men had beaten all odds! However, he needed newly dropped tents erected, not so much for this Army group, but his own larger force that will be coming from Yudam-ni –in what shape; he did not and could not know. These were those tents –with additional stoves originally intended for air drop (2 December) to Task Force Faith.

–WAS HE WORRIED?–

As he states, “The only time I was concerned was when the 5th and 7th Marines were fighting their way out of Yudam-ni.” (Knox, O.H. 534) However, that event lasted over November 29-December 3, and overlapped this period of events. Was Smith just edgy over that event? Could it be, that is why he was so irritable with us? But others describe him as cool, calm and collected. Even Gentle: Nevertheless, remnants of our phantom force were here at Hagaru, and his marines were not! If Army wounded numbers would be any indication of Marine numbers, following an equally bloody battle, then his division would indeed be in bad shape.

“RESCUE OF U.S. ARMY WOUNDED.”

Casualties —estimated as high as 75 per cent or suffered by three U.S. Army battalions east of the Reservoir. At 2200 on the night of 1 Dec, the first survivors, most of them wounded, reached the Marine lines north of Hagaru. This time line would be during the final phase of the breakdown and breakup of our forces at Hudong-ni. Still this force at Hagaru could not know of that time line. Nevertheless, it does record most of these were wounded, some two or three times. That of itself is an earthshaking revelation.

-POINTS-

Almond responding to the concern of the senior Marine staff officer (Colonel Forney) attached to X Corps. Although this officer was lower in rank than his division commander, he however was in the planning phase of withdrawal operations back into Hungnam. It would seem to me that the isolation of Smith in all things would be the marine procedure of supplying public relations reports, that the division commander bears all responsibility for the press reports. (As the prime mover) of all events within his division, that he and he alone issued every order of importance. That once again being none of my business just stated out of curiosity. It does not bother me, but it does intrigue me. It merely separates that marine division commander from; “The Marines.”

While there will be no official investigation [as of this date] into the cause of the colossal foul-up at Changjin, and the praise given General Smith would overshadow those problems created there. As a result instead of being solved, they would simply be transferred to —The IX Corps. For Smith had vowed that never again would the Marine Division serve under General Almond's command. Here the marines' have already been removed from Army control—for command and control were both required to get the job done. Or at least for one man to control a required retrograde movement of such a rapid and full magnitude, to delegate responsibility to those units involved. While that was set-up at Hungnam for the evacuation of the forces to South Korea, Smith would argue for his division to receive priority (first out) of evacuation. (Moreover, he received it!)

While it remained true that Smith had been given full responsibility for command of all forces within the Changjin area his handling of all forces was not accepted within the control of all forces there at Changjin Reservoir, —that true designation of the reservoir itself. As his force would receive priority on to ships at Hungnam, they will also receive air priority at Changjin. (General Smith grants air priority on the breakout on December 1 to Task Force Faith, The last day, of five.) FACT: Failure to substantiate that Task Force Faith got priority in those plane numbers, or more ammo drops designated for us! It was therefore the luck of the draw that the force west of Yudam-ni will be days away from breaking loose of the involvement in that region, otherwise this would be an open conflict of interest and another dilemma for General Smith. However, hindsight points out there was, really no conflict of interest, since hindsight could never know the answer to a no brainer question. The one force SMITH

does not assume responsibility for –that Phantom Force east of Changjin does not really exist –in Marine history or under that commanders control, as the evidence points to the fact that he issued no orders whatsoever to Faith, prior to his own order to withdraw. Could that signify *a dereliction of his duty to those army forces*? He does –as the commander in charge– continues to deny that Army Task Force Faith a Presidential Unit Citation (PUC) Award, through eleven endorsements over forty-nine years (1999) thus establishing the fact –at one time in history– we did —at some time—exist, at the Changjin Reservoir! Sadly: History Failed to Record: this Issue.

I am not an expert writer, nor do I profess to be, I feel limited in my word knowledge, but writers try to convey events to others, but words lack what events took place east of Chosin for five nights. Simply put to condense, East of Chosin between November 27, and December 1-2, a great battle was fought, resulting in great destruction to American forces there. It would be futile indeed to attempt to vividly personify what truly happened there, as I stated earlier, that is for those on the fringe of the battles, the reporters and others. Events at Chosin are entirely to cluttered to separate, nature has been generous to me in that respect, for I truly do not care to relive those events in minute detail, and my sole purpose is to place those of Task Force MacLean and Faith where they belong, where they have always been East of Chosin.<sup>130</sup> Not a Marine operation, for other than the order to remove the tank force, which was never a part of Task Force Faith- there was never an order to Task Force Faith directly from the marine commander , in that respect it was all an army command operation led by Lieutenant Colonel Faith Outside of the Marine Air Wing assisting us we again had to work the problem ourselves, sadly as I have already stated through some marine obstacles , those are well known by now, if not I have failed the reader, and those gallant men of Task Force Faith , and if I have failed them I have truly failed myself, for my life has been deeply ingrained with their fate. May they rest in peace, and in history?

They were not "great men" they were only "ordinary men" from ordinary families throughout the states from every region of the country - citizen soldiers, - meeting a great challenge, a call to battle, being forced by circumstance to meet that challenge, ordinary men from any one of the then 48 states, sons, husbands, and fathers, some young, others a little older. Some married some not, some with children, to carry on their name. Others not, each would age in years, but some would never age a day longer, forever young. However, now respectfully no longer forgotten in; a forgotten place in a corner of North Korea.

*-RELATED ARTICLES-*

17- Year-Old Infantrymen tell of horrors in Korea

*By H.D. Quigg (UP)*

*December-15, 1950*

A U.S. Base in Japan. (UP) -

You sit with them on a hospital bed, on a clean bed in a warm room and you think how it must have been in the stinging and dulling cold as the wind came off the Chosin Reservoir and the wounded were piled so heavily on the truck that some of them couldn't get breath enough to scream with the others.

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<sup>130</sup> While I refer to Task Force MacLean as well as Task Force Faith—since the Second Battalion of the 31st Regiment would never arrive east of the reservoir, it in reality would never become a Regimental Combat team, as intended! The abnormal mixture of one foreign 32nd Battalion from another regiment into this incomplete RCT, multiplies that abnormal error many times over!

These two are such young men to have done such things. Both are only 17. They were among the seven or eight on the truck able to keep firing and fighting. They talked with half-smiles on their faces and their voices soft. One had a bullet hole in the back and was blinded in one eye. The other had a bullet nick in the shoulder and some frostbite and shrapnel wound.

They were infantrymen from two different companies of the Seventh Division who became buddies in battle and soon are going to be separated. They sat on the clean sheets and talked about the day the Chinese came down around them and their truck, loaded with 40 yelling and cursing wounded GIs, was caught on a blown bridge with the Chinese firing across at them.

#### Illinois Youth Tells Story

They talked through a long afternoon about the fight and how they were taken prisoner and finally released and how some of the wounded stayed behind and others died. And here's the way they told it, first one , and then the other speaking.

"East of the reservoir we hit them hard, first-man, we was tearing them to pieces- and then we got to some big hills, to the second road block, and they poured on us."

That's the way Pfc. Merle D. Powless of Clinton, Ill, began the story. He has wavy black hair and thin adolescent face. He tilts his head a bit and glances at you shyly as he talks.

"The night of December 1, it was," he said "The Chinks came in on our convoy from all four directions with mortars and hand grenades and rifles."

That's the night I got hit," said Pvt. Charles I. Cave of Kansas City, Mo. "We went up -about 25 or 30 of us including Powless and me-to take the high ground and knock out the road block . I got knicked, just grazed on the shoulder with a rifle bullet. I got a small piece of mortar shrapnel in my leg earlier."

#### Block Knocked out

Cave has blue eyes and brown hair parted low on the left side in a straight line. He wore the calf - high rubber and leather shoe pacs which the Army issued in cold weather.

"We got up and knocked out the roadblock with four or five grenades- the colonel threw them," Cave said.

"And they threw the one back, and that's the what got me in the eyes." Powless interrupted. "I still can't see out of my right eye. My left is okay but the cornea is scarred."

"Any man who could walk or fire went up to take that road block." Powless continued. "Some were wounded badly, some with one arm hanging. Scared? Gee, I was scared. The roadblock was just over the rise, and the Communist had a machine-gun set up there."

#### Convoy Ambushed

"I was out on the left flank and the grenades came down from the right and knocked me down. I couldn't see anything out of either eye for about 20 minutes."

"After the roadblock was knocked out, we were on the first trucks in the convoy as it began moving again . but the rest of the convoy didn't follow us. It was night and we made a turn and they didn't. We got ambushed and 10 men were killed. Then we came to a long concrete bridge and we didn't know it had been knocked down in the middle, so we drove on it. And the Chinese caught us behind."

The fight on the bridge and how the Communist came out with grenades after the truck loaded with wounded is a story for tomorrow.

Note: Could not find continued story line !

Officer. Captured by Reds. Says they ignored wounds  
By H.D. Quigg

An American Hospital: Japan (UP)- These big buildings overlook the sea and across the narrow strait of the sea lies Korea.

A pajama-clad lieutenant colonel sits on a hospital bed, his right forearm in a cast, combat boots on his feet.

"I'm trying to get straight in my own mind just what happened." he said. "I was captured December 2 and turned loose December 5. There were 10 other soldiers, all wounded or suffered from frostbite, who were prisoners with me. The Chinese didn't treat our wounds. But they didn't harm us. The whole thing probably was, a propaganda stunt-but it wasn't so well done."

Lt. Col. Robert J. Tolly, 38 whose parents live at Hillsdale, Mich, was commander of a field artillery battalion when he was taken prisoner. His outfit was moving along with the Seventh Division units trying to join with the Marines on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir. "We hit a series of roadblocks," he said. "We got through one and hit another and another. There was battle at close hand on the night of December 1.

"We were taken out the next day, and that night, about 7 or 8 o'clock, I was caught alone. I had just finished wrapping a couple of wounded with blankets and was about 30 feet away from them in a frozen-over swampy area, about 150 yards from the reservoir, when I heard a Chinese patrol coming."

#### Very Little Pain

"They were behind me and I could hear them talking. It was pitch dark-no moonlight. I just had time to duck down in a gully, they couldn't see them."

One Chinese shot three times with a carbine from about 10 feet away. Maybe he just shot at a sound. The third shot hit me."

Tolly has a determined, worried look on his face. He speaks precisely, in the manner of a professional soldier giving an exact account of a personnel experience.

#### How does it feel to get shot in the arm?

"Allowing for the excitement and so forth." he replies, "there was very little pain, it was like getting cracked in the arm with something lighter than a baseball bat. A cue stick maybe.

Also, the extreme cold-it was zero perhaps had something to do with deadening the pain. The bullet broke my arm."

"There were three or four guys on me right away. A couple grabbed my arms. They took everything from my pockets on 'shakedown' I got my wallet back four times out of five. The fifth guy kept it."

"The only thing I put up as objection to was their taking my pile jacket and gloves. All I got was the end of a bayonet jabbing at me".

#### Never looked at wound

"They never looked at my wound. I wrapped an old piece of T-shirt around it. They left me my field jacket and pants. We walked back to a Korean house where 10 other prisoners were."

"The Chinese had found a lot of American canned fruit juice and three cans of C-rations, and that's what fed the 11 of us for three days."\*

They had walked unharmed -by some strange strike of luck-two thirds of the way through a Marine minefield. End.

Note: \*That American canned fruit juice was undoubtedly left over from the supply dump vacated at Hudong-ni!

#### In a related article from the AP 15 December, 50

Marine and doughboys battled desperately to break out of deep Red traps in the Changjin reservoir area. A. P. Correspondent Tom Stone reported Chinese pressure on them eased somewhat Monday, however.

Release 27

The Chinese oddly released 27 wounded Americans in the reservoir sector. This brought to 84 Americans similarly released. END<sup>131</sup>

So those men that had been captured around Hudong-ni arriving back at Hagaru had been released by the Chinese! One must remember that the Chinese had been rescued and aided by America only five years before, and that China had strong ties to us during the Second World War. The revolutionary doctrines may not have sunk into nor reoriented them fully against us, nor completely convinced them we were their enemy! Just a wild guess!

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<sup>131</sup> All articles:: Belleville. Illinois; News Democrat Newspaper, 1950.. Via: Public library.

–Chapter 12–

West of the Reservoir  
–Return to Hagaru-ri–

-RED FLAG's-

Fox Company vs. 31st Rear CP  
Toktong Pass—Hudong-ni.

While it is known and reported that one of the deficiencies of our Phantom Force being, we were in seven separate positions, yet, reality maps show the marine force west of Changjin were more widely scattered than we were, –their being (8800+) more of them at Yudam-ni —the reverse positions (2800) to Task Force Faith. That marine problem required movement to “rescue” two of their units on distant hills. Those movements required battalion size strength over three attempts to rescue their forces (1/7/C & 2/7/F) 3 miles distant from each other. That further required additional (two) round trips (+one 7 miles total of 23 miles) to retrieve those units and return one of them –under orders– not to Hagaru, (7 Miles) as ordered by their division commander, rather (4 miles) back into Yudam-ni under order of Colonel Litzenberg, the 7th Regimental Commander. For on that side of the reservoir, the trapped unit was not the foremost unit —as in the case of Faith— but their rearmost unit. “Fox” Company was totally isolated and surrounded around Toktong Pass. No matter what the situation, west of Changjin that forward group, that larger body of men had to come back through “Fox Hill” to exit Toktong Pass! Since the Joint Command established at Yudam-ni had no immediate plan to follow their division commander’s order to return to Hagaru, this Toktong Pass had no immediate necessity to invest in lives to keep it open! Also unlike our side, Fox Company —while holding their position on the hill overlooking Toktong Pass they contributed– nothing whatsoever to keeping that pass, open or secure, as only the enemy had the freedom to pass through it at will!

In Colonel Faith's situation, his forces had to come through its Tank Company at Hudong-ni, that smaller body of men, having regimental orders to move forward to join the main body of men, but they were no longer there. One can but wonder, had the situation been the same would the marine commander have ordered those men in the rear, on “Fox Hill” to also move to Yudam-ni? As indeed the 7th Marine Regimental Commander did! Since this force on “Fox Hill” were commanded by the 2/7th Marine Battalion commander, however, their battalion commander never (volunteered) flying in to relieve and evacuate Captain Barber of his command at Toktong Pass. It was the regimental commander’s decision as to the time of their withdrawal back to Hagaru. Did he in fact order them to stay put –hold their ground– or withdraw per his orders, as soon as possible back into Hagaru? I cannot reconstruct what happened there, nor can they reconstruct what happened on the east side with our forces trapped there. Yet, time wise their division commander on the 28th had issued the orders concerning that early withdrawal order –alert– to withdraw. Indicating last in first out, so they were ordered back to Hagaru 28 November: However, they did not return completely into Hagaru until December 4, the rear guard entered Hagaru-ri at 1400 hours. “When Colonels Litzenberg’s and Murray received General Smith's order to withdraw from Yudam-ni, they already were regrouping their regiments under Smith’s previous order for one regiment to clear the supply road and “rescue” the marines on Fox Hill. By midmorning of 1 December all of Litzenberg's and Murray's forces were concentrated astride the road about two miles below town.” [As per Mossman GPO: via, Marine history.]



Round trips through enemy territory: Colonel Litzenberg's attempt to open the road back into Hagaru, involved not the entire regiment—as ordered—to follow the lead of the various assigned battalion's efforts to fight through the enemy forces between Yudam-ni and Fox Company. The "Joint Command" would remain intact at Yudam-ni while these three days of efforts to "rescue" Marine isolated companies on various outpost hills did not seem to me to follow the intent of General Smith's order. First order of business should have been to regroup and isolate the two regiments at Yudam-ni. I.E. unite the RCT-5 into one consolidated regiment! If General Smith's order—calling off the advance westward—was dated 271400 Nov. why wait until 292400 Nov. to regroup for the inevitable event to return to Hagaru? That was their only option from day one at Yudam-ni! The chronology of events concerning those miles back and forth through enemy territory: 28 November—1st attempt—4 miles to rescue C Company and 4 miles to return back to Yudam-ni, total 8 miles—round trip! [Removal of C Co. further endangered Fox Co.]

### C. Chronology of the Battle

#### 1. 27 November 1950

##### a.) Yudam-ni

- (1) 0815 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (2/5) attacked westward along the MSR toward an objective one and a half miles to the west.
- (2) 0815 3/7 attacked north and west of Yudam-ni to seize high ground around the village. The attacks are successful.
- (3) 2/5 is held up by CCF forces manning roadblocks and fortified positions on high ground overlooking the MSR. During the day, this main attack netted 1,500 meter advance.
- (4) At 2125, assault battalions of the 79th and 89th CCF divisions attacked the 5th and 7th Marines regiments (RCT-5 and RCT-7) from the west, north, and northeast in a major battle. The temperature drops to -20°F. The Chinese push back the Marine lines slightly but suffer tremendous casualties.
- (5) C Co, 1/7 and F Co, 2/7 was guarding **Hill 1419 and the Toktong Pass respectively** along the MSR to the south of Yudam-ni. Both of these units were surrounded and attacked by units of the 59th CCF division. Both USMC units sustained significant casualties but held their ground. Three days of Class I and III and two units of fire were on hand for USMC units at Yudam-ni. [Keep in mind that C CO 1/7 was guarding **Hill 1419!** Also the 1/7 Battalion is commanded by LTC Davis.]

##### b.) Hagaru

**No significant enemy action.** CIC agents from 1/3 were collecting good intelligence on Chinese intentions to attack the defenses at Hagaru.

#### 2. 28 November 1950

##### a.) Yudam-ni

- (1) USMC units attacked at dawn on 28 November to regain the high ground overlooking Yudam-ni that had, been lost in the previous night's CCF attacks.
- (2) The RCT-5 and RCT-7 commanders made plans in coordination with each other and issued joint orders. No one overall commander at Yudam-ni was appointed. However, the cooperative command system worked well.
- (3) 1/7 sent south along MSR at 1015 to relieve C Co, 1/7 and F Co, 2/7. 1/7 advanced four miles south to C Co **after heavy fighting but could get no farther.** 1/7 was ordered back to Yudam-ni and returned at 2110 with Co C. F Co, 2/7 was still on its hill overlooking Toktong Pass but had received ammunition and medical supplies by air drop. [Timeline: Miles 4 + 4= round trip, 11 hours 5 minutes. [No tally on casualties! **Recall C Co, 1/7, has freed Hill 1419, rather than stay** (3 miles

from Fox Company) **here with increased battalion strength, they all return to Yudam-ni to battle another day (1 Dec.) to retrieve this hill!**]

(4) At Yudam-ni RCT-5 defended the west and north while RCT-7 defended the east, south, and southwest portion perimeter. **No major attacks from CCF occurred this day and night.**<sup>132</sup>

[Next day 29 November, duplication, getting no further than prior C Company location, same 8 mile round trip now equals 16 miles, ground gained none. Add 1 December, additional 7 miles to “rescue” Fox company =16 + 7=23, total miles, gained 7! The question I pose, why would this relief force not stay at Charley, Co 1/7 overnight and proceed to break through to Fox Company the three miles, the next morning? The timeline was to travel back to Yudam-ni after dark! In reality this should have been the lead battalion for the entire (1/1 & 1/2 & 1/3 Battalions) Regiment to follow through and return to Hagaru as ordered by General Smith. Recall Task Force Faith convoy destruction over 4 miles!]

### 3. 29 November 1950

#### a.) Yudam-ni

(1) Repositioning of units to accommodate an RCT-7 attack south along the MSR was effected. Joint planning between RCT-5 and RCT-7 continued.

(2) A composite battalion was formed [dubbed Damnation] to try and fight south to relieve Fox Co, 2/7 but again this effort was turned back by CCF forces entrenched along the MSR.

(3) **The night of 29-30 November was relatively quiet at Yudam-ni.**

(4) F Co, 2/7 was attacked for the third night in a row at Toktong Pass. However, aerial resupply had been plentiful and an estimated three CCF companies were decimated at a loss of one Marine wounded that night.<sup>133</sup> [Red Flag: No major attacks reported two of three nights at Yudam-ni.]

### 4. 30 November 1950

#### a.) Yudam-ni

(1) At 0600 on 30 November a joint RCT-5/7 order was issued to move the perimeter south of Yudam-ni in preparation for RCT-7's attack to the south. **Planning, coordination, and execution of this move were the day's main activities.** Aerial resupply of Yudam-ni continued.

(2) At 1920, Yudam-ni received the Div order for both RCT-5 and 7 to move to Hagaru and to be prepared for further moves south. [RED Flag, Again no major attack reported.]

#### b.) Hagaru

Reinforced by the tanks and personnel from TF Drysdale, the perimeter sustained another major attack from the 58th and 59th CCF divisions. The attacks came from the SW and the east. Fifteen hundred Chinese dead had been left in front of the perimeter in the aftermath of their two major attacks on Hagaru. The perimeter held **and the Chinese retired prior to daybreak**, having gained only a portion of East Hill, on the extreme eastern edge of the perimeter. [Red Flag: Lacking 31<sup>st</sup> Tank Company into Hagaru—301730 November.]

c.) Koto-ri No significant activity.

d.) Chinhung-ni No significant activity.

### 5. 1 December 1950

#### a.) Yudam-ni

(1) Joint order issued for the RCT-5 breakout to the south. Plan called for 1/7 to move across country **to relieve F Co, 2/7 and seize Toktong Pass** while 3/5 led the attack along the MSR and

<sup>132</sup> CSI Battlebook, Chosin Reservoir, Combat Studies Institute Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. P.61.

<sup>133</sup> CSI Battlebook, Chosin Reservoir, Combat Studies Institute Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. P.62.

joined with 1/7 in the vicinity of Toktong Pass. 3/7, 2/5, 1/5 and a composite battalion guarded the rear and were to follow down the MSR. Artillery was echeloned and all equipment that could be brought out would be. Air would cover the movement and the heavy trucks would come last so that breakdowns would not slow the whole column. The main advance would be straight along the MSR to Hagaru.

(2) 3/5, which was north of Yudam-ni, had great trouble disengaging from the enemy at 0800 on 1 December. Close fighting and air attacks finally allowed them to disengage. 3/7 opened a penetration and attacked to hold the shoulders of the penetration above the MSR. At 1500, 3/5 attacked south above the MSR. **1/7 assisted 3/7 in seizing Hill 1419** and then started their attack cross country to the Toktong Pass. [Here, three days later, 1/7 is back where they started from,]

(3) On the night of 1-2 December, 1/5, 2/5, and 3/7 were **all hit by heavy attacks** from the CCF, but with the aid of **night fighters** and supporting arms, the attacks were thrown back with heavy Chinese losses. 1/7 and 3/5 continued their progress south throughout the night.

## 6. 2 December 1950

### a.) Yudam-ni

(1) 1/7 continued its cross-country attack toward Toktong Pass and repeatedly surprised enemy units. The terribly cold weather and the rugged, icy terrain were 1/7's worst enemies. However, the first elements of 1/7 were able to reach F Co, 2/7's position overlooking the Toktong Pass at 1125 on 2 December. F Co, 2/7's casualties during their five-day ordeal were twenty-six KIA, three MIA, and eighty-nine WIA. 1/7 set in on high ground around Toktong Pass for the night and was an exhausted battalion.

(2) 3/5 had to fight to clear both sides of the MSR as they attacked south. They fought continuously until 0200 on the night of 2-3 December when they halted 1,000 meters short of F Co, 2/7's position to rest and reorganize.

## 7. 3 December 1950

### a.) Yudam-ni

(1) 1/7 attacked in conjunction with 3/5 to clear Toktong Pass and then fell in along the MSR and led the move down the MSR to Hagaru. Resistance between Toktong Pass and Hagaru was light compared to that found north of the Pass, and 1/7 made excellent advances with the lead elements forming up into drill formations and marching into the Hagaru perimeter at 1900.

(2) 3/5, after attacking with 1/7 in the early and midmorning, held Toktong Pass and had other units in: the column pass through them heading south along the MSR. About midnight 3/5 fell in along the MSR to move with and protect the artillery. The column then took the order in which it would reach Hagaru: 1/7, 1/5, 3/5, 2/5 and 3/7. Artillery and support units were interspersed throughout this column. A total of 115 air sorties were flown on 3 December to support the move south to Hagaru.

## 8. 4 December 1950

a.) Yudam-ni At 1400 on 4 December, the last elements of 3/7 entered the perimeter at Hagaru. The head of the column had taken fifty-nine hours to cover the fourteen miles from Yudam-ni to Hagaru and the rear unit seventy-nine hours. **Some 1,500 casualties and nearly all of the equipment of the units located at Yudam-ni were brought to Hagaru and the first phase of the breakout was**

**completed.**<sup>134</sup> [END] However, 8 (16 units in all) when 155mm howitzers' had to be abandoned when their prime mover tractors ran out of fuel, later destroyed via air attacks.

The major concern for this author is trying to understand how the Marines had the freedom to move (16 miles) round trip those two days over terrain covered exclusively through a massive force of enemy, surrounding them, in unsuccessful efforts to rescue Fox Company at Toktong Pass!<sup>135</sup>

In reality, by not leaving —28 November— from Yudam-ni until the same (1 December) period as Faith's breakout, the Red Flag of “air priority” to Faith was iffy and suspect at best. Again, could —reference— be in their history only to divert attention elsewhere? Hide blame on their need to withdraw needed air power, and ammo drops for their own large force from that on the east side —therefore decreasing the damage their forces would suffer in their own withdrawal? Within this same time frame Colonel Faith's one battalion had already drawn back —two mile— somewhat, “back towards Hagaru” as per marine history on the 29th, yet here the main body west of Changjin was still at Yudam-ni with no real history stating they were locked in that far above “Fox Hill”. Their command by “Smith” to rescue that force trapped there at “Fox Hill”. However, no evidence they were slowly inching their way back towards Hagaru—as ordered! Much to the contrary!

“The two Colonels planned to move down the road toward Hagaru-ri as a single column during the day of the 1st, leaving a rear guard to barricade the front entrance to their position while the main body unlocked the rear door. The key, judged Toktong Pass. The two commanders intended to send one battalion cross-country east of the road after dusk to relieve the Fox Hill troops and secure the pass before the main column arrived.” That order for one full battalion for one individual task; is the answer to why the Army force could not do what they did! Remember the numbers, 6 battalions west of Changjin, plus the 11th Artillery Battalion, compared to 2 mixed American/ROK's infantry, battalions and one equally mixed battalion of artillery minus one battery (-C) created an unequal fighting force east of Changjin. Was the enemy action equal? Compare the reported casualties:

East Hill was at the eastern edge of Hagaru, on the night of 28 November it was re-enforced against enemy elements of the *58th CCF Division*. Therefore, it was a danger section outside of Hagaru. Nevertheless, two of these divisions of the enemy are locked in combat with the Army Task Force east of Changjin, some eight miles upward along the reservoir banks. Each CPVF division reported at strength of 10,000 per division, with the lowest strength of 7,500. This *58th Division* of enemy now east of Hagaru, is from one of those divisions also reported as having some 7,500 men. What happened to them? Where did they go? What did they do? These enemy forces, being in close contact at all times overlooking the forces at Hagaru, yet little is known of them!

Surely had the *58th Division* been at full strength, without question they could have overran —one battalion— stationed at Hagaru! Notwithstanding the unknown and un-stated number of tanks located there. As Marine History records, “They made no more attempt to break through.” (Dec. 1) WHY is that? Was it because they were weak? Or was it perhaps —just perhaps— this enemy would move forward to cover a sure bet; to help block that Phantom Force that now had no other option than to pass through Hudong-ni, four miles up the road towards Hill 1221? Did they simply exchange positions when the 31st RCT Tank Command was ordered back into Hagaru? That answer is indeed open ended!

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<sup>134</sup> CSI Battlebook, Chosin Reservoir, Combat Studies Institute Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (#1 thru #8) P.61–65.

<sup>135</sup> Smith interview by Benis Frank: 1969, “Murray made, as I said, about 2,000 yards, and I halted the attack, because it was manifest that we were up against a massive force out there.”

Our Phantom Force provides no clue to the division or the enemy regiments we engaged within our path, at least no records survived to that affect.

Still the answer; no one can say for sure that the *58th CCF Division* just disintegrated with their second attempt, too capture, the very importance of Hagaru, isolated and alone in the center of that  $\Rightarrow Y \Leftarrow$  the arrows pointing to represent Hagaru the underlined V as the HUB of the three spokes outward would depend on the other three points West  $> \underline{V} <$  East, and the lower leg to Koto-ri, South of this hub. If Hagaru fell, so would the other points above east and west, over time. Each of these units would lose the airstrip, each would depend on air supply drops, and each could never expect a rear unit upwards of Koto-ri to “rescue” them. Therefore, each or all of the enemy forces could have folded in their lines to attack inward to Hagaru—but they did not instead concentrating on those outer forces. The implication that only the *80th Division* was east of Changjin is now discounted by the *81st Division*, elements of the *94th Division* and *58th Division* being their between Hagaru and Hudong-ni as well. However, —reports— that three of these four enemy divisions had been in earlier positions north of the Reservoir. It implies that their mission was to trap whatever force will venture north toward Changjin that force would have to pass through these two divisions. Nevertheless, our forces were not moving towards their forces on the required timetables, so the impatience of the Chinese to engage our units required they move downward towards us, that delay cost them efficiency. Had General Smith obeyed his orders to be within his assigned Zone “north of Hagaru?” That  $> Y <$  would have been a V with no descending leg downward to Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni, with Smith having no responsibility for that Army right side of that V therefore only the left side would be his 1st Division Zone of operations! That would satisfy his demand to have his division concentrated at all times. So why would he refuse to take this concession he sought and requested?

As Historian Appleman would state: (page 55-56)

“It appears that the CCF 80th Division conducted most if not all of the operations against the 31st RCT east of Chosin. It is not certain that the entire division was engaged in these actions, nor is it certain that other enemy formations were not engaged there.” – “Further, the 31st RCT never identified this enemy division during the battle there.... Surviving records of the 31st RCT or personal recollections of participants do not identify the enemy unit’s encountered there—only that they were Chinese.”

That enemy delay (not MG Smith’s) more than any other condition “saved Smith’s” command, had the enemy not moved, our (Army) forces would have moved further into that open-ended “V” or “U” trap the enemy made famous, as a tactic of battle, yet, a hypothesis of who really “saved” Smith’s command. The American Press (agents) created and praised Smith’s delays, but did that activate an unplanned enemy attack? As MacArthur said: “I, myself felt we had reached up sprung the Red trap, and escaped it.”<sup>136</sup> All one has to do here is to compare that four miles added to our journey back to Hagaru to weigh the danger to each of our forces being four miles further north. Still, because the enemy failure to attack Hagaru after two attacks, does not add credence to the implied fact that they just disappeared in thin air. Reconnaissance reports failed to locate them, yet a marine force, sent out east of Hagaru “reportedly” to count 300 dead in the burned out truck convoy at the final roadblock there. A FACT verified by survivors of that action. What is implied is that those in charge at Hagaru, failed to record any documentation of any great enemy threat to Hagaru from the east side of the reservoir. Nevertheless, that threat was there all the time, and a Phantom Force was required to

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<sup>136</sup> MacArthur Reminiscences: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Fifth-printing 1964. p.429.

neutralize that threat. Such is the relationship to two different Alamos, one in Texas the other in North Korea.

Since it is implied and restated, that the full 60,000, (8 Divisions, of 7,500 men) of CCF was facing the 1st Marine Division independently, and not facing the entire Tenth Corps (X Corps) of which the Marine division was only one of five divisions belonging to this corps. Those three enemy forces — joined by the *58th CCF Division*, having annihilated our task force, could well move back to East Hill and fortify that location. However, that would merely indicate a reciprocal action of the force at East Hill moving forward to Hudong-ni to occupy that area now deserted by the 31st RCT tank command. While the Marine forces will never —continuously— engage those enemy forces on East Hill between December 1 and December 6, one can but wonder what that CCVF force “did those 5 days” it seems an oversight here that the marines failed to state that the remaining forces hitting our force has never linked up with those on East Hill on December 4-7. That enemy force on East Hill remained a vital treat to those planes landing and taking off from Hagaru! Knocking out any of those planes —or severe damage to the runway— could have delayed several incoming and outgoing flights!

“The Hagaru-ri perimeter had been quiet for four days by the time the last troops from Yudam-ni arrived.” (1400 Dec.4) “After failing to take the base during the night of 30-November, the *58th Division* had made no more attempts to force its way in. About fifteen hundred dead Chinese counted so far by the marines along with information from prisoners indicated that the enemy division would need reinforcements and new supplies.”<sup>137</sup> Only 1,500 dead from a division of 7,500 —to a Marine high of 10,000— left a large amount of enemy forces! Since some of the Chinese positions on East Hill dominated the Marine withdrawal route, “General Smith's rear guard attacked the height on the morning of 6 December as the 7th Marines moved out of Hagaru-ri.” (Mossman p.141) “The assault cleared the hill but also prompted hard Counterattacks from ground farther east that cost the Chinese over twelve hundred killed before they subsided near dawn on the 7th.” Ground forces *farther east, would be from the vicinity of Hudong-ni!* This final assault battle between Hagaru-Koto-ri, also included those Army men from Task Force Faith, now designated as under a Marine Provisional Battalion which lost 120 Artillery men from the RCT-31 (that 3rd battalion) east of Changjin, namely from the 57th Field Artillery Battalion (-C Battery) These 120 were those “able bodied survivors” of Task Force Faith, all KIA or MIA’s, this one day, 6 December 1950! Yet, General Smith is on record denying the PUC too, these Task Force Faith casualties as “contributing nothing to the breakout from Hagaru-to Hungnam!”

-RED FLAG-

Counterattacks from ground “farther east” pose this question, were those reinforcements coming through the *80th Division* zone east of Hudong-ni? Are: were, they just a mixture of the other two sister divisions belonging to the *27th Army-the 81st & 82nd*? On the other hand, those 1,200 men killed, from the *58th Division*, that had previously moved further east, or were their forces from the *80th Division* moving further south towards Hagaru, or a combination of both? If either, why wait until the 6 December to move their forces into East Hill instead of the 5th? Could it be they were busy with another task force —someplace “farther east” around Hudong-ni? Perhaps! Still what all this indicates, that it did not really matter at the time, to what unit was in what position as far as the X Corps was concerned. Review again the chart that lists our American force of 2,505 men from our side — missing— as to where they were or not, located at this time and place. It is asinine to attempt to over exaggerate your enemy forces, while disclaiming the where about of your own forces, recording their

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<sup>137</sup> Mossman: Ebb & Flow GPO, CMH p. 137-138

numbers but not their location. Above all else one would be purely led to believe that our forces were concerned with our actions more so than the enemy –after all– this is an after the fact report. There is entirely too much Marine speculation of where the enemy “might have been” over the location of where those 2,800 Americans “might have been.” A location somewhere East of Changjin, just does not cut it.

–Changjin OR Pujon–

History should be as accurate as it positively can be, as others view history as statement of fact. That –injustice lies in the placement of mere speculation, over facts in relationship to the reservoir and that confusion over which of the two objectives was now Army responsibility. The answer is both of them at one time, now the Changjin previously assigned to the marines. Yet, they will attempt to remain there as well. The results of accurate history could be embarrassing to those that embellish its events to praise or honor themselves. Such is the case here. We can't all be East of Changjin, no more than we all were west of Changjin, the 17th Regiment –again– was at Hyesanjin on the Yalu far, far, northeast of Changjin, these 2,505 men listed as missing in action were not there, nor was the 17th at the eastern banks of Changjin. However, those 2,505 American men from the 7th Division were there, and history expanded to place them there, unless one removes the paragraphs filled by others filling that void over time. Hence, the same Marine Corps embarrassment to relocate out of that position, one they held unlawfully over the years. However, their damage control and Public Relations Affairs officers could not allow that to happen. One should remember that the Marine Corps wrote their own history of the Reservoir, The Army contributed very little information to that written history of battle, and that is utter failure on the part of the Army. It is indeed no fault of the marine historians to expand on their own involvement there. Yet just as they carved out that air strip–regardless of the controversy of who ordered it –it benefited all concerned. Just as that Phantom Force east of Changjin made their own large “commitment” (that Bacon & Eggs reference once again\*) to Changjin History on that east side of the Reservoir, those Army lives bought time, that time in turn bought space, that space in turn brought in more Marine replacement troops and equipment to Hagaru. Over that time, that saved further Marine casualties on the road back into Koto-ri. Indeed those survivors—so called able bodied men from Task force Faith will make an additional “commitment” of over 120 of those 385 men to the Army casualty listings.

\*Bacon & Eggs reference; It has been stated, that the pig providing the Bacon made a total commitment to that breakfast, while the Hen providing the eggs made only a contribution to that meal. In that, respect the Army supplied the Bacon and the Marine Corps supplied the Eggs.

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Note in the Map 20 below, the absence of the 31st RCT Tank Company —is missing from this Marine Map— as if they had never been located between 27 and 30 November at Hudong-ni. Thus without knowing this in advance one can remove them from Military History being there between those three days. That area is the same as the one where Task Force Faith convoy was stopped! As Roy Appleman in his book, “*East of Chosin*” states:<sup>138</sup>

“Was it not ironic that Task Force Faith came to its final stop just short of the site of Drake’s 31st Tank Company bivouac and the 31st Infantry Rear CP? Thirty hours earlier there had been 16 operable tanks and 325 soldiers in a perimeter within a stone’s throw of where the convoy died –they had been there since the evening of November 27. Then on November 30 an order came for them to withdraw to Hagaru-ri.” It has been stated that a picture is worth a thousand words! So too, a map can be the same!

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<sup>138</sup> Roy Appleman: “East of Chosin” p.322.

But this one is intentionally missing an important fact within its date lines! While history records the fact missing. One can only wonder why that fact is missing here.

This fact could have been of value to those writing the “*Thesis*” on the study of “Encircled Forces” with a strong tank defensive only four miles behind them!

Department of the Army: The Infantry Battalion, FM 7-20 (1969)

“The encirclement offers the greatest possibility for fixing the enemy in position and permits his systematic capture or destruction.”<sup>139</sup>

“A unit is considered encircled when it is surrounded by an enemy force which has cut all ground routes of evacuation and reinforcement. In a fluid situation when forces are widely dispersed, commanders must plan for and accept encirclement either alone or with the assistance of a linkup force.”<sup>140</sup> This event 19 years before the above manual! **THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN A VALUABLE PIECE OF HISTORY TO ENCLUDE IN THAT MANUAL!**

S.L.A. Marshall: Part two: The difference between the 2nd Infantry Division disaster, in Eighth Army area, and between the 1st Marine Division in X Corps:<sup>141</sup> [Author, using selective paragraphs. Note, **all brackets and bold print** are by this author for clarity and emphasis’.]

Written in 1951, the two parts of this report on Chinese Communist Forces in Korea were classified under the U.S. Espionage Laws as a secret document. Released: after twelve years—declassified. [Apparently: released early as —Secret— required double the time to declassify!]

Part One: is on the Operations of the 2nd Infantry Division Rifle Companies in the battle of Kunu-ri, November 1950.

[Note; It is ironic of the similarity—in this report— between the enemy tactic used against the 2nd Division and those East of Changjin, coming from the rear and the ridges and low points along the reservoir. As much as that difference between the weather effects between the 1st Marine Division west of the reservoir and the 31st RCT east of the Changjin Reservoir!] But first to outline the difference as stated above:

Part Two<sup>142</sup>

Detailed study of the operations of the 1st Marine Division against CCF in the Koto-ri, Hagaru-ri, Yudam-ni area 20 November to 10 December 1950 substantiates in nearly all major particulars the conclusion drawn in the paper, “CCF in the attack,” published on 5 January 1951, ORO-S-26 (EUSAK), wherein CCF tactical methods and weapons employment were evaluated on the basis of the experience of the 2nd Infantry Division in the battle of Kunu-ri, 24 November to 1 December 1950.

In its on fall against 1st Marine Division, **CCF did not at any time succeed or in enveloping and fractionating any major element of the command**, or in overrunning more than a minor outwork of a general defensive perimeter. Hence its tactical elements were at no time as fully extended in the attack against local positions as occurred during the enemy assault against 2nd Infantry Division’s line

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<sup>139</sup> Introduction-Chapter 1, Department of the Army: The Infantry Battalion, FM 7-20 (1969) p.4-23.

<sup>140</sup> A Thesis: by Major Robert M. Coombs, USA. p.1:-Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir, Korea-1950.

<sup>141</sup> CSI Battlebook, Chosin Reservoir, Combat Studies Institute Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Also. Hopkins: Addendum, One Bugle, No Drums.

<sup>142</sup> Marshall, S. L. A: CCF (Chinese Communist Forces) in the Attack (Part II), ORO-S-34 (EUSAK), Chevy Chase, MD Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office, 1951.



east of the Chongchon River. There was thus far less chance to observe CCF characteristics in the fire fight under wholly fluid conditions.”

[This is fully understood by any veteran with prior combat training: Known as “The Terrain” that area you must fight over to obtain your objective! Therefore as stated in the following paragraph, since the Terrain: “were wholly unlike, not only as to the character of the countryside, but as to the manner of initial employment by our forces and initial deployment by CCF, there is no warrant for any broad comparison between the two operations. [Likewise: east of the reservoir! “The Terrain” also determines the “initial employment by our forces and initial deployment by CCF!]

“Since the circumstances of the fighting around Kunu-ri by 2nd Infantry Division and north of Koto-ri by the 1st Marine Division were wholly unlike, not only as to the character of the countryside, but as to the manner of initial employment by our forces and initial deployment by CCF, there is no warrant for any broad comparison between the two operations. Where that is done hereinafter, it is solely with the object of emphasizing CCF characteristics and capabilities.”

#### Weapons and Works

“In general, the CCF Divisions engaged by 1st Marine Division appear to have been no better armed than those engaged by 2nd Infantry Division at about the same time. **The major material difference was that the CCF divisions engaged by 1st Marine Division appear to have been critically in short supply, both as to food and ammunition.** [Again the major difference between the CCF forces east of the reservoir—unequal—makes all the difference!] Whereas the persistence of CCF fire from fixed positions, the circumstance that the machine gunners and grenadiers seemed never to run short of munitions, and the observation that troops in the rifle line were backed up by an ample train bearers, were noteworthy in CCF operations **against 2nd Infantry Division, the situation was quite the reverse among CCF operating in the Chosin Reservoir area.** CCF divisions committed to the battle seem quickly to have exhausted such stocks as they had brought forward. Their effectiveness ceased at this point, since resupply had not overtaken them. When they withdrew because of ammunition failure, fresh divisions came forward into that part of the line, and the supply-exhausted division then disappeared from the front. [The difference between the friendly forces on the west side and the east side of the reservoir, —while facing a smaller size force— our enemy never seemed to run short of ammunition.]

This phenomenon was remarked upon by Major General Oliver P. Smith commanding, and was confirmed by regimental and battalion commanders. PW interrogations showed that the great body of these troops had crossed the Yalu River between 13 and 16 November, concurrently with 1st Marine Division’s first advance from the base ports northward, and had then pressed on toward the battle area as rapidly as possible. It seems probable that all other major considerations, such as competent supply arrangements, were subordinated to the necessity for getting these troops forward in time to intercept 1st Marine Division’s column and cut the MSR after the preponderant strength of the division had been committed to the attack in the Reservoir area.

Consistent with this hypothesis, it was also noted by all forces within 1st Marine Division that the CCF enemy were invariably committed to the attack on one line, with no options. This held true of divisions, as of battalion and company formations, each had been given one set task. Each appeared to persist in this task so long as any cohesive fighting strength remained. When at last beaten back from it, the CCF appeared planless, and aimless, incapable of rallying toward some alternative object. The troops withdrew and sat on the countryside.

Even so, prisoner interrogations indicated a high order of average intelligence. Not alone among officers, but in the rank-and-file, the average interrogee could name his company, regiment, division, army and army group, and was knowledgeable of the plans and intentions of higher headquarters. Thus it was from enlisted PW's that 1st Marine Division first learned that the CCF plan was to attack in main against the MSR, after two regiments had passed to the northward.<sup>143</sup> This intelligence was gained while the advance was still in progress. But what was particularly puzzling was that PW's had little or no consciousness of rank. The prisoner would identify himself as a "soldier" or "officer" but could not state his grade. If there were CCF NCO's, they could not identify themselves as such." [Note: Northward is the wrong direction for the Marines, it is westward—not northward until after seizing Mupyong-ni!]

During 1st Marine Division's campaign, there were six instances in which the CCF attack was supported by light artillery pieces. Not more than two or three guns were employed at any one time, and the shelling was limited as to rounds. In the main, enemy offensive power was based upon automatic weapons, chiefly the .30 caliber submachine gun, the rifle and the light potato-masher grenade being the principal other attacks on 1st Marine Division's defensive perimeters. There were no novel or eccentric employment of any of these weapons, other than ineffective attempts to string grenades so that they could be used to booby-trap the facings of physical roadblocks, with a lanyard leading back to a roadside pit. This device usually failed because the Chinese soldier in the pit was dead before the time came to pull the string. In one instance the failure was due to the grenade pins freezing.

On the defense, these CCF furnished their hilltop positions with artillery-resistant bunkers, walled with heavy logs wired together in double thickness, with timbered ceilings and a two-foot thick rock and earth covering. These works resisted air attack except under a direct hit by rockets. Their materials had been moved to the high ground on horseback, and after the CCF deployment through the general area, the horses had then been withdrawn into the back country, away from the MSR. There were few horses to be seen in the area by the time that the US air force began to work it over.

In cutting 1st Marine Division's MSR north of Koto-ri and west of Hagaru-ri, with the object of isolating and destroying the division, CCF used both roadblocks (physical) in substantial number and the demolitions in lesser number. The explosives were properly employed in the most sensitive spots along the withdrawal route, a notable example in the blowing of the apron bridge across the penstocks not far from the base of Hill 1081, south of Koto-ri. This bridge was directly above the facing of a 1500-foot-deep gorge. Unreplaced, it meant that the road south was blocked to all vehicles. The division had foreseen the problem and was prepared to span the gap without loss of vital time to the column. A treadway bridge had been flown in to move with the column. Even so, CCF had accomplished this block with some expertness, getting a maximum of impairment **with a minimum of explosive**. The whole road was replete with opportunities of this sort had the enemy been well fixed with explosives. The MSR was a narrow track cut into the side of a mountain. A few heavy rockslides would have completed its ruin. But though CCF was in possession of this part of the countryside for more than one week, no major demolition's of this type were attempted. There, and farther to the north, between Hagaru-ri and Yudam-ni, CCF appears to have had only enough explosives at hand to

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<sup>143</sup> This prisoner information is redundant throughout all books, as a prime facture of reliability! However, the enemy never let the Marines pass "to the northward" but had established road blocks in front of these two Marine regiments at Yudam-ni, stopping them from advancing westward toward Mupyong-ni!

wreck a few minor bridges which could be unhinged with small charges. [This author would dispute this part of the CCF in destruction of the Funchilin Pass, as there is some indication that it may have been destroyed by friendly heavy field artillery instead.]

The usual physical road block was accomplished by the piling-up of rock, earth, and rubble so as to form a not-too resistant barrier averaging between 2-1/2 and 3-1/2 feet in height. About half the time these road blocks were given some supporting fire from the flanks-usually one or two machine guns, and perhaps a mortar, firing from the ridgelines off the flanks. In other cases, the block was not given active support, even though the high ground off flank had not been swept by friendly skirmishers, and readily pushed aside by the dozers moving in the van of infantry column.

However, there are also examples in which the road block was supported strongly and persistently by automatic fire from the ground, and snipers closing in at practical small arms distance. There then ensued the knocking-out of vehicles by bullet fire, the temporary blocking of the column, and a steady attrition in men and material along the road, **until at last the CCF were brought in check by superior fire and movement.**<sup>144</sup>

#### Discipline in the column

Among the incidents of this character, the most instructive is the experience of Task Force Drysdale, on the road from Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri on the night of 27-28 November. This small TF of British Commandos, one company of Marines and one company of infantry, was sent north from Koto-ri, to open the MSR to Hagaru-ri after receipt of the first report that CCF had cut the road. It moved in trucks after having first swept the ridges immediately north of Koto-ri -one area where there were commanding ridgelines right next to the MSR. A supply convoy was supposed to follow in its wake, moving under its protection. In the forefront of the TF moved one platoon of medium tanks. Another platoon was assigned to follow after the truck convoy, serving as rear guard for the column as a whole.

The subsequent breakdown of this column as it ran into an ambush installed by CCF (the force was estimated at less than 3 battalions of enemy) in the open country beyond the Koto-ri ridge can be attributed largely to the manner in which the armor was handled. On a small scale, the action and reaction were almost identical with the misfortunes of the 2nd Infantry Division's column on the road between Kunu-ri and Sunchon, three days later. Whereas the safety of the thin-skinned vehicles, once they came into the fire gauntlet, depended almost wholly on rapidity of movement, the armor stopped to engage as soon as CCF fire began to rattle against its side. This in turn blocked the road and subjected the motorized elements to a punishing fire from the flanks, which they were in no position amply to return. Argument and pleading with the tankers proved futile. They had not been placed under direct command of the TF leader, and they were largely insensible to the effects which their tactics were having on the friendly elements to their rear.

In an effort to save the TF from total ruin, the officers with the infantry elements (and the Air FO's as well) sought to intervene with the armor, and to persuade it to desist from fire and keep moving. Those farthest to the rear could not even understand what was happening and did not realize that it was the armor, more than the enemy, which had produced the paralysis. About half of TF Drysdale's personnel got through this ambush finally; fifty percent of its vehicles had been lost. The supply convoy was lost

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<sup>144</sup> This is an important paragraph concerning this author's last bracket enclosure, concerning who may have destroyed and caused that massive road damage at Funchilin Pass!

altogether; the personnel were either killed or captured. Notably, the tanks, which by their fire had brought the other elements into jeopardy, escaped without loss.

Those who were in best position to observe the ambush and breakdown of this small column, agreed that the losses had been due less to the direct effects of CCF fire than to lack of control within the armored force, lack of communication between it and the motorized element and the failure of the tankers to understand what their halt-and-fire tactics were doing to the train behind them.

This is a relatively new problem for US armor and the motorization in joint movement via the road. Its common denominators are emphasized by the identicality of experience between TF Drysdale and the 2nd Infantry Division's column. They should perhaps be given rather close study in common, since there are several major lessons to be emphasized, and the problem is likely to be a recurrent one for so long as enemy tactics are directed toward crossing the rear and closing the escape route. What is plainly indicated is that short of a clear appraisal of the problem, and the determination of the SOP's which will assure tactical unity within the column, the presence of armor does not of itself assure additional protection to a motorized column moving through enemy country over narrow roads, and may vastly increase its vulnerability. What is intended as a shield becomes in fact a drag upon all movement, in a situation where mobility is requisite to safety.

In the case of the 2nd Infantry Division, the armor was interspersed through the length of the column. With TF Drysdale, it was used as a covering force front and rear. The results were alike dismal, because in both cases the means of control and communication had not been made firm prior to movement.

#### CCF's Grand Object

TF Drysdale's experience has here been stressed out of all proportion to its significance, in the general operations of the 1st Marine Division, because it illuminates the one point at which CCF's general object in the attack upon 1st Marine Division achieved a measure of local tactical success. Here, once again, as in CCF's operations against 2nd Infantry Division south on Kunu-ri, the main purpose of the Chinese enemy was to entice and permit a maximum extension of the forces in the attack, then close across the MSR, and undertake the general envelopment and destruction of the main column as it responded to the mounting pressure against its rear.

This effort was beaten down in detail at every point by 1st Marine Division which, throughout its advance to the Chosin Reservoir and westward to Yudam-ni, and subsequently during its withdrawal southward to Chinghung-ni, put uppermost the principle of firmness within its own lines, both during the attack and when on defense. [this could well be disputed by marine reports of setting howitzer position along the road back into Koto-ri that time frame would require the same tactic as the tank column of TF Drysdale] After the one sally by TF Drysdale, made with the object of reopening the MSR between Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri, 1st Marine Division did not again employ minor forces in any attempt to shake CCF's hold on the MSR, though the enemy had closed across the road, both between Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri (1st Marine Division CP) and between Hagaru-ri and Yudam-ni where 5th and 7th RCT's were operating. Temporarily 1st Marine Division accepted this situation. At all points its forces operated fortress fashion within their own perimeters, counter-attacking in such measure as was necessary to keep CCF off balance, and to deny the enemy any undue advantage in ground. In effect, 1st Marine Division stood in column on a line of strong points within enemy country. Supply of critical

materials to these strong points, and the evacuation of the wounded from them, was maintained by air. The construction of airstrips had been undertaken immediately, and the construction was in process even before the strength of CCF in the Reservoir area had been felt.

As will be discussed later, 1st Marine Division at its four main positions- Yudam-ni, Hagaru-ri, Kotori, and Chinghung-ni- put depth of organization, and unity within the local force, above all else, and occasionally with deliberate intent forsook certain of the higher ridges in the immediate vicinity to the enemy, for the sake of greater tightness within its own lines. This choice paid phenomenal dividends and in no instance involved and inordinate cost. [This is the fate of Task forces east of Changjin. Withdrawal of their tanks created a tighter perimeter at Hagaru-ri however doomed the other Army forces.] CCF proceeded to impale itself upon this line of strong points. In all four areas, as the days and nights wore on, its attacks, at first pressed in full fury, gradually diminished in violence, until finally the enemy pulled off, having had enough. Though they continued in great numbers in the countryside and swarmed among the ridges during the daylight hours, their role was strictly passive and they did not resume the organized attack. [Same east of the reservoir, there is no way we could have survived five days within our perimeter with a continuous full fury attacks each day, as we were also diminishing in manpower as much as they were, or more so due to the weather elements.]

Perhaps the most startling example of the effect of a resolute defense upon CCF's moral aggressiveness was provided by Fox Company, 7th Marines, which for five days and nights preserved a perimeter defense in isolation, holding the pass between the division force at Hagaru-ri and the 7th and 5th RCT's at Yudam-ni. During this period the company was wholly surrounded by CCF troops in aggregate strength of perhaps two battalions. The perimeter was close invested and broken at one point on the first night, though the ground was regained and CCF driven off before morning came. The enemy attacked along the same line and in about the same strength on the second night, but again repulsed. On the third night, CCF come on less surely, though by that time Fox Company had taken heavy losses. **Then came the respite, though CCF forces in large number remained within seeing distance during the next two days, there was no further assault.** [Still this same script was being played out east of Changjin with two additional days to go, and F Company had officially been ordered back into Hagaru-ri. The praise over Fox Company of 240 men *holding the pass between the division force at Hagaru-ri and the 7th and 5th RCT's at Yudam-ni* is inaccurate! Fox Company has become a liability rather than an asset! The fact that two prior round trips from Yudam-ni to "rescue" that company, jeopardized those two battalions sent to rescue Fox Company failed after two attempts, over two days of four miles before these rescue forces were ordered back to Yudam-ni, equals two round trips of four miles forward, equal two eight mile trips, equal to 16 miles. Task Force Faith was destroyed within four miles on the east side of the reservoir! This brings into question the severity between the CCF enemies on this west side of the reservoir!] On the fifth morning, a battalion of 7th Regiment, moving cross-country [**Another seven miles=16+7-23 miles invested to rescue Fox Company!**] to the relief of Fox Company, was temporarily halted by strong CCF resistance, within less than 1000 yards of the latter's lines Such was the morale of Fox Company after its successful defense of the position for five days that it offered by radio to send a patrol out and bring the relieving battalion in. [History has never recorded: this negative event!]

The incident was not the rare exception; it was typical of the spirit which activated 1st Marine Division's operations as a whole. "We had the feeling at all times that we had the upper hand and that we were giving the enemy a beating whenever he chose to fight," said General Smith of the operations

of his forces. This estimate is supported by the detailed study of what occurred to companies and platoons in 1st Marine fighting line, of CCF losses and reactions. They believed, on the basis of what they saw and felt, that they had been victor on every field. They were confident that they had achieved these results mainly with their own fighting power. They were indignant that what they had done had been in past discounted by those press reports which said by inference that 1st Marine Division, having become overextended in enemy-held country, had to be extricated by the intervention of other than Marine Forces. [Thus discredits all report about the Marine Division being “out of their element, too far inland, miss-used” etc.]

It suffices to add that on the record, 1st Marine division was fully confident of its own situation and power to contend against such further pressures as CCF might put upon it from the hour that 5th and 7th RCT's withdrawing from Yudam-ni to the westward, closed upon Hagaru-ri at the southern tip of the Chosin Reservoir, where the division CP and defensive perimeter were established. [Note the discrepancy in direction of the earlier report of northward.] “PW interrogations showed that the great body of these troops had crossed the Yalu River between 13 and 16 November, concurrently with 1st Marine Division's first advance from the base ports northward, and had then pressed on toward the battle area as rapidly as possible.” Thenceforward, it was a question of how best to conserve force and drive CCF from the ridges flanking the MSR to the southward, with minimal loss in personnel and vehicles to the column.

#### Attrition and Concealment Within CCF.

Apart from those enemy forces which had become broken or neutralized in the attempt to destroy, by direct assault, 1st Marine Division's defensive perimeters at Yudam-ni (a two-RCT position) Hagaru-ri (a reinforced battalion position), the effort of CCF during the period 27 November to 2 December had been directed toward deploying other maneuver bodies against the corridors connecting these focal points in battle. These CCF, though out of range of the infantry weapons in the defensive bases, were not left unmolested. From Chinghung-ni to Koto-ri was 12 miles, from Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri 9 miles, from Hagaru-ri to Yudam-ni 13 miles. Such targets as were brought under observation by air or by road patrols were thus usually within range of 1st Marine Division artillery in one or two of the four defensive bases. Weather, for the most part, was favorable for air strikes.

Whether the use of villages for daylight cover was peculiar to this one operation, and was super-induced by the effects of sub-zero temperatures on an army traveling for the most part without blankets, or heavy overcoats, and shod in tennis shoes, is a point worthy of close regard.

Certainly the loss to CCF caused by cold alone, during the long week in which blocking groups camped on 1st Marine Division's MSR, vainly hoping to trap the division when it attacked south, must have been terrible indeed. Hundreds of these enemy surrendered because they were no longer fit to fight; under the lash of the weather the hunters became the hunted. Many were found dead, victims of freezing untouched by a bullet or shard. Some who surrendered were frozen through in all limbs. Others reported that they had been without food for the greater part of one week. They had kept alive by digging foxholes just barely wide enough for one man to squeeze his body into, and then like animals, had sunk themselves in these burrows, trying to conserve such warmth as their bodies would impart to the frozen ground.

Among these fighters were many who could no longer work a rifle bolt or pull a trigger. A sufficient number retained enough bodily activity, however, to persist in the main mission, until destroyed by 1st

Marine Division's battalions in the sweep from ridgeline to ridgeline which permitted the advance to the motorized column through the mountain passes. by progressive fire-movement, 1st Marine Division eradicated these CCF over a wide belt on both sides of the MSR. The Division strong-points farther to the southward severed as dustpans to the broom during this sweep, and portions of their garrisons attacked northward concurrently with the advance southward of the main column, thereby entrapping greater numbers of CCF within the corridor which they had purposed to use as a deadfall for the US force. The seeming slow progress of this movement, which was watched with apprehension, if not alarm, by the outside world, was due to the natural difficulties of the countryside and the painstaking care with which 1st Marine Division had reorganized its resources before proceeding with the attack.

During the campaign as a whole, the temperature varied between 20 above zero and 20 below. There had been one major snowstorm with a fall approximating six inches, which built up drifts five to six feet deep in some places.

#### Systematic Use of Cover

As inexorable as were the conditions imposed by man and Nature on those of the enemy who thus took position in the open country, it does not follow that the use of village cover by the great body of CCF in this vicinity was an expedient of the time and place.

Rather, the absence of any logical alternative supports the premise that the systematic use of village cover is standard procedure with CCF, and that they must refuge in the native huts in numbers which would be unthinkable to any western soldiery. They concentrate their field forces in this manner during the daylight hours, using village concealment adjacent to their axis of advance and main object of attack, for the express reason that there is no other place to hide, except in caves or heavily forested areas. Whole armies cannot hide themselves in man-made works and escape detection by the normal means of air reconnaissance, however skilled their camouflage discipline. Nor can they dispose themselves along ridgelines and among hilltops and remain capable of reassembly within such an interval as would permit them to achieve effective concentration against a more mobile opponent. These things are not within human possibility, and the CCF thus far have shown no super-human capacities in its Korean operations. To deny these forces any use of village concealment would seem, therefore, to be an essential step toward the disruption and paralysis of their operations. Thrown upon the open countryside, they will lose effective mobility, in whatever season.

#### Lines of Advance.

Equally marked in this operation, as in 2nd Infantry Division's operations around Kunu-ri, was CCF's preference for the night attack, which when held or repulsed, would consummate in a withdrawal just prior to dawn. Their tactics in the night attack were no wise different than those described in the paper "CCF in the attack" except that they were not experienced in full experienced because they were invariably beaten on the local ground by 1st Marine Division's perimeter forces. The attack almost invariably sought to achieve local penetration under the cover of a pinning machine gun fire. The grenade and submachine gun were the main weapons in the subsequent attempt to develop a breach. On at least six occasions these thrusts achieved an initial, partial success. This done, the enemy attempt to follow-up proved fruitless. Either further exploitation was prevented by a dam of fire lowered against the breach by 1st Marine Division's supporting weapons, or the ground was retaken and CCF driven off by the counterattacking infantry.

#### Attitude of CCF

Throughout the campaign the enemy's attitude toward US wounded remained inscrutable and in major respects contradictory. For example, during the evacuations of US wounded across the frozen surface of Chosin reservoir from the east bank to the Hagaru-ri position, CCF riflemen stood on the embankment within 100 feet or less of the rescue party. But not one shot was fired throughout two days against the wounded as they walked or crawled down the embankment and across the ice toward succor. Native North Korean agents went into huts on the east shore where US wounded were in common quarters with CCF. The latter had made no effort to feed or otherwise serve these casualties, but if they reached for food or drink for themselves, the CCF did not interfere. The native agents delivered notes to these men, in full sight of CCF, telling them what steps they were to take toward rescue. CCF did not molest the agents, nor did they attempt to stop the US wounded when they quit the shelter to comply with the instructions.

On the other hand, in repeated instances, during their attacks upon a road column, they centered their fire upon ambulances bearing the red cross marker to the extent that other vehicles moving next to those vehicles in the same convoy escaped relatively unscathed. [This dealing with the Army Task Force east of Changjin, and may well explain our luck of the draw to be exempted from the Chinese forces having no prime concern of those that moved farther south to Sasu no-man's —land closer to Hagaru. In the Book: "Mao's Generals Remember Korea" there was concern over the earlier atrocities' committed by North Korean forces, and the Chinese forces were instructed to become more humane in their care of the captured. They were ordered to release several of them after capture!<sup>145</sup> Purpose: To confuse their enemy! Also the memory of the American aid to China to be free of the Japanese in WWII may have played in some remaining affect on those forces. Who can say for sure? Likewise note from this same book: Verification of S.L.A. Marshall's work: in "Mao's Generals Remember Korea." "The CCF's hasty intervention proved to be timely for its armies on the western front that halted the UN's advance but fatal for the other armies on the eastern front that were underprepared to fight the U.S. X Corps" .p.14]

#### Myth's-Exposed

As we look back over embellished reports, stated as facts and many recorded officially in Marine history, we find many that were not factual! Speculation is not official record!

Is it true, that the marines were faced with the "Elite" forces, from the CCF?

This claim offset the marine division's substantially stronger strength in ammo than the enemy forces. The fact that Task Force McLean-Faith east of Changjin was dropped 6 extra tons of ammo-16 tons as opposed to 10 tons for the west side,-seems to indicate that this smaller Army force used far more ammo, and needed much, much, more for survival. Also, missing was a major air to ground cover at night, while it is recorded how the Marine Air Wing, prioritized these for the forces, we would receive no night fighters, from the first night until shortly after dark on 1 December!

PW interrogations showed that the great body of these troops had crossed the Yalu River between 13 and 16 November ... and pressed on toward the battle area as rapidly as possible

"It seems probable that all other major considerations, such as competent supply arrangements, were subordinated to the necessity for getting these troops forward in time to intercept 1st Marines column and cut the MSR after the preponderant strength of the division had been committed to the attack in the Reservoir area."

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<sup>145</sup> "The next morning we received Chairman Mao's reply: "You are right in releasing a group of POW's. [They] should be released immediately. Henceforth release [the POW's] in groups, and no need for our instructions." Translated and edited by Xiaobing Li, Allan R. Millett, and Bin Yu: University Press of Kansas. 2001, p.80



[This establishes the fact that those forces at Yudam-ni were not as organized or in place as those facing Eighth Army on the west side in North Korea. The downward slope of the Yalu River bordering China provided a shorter supply line and travel time for CCF forces facing Eighth Army to the west. The immediate danger was always to Eighth Army, the CCF force facing X Corps had moved towards Changjin across our boundary lines. At no time did X Corps operated within Eighth Army assigned territory. Thus the CCF was deployed to prevent this event from ever happening. Still the urgent relocation of the 5th Marines to the west side of Changjin was responsible also for the integrated units and the joint command there. The 5th Marines also being rushed, between the east side to the west side, toward the battle area as rapidly as possible.

[This report does not cover—in detail—the action on the east side of Chosin Reservoir. It does cover the action and deficiencies of Task Force Drysdale. That due to fragmentation of top command, even though created by the Marines, no one was in single command of setting the force in place. The criticism of the tanks in the lead stopping to fire on the enemy created a road block for those vehicles behind those tanks]

“This small TF of British Commandos, one company of Marines and one company of infantry on the night of 27-28 November, was sent north from Koto-ri to open the MSR to Hagaru-ri after receipt of the first report that CCF had cut the road. The CCF force was estimated at less than three battalions. In the open country beyond the Koto-ri ridges can be attributed largely to the matter in which the armor was handled.

On a small scale, the action and reaction were almost identical with the misfortunes of the 2nd Division’s column on the road between Kunu-ri and Sunchon, three days later. Whereas the safety of the thin-skinned vehicles, once they came into the fire gauntlet, depended almost wholly on rapidity of movement, the armor stopped to engage as soon as CCF fire began to rattle against its sides. That in turn blocked the road and subjected the motorized elements to a punishing fire from the flanks, which were in no position amply to return Arguments and pleading with the tankers proved largely futile. They had not been placed under direct command of the TF leader, and they were largely insensible to the effects which their tactics were having on the friendly elements to their rear.”

Thus it was from enlisted PW’s that 1st Marine Division first learned that the CCF plan was to attack in main against the MSR. “after two regiments had **passed to the northward**”. Northward being up the east side of the reservoir!

Note the discrepancy in direction of the earlier report of northward;

[There being no indication in reality that the CCF’s knew anything about the unnamed army task forces to occupy the ‘northward’ path to Changjin on the eastern side of the Reservoir! Nor could they have known about the rapid change of plans for **two marine regiments** to change places from ‘northward’ to ‘westward’ into Yudam-ni!

This changes the rational and Marines much promulgated reports that the CCF were massed against the Marines ‘westward’ at Yudam-ni! That force would need further time to rapidly move supplies to the westward to face the Marines there! Thus a cause for their lack of ammunition! This indicating that the blocking CCF was originally massed ‘northward’ of Chosin against that main line of attack ordered and never changed by X Corps. So the latter reports, that the Chinese had to relocate to the east side of the reservoir is invalid! They were massed there all the time! Remember this important fact; the 5th Marines-that second regiment would not relocate to the ‘westward’ until Task Force Faith had arrived ‘northward’ on the eastern banks of the Changjin Reservoir!]

“The 79th Division of the 27th Army moved south on the west side of the road that led from Changjin to the reservoir to gain contact with the 20th Army. It was ultimately involved in the attack on the Marines at Yudam-ni. The remainder of the 27th Army attacked elements of the 7th Infantry Division east of the reservoir.

The 26th Army appears to have been initially in reserve. The route it used to join the battle is unknown. Its 76th and 77th Divisions were committed south of the river near Hagaru on 5 December in an attempt to prevent the Marines from breakout. The 78th and 79th Divisions were not encountered during the battle. It is believed they reached the area too late for combat. Like the decision to select option three, the attack of the Marines, there was an error in their decision selecting this scheme of maneuver. Of a total of twelve divisions available to the group, five were directed against the Marines, three against elements of the 7th Infantry Division, and four remained in reserve (they probably did not arrive until after 1 December). Instead of concentrating their force against the Marines and using the reservoir as an obstacle to movement by the 7th Infantry Division, they split their forces and apparently were left without an effective reserve to influence the battle for almost a week. They were successful in decimating the elements of the 7th Infantry Division, but they did not have the forces needed to deliver the critical blow against the Marines at the decisive time. The commander of the 20th Army committed the same error when he chose to engage the Marines at Yudam-ni, Hagaru, Koto-ri and along the two MSR's simultaneously.”<sup>146</sup>

Any logic would indicate that if the two regiments had passed to the “northward” that would leave no one “westward” of Hagaru-ri! This due to the fact that only two regiments were there at that time line. This would also be the reverse criteria had those two regiments moved “westward” no one would be to the ‘northward’ path heading for Changjin! Still the report that “1st Marine Division’s first advance from the base ports northward,” This places that force east of Chosin to proceed directly north to seize the town of Changjin. [MacLean’s, 31st RCT order #25] While later history will record that more CCF were employed on the east side rather than the one division [80th] reported at the start, that those forces had relocated there from the west side seems a fabrication of fact, if the earlier forces were east of Chosin moving towards the northward, the Chinese would be deployed in mass there to stop that advance. What seems evident here, is the reverse situation created to face Faith’s Forces of lighter resistance was also fabricated and that there was in reality less CCF forces facing those to the ‘westward’ [Marines] at Yudam-ni than on the east side. That those marine reports were in fact fabricated and embellished to favor their engagement in this action ‘westward’ of Hagaru-ri! The CCF claim to be facing Marines on the east side of Changjin Reservoir:<sup>147</sup>

Their army bashing “smoke and mirror” creativity to favor the Corps

As will be discussed later, 1st Marine Division at its four main positions- Yudam-ni, Hagaru-ri, Koto-ri, and Chinhung-ni- put depth of organization, and unity within the local force, above all else, and occasionally with deliberate intent forswore certain of the higher ridges in the immediate vicinity to the enemy, for the sake of greater tightness within its own lines. This choice paid phenomenal dividends and in no instance involved and inordinate cost.

[This is the fate of Task forces east of Changjin. Withdrawal of their tanks created a tighter perimeter at Hagaru-ri but doomed the other Army forces. Three nights then the fighting tapered off! Still this

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<sup>146</sup> CSI Battlebook, Chosin Reservoir, Combat Studies Institute Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. P.55.

<sup>147</sup> Mao’s Generals Remember Korea. P.52

same script was being played out east of Changjin without intermissions and two additional days to go, and F Company had officially been ordered back into Hagaru-ri]

[This next is a departure from this objective reporting.]

Changjin Reservoir

Was it truly; One of the greatest battles?

No comparison-outside of the weather-to the battle field destruction, of the earlier affects of the North Korean Army! With their heavy tanks and artillery in South Korea, the massive death toll on our forces and Korean civilians were indeed immense. Marine early promulgated facts were that the entire CCF force of 120,000 men were massed exclusively against them—"Life of Chesty Puller" [Marine], Hopkins; "One bulge, No Drums". One marine past president of the Chosin Few would claim 200,000 in a dispute with a Newsweek publication, comparing the 1st Marine Division, as exceeding the two Marine divisions, enjoined to seize Iwo Jima. "Chosin had 20,000 Marines (17,000 Marines, 2,000 U.S. Army, and 1,000 British Royal Marines) Chosin: Chinese outnumbered the Americans 10 to 1."<sup>148</sup> [Do the math; 20,000 X 10%=200,000.] This was an attempt to elevate the 1st Marine Division status (never at Iwo Jima) beyond that; Marine Divisions *successful* however, far bloodier battles on Iwo Jima! Iwo Jima=25,000 Japanese, Marines=60,000, an exact reversal of forces!

As facts come forth, and the decades pass, it may be that the Marines faced only some 40,000 rather than this 60,000 as now reported! After 60 years history has lost some 60,000 of the enemy reported to have been massed there at four location-exclusive of any force on the east side of the reservoir-Hagaru-ri, Yudam-ni, Koto-ri, and Chinhung-ni! Some of these forces are officially recorded in Marine G-3 History, as speculative of where those other divisions of CCF: "May have been" -which should have absolutely no place in recorded history—but it is written in their history, and may now create a backlash to refute their own recorded G-3 speculation. After all, that G-3 history is "Based on a report" by a Ph.D.-(Doctor of Philosophy)-and under The Great Seal, of The Department of the Navy! That fairly locks it into 1957 history. I dispute other parts of this history under "Red Flag" notations, but that is fully understandable; I'm an Army veteran, and one can use that as a bias if they wish. But to refute one's own Official Published History, is suspect without some expansive research to explain those discrepancies.

Although three enemy divisions had been reported as being around the east side of the reservoir, by Lieutenant Colonel Murray, 5th Marines to Lieutenant Colonel Faith, upon his arrival there, marine history does not confirm that fact—other than the 80th Division hitting us! As I state within; "we as a force made no claim to fame" on that side of the reservoir! There being some arrogance in that now! That now requires more damage control from the "other side" to retain their own hold on that glory they claim on their side, against the army forces; The 7th Division and those of the 3rd Infantry Division. The Army veteran can only stand on the curb and await the final results! The more army bashing, by marines, the more suspect the motive! There are entirely too many early books out there that would have to be checked for prior stated facts on the early history dates closer to the combat event. That is ammo for any army soldier sick and overly tired of this line of degradation! Don't despair—simply repair; check the sources, of the later historical version adding 80th & 81st plus one

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<sup>148</sup> Letter To Newsweek Magazine (Korea Not Important Enough) (Lee N. Mead President-N.Y.C./L.I. Chapter of The Chosin Few.) April 11, 1999


A KOREAN ALAMO-EAST OF CHOSIN  
THE CHOSIN RESERVOIR CAMPAIGN

-1953-

MAP-20

(PAGE 227)

The Marine History completed in 1957, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea- Volume III-1950-1953, Historical Branch G-3, What is indicated by this map notation is "Attempts to Reinforce Hagaru, 28 November - 1 December" We know about Drysdale's convoy upwards from Koto-ri! That effort was an attempt to reinforce Hagaru!



But the importance of TF Faith has other implications! If one studies this map it places the 1/32 above Sinhung-ni Perimeter on 27 Nov. The "falling back towards Hagaru" recorded in this history, is that action by Faith of only 'falling back into the Sinhung-ni perimeter' It had nothing whatsoever to do with any other movement under MacLean's orders to move any further south towards Hagaru! The Marine history implies an order has been issued on this date -29th at noon- that Faith was acting on orders to return into Hagaru. That is false, that is not accurate!

The dates are accurate for the Sinhung-ni Perimeter, 27 Nov- 1 Dec! However, the movement from there, "back towards Hagaru." as implied and not denied, by this accounting is that withdrawal is -as stated - an; "Attempt to Reinforce Hagaru"

28 November < "ATTEMPTS TO REINFORCE HAGARU" ! > 1 December 1950

All underlining and bold print are mine. [As are brackets]

See Weapons & Works: This could change the entire concept of the enemy location in strength! Over the years the inference seems to be that far more enemy were re-routed to the east side, rather than is fact or not, calls into play that the enemy may well have been massed on the northward side to block the most logical path to Changjin.

This discredits the marine involvement to a lesser extent.

Must consider the number of tanks located there.

This would be a major cause east of Changjin but also for those 5th Marines that had no more time on their side to the west!

## -Chapter 13-

### From Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri

9. 5 December 1950

a.) Hagaru

(1) At 0800 the Division order for the continuing attack to the south, along the MSR, was issued. Under this plan, the attack was to commence at 0630 on 6 December, with the 7th RCT attacking south along the MSR toward Koto-ri and the 5th RCT attacking East Hill to clear this high ground of Chinese so that RCT-7 could affect their breakout (the MSR to Koto-ri ran just south and was dominated by East Hill) and then following RCT-7 south, down the MSR. Division and regimental trains and the artillery units were to be placed between the two RCTs in the column moving south along the MSR. Tanks would bring up the rear.

(2) From 1 to 5 December enemy attacks against Hagaru were relatively light as heavy casualties, and lack of ammunition and supplies, made the CCF in the area unable to launch a major attack. During this period 3,150 Marine, 1,137 Army and twenty-five Royal Marine casualties were flown out of Hagaru on Air Force C-47 and Marine R4D aircraft from the rough strip at Hagaru. Although three planes either crashed or were heavily damaged during these evacuation operations, no lives were lost in this operation.

(3) Even though there were intelligence reports that the CCF was reinforcing its efforts against the 1st Mar Div with Chinese units closing from the vicinity of the Yalu, General Smith decided that his men needed a day to rest and regroup before they could make an effective attack further south. The division staff was also severely depleted and the extra time facilitated better planning and coordination for the division attack to Koto-ri. Accordingly, 5 December for most of the Marines and soldiers in Hagaru was a day of rest.

(4) The 1st Marine Air Wing also did extensive planning and conducted face-to-face liaison on 5 December at Hagaru in an effort to extensively support the breakout and attack on East Hill on 6 December.

(5) Heavy artillery preparation, particularly 155mm missions were fired throughout the night of 5-6 December on targets along the MSR to the south in an effort to use up arms that could not be carried south and to soften up the route of advance. VT fuses were mainly used so that the road (MSR) would not be cratered.

b.) Koto-ri During the period 1-5 December, there were no friendly losses at Koto-ri while 646 CCF were KIA making various attacks against Koto-ri. Daily airdrop of supplies occurred during this time.

c.) Chinghung-ni (sic) No significant activity.

10. 6 December 1950

a.) Hagaru

(1) The attacks commenced as planned. The RCT-7 attacked south with 1/7 on its left flank, 2/7 along the MSR as advance guard, the provisional Army battalion (31/7) on the right flank, and 3/7 as the rear guard. Progress was initially slow and gained only against stubborn CCF resistance.

(2) RCT-5 attacked East Hill at 0700 but met determined opposition that was well dug in on commanding positions on the Hill. With heavy air, artillery, and mortar support, and with aggressive attacks, East Hill fell to RCT-5 at 1100. RCT-5 then occupied defensive positions and weathered several CCF counterattacks. The most determined counterattacks came during the night of 6-7 December and

produced what was probably the fiercest fighting of the whole Chosin campaign. On the morning of December, 1,400 Chinese bodies were counted in front of RCT-5's lines on East Hill.

(3) At 1400 the Division CG and the members of his staff displaced by helicopter to Koto-ri to begin planning the next phase of the breakout.

b.) Koto-ri Work commenced to improve the small air strip at Koto-ri so that air evacuation of casualties could be effected when units from Hagaru arrived at Koto-ri. Plans were also made to receive, feed, and provide warming tents for the personnel arriving from Hagaru.

c.) Chinhung-ni No significant activity.

11. 7 December 1950

a.) Hagaru

(1) The order of march from Hagaru to Koto-ri turned out to be RCT-7 in the lead, followed by, in order, division train number one, 3/5, division train number two, 1/5, 41st Commandos (Royal Marines), and finally 2/5. The last unit (2/5) left Hagaru at 1200 on 7 December. A massive demolition effort left Hagaru (sic) one big cloud of smoke.

(2) The attack south to Koto-ri continued nonstop through the night of 6 December into the day and then the night of 7 December. There was some delay in getting division train number one to closely follow RCT-7. What happened then was that CCF forces that had been forced back off the MSR by RCT-7 had time to return by the time the trains followed. CCF forces in masses as large as 800 infantry men attacked the trains with the support of mortar fire. These attacks were beaten off, in many cases with the aid of **night fighter** close air support. Thus in the attack south to Koto-ri, the trains bore the brunt of the enemy action. The last elements of the 2/5 arrived at Koto-ri at 2400 on 7 December. It had taken them a total of thirty-eight hours to complete the eleven-mile attack from Hagaru to Koto-ri. Ten thousand men and one thousand vehicles made it through to Koto-ri. Friendly casualties from this action totaled 103 KIA, 7 MIA, and 506 WIA.

(1) A division operation order was issued at 1815 to implement a continuation of the attack south to Chinhung-ni commencing at first light on 8 December.

(2) An airborne tactical air direction center in an R5D was used for the first time ever on 7 December to coordinate air support and supported the division column as it attacked south along the MSR to Koto-ri.

(3) Two hundred casualties were evacuated by air through the newly {proved air strip at Koto-ri. Navy TBMs evacuated the majority of those casualties, with between four and nine casualties to a plane.

b.) Koto-ri Work commenced to improve the small air strip at Koto-ri so that air evacuation of casualties could be effected when units from Hagaru arrived at Koto-ri. Plans were also made to receive, feed, and provide warming tents for the personnel arriving from Hagaru.

c.) Chinhung-ni No significant activity.

(4) Eight sections of treadway bridge (Brockway) were airdropped into Koto-ri on 7 December. One was damaged in the drop and one was captured by the CCF. A critical bridge over a 2,500 foot chasm along the single lane MSR had been blown by the CCF south of Koto-ri and had to be spanned if the division was to be able to continue its breakout. These air dropped bridge section were vital to this effort and had been requested on 4 and 5 December after it had been discovered that the bridge was blown. At least four sections were needed to span the gap in the MSR.

c.) Chinghung-ni Task Force Dog, consisting of the 3d Bn, 7th Infantry, the 92d Armored' Field Artillery Bn, and numerous service attachments all from the 3d Infantry Division (USA), relieved 1/1 (USMC) at Chinghung-ni on the afternoon of 7 December so that 1/1 could attack north to seize the Funchilin Pass area and facilitate the attack south from Koto-ri by the rest of the 1st Marine Division.

## 12. 8 December 1950

### a.) Koto-ri

(1) The ten miles from Koto-ri to Chinhung-ni contained overall the worst terrain along the whole MSR from Yudam-ni to Hungnam. The MSR wound like a snake in many sections through mountains that left cliffs straight up on one side of the road and straight down on the other. The division plan called for RCT-7 to lead the attack at 0800, 8 December and seize objectives on both side of the MSR. RCT-5 would follow and seize Hill 1457 which commanded the MS from a position east of the MSR and two and one half miles south of Koto-ri. 1/ was to simultaneously attack north from Chinhung-ni to seize Hill 1081 which controlled the Funchilin Pass. RCT-1 was to be the Division rear guard and would follow RCT-7 and RCT-5 down the MSR to Chinhung-ni. Learning from the problem the trains encountered between Hagaru and Koto-ri, this time they were more closely integrated into the combat units and no gaps were to be allowed in the column.

(2) The night of 7-8 December saw a heavy snow storm cover the entire battle area. 1/1 set out at 0200 from Chinhung-ni in order to be able to attack Hill 1081 at 0800. The snow storm continued into the afternoon of 8 December and served to conceal the attack of 1/1. Using surprise 1/1 gained (sic) a foothold on Hill 1081, during 8 December after overcoming numerous interconnected Chinese bunker complexes on both the eastern and western slope of the Hill. 1/1 spent the night on their newly won ground.

(3) CCF resistance was heavy and RCT-7 made slow progress to war their objectives on both sides of the MSR. The weather and the terrain also hampered movement. 1/5 attacked south from Koto-ri at 1200 and managed to occupy their initial objective (Hill 1457) just prior to darkness. RCT-7 and RCT-5 units set in that night (6-9 December) and prepared to continue their attacks at daybreak.

(4) Only scattered small arms fire was received that day and night back in the perimeter of Koto-ri.

b.) Chinhung-ni No significant activity. E Btry, 2/11 and the 92d Armored Field Artillery Bn supported 1/1 with fires from Chinhung-ni.

## 13. 9 December 1950

### a.) Koto-ri

(1) The weather cleared by the morning of 9 December and effective air and artillery support again was available to the Division.

(2) 1/1 continued the attack on Hill 1081, overlooking the Funchilin Pass. A Co, 1/1 seized the crest of the hill at 1500. A Co suffered 112 casualties in the battle while 530 CCF dead were counted on Hill 1051. This was the key terrain between Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni and it was then in friendly hands.

(3) 1/7 continued its advance south along the MSR and seized the objectives it had stopped short of the day before. C Co, 1/7 moved forward and secured the blown bridge site at around 1200. The bridge sections were brought forward by truck and construction of the bridge was completed by 1530. Late in the afternoon a patrol from 1/7 made contact with 1/1 in the Funchilin Pass. Word was sent back to Koto-ri to send forward the division trains. The first vehicles crossed at 1800 on 9 December and crossings continued throughout the night.

(4) In the perimeter at Koto-ri, casualties were evacuated by air, the perimeter was adjusted to facilitate the movement to the south, and plans were made to destroy supplies that would be left at Koto-ri. 1/5 stayed on Hill 1457 (obj D) all day, protecting the MSR. Likewise, ROT-7 units occupied positions that outposted or protected the MSR from Koto-ri to the Funchilin Pass.

## 14. 10 December 1950



(1) During the early morning hours of 10 December, over 350 CCF attacked 3/1 just south of Koto-ri. This was the only overt enemy attack of the day. However, large numbers of CCF were seen moving south

b.) Chinhung-ni No significant activity.

a.) Koto-ri

(1) During the early morning hours of 10 December, over 350 CCF attacked 3/1 just south of Koto-ri. This was the only overt enemy attack of the day. However, large numbers of CCF were seen moving south parallel to the MSR. Mortar, artillery, and air support were brought in on these columns causing heavy enemy casualties and probably preventing an attack on the MSR.

(2) The Division CP left Koto-ri at 1030 on 10 December in C-47 and helicopters and moved to the Division rear CP at Hungnam and began planning for the embarkation on Navy shipping. Up until 10 December, General Smith thought that the Division would occupy the south, southwest sector of a defensive position around Hungnam. On this date, he was informed that the 1st Marine Division would be immediately evacuated by sea to South Korea.

(3) RCT-7 fell in on the MSR with and behind the division trains and moved forward to Chinhung-ni. By 1800 on 10 December RCT-7 and the Division trains had all arrived at Chinhung-ni.

(4) RCT-5 followed RCT-7 as RCT-1 relieved them of their position from which they were protecting the MSR. 1/5, the rear unit of RCT-5, arrived at Chinhung-ni on the early morning hours of 11 December.

(5) RCT-1 commenced the final withdrawal from the perimeter at Koto-ri at 1500 on 10 December. 1/3 was positioned to cover this movement and the 92d Armored Field Artillery Bn fired concentrations on Koto-ri just after the last RCT-1 units left the old perimeter. The forty tanks left in the Division brought up the rear. This was done so that if any of the tanks became disabled on the narrow, winding MSR, they would not hold back the main column.

(6) After Hill 1081 was taken, little effective, organized opposition was offered by the CCF to deter the Division's attack from Koto-ri to Chinhung-ni. However, long-range and sporadic enemy small arms fire was common.

b.) Chinhung-ni Motorized units arriving at Chinhung-ni were organized and then sent right on to Hungnam via the MSR. Trucks from the coastal area were brought forward to pick up the infantry and move them back to Hungnam. However, there was a shortage of trucks and many infantry men walked back to Hungnam. Traffic control was probably the biggest problem at Chinhung-ni during this period.

15. 11 December 1950

a.) Chinhung-ni

(1) At approximately 0600 on 11 December CCF units ambushed the Division column moving south in the vicinity of Sudong. The attack halted the column for five or six hours and left eight friendly KIA, twenty-one WIA, and ten vehicles destroyed. However, the ambushing force was destroyed and the column moved out again and was not attacked south of Chinhung-ni after that.

(2) At the tail end of the column some confusion had resulted when plans for RCT-1's movement had been changed. Due to this confusion, the tanks were protected only by the Division Recon Company instead of an infantry battalion. When the ninth tank from the rear had to stop because its brakes froze, CCF units, hidden in the refugee crowds that were following the withdrawal, attacked the tail end of the column. In that fighting the last seven tanks in the column were lost and left behind. Once this tail end of the column caught up with the rest of the column no further incidents occurred. [Benis Frank: Smith interview, 1969. Then, after Murray got out, the Chinese came upon the hill and Lewie had orders to guard the rear of the column. We had taken the precaution of putting the tanks at the rear of

the column because we were afraid if something happened to a tank it would block the road and it'd be so heavy you couldn't move it. So the tanks were the last elements in the column, and Lewie just assumed the tanks would take care of the rear, and he let Sutter go on down the road. Then the Chinese came down the slopes over the road and they began intermingling with the refugees - there were about 3,000 refugees who were following us out - and the refugees kept coming forward. We kept them back. We didn't allow them to mix in with our column. The Chinese were coming down and there was nothing the tanks could do because on a cut out of the side of the mountain the tanks could either shoot ahead or shoot back, but they couldn't shoot up. The enemy began throwing some grenades and stuff at the tanks, and one of the tanks had a brake lock. When you use your brakes a lot they are liable to lock on you. One or two tanks were able to get by this tank with the brake lock, and then I think another one had a brake lock. And the enemy troops were beginning to heave thermite grenades on the tanks and our tankers abandoned two or three of the tanks. We had 50 tanks all told and those tanks did not get out.

Finally the elements of the Reconnaissance Company were the last out. They shouldn't have been. Lewie's infantry should have been the last out. When they came across the bridge, Partridge verified that they were the last people and blew the bridge. I guess the refugees just went around over the mountainside. That's how they came on out. We took 100,000 of them out of Hungnam.”]

(3) At 1300 the last Division elements cleared Chinhung-ni and at 2330 the tanks, the last Division units, arrived at staging areas in the Hungnam harbor complex and the breakout was complete. The final movement from Koto-ri to Chinhung-ni had lasted from 8 to 11 December and had resulted in friendly losses of seventy-five KIA, sixteen MIA, and 256 WIA. In all, the Chosin reservoir campaign had resulted in 37,500 known CCF battle casualties and 4,418 USMC battle and non-battle casualties.

#### D. Turning Points

1. The turning point in this battle occurred when the CCF had not beaten the USMC forces by the morning of 30 November. Initially the CCF had the advantages of surprise, mobility, and mass. The USMC forces had the advantages of superior fire power, control of the air, and esprit de corps. By the 30th, some of the Chinese advantages turned into liabilities. Their surprise was gone and their mobility, which was gained in the rugged mountain country of NE Korea because they were lightly armed and carried few supplies worked against them as they could not bring heavy fire to bear on the Marines and they were running out of ammunition and food. Conversely, for the Marines, time was on their side and their strengths became stronger. They recovered from the surprise attack of the Chinese and methodically figured out how to bring their heavy firepower to bear on the CCF. Control of the air allowed the Marines to be resupplied regularly by air and to attack the Chinese from the air both day and night. And lastly, on the morning of 30 November, when the Marines were not beaten by the great masses of Chinese who had repeatedly attacked them for the previous three nights, they felt that they could not be beaten and their esprit was higher than ever.

2. Major General Smith, 1st Marine Division commander, and his staff recognized the potential strengths of the Chinese before the battle began. He attempted to minimize these CCF strong points by insisting that his division not be overextended and thus defeated in small detail and he ensured that large logistical stock piles were established at Yudam-ni and Hagaru before he would kick off his ordered attack to the west and north. Those actions were undoubtedly keys to achieving the successes that the 1st Marine Division achieved during the Chosin Reservoir Campaign.<sup>149</sup> [END]

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<sup>149</sup> CSI Battlebook, Chosin Reservoir, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 9 December to 11 December P.70-72.

At this point in time, General Smith has come to realize his glowing error of over extending his forces by two regiments at Yudam-ni, better late than never. However, that error was not without 1,000 men killed on the east side of the reservoir.

As always: This CSI Battle Study completely and totally ignores any description of Task Force Faith east of the reservoir! Since it was common knowledge that the 1st Marine Division had never been encircled completely, as again defined below:

*“A unit is considered encircled when it is surrounded by an enemy force which has cut all ground routes of evacuation and reinforcement. In a fluid situation when forces are widely dispersed, commanders must plan for and accept encirclement either alone or with the assistance of a linkup force.”*<sup>150</sup>

It is inconceivable to me the time used to explore those other Marine successful battle areas, as too those that were encircled, and failure to gather needed information as to why that was the truth at the reservoir? As pointed out the two Companies 1/7/Charley & 2/7/Fox on the west side qualify under the term encirclement, and were under attempts—with the “assistance of a link up force to assist. Too finally “rescue of them” However, a RCT of three—Army “abnormal” Battalions, are encircled east of the reservoir and units and air support were withheld from them? This force lacking assistance, in having their —own rear guard assistance completely and intentionally— withdrawn from them, —buried under the praise given those Marine forces with lesser problems! Here was the case for study, of why did that happen? More important why was it ignored?

Compare:

1/7/C & 2/7/F (240 men) attempts from Yudam-ni—two, and from Hagaru, two extra attempts using tanks, each ordered back to Hagaru. Point, Excessive efforts to save Fox Company while praising their ability to stand alone and awarded three —Medal(s) of Honor, in doing so, two officers and one enlisted man. Recall above Turning point; “The USMC forces had the advantages of superior fire power, control of the air, and esprit de corps. By the 30th, some of the Chinese advantages turned into liabilities. *Their surprise was gone and their mobility, which was gained in the rugged mountain country of NE Korea because they were lightly armed and carried few supplies worked against them as they could not bring heavy fire to bear on the Marines and they were running out of ammunition and food.*” Certainly our fire power overpowered that of the CCF, the marines had no anti-aircraft units spitting fire of fifty caliber ammo at 1800 rounds per minute. But they required ammo, and we were never resupplied to maintain our superiority! The fact that Fox Company received an early drop of ammo on 1 December and our force being 12 times larger received none indicate the assistance given to Task Force Faith on the east side of the reservoir. Excuse being due early morning fog on our side of the reservoir, we will receive no air to ground cover until afternoon. Confusion to why, delay was transferred to Navy fleet in the Sea of Japan. The standard explanation that a pilot from the USS Leyte appeared overhead to inform us that when the fog lifted he would lead a squadron of planes to our area! However, official Navy history seems to dispute this well promulgated report, recording that ALL 1 December flights were weathered out at the reservoir, and diverted to the Eighth Army side. This means that flights from the other Marine (MAW) based aircraft would be required to pick up the slack, creating a longer delay. So suspicion surfaces over this statement, as to who issued it?

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<sup>150</sup> A Thesis: by Major Robert M. Coombs, USA. p.1:-Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir, Korea-1950.

Checking the sources we find it to be Captain Stamford USMC the commander of this solely attached, Marine Tactic Air Control Party (TACP) containing one officer (Stamford and three enlisted men.) It should be understood, that Captain Stamford has no other duty whatsoever, except to provide night and day air to ground coverage exclusively for Lieutenant Colonel Faith's 1/32 Battalion to which he is exclusively assigned. Stamford was attached to the 1/32 Battalion for the Inchon Landing! Rather by oversight or neglect (exchange to the U.S. Air Force TACP units) he remained attached while east of the reservoir.<sup>151</sup> However, as already stated, his personal involvement in placing Army force on the night of 27 November, has already been disputed! That in that earlier case his duty was to request **night fighters**, to enjoin 1/32 Battalion air to ground cover! However, Stamford never calls into the Hagaru dispatcher to send those night fighting aircraft. Why not? While the reason for this will only surface on 1 December, Captain Stamford's explanation is unbelievable! Also for the next four nights we will never have any **night time air to ground coverage**. This in contrast to the Marine forces at Yudam-ni having nightly coverage!

Recall:

(3) On the night of 1-2 December, 1/5, 2/5, and 3/7 were all hit by heavy attacks from the CCF, but with the aid of **night fighters** and supporting arms, the attacks were thrown back with heavy Chinese losses. 1/7 and 3/5 continued their progress south throughout the night.<sup>152</sup> However any reason for our lack of night fighter's air to ground support relied solely on Captain Stamford's ability for calling air strikes as needed. This is such a complex issue it requires a later chapter of its own!

But first things first, the prime reason we were at the reservoir is just as complex!

As it is imperative that Zone boundaries are known and respected as defined, at all times. Verbal Zone changes between commanders cannot resonate to all concerned for full compliance; "to assure coordination between adjacent divisions." Since there seems to be no authorization for General Smith to have his forces anywhere south of Hagaru-ri. Indicate he has deliberately delayed (again) moving them North of Hagaru-ri where they belonged.

It should be noted: Operational Order 6 issued 11 November 1950 remains in effect until Plan 8 –Draft 2 is activated 232400I November 1950. Change from former Plan 6, Moving Marine line of departure from Hagaru-ri to Yudam-ni to compensate for Smith's lack of activating his own orders of 13 November 1950.

Plan 8, Draft 2 – becomes Plan 8–**Operation Order 7**–Draft 3 activated 252400I November 1950.

*"We planned an orderly concentration and movement to Chosin, by first concentrating the regiments and moving them one by one... [But] this plan was never carried out. Before we knew it, Almond ordered our closest battalions and smaller units to Chosin, individually, and as fast as they could get there."* 7th Division: G-3 .*Estimated timeline to exchange all three Division Regiments-7 December.* This concentration of regiments will never be achieved as below, interference by General Almond, shatters any concentration of two of the three regiments! The RCT 31 would never become a "normal Regiment" with the attachment of one battalion from the 32nd Regiment. Likewise: a reciprocal effect for 32nd RCT, lacking its 1/32 Battalion!

31st RCT– Major General Almond explained the composition of the 31st RCT:

*"The composition of the 31st RCT at the Changjin Reservoir (an infantry battalion of the 31st Regiment and an infantry battalion of the 32d Regiment) was not in keeping with the doctrine of 1950 which stated that a regiment was a fixed unit. Doctrine further stated that employment of a regiment as a RCT*

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<sup>151</sup> Roy Appleman *East of Chosin*: Texas University Press, p. 63.

<sup>152</sup> CSI Battlebook, Chosin Reservoir, Combat Studies Institute Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (#1 thru #8) P.61–65.

(normally composed of an infantry regiment, a light artillery battalion, an anti-aircraft battery and an engineer company) was not the preferred role. MG *Almond* explained the composition of the 31st *RCT*: “cross attachment [of *battalions* between regiments] was *not* normal. In this situation *this employment* was an *expedient* necessitated by the time element and *the* location of the most available elements.”<sup>153</sup> *Above* is the main source of the problem “the time element” created for Colonel’s MacLean and Faith. Distance and time element was entirely too short to execute. The time to establish the five days of fire could never be achieved due also to this —shortened time element.

Continuing the *Thesis* used as a major analysis in my research concerning; What History Failed to Record. It is a major source—unlike many manuals that were never distributed to lower echelon soldiers, however—never available at the time—one concerning, The Regiment, the disclaimer, that no such manual defines the duty and/or any basic solution, are training knowledge to an army force completely encircled by an enemy force. Here was the data to create one had the study been made. The one (Reference in the *Thesis*) developed in 1969 was for a smaller battalion size force. At best all that could be achieved would be only a mixture of the two 1/32nd, and 3/31st Battalions at the reservoir. Lacking a third infantry battalion, neither battalion will ever reach full regimental strength, though lacking, 2/31st, Battalion and C Battery of its supporting artillery. However, this was compensated by the entire 31st tank command. As one (1/32nd) of these two battalions, lack their individual, artillery and tank support units, and their five day ammo supply, they require sharing those elements from this one (3/31st) battalion to supply all their necessary artillery and tank support units, rations and ammunition, to individually sustain each battalion. As the 1/32nd Battalion have been pulled from their relocation journey, they were also deprived of their adequate five day ammo supply to sustain any enemy attack of any duration on their own. Had they been attacked on their way to the reservoir they could have been toast! Given that “*expedient necessitated*” the X Corps planners were required to—but failed—too anticipate whatever emergency that could arise to this one battalion, “*expedient necessitated*” relocation. The fact contained in this *Thesis* that Lieutenant Colonel Murray USMC, states, in case of attack he would supply, what was needed to Lieutenant Colonel Faith and his forces. This support structure, was transferred to, 3/31st Battalion, as contained within OPN O 25! Hence, this information was lacking in detail concerning the missing 2/31st Battalion within this *Thesis*. The lack of this third battalion rules out a complete Regimental Combat Team and was therefore an incomplete unit lacking that additional third battalion, hence, denied any traditional rectangular support. In other words, *since MacLean lists his 3rd; 2/31st Battalion being at Changjin*, within order OPN O 25, we can never know *his plan* for their disposition at the reservoir, i.e. did he intend to use them as his rear flank protection? (Are *too pass through* the 1st Marine Division to begin the attack westward, as outlined on (the Division section of OPN O 25 270800 to seize Mupyong-ni?) A later fact; Colonel MacLean, mistakenly believed an enemy force was part of his arriving 2/31st Battalion. That fatal mistake cost him his life at the reservoir! Thus this *Thesis*; due to lack of documentation, neglects this fact and mistakenly assumes the two battalions listed were the only ones ordered, as a requirement to fulfill the mission assigned to Colonel MacLean at the reservoir! Another mystery contained in the *Thesis* is evident on its page 25. (Based on 7th Inf Div, “Action Report,” p.5.) In order of Colonel MacLean’s, March Table on OPN O 24; as stated, “*The Tank Company of the 31st Regiment had previously started movement to the Changjin Reservoir on 24 November, arriving at Pukchong (DV4225) on the 25th. On the 26th it departed for Hamhung by rail, arriving there that afternoon.*” as corrected on Colonel MacLean’s March Order; Effective; 250800I November: (See, March Table; this chapter.)

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<sup>153</sup> A Thesis: by Major Robert M. Coombs, USA:-Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir, Korea-1950. p.68

Serial-4-

Organization & Commander-

Capt Drake --Hv Tk Co, 31st Inf. - No. of Vehicles-34

Cross Ip- --Remarks-Departs present location 15 min after 57th FA Bn clears. (Ip=Initial point)

This highlights the importance of having OPN O 23 and OPN O24 documents in hand!

Concerning Faith's relocation, "The Battalion S-3 started to assemble the column in a schoolyard and prepare it to march in a different direction. The executive officer proceeded to corps HQ to receive the new orders for the battalion commander. There he was told that the 1st Battalion would move to the area of the 5th Marine Regiment on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir and await the arrival of other 7th Division units. He was told that the battalion *WAS NOT attached* to the Marine Division, *but that a change in boundaries* had been effected which included the 5th Marine Regimental sector *in the 7th Division area.*"<sup>154</sup> This confusion shows the lack of planning from X Corps, as changing each hour while the one foreign element of the 31-RCT was moving towards a location without either its regimental or the attached battalion infantry commander given any prior knowledge of its mission once they arrive in place to launch that mission. The fact that the 32nd Battalion was tapped as the leading force by command of General Almond himself, aborted Don Faith's active mission to join his parent regiment at Samsu, (changed to "attached to the 1st Marine Division" then changed again as part of RCT-31) located near the Yalu River, (between Singalpajin and Hyesanjin) highlights "*an expedient necessitated by the time element and the location of the most available element.*" As expressed by Almond as *–not normal–* justification for tapping this single battalion relocation due to its reference to the Changjin Reservoir, was never justified. By his action Almond removes the 1/32nd Battalion from its commander Don C. Faith, who travels ahead to meet with Colonel Beauchamp his regimental commander at Pukchong, completely ignoring the chain of command in the 7th Division.

The confusion between being "attached" or not should be explained in more detail; on early 24 November, while Lieutenant Colonel John Chiles was briefing GHQ officials in Tokyo about the "altered/revised" Draft Three, Almond has unilaterally ordered Lieutenant Colonel Faith's Battalion (minus Colonel Faith) to the reservoir, however, that required his battalion crossing over into the 1st Marine Division boundary line. A loose battalion physically leaving his 7th Division Zone General Almond pending authorization from CINCFE to the active change of boundaries, under pending Draft Three *–temporary–* "attaches" Faith's battalion to the 1st Marine Division. Note in MacLean's Opn O 24 [(below) 1a and 1b] are listed as Omitted/Omitted; indicating the planning has not been finalized (until 252400I —as OPN O7<sup>155</sup>) as to what the rest of the 7th Division is required to do. As detailed: "IN THIS ISSUE of the Changjin Journal-09.25.05-(#57) we continue with background material regarding the activities of the 1st Battalion 32d infantry. This is a report dated October 1953 by the battalion's operations officer (S-3), Maj. Wesley J. Curtis, written at the USMA West Point between September 1951 and January 1953 based on notes Curtis made while hospitalized in Japan. Students of Chosin will note that historians have had a considerable amount of detailed information available from reports by Majors Curtis, Miller (CJ 06.25.05) and Jones about the activities of 1/32." (GAR)

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MAJ. WESLEY J. CURTIS, FAITH'S OPERATIONS OFFICER (S-3)

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<sup>154</sup> Changjin Journal 09.25.05

<sup>155</sup> This Author has copy of this complete document.

“The next morning –the 24<sup>th</sup> – the battalion moved before dawn on the 160-mile road march to Pukchong. The battalion commander, Lt. Col. Faith, went ahead by himself to get his instructions at regiment HQ since he had been out of communication with the regimental commander for three days. Col. Faith left his executive officer, Maj. Crosby P. Miller, to move the battalion. The battalion column reached the outskirts of Hamhung at about 0900 hours where it was met by a division liaison officer from corps HQ. He instructed Maj. Miller to halt the battalion, have it turned around, and report to corps HQ for further instructions. The LnO had missed Col. Faith, who was on his way to Pukchong and therefore out of communication with his battalion.” This paragraph more or less disputes this one, “On 24 November 1950, the 7th Infantry Division received a warning order from X Corps directing *the assumption* of the 1st Marine Division zone east of the reservoir on 27 November. The order also attached the 1st Battalion, 32d Regiment (1st Bn. 32d Inf.) to the 1st Marine Division for operational control.”(fn 1)<sup>156</sup> (fn 1) 7th [U.S. Army] Infantry Division, “Command Report (CHRIS-5(RI); Chosin Reservoir 27 November to 12 December 1950 (n.d.), hereafter referred to as 7th Inf Div, “Command Report.” In other words this was an –urgent–activated “warning order” demanding “instant compliance” without knowledge of the 32nd Battalion Commander.

#### CHANGING DIRECTION

“The Battalion S-3 started to assemble the column in a schoolyard and prepare it to march in a different direction. The executive officer proceeded to corps HQ to receive the new orders for the battalion commander. There he was told that the 1st Battalion would move to the area of the 5th Marine Regiment on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir and await the arrival of other 7th Division units. He was told that the *battalion was not attached to the Marine Division*, but that a change in boundaries had been effected which included the 5th Marine Regimental sector in the 7th Division area... [Note #1; the plan has now been finalized as outline in this last sentence! Italic’s are mine.]

...The battalion column was assembled in the schoolyard by 1100, where it proceeded to eat C rations. Over the jeep radio of the Marine Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) attached to the battalion, came a broadcast from Tokyo in which General HQ announced that Eighth Army had launched an offensive designed to quickly terminate the war. The word was that American divisions in Korea would be back in Japan by Christmas; this word spread quickly and drew cheers from the troops. [Note #2; this is an extremely important paragraph to be used later.<sup>157</sup>]

At 1130 hours the S-3 departed with guides to locate an assembly area for the night. The battalion was to follow after a half hour. The S-3 picked an area in the vicinity of Chinhung-ni (356460) at the foot of the long winding defile leading up to the plateau which contained the Chosin Reservoir. The battalion was enveloped in this early darkness –about 1645– and its men attempted to protect themselves from the bitter cold of the night. Orders soon told them that the move would continue at 0630 the following morning.

SATURDAY, 25 NOVEMBER 1950 [Important note here –Draft 3–OPN O7 now fully activated as of 252400I November 1950. Hence moving 1/32 Infantry Battalion, 7th Division, zone under OPN O 7, 252400 now officially into that of the 1st Marine Division.]

Lt. Col. Faith rejoined his battalion at approximately 0030 hours; he had driven all the way to Pukchong to learn of the change in plans and had then driven back. The troops slept restlessly because of the bitter cold and they moved about all night. Chinhung-ni was on the main supply route [MSR] of

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<sup>156</sup> A Thesis: –by Major Robert M. Coombs, USA. p.68:-Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir, Korea-1950: p.21.

<sup>157</sup> The reference to the TACP (Captain Stanford) by obtaining communications, came –a broadcast from Tokyo–confirms the later fact that, this Marine TACP could indeed (randomly) contact Tokyo!

the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, so there was considerable traffic on the road. A railhead was also in operation at the foot of the pass. Traffic on the pass up to the plateau was one-way and the plan to move the battalion at 0630 had to be coordinated with the traffic regulating point at the foot of the pass.

The battalion commander, the operations officer, the operations sergeant and the sergeant major left the assembly area at 0600 in two vehicles and started up the pass. The executive officer, Maj. Crosby Miller, was to follow with the battalion at 0630.

Up on the plateau the road was covered with ice and some snow. Road signs soon indicated various units of the 1st Marine Division. Upon reaching Hagaru-ri at the southern tip of the reservoir the party turned right up the east side of the reservoir into the area of the 5th Marine Regiment. The command post of the 5th Marines, the officers learned, was located in the area of its advance battalion some 12 miles north of Hagaru-ri. The other two battalions were located along the road at about four-mile intervals.

While driving north, Col. Faith and his party met the commanding officer of the 5th Marines at about 0930 who was driving south on an inspection of his area. He introduced himself as Col. Murray and stated that he had been expecting Faith. He assigned an area to Col. Faith for his battalion on a piece of high ground near [533775] and arranged for communications with his headquarters and the issue of rations, ammunition and gasoline.<sup>158</sup> He stated that he had no definite plans at that time for the movement of his regiment and that although Faith's battalion was not attached to him, he would expect to assume control of it in the event of a general attack on the 5th Marines. He requested that Col. Faith report to his command post for a general orientation after his battalion closed in the assigned area." [Note #4 "7th Division Order 26: 2. 7th Inf Div (now -250930-officially) assumes responsibility for new Z with Min of one (1) Inf Bn: continues clearing HYESANJIN area until relieved by I ROK Corps." Indicates the RCT-5 is officially relieved of this area, as it now belongs to Lieutenant Colonel Faith! Apparently 1st Marine Division G-3 had failed to notify Lt. Colonel Murray of this change.]

Colonel Allan D. MacLean's involvement:

Operational Order 23, Mission assigned to 31st Infantry Regiment in center zone of X Corps: as written, Note date and time of the order(s);

RCT-31 222400 Nov. 50,

Vic Untaek, Korea

1) b. 7th Inf Div. Continue adv in Z to N. [What the rest of **the division** is doing!]

c. C Co. 13th Engr Bn, sup RCT 31.

2) 31st RCT operations: [What **the regiment** is doing within their zone of operations.]

2) c. 3rd Bn. (1) Blocks en mvmt into Z from S and east. (2) Prep to reinf 1st and 2d Bns. [MacLean's next operational order number, in 7th Division zone, likewise dates and places his prior position] [This document declassified 7/13/1991.]

(Colonel Allan D. MacLean, 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment: operating within order of OPN O 23; (above) until he issues OPN O 24, at 242400.)

Recall, "The executive officer proceeded to corps HQ to receive the new orders for the battalion commander. There he was told that the 1st Battalion would move to the area of the 5th Marine Regiment on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir *and await the arrival of other 7th Division units*. He was told that the battalion WAS NOT attached to the Marine Division, but that a change in boundaries *had been effected* which included the 5th Marine Regimental sector in the 7th Division area." Keep in

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<sup>158</sup> Surely there was also information given to Captain Stamford to connect to the Hagaru dispatcher.



mind the above “*Thesis*” statement contains “the assumption” that the “32nd WAS attached” whereas this 1/32nd executive officer statement disputes that “assumption”! The concept of a change of orders from one zone to the other does not mean the force ordered to another zone must be relieved by another force before leaving that “previous assigned” mission in zone, this concept, never honored by General Smith! Otherwise a rear guard could never advance forward as no replacements will fill their void! Also the fact that the 31st RCT have their March orders toward the reservoir effective at 250800I. However, the 2nd Battalion was NOT ordered to move under this March Order, (to the contrary –too continue present mission) rather the contrary issue-per OPN 0 24- (2) a. RCT (-) moves 250800 Nov 50 to assy area vic area RR station PUKCHONG. Prep for further mvmt to S & W by RR & mtr, (3) a. 1st Bn: Continues present mission. b. 2d Bn....Continues present mission. This 2nd battalion is later listed on RCT-31, OPN 0 25. Apparently MacLean expecting it to arrive east of the reservoir, but never told, it would never arrive –being held at Koto-ri via order of X Corps!

Friday 24 November '50: General Almond—apparently anticipating (message CX69661 was already at X Corps HQ’s at–240025I) General MacArthur’s approval of his requested “modifications” halts, Lieutenant Colonel Faith’s battalion movement en-route to Samsu, and re-routes it into the Chosin Reservoir arena! Thus Lieutenant Colonel Faith and his unsupported battalion, is cut loose from his parent regiment and sent westward, through the 3rd Division Zone, (south of Hagaru-ri.) toward the Chosin reservoir.

Operational Order 24, Mission assigned to 31st Infantry Regiment in center zone of X Corps: as written, “The battalion commander, the operations officer, the operations sergeant and the sergeant major left the assembly area at 0600 in two vehicles and started up the pass. The executive officer, Maj. Crosby Miller, was to follow with the battalion at 0630.” [End]

Timeline within statement above: 250030 -250600- 250630. This last timeline (250630) one hour and thirty minutes (250800) before Colonel MacLean’s OPN 0 24 March Order was activated to move his RCT-31 towards the railroad station at Pukchong! Total Timeline for Plan 8, 15 November to 24 November-Timeline for 7th Division involvement 2 days-road mileage too travel 140-160 Miles!

RCT-31

242400 Nov. 50,

Vic Untaek, Korea

Opn O 24: 242400I Nov 50; 1) b: What the rest of the 7th Infantry Division is doing within this Zone of operations; important note, the 7th Division boundary line has been eliminated, an extended; “Though that zone previously assigned to the marines.”

1) a. **Omitted.**

-b. **Omitted.**

2) a. RCT (-) moves 250800 Nov 50 to assy area vic area RR station PUKCHONG. Prep for further mvmt to S & W by RR & mtr. 3) a. 1st Bn: Continues present mission. **b. 2d Bn....: Continues present mission.**

As reported; Colonel MacLean was informed of the change in his mission late night of 24 November via a phone call from General David Barr commander of the 7th Division! Thus it seems that the only man with the final plan was Colonel MacLean. Sadly his operation orders would not see the light of day until his documents were available from the archives in 1979, unfortunately no one published this first one (OPN 0 25) copied, and apparently no one had any interest in searching for the other two – earlier ones– orders (OPN 0 23 & 24) these two documents, outlines the timeline and location from

which we start our journey to the reservoir. The disclaimer for the *Thesis* author (1969) that he did not have these documents, as they were not released prior to that date, thus while possibly available to him for research, but having no authority to publish!

**MARCH TABLE FOR THE 31st RCT NOVEMBER, 25th, 1950.** An archive document (part of OPN 0 24) that was declassified on 7/31/91: it gives information from the move order dated by Colonel MacLean, November 24th at midnight. All units, will move (250800I November) to assembly area at Pukchong railroad station.

MARCH TABLE

Opn 0 24 Maps: Korea 1:250,000

Untaek, Korea,

242400 Nov 50

(Destination: Pukchong)

Serial-1

Organization & Commander-

Maj Storms

3rd Bn (-), -31st Inf -No. of Vehicles-120- Cross Ip-0800

Remarks-Organic vehicles plus 25 pers carriers (2-1/2T)

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Serial-2

Organization & Commander-

Lt Col Embry [Embree] -57th FA Bn (-C Btry) -No. of Vehicles-88

Cross Ip-0900 -Remarks-Less Sv battery

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Serial-3

Organization & Commander-

Col MacLean -Command Group- No. of Vehicles-13

Cross Ip-0945 -Remarks-Time subject to change

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Serial-4

Organization & Commander-

Capt Drake -Hv Tk Co, 31st Inf- No. of Vehicles-34

Cross Ip- ----Remarks-Departs present location 15 min after 57th FA Bn clears

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Serial-5

Organization & Commander-

Capt Hepner -Sv Btry, -57th FA Bn- No. of Vehicles-19

Cross Ip-1200 Remarks-

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Serial-6

Organization & Commander-

Maj Couch-3rd Bn elements-No. of Vehicles-20

Cross Ip-1400-Remarks-7th Div QM trucks. Time subject to change

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MacLean

Col

OFL:

Witte (Signature)

S-3 [Total Vehicles=294, plus, 12-105mm Howitzers' and numerous trailers, attached. Note 15th AAA-AW Company not on this list.]

These facts covered but having missing connections within the *Thesis*: see pages 66-67 Any reference to the 31st RCT must include the fact they have been busy guarding this marine right flank east of the Pujon Reservoir up to 24 November. The responsibility west of this reservoir had been that of the RCT-5. The later fact that two enemy divisions (26th Army-76th-77th Div.) have crossed over from the Pujon Reservoir to the Changjin Reservoir is highlighted in Navy Map 19. One could conclude; had the RCT-31 remained in place they would have engaged those two CCF Division, east of the Pujon Reservoir about the same timeline before they crossed over to the Changjin Reservoir! However, RCT-31 would have been in better shape if we had met them here!

“The doctrine for large units in 1950 consisted of general statements in Field Manual 100-15, *Field Service Regulations for Larger Units*.<sup>69</sup> The need for a corps to focus on the deep battle comes through unmistakably in this manual as does the concern that corps obtain accurate and timely intelligence about enemy long-range intentions: The Corps plan must be projected well into the future; they must envisage action days in advance.... Adequate and timely information of the enemy must be assured if the commander is to make the maximum use of his own forces and employ them decisively.... Plans for the employment of the corps cannot be improvised. From the initiation of operations until their conclusion the corps commander and his staff must be planning far in advance of the current situation.... Failure of large units to prepare suitable plans for future action may so delay the execution of suitable measures as to jeopardize the operations of the corps and higher units.<sup>70</sup> All of these points, reinforce what corps must understand as a matter of course: they cannot be taken for granted.” [Facts reveal corps failed in all of these!]

However, below is an in depth review of what happened.

“The race to the Yalu and the Chosin Reservoir campaign were painful defeats because, to a great extent, X Corps did not follow its own doctrine of foreseeing events and planning for all contingencies. The corps jeopardized its own operations and almost presented the Eighth Army and the U.S. government with a catastrophic defeat due to its lack of vision. The Far Eastern Command and General MacArthur must share in this blame, but the X Corps was the controlling headquarters and could have done more to analyze and plan for different contingencies. The recovery of the situation after the disastrous defeats of late November and early December were partly a result of X Corps' remembering how a corps should act. The evacuation of Hungnam was a considerable triumph because X Corps recalled its proper role and coordinated as a corps should.”<sup>69</sup> [46. Ibid pp. 12-13.] United States Department of the Army, FM 100-15: *Larger Units* (Washington, DC, June 1950). The updated version of this regulation probably did not reach the field for many months after its publication. Corps staff officers probably drew largely upon their experiences in World War II, however, and what they knew about doctrine (impossible to assess) probably was drawn from the 1942 rather than the 1950 version of the FM. The sections dealing with the corps in the offense or defense were, moreover, almost word for word in the two versions.”<sup>70</sup> [70 Ibid p.62-63,-67]

General Almond was personally involved in the planned withdrawal and re-concentration of forces right from the start. He ordered his staff to begin initial planning on 29 November for the concentration

of the corps at Hungnam. He then flew to Hagaru-ri (30 November) and met with General Smith (1st Marine Division commander), Major General Barr (7th Infantry Division commander), and Brigadier General Hank Hodes (deputy commander, 7th Infantry Division). At this meeting, still surrounded in controversy because of the destruction the following day of Task Force Faith, Almond explained his concept of the withdrawal of the corps. He also ordered Smith and Barr to “submit a plan for the withdrawal of the 31st and 32d Regiments from the positions east of the lake [Chosin Reservoir] into Hagaru-ri and the evacuation of the wounded.”<sup>159</sup> Seems Almond had not forgotten his recent order placing General Smith, specifically in charge: via; Opn OI 19, 292047I Nov50; This order does not – repeat– does not designate General Barr any authority whatsoever to agree or disagree with General Smith’s unilateral decisions in this matter! Recall: “Part 1: **EFFECTIVE at ONCE** all Elms 7th Inf. Div in KOTO-RI (CV5560)-HAGARU-RI (CV5171)-CHOSIN RESERVOIR are Atchd to 1st Marine Div:...”<sup>159</sup> This order totally relieves General Barr and Brigadier General Hank Hodes, of any and all responsibility for their prior forces trapped east of the reservoir, as General Almond shifts that responsibility directly to General Smith –as the named: Fleet Marine Force Commander! “Part II: 1st Mar Div: Redeploy one RCT without delay from YUDAM-NI (CV4182) area to HAGARU-RI area, gain contact with Elms 7th Inf Div E of CHOSIN Reservoir; coordinate all forces in and N of HAGARU-RI in a perimeter defense based on HAGARU-RI; open and secure HAGARU-RI KOTO-RI MSR. Part III: X Corps coordinates movement to KOTO-RI of Elms 7th Inf Div now S KOTO-RI.” This order is not for delay as other authors state, rather immediate, and before midnight of this same night an order is issued to Task Force MacLean’s S-3 —rear CP at Hudong-ni, informing them of this change and for their withdrawal back —four miles into Hagaru-ri! Indicating ALL forces per Part II, inclusive of those at Yudam-ni, was immediately ordered back to Hagaru-ri! Why were they slow to respond until 4 December?

Delving further into this confusion and chaos are two combat options overlooked before the advance of Lieutenant Colonel Don Faith’s orders to relocate to the reservoir! These first two options were used in WWII as outlined by Major General Holland Hollin’ Mad Smith USMC, (later Lieutenant General) Commanding General of the First Amphibious Corps.<sup>160</sup>

(Option One —Place the Marine’s under full Army regulations!)

“After the 50 over-age destroyers were exchanged for the use of British bases in September, 1940, we manned strategic points in the Caribbean and in June 1941, sent an expeditionary force to Iceland. The Iceland force was drawn from the Second Marine Division, which was officially activated on the West Coast at the same time as the First. It consisted of a strongly reinforced regiment (the 6th) and passed through the Panama Canal to my area before going north.

The force reported to me for transportation and embarkation, and went north as part of my command until it reached Iceland, where it came under command of the Army. Due to this curious command setup, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, whose troops were being employed by the Army, reported to the Secretary of War. This is the first and only incident I can recall in World War II when the Marine Commandant had two bosses; he reported to the Secretary of the Navy on all other matters, but to the Secretary of War on Iceland.

This attachment of Marines to the Army differed from the ordinary type, which we describe as an operational attachment. Under a seldom-used provision of law, the President may declare portions of

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<sup>159</sup> HEADQUARTERS X CORPS: SPECIAL REPORT ON CHOSIN RESERVOIR 27 NOVEMBER TO 10 DECEMBER 1950, p.38-39.

<sup>160</sup> Coral And Brass: “How I got the name "Howlin' Mad" I don't know, but it was pinned on me while I was stationed on Luzon, the main island in the Philippines.” p. 22.

the Marine Corps to be part of the Army, under Army regulations and under the Secretary of War. [The Secretary of War being changed to Secretary of Defense and the Korean Conflict under the banner of the United Nations.]

At the urging of General George C. Marshall and the Secretary of War, this was done in the case of the Iceland force of Marines, which was then the only body of U.S. troops in readiness for instant overseas expeditionary duty. The provisional Marine brigade selected for this mission was fully organized and underway for Iceland within a week of receipt of orders. Although this type of attachment of Marines to the Army begat an infinity of extra paper work, plus separation of our men from their normal Naval source of supply (a most important consideration on an island supported and maintained by and for the Atlantic Fleet), Marshall insisted that we be placed under Army command. This was another example of the Army's insistence that Marines be kept away from independent responsibility and, although General Holcomb, our Commandant, protested the decision with great vigor, both on the grounds of principle and of horse, sense, he was overruled by Army influences in the high counsels.”<sup>161</sup>

(Option Two —relieve the Army Commander, creating much controversy.)

Major General Smith had an attached Army National Guard Division the Twenty-seventh Infantry Division assigned to his command, while he had little control over them still they were under Admiral Chester Nimitz Naval Operational command. MG Holland M. Smith was not pleased with their performances in his operations. “The attack by the Twenty-seventh was late starting. According to reports to me, one battalion moved 50 minutes late, other elements moved even later and the 106th Infantry was unable to start forward until three hours and fifteen minutes after H-hour. I considered the two Marine divisions on the flank were jeopardized by the sagging in the center of the line and I plugged the gaps between them and the Twenty-seventh. We made little headway that day. By nightfall my map showed our lines as a deep U, with the Twenty-seventh very little ahead of its departure point and still occupying the bottom of the U, and the two Marine divisions holding the flanks.”<sup>162</sup>

That: they delayed movements and created a gap or U in his lines on several island to be invaded. (Sound familiar to another Smith, in North Korea?) [Recall Appleman’s statement of the 1st Marine Division delays: “Thus it was, that with virtually no enemy opposition, the marines advanced at an average rate of only a mile a day between 10 and 23 November.”<sup>163</sup> The above issue of “one battalion moved 50 minutes late,” This required the same concept for the Army: All attack orders called for instant response.]

Having built up his resentment over these Army Division delays and since his rank was equal to MG Ralph Smith he appealed to Admiral Raymond Spruance: stating,<sup>164</sup> “Ralph Smith [Army] has shown that he lacks aggressive spirit,” I replied, “and his division is slowing down our advance, he should be relieved.” I suggested that Jarman take over the Twenty-seventh Division as a supplementary duty until another commanding officer was appointed. Turner supported me and Spruance agreed.”

On June 24, the following message was dispatched from Spruance as Commander, Fifth Fleet, to me as Commander, Northern Troops and Landing Force, and circulated to others concerned for information:

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<sup>161</sup> Major General Holland M. Smith: Coral and Brass-p.99-100.

<sup>162</sup> Coral and Brass: p.170.

<sup>163</sup> Roy Appleman: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu. CMH, GPO. p. 774.

<sup>164</sup> Coral and Brass: p 173.

“You are authorized and directed to relieve Major General Ralph Smith from command of the Twenty-seventh Division, U.S. Army, and place Major General Jarman in command of this division. This action is taken in order that the offensive on Saipan may proceed in accordance with the plans and orders of the Commander, Northern Troops and Landing Force.”

Accordingly, Ralph Smith was relieved and returned to Honolulu and Jarman succeeded him. Relieving Ralph Smith was one of the most disagreeable tasks I have ever been forced to perform. Personally, [Likewise at the Changjin Reservoir, General Oliver P. Smith should have been relieved of his command and replaced by the Marine Assistant Commander Craig For the same following reasons, explained by Holland Smith] I always regarded Ralph Smith as a likable and professionally knowledgeable man. However, there are times in battle when the responsibility of the commander to his country and to his troops requires hard measures. Smith's division was not fighting as it should, and its failure to perform was endangering American lives. As Napoleon has said “There are no bad regiments, only bad colonels,” and the basic remedy for the defective performance of the Twenty-seventh Division was to find a leader who could make it toe the mark. Ralph Smith had been only too conscious of what was wrong, as he was the first to admit to Jarman, but he had been incapable of strong and necessary action. I realized at the time, as I in turn said to Jarman, that the relief of Smith would stir up a hornet's nest because of its inter-Service implications, and because I knew how Richardson would make capital of such a situation; but in the face of the enemy, I felt that we were all Americans, and that victory was more important than any Service's prestige.

One of Jarman's first acts was to relieve one of the Army's three regimental commanders.

Referring to this officer's conduct at Saipan, Jarman wrote to Richardson on June 30:

A few days later, Major General Griner, formerly in command of the Ninety-eighth Division in the Hawaiian Islands, was appointed to relieve Jarman. Griner's orders, which were signed by Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., commanding Army troops in the Pacific Ocean Area, did not direct him to report to the Corps Commander. In other words, Richardson completely ignored me in sending a new division commander to me.

However, Griner realized the anomaly of such a situation and reported to me officially. I gave him a full account of the action of the Twenty-seventh and expressed the hope that he would reorganize the division and develop among the men a better fighting spirit.

Continuous pressure exerted by the Second Division on the left and the Fourth Division on the right enabled the Twenty-seventh to clean up their sector. Finally, the line was straightened out until the Second was pinched out at Garapan and the line across Saipan was held by the Twenty-seventh on the left and the Fourth on the right. [Don't miss the point, that now the Second Marines were pinched out.., on the left weakens and lowered that Marine line on that flank of the Twenty-seventh Division! Again the terrain each division must attack over, only that man has the eagle eye view and the common sense of his individual training to justify his needed response.]

Army protagonists, swayed by a mistaken sense of loyalty to their own branch of the Service, have magnified this incident into an importance out of all proportion to its proper place in the history of the war. Other Army generals were relieved in the South Pacific, France and Germany, with nothing like the acrimonious reactions which marked the relief of Major General Ralph Smith. Perhaps the fact that I was a Marine General offended their sensibilities.”<sup>165</sup>

Option Three:

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<sup>165</sup> Coral and Brass: p 174-75.

Regardless, of the controversy, a precedent had been set by The Department of the Navy and recorded in Army history, therefore could reciprocally be reapplied by General Almond's written request to the Navy Officials to relieve MG Oliver Smith.

Option Four: approve #3 unilaterally, by the United Nations, via Far East Commander in Chief, General Douglas MacArthur! Certainly the Marine delays at the reservoir cost the Army units over 1000 lives lost on the east side of the reservoir.

Option Five: Likewise, approval, By President Harry S. Truman.

Option Six: Leave Draft 3, OP O7, in place minus the 7th Division 31st RCT! Place O.P.Smith responsible for activating a direct order from General MacArthur for his 24 November offensive!

As Holland M. Smith states: "The man in the front line is blessed with a sense of immediacy; (sic) he knows only the danger directly in front of him. The general, however, knows far in advance what is to come and the picture is always there, spread before him. He goes into battle with a price of victory already calculated in human lives. This knowledge is a terrible burden, never to be shaken off, night or day. There is no escape."<sup>166</sup>

Indeed true, while the 7th Division was well within their zone east of the reservoir, the 5th Marines delayed movement into their new Zone "north of Hagaru-ri" but relieved from this 7th Infantry Zone mid-day 25 November. It was the battle lines between a Marine General and an Army General doing their job, not the lower echelons enlisted men. The difference between the two ranks: only those below the officer's rank are required to take the oath to obey orders, the officer's are not bound to that same oath.

#### Uniformed services of the United States **oath of office**

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

All officers of the seven Uniformed services of the United States swear or affirm an oath of office upon commissioning. It differs slightly from that of the oath of enlistment that enlisted members recite when they enter the service. It is required by statute, the oath being prescribed by Section 3331, Title 5, United States Code.<sup>[1]</sup> It is traditional for officers to recite the oath upon promotion but as long as the officer's service is continuous this is not actually required.<sup>[2]</sup> One notable difference between the officer and enlisted oaths is that the oath taken by officers does not include any provision to obey orders; while enlisted personnel are bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice to obey lawful orders, officers in the service of the United States are bound by this oath to disobey any order that violates the Constitution of the United States.<sup>[3]</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> Holland M. Smith, USMC—Coral and Brass: p.252.

## -Chapter 14-

### Analysis

It should be evident from the last two chapters, that the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division actions and battles, in no way were as disastrous as the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division and the 31<sup>st</sup> RCT disaster on the east side of the reservoir, “the number of casualties are directly related to the time of exposure.” Added to those casualties were some high-ranking officers, blending shades of our own Civil War, when even generals were killed and wounded in action. While some praising their officers as bunking and eating with them, the higher praise is having so many officers shedding their blood and lives among the very men they led into battle. No higher tribute can be given to them. While others criticizing General Hodes for his failure to take over command of our forces east of the reservoir, General Craig USMC and more than likely would and could—and more than likely would— have taken over the Marine Joint Command at Yudam-ni. However, General Craig had left on emergency leave 27 November. While either ADC generals could have assumed command, the end results of each battle would not have changed! Without doubt General Hodes would also have lost his life or been WIA as well east of the reservoir. Likewise LTC Lockwood over 2/7 Battalion could and should have relieved Captain Barber on Fox Hill!

The excessive cost of battles is calculated in human lives. The American men that died in North Korean had much they could have complained about, but they did not; most had highest hopes that their efforts there would have given the Korean people a new freedom and solution to their despair and a far better life in this ancient country. As General Douglas MacArthur, in his final speech at West Point would state: “The soldier above all other men, is required to practice the greatest act of religious training—sacrifice: In battle and in the face of danger and death, he discloses those divine attributes which his Maker gave when He created man in His own image. No physical courage and no brute instinct can take the place of the Divine help which alone can sustain him. However horrible the incidents of war may be the soldier who is called upon to offer and to give his life for his country is the noblest development of mankind.”<sup>167</sup>

Alan Seeger's “Rendezvous” echoes a letter he wrote in 1915, in which he says, “If it must be, let it come in the heat of action. Why flinch? It is by far the noblest form in which death can come. It is in a sense almost a privilege. . . .”<sup>168</sup>

Back to Holland M. Smith:

“The mission of the Marine Corps is primarily offensive. Any other role deprives us of our effectiveness. For a small, well-trained force, capable of great mobility, the best employment is offensive, not defensive. This is a sound military principle.” Assigned in 1926 to the field officers’ course at the Marine Corps School, I was appalled to encounter there almost the same degree of outmoded military thought as I had found at the Naval War College. The school was commanded by Colonel Robert H. Dunlap, with Major W.W. Buckley as Chief of Staff. . . . \*

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<sup>167</sup> General MacArthur, West Point, May 12, 1962, on his being awarded the Sylvanus Thayer Medal. *Reminiscences*, p. 482.

<sup>168</sup> Alan Seeger as a student at Harvard in 1910. The man who wrote this review of *Poems* was T. S. Eliot, Seeger's classmate at Harvard.



From the first day of the course, I found myself deep in difficulties because I objected to the emphasis placed upon defensive tactics. The mission of the Marine Corps is primarily offensive. Any other role deprives us of our effectiveness. For a small, well-trained force, capable of great mobility, the best employment is offensive, not defensive. This is a sound military principle. At the Marine School in Quantico, as well as at the Army School in Leavenworth, the classroom strategists preached that the principles of attack were confined to a superiority of numbers, which is contrary to the opinion of the world's greatest soldiers. Mobile, well-trained troops, imbued with *esprit de corps*, should not be confined to a defensive position if there is the possibility of a successful offensive.<sup>169</sup> Napoleon proved this a century ago. He fought most of his battles with numerically inferior forces but he moved them so rapidly and used them so boldly that he compensated for this initial handicap. One of his greatest maxims was, "The art of war (with inferior forces) consists in having larger forces than the enemy at the point of attack or defense." Stonewall Jackson could not have succeeded had he fought his battles on the theory that he must have numerical superiority before he attacked."<sup>170</sup> Unfortunately, General O.P. Smith and his officers were not schooled in this Marine tactic at the reservoir, their reluctance to attack eastward back into Hagaru—their inevitable tactic took them four additional days of delay to execute that tactic.

Recall Holland M. Smith's statement: "The man in the front line is blessed with a sense of immediacy: he knows only the danger directly in front of him. The general, however, knows far in advance what is to come and the picture is always there, spread before him. He goes into battle with a price of victory already calculated in human lives. **This knowledge is a terrible burden, never to be shaken off, night or day. There is no escape.**"<sup>171</sup>

"Any infantry officer must at times be ruthless. Part of the job is to send men into places from which you know they are not likely to come out again. This is never easy, but it is especially a soul searing business when the only thing you can buy with other men's lives is a little more time." General William F. Dean Commander, (MOH) 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, on sending the first small Task Force—Brad Smith—into South Korea.

\*The fact that O.P. Smith in his 15 November letter to his Marine commandant seems to support a suspicion that he is afraid his division would be unable to succeed with their mission, in either defensive or offensive tactics due to the weather in North Korea. "I believe a winter campaign in the mountains of North Korea is too much to ask of the American soldier or marine."<sup>172</sup> This author has trouble trying to understand why this Marine commander is against committing his men to the battle. I believe he is afraid of losing any of his forces to the enemy. As stated above: "The general, however, knows far in advance what is to come and the picture is always there, spread before him. He goes into battle with a price of victory already calculated in human lives." Indeed every battle has a projected casualty number assigned to that battle, the cost in lives for that battle. The commander's burden is to accept that figure and hope it will never exceed—rather be lower than calculated. Hence, General MacArthur would state over his casualties in this North Korean campaign: "Our losses in the entire Yalu operations were comparatively light. In the Eighth Army, the number of troops killed, wounded, and missing amounted to 7,337 and in X Corps to 5,638."<sup>173</sup> Indicating far less casualties than

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<sup>169</sup> The commanders on each side of the reservoir should have issued orders for the Joint Command at Yudam-ni and Colonel MacLean to withdraw from each side of the reservoir. They could have done that, but they did not.

<sup>170</sup> Holland M. Smith, *Coral and Brass*, pp. 57-58.

<sup>171</sup> *Coral and Brass*, p. 252.

<sup>172</sup> Gen. Oliver P. Smith, 15 November 1950 letter to the Marine Commandant Cates.

<sup>173</sup> MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Fifth-printing 1964, p. 426.

calculated, and since the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, calculated as adding a larger amount than recorded—they being a larger reinforced division—surely had far less than calculated. Since General Smith has this pre-calculated listing, it seems he is resistant to any amount of loss, of his forces. However, that is part of any general's burden. Without any comment from me on a statement made by John Toland; concerning the dispute between the taking of Seoul and Smith's slow movements: "The courtly Smith may have looked unaggressive to Almond. It was well-known that he was a Christian Scientist and his side-arm holster was always empty. . . . But he was extremely stubborn about anything that involved the safety of his troops."<sup>174</sup>

Rather, a victory or defeat is not a division commander's unilateral call, that tally belongs to X Corps command! However, a hell of a heavy cost—in North Korea—for failure to obtain any land or achieve any victory whatsoever! As Holland Smith was chivied over his large losses at Iwo Jima, "I have been blamed for the relatively high casualties suffered by the Marines under my command in the Central Pacific. I have been called "butcher," "cold blooded murderer," and "indiscriminate waster of human life." One mother wrote Secretary of the Navy Jame (sic) Forrestal (now Defense Secretary) during the Iwo Jima operation as follows: "Please, for God's sake, stop sending our finest youth to be murdered on places like Iwo Jima. Why can't objectives be accomplished some other way?" To which the Secretary replied: "There is no short or easy way." This is not an attempt to excuse the Marine casualties. To do so would insult the memory of the brave men who died so willingly for their country."<sup>175</sup>

Could it be that Smith's has little faith in his division structure compared to such losses as Iwo- Jima? His past remarks to compare his division as better than the 7th Division may have some credence here. The training structure —reality— of his Marine Division seems no better off than the 7th Division with our 33% ROK's attached! While most 7th Division soldiers had an average of 2 years (Regular Army) on duty, the Marine Division was burdened with reserve units.

Consider: General Smith's remarks about his observation of his own division in Korea: "Several of these Hoosier reservists died fighting in Korea, while many others forever bore great physical and emotional scars. General O.P. Smith, commander of the First Division at the time of the Evansville reservists' tour, commended this and other reserve units when he noted, "When I was detached from the Division in April of 1951, 51 percent of the Division was composed of reserves, and in my opinion it was a better Division than the one I brought to Korea."

## RESERVE READINESS

"The Marine who had never fired a rifle before was not an exception. We had number of reservists who may have been NCOs, in the reserve, but had never been to enough summer camps to have fired the range. Nevertheless, they learned quickly. Lt. Gen. "Brute" Krulak (father of Charles Krulak, former commandant) wrote a book *First to Fight* which can be found in paperback in some used bookstores, in which he talks about the mobilization of the 1<sup>st</sup> Mar Div under the theory 'be prepared to go with what you've got.' We did."<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>174</sup> John Toland, *In Mortal Combat Korea 1950—1955*, Willow Morrow and Company, Inc., N.Y., p. 215.

<sup>175</sup> Holland M. Smith, *Coral and Brass*, p. 16.

<sup>176</sup> *Changjin Journal*: 08.18.00, (Chapter 25) *Citing*, TRACES of the Indiana Historical Society, Summer 2000 issue, which contains articles based on Marine Corps reserve units in Indiana that provided replacements for the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division at Camp Pendleton when they were preparing for Korea. This quotation relates to preparedness.

As to our delay to breakout east of the reservoir, the misconception of our mission was never truly understood to its reality. In the *Thesis* as earlier authors imply, our mission was to guard the right flank of the Marines at Changjin Reservoir. If one's premise is wrong so will your results be! Again using an offensive or defensive tactic, the man on the front line must be observant of the terrain directly in front of him to map his route to take out the enemy forces—is there a swamp, deep tundra, or a fortified pill box ahead?

“At least one of Almond's staff officers, Lieutenant Colonel McCaffrey, felt that Brigadier General Hodes was deficient in his duty in that he was tasked, presumably at this 30 November meeting, to rescue TF Faith but failed to do so.<sup>177</sup> He stated in his oral history interview: “There was this Ass't Division Commander [Hodes] who was supposed to break in with another battalion. The 3d [sic-2d] Bn of the 31<sup>st</sup> and the Tank Co. of the 7<sup>th</sup> Div. was supposed to break in. They got to a road block and lost 8 tanks out of 24 [sic 6 out of 22] and the ADC turned them around and said they couldn't break through. He came back and told Dave Barr they couldn't break through. The Maj. Gen. [Barr] was in Hungnam, the ADC was in Hungnam [sic-Hagaru-ri] and there were 2,600 men dying up there, and I haven't forgotten that one either. Those two G.D. General Officers could have been up there. That's where the Marines were.” (McCaffrey interview.) However, at the time that Hodes did try to break through, he has only the RCT HQ and a tank company; the 2/31<sup>st</sup> Infantry was stuck at Koto-ri.<sup>178</sup>

, As Appleman also points out, Colonel McCaffrey seemed more concerned with his own damage control image [deficient in *his* duty] than the facts of his own action resulting in X Corps planning disaster. Where was that other MYTHICAL 3d [2d] Bn of the 31<sup>st</sup>? Fact: they were held up via order of X Corps at Koto-ri, hence that battalion never made it to Hagaru-ri. Apparently the X Corps staff were still locked into their own mode of ignorance too where these 2/31 Battalion forces were, as defined by OPN O 24—what the rest of the division was doing—merely listed as **1.a) Omitted, and 1.b) Omitted** as well! However, MacLean's OPN O 24 has ordered his 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion to continue their present mission within X Corps area of operations, now under OPN O 7, now assigned directly under X Corps control. Colonel MacLean never regains control of them as part of his mission at the reservoir has never been explained other than that he could expect them to arrive there; “2d Battalion, 31<sup>st</sup> infantry Regiment minus Company E (2d Bn, 31<sup>st</sup> Inf (-) was directed to move from Pukchong to the Changjin Reservoir. The battalion arrived in Hamhung on the evening of 27 November. X Corps ordered it to remain there pending further orders. The Corps exercised control over all movements on the main supply route between Hamhung and Hagaru.”<sup>179</sup> The “North of Hagaru,” under 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division Zone of operations! Here McCaffrey, promoted by Almond to replace Colonel MacLean, as 31<sup>st</sup> Regimental commander, has short memory loss, on which battalions were east of Changjin, also how many tanks were sent there. Example, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion was already there, this was only the rear CP, and there were 22 Tanks total, not 24. More data on Colonel McCaffrey is listed below.  
Death of 31-RCT: Part 5–Reflections.<sup>180</sup>

“In the press of continuing war the collapse of RCT 31 was soon forgotten. [For some thirty years!] The regiment reorganized, was back in action under new command by February [sic late January] and fought well. Years later William McCaffrey, now a retired lieutenant general, who was given

<sup>177</sup> Recall that task was already assigned to General Smith by Almond the evening before. Hodes likewise has no authority to rescind Smith's order to override his command withdrawing the tanks back to Hagaru.

<sup>178</sup> Appleman, *Escaping the Trap*, p. 120.

<sup>179</sup> 7<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, “Command Report,” and 7<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, “Action Report,” p. 9.

<sup>180</sup> Patrick Roe, USMC, *Death of 31-RCT: Part 5–Reflections*. (<http://www.chosinreservoir.com>) in 5 parts.

command of the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry in March thought the disaster was a collapse of leadership from the top down.”

FACT: as stated above, and overlooked in these reflections, McCaffrey, was assigned as a staff officer to X Corps, and the 31<sup>st</sup> RCT (incomplete) was where they were sent via orders from X Corps! Thus McCaffrey was directly involved in this decision to place Colonel MacLean in place east of the reservoir! Later criticism of an event does not exonerate one’s prior silence! The following was unilateral damage control to save his ass & career, and involvement here! It was rather “*a reflection of incompetence and misconduct on the part of*” General Almond and his Staff! Give credit where credit is due, Colonel McCaffrey included, they shift the responsibility downhill! Of further disrespect also to: “*a lesser degree of incompetence on the part of the field grade officers, [some listed above] who, nevertheless, in general, died or were overwhelmed by the cold, the enemy and the enormity of the problems that cascaded over them.*” [And McCaffrey, eventually received a third star!—what a travesty!]

“...In three days the chain of command ceased to function and leaderless men faced death from the enemy and cold with no guidance and only whatever desperate courage could be summoned up from their innermost sources of their being.”<sup>181</sup> The X Corps STAFF officers cannot claim ignorance to these facts, or their neglect in their planning stages. Their silence changed to “damage control” to shift their responsibility to the forces *they* planned for, and *their* orders, sending *these men* to the reservoir, and the removal of our credential orders by marking them Secret and shifting our efforts to the Archives—there to be buried with all of us—and from all of us for some 30 years! No better example can be offered than the footnote for the above paragraphs! Given the fact that General Almond has personally pulled 1/32<sup>nd</sup> and 3/31<sup>st</sup> Battalions for relocation, all written orders (hidden from view) that followed were given by Colonel MacLean, who in the end could only be faulted for following his orders—as a West Point Officer. (Duty-Honor-Country) For Lieutenant Colonel McCaffrey, a man promoted to Colonel, and later to replace Colonel MacLean to command the 31<sup>st</sup> Regiment to then blame Brigadier General Hodes, was his own attempt to cover up his X Corps, unexplained and unjustified commitment of these forces to disaster, and their complete abandonment. McCaffrey, while admitting that Almond had his faults, still referred to him as “a great soldier.” He had served as Almond’s chief of staff in the 92d Division in Italy in World War II. “I got hired on because we’d been through the mill together. We had some bad times in Italy.” McCaffrey interview: Surely he knew Almond better than any other officer in X Corp, and his silence was his acceptance of Almond’s 7<sup>th</sup> Division relocation to the reservoir. Thus, under utter chaos, the die was cast and the journey began, for this disastrous and fateful journey for this 31<sup>st</sup> RCT mission to disaster! The 7<sup>th</sup> Division “Hourglass” had been turned 180 degrees and the sands of time have started their movement allotted, via X Corps to this journey and this division’s disaster at the Changjin Reservoir!

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Still it should be evident from the above criterion; *the isolation* of Task Force Faith meets the requirement of this *Thesis*. Also it should be understood that there will be no effort made to physically link up with this force, either while it remains in place, or proceeds to breakout! To the contrary, all rear support will be withdrawn from this forward force, leaving any innuendos about Task Force Faith responsibility in keeping its rear line secure, now a moot point! Lieutenant Colonel Faith’s order from

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<sup>181</sup> Letter –McCaffrey to author Patrick Roe, USMC.

General Smith—“On 30 November Task Force Faith was advised by the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division that it was now attached to the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, that it should make every effort to improve its situation by working toward Hagaru-ri, that it should do nothing which would jeopardize the safety of the wounded, [?] that no infantry assistance could be rendered immediately, but that ample air cover was available. Shortly after acknowledgement of this order radio communication went out.”<sup>182</sup> However, missing is a delay into the next day, as this order “attaching” the Task Force Faith was “effective at once” per Part 1, 292047I November 50 via a X Corps Order OI 19: The X Corps early order over the issue, Part 2; “to gain contact” was buried in a simple fact, this “contact” order was issued, but was never obeyed. However, it could be enhanced merely by establishing an earlier communications (frequency) link to remain in constant radio “contact” with this trapped force! Such as this one isolated case here. Per National Archive reports on the Army CP command: “On the night of 29 Nov the rear CP received orders to withdraw to Hagaru-ri and that we would now be under the control of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division.”<sup>183</sup> Since the authority was given to General Smith, at 292047 Nov, Captain Rasula’s statement must lie between 292048 and 292400 hours! Hence, one thing seems clear from this analysis: This is another unlawful order, as will unfold; i.e., as there was no justification for any; “expedient necessitated by the time element and the location of the most available elements.”<sup>184</sup> “The Chinese admit they had no effective weapons against an American tank, [in stating,] a 20-pound TNT charges placed on the tracks or under the tank would disable it. Antitank sections consisted of four men carrying two 20-pound and two 5-pound charges.”<sup>185</sup> In other words, having no high powered weapons to disable these high profile steel monsters, the enemy was wisely reluctant to approach them! Thus it should be noted that while the 31<sup>st</sup> Tank Company, was located at Hudong-ni, it was never cut off or encircled, between Hudong-ni and Hagaru-ri. The Chinese obsession and fear over attacking these monsters, justified in stating, *their excessive number* of tanks at the reservoir, “After being divided and surrounded, the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division immediately formed defense perimeters at three places with the help of 200 tanks.”<sup>186</sup> There was only *one* tank between Yudam-ni and Toktong Pass! Now with no rear tank defense for Task Force Faith, those “*three places,*” *can only be Hagaru, Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni.*

While it is unclear which official—Army or Marine source—issued that *withdrawal order* to the tank commander, or what later hour of that night it was issued. [It had to be between 292048I-292400I.] Regardless, the rear tank command was ordered to withdraw to Hagaru, this night of 29 November! But no such order was issued to Task Force Faith! Lacking in each message was information, that either the forward or rear units were now separated, four miles from each other. The latter area to be abandoned to the enemy forces without challenge. Hence once the tank company has been removed, that adds a total of eight—undefended—miles between Task Force Faith and Hagaru-ri. Now pending an immediate withdrawal, all supplies stored at Hudong-ni (260 tons) were to be destroyed in place. Those supplies include the ammunition ordered—via X Corps—for the 7<sup>th</sup> Division mission, requirement covering “*a five day minimum supply,*” per planning order Annex D, Logistic Plan to OPN O 7 Plan No. 8 (Draft No. 3). That X Corps supply requirement, never fully achieved due to the rapid relocation to the reservoir. Now whatever is stockpiled is to be destroyed in place. That aftermath,

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<sup>182</sup> *Changjin Journal* 04.15.00: (Chapter 13), The Eleventh Endorsement (Copy) Section 6.

<sup>183</sup> Captain George A. Rasula: Assistant S-3, 3/31<sup>st</sup> Regiment, source, enclosure 5, National Archives interview.

<sup>184</sup> *A Thesis*, Major Robert M. Coombs, USA, p. 68, Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir, Korea-1950: Almond’s reply (fn15) to Major Coombs’ inquiry why such a mixture of battalion force was necessary. This was a typical “Catch 22” dealing with the tank company withdrawal. The threat to Hagaru overrides the threat to Task Force Faith.

<sup>185</sup> *SOUTH TO THE NAKTONG, NORTH TO THE YALU*, p. 720.

<sup>186</sup> *Mao’s Generals Remember Korea*, p. 17.

leaves residue of cordite odor, and gun power peppered over the snow, as Task Force Faith reaches this area at Hudong-ni.

However, we know this withdrawal order was never activated until the afternoon of the next day (301600 Nov). This creates a timeline problem—why the delay? Recall: “In the U.S. Army, “An order calls for instant compliance. . . . Once an order was published it could not be changed except by the issuing authority.” However, it now coincides with and overlaps that order to Lieutenant Colonel Faith. Why the deliberate omission order to link up both forces, before the tank company withdrawal back to Hagaru, under the umbrella, “that ample air cover was available?” This is an important issue concerning communications between Smith’s HQ’s and Lieutenant Colonel Faith’s forward area. Indicating 30 November as the last incoming “contact” message issued from General Smith’s HQ’s to Colonel Faith, until 011100 December. The conclusions reached in the *Thesis* concerning RCT commander Colonel MacLean and inherited by Lieutenant Colonel Faith failure to secure the road network behind their forces, indicate any underlined conclusion reached in the *Thesis*, lacks this factual input to reach any such conclusion, as those rear forces have been removed, 19 hours earlier from Colonel MacLean’s command authority, and this area, conceded to the enemy, by some higher authority!

Restating the question: Why the delay over the tank force, returning to Hagaru-ri? In his *East of Chosin*, Appleman states that the OPCON (Operational Control) order was not “effective until 0800” (daylight hours) on the 30th. Recall the order states: “effective at once” per Part 1, 292047I November 50, via an X Corps Order OI 19. Still, the tanks will not move out until around 301600 hours, arriving at Hagaru at 301730. Again, why the eight-hour delay? The answer should lie within the very basic training and knowledge of the lowest private in the United States Army. One does not surrender his post or assigned command without proper authorization. Captain Robert Drake was a graduate of West Point (Armor, Class of ‘44). In my opinion, he would never surrender his own armor command, plus sever his connection to his own regimental commander trapped above him. Especially: and solely on the strength of a relayed, unreliable, and unsigned (by someone unidentified) radio message. He would require confirmation from someone higher in his division command. As it happened, the 7<sup>th</sup> Division Commander General David Barr arrives this same morning for his scheduled afternoon meeting at Hagaru with CG Almond, MG Smith, and 7<sup>th</sup> Division, ADC BG Hodes. (Order as stated, 0800 precedes Barr’s arrival.) While other authors may imply that General Barr ordered Captain Drake to relocate his command at Hagaru-ri, MG Barr was no longer the one responsible as he had lost full operational control (“effective at once” per Part 1, 292047I November 50 via a X Corps Order OI 19”) over his forces in the Changjin arena. Temporarily at least, these forces no longer belong to his division *until* reaching the rear area, specified in Almond’s order. This order cannot extend into Koto-ri or Chinhung-ni, as it will overlap into the (controversial) 3<sup>rd</sup> Division Zone of operations. All MG Barr is authorized to do is to explain to Captain Drake, that that prior night’s order was and still remains an *official order* by the new (sole) Marine commanding authority. General Barr does not have to explain in detail what Captain Drake was to do next. That action was obvious. Case closed. Legally, (damage control, could be argued later) that tank command, plus the medical holding team, artillery service battery, and the rear CP forces belong at Hagaru-ri, **as ordered**. However, were they really needed there? Per Marine history, on the evening of the 30th at Hagaru-ri, “*The enemy had shot his bolt.*” There were no more threatening attacks against Hagaru-ri after this night, indicating those returning tanks may not be needed! Hence, therefore available—on 3 December—for use in an attempt to “rescue” Marine Fox Company, seven miles-west of the reservoir, as it was THEN entirely too late to return, to help Task Force Faith!

Apparently General Smith had some unpublished knowledge, on how to break out of an encirclement, while doing “*nothing which would jeopardize the safety of the wounded.*” Perhaps the Marine Corps—or the Navy who supply their corpsman—had such a manual, outlining a plan to do this! If so that knowledge should be shared between all branches of military service. Hence without that knowledge one may conclude, as in the case of the Fox 7 stranded at Toktong Pass, to ignore their withdrawal order from their superior commander, *was justified by having no means to evacuate their wounded.* Likewise

As other authors add one word to Smith’s extended timeline to Almond’s simple three words in his part two order: “1<sup>st</sup> Mar Div: Redeploy one RCT without delay from Yudam-ni (CV4182) area to Hagaru-ri area, *gain contact* with Elms 7<sup>th</sup> Inf Div E of Chosin Reservoir; **coordinate all forces in and N of Hagaru** in a perimeter defense based on Hagaru-ri; open and secure Hagaru-ri-Koto-ri MSR.” General Smith will add fuel to the fire, for the addition of inserting one delaying word; *THEN into* Almond’s order, to read verbatim, “*Redeploy one RCT without delay from Yudam-ni (CV4182) area to Hagaru-ri area, –[THEN]– gain contact with Elms 7<sup>th</sup> Inf Div E of Chosin Reservoir.*” Since the Yudam-ni force defies both Almond and Smith’s orders—for their own “Joint Command”—withdrawal date, in remaining at Yudam-ni an additional three days, following their division commander’s first order 28 November to withdraw back into Hagaru-ri. (They will never reach Hagaru until 4 December.) Thus, Task Force Faith was moved to the back burner to wait until THEN to receive consideration for any assistance from any ground force on their breakout. Preceding the order by Almond, Smith has already ordered Colonel Litzenberg to clear the road back to Hagaru-ri and “rescue” his regimental Fox Company. “At 1710, 29 November, the CO of RCT-7 [Col. Litzenberg] sent a dispatch to the 1MarDiv stating that he was unable to organize a force at Yudam-ni adequate to clear the MSR without endangering the holding of the Yudam-ni area.”<sup>187</sup> However, Smith has delegated the responsibility of “holding of the Yudam-ni area” to RCT-5, thereby relieving Colonel Litzenberg from that unilateral Joint Command formed at Yudam-ni between his three (5<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup>, and 11<sup>th</sup>) regiments located there! Apparently General Smith, while never losing communications with those commanders at Yudam-ni, has a severe problem of communicating his orders to his subordinate commanders. The point made, Fox 7 has also failed to comply with their regimental orders for withdrawal under several options.

Also “Almond’s order on the 30th enlarged these instructions. General Smith now was to pull in *both* Marine regiments from Yudam-ni and was to find some way to bring Task Force Faith back to Hagaru-ri. He also was to secure a larger segment of the reservoir road from Hagaru-ri south twenty-two miles to the village of Sudong.”<sup>188</sup> [But recall Public Relations reports: Smith kept his line of retreat open at all times! And the fact the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division was to be north of Hagaru-ri!] Litzenberg also added: “request was made that a force, reinforced with tanks, be sent from Hagaru-ri to extricate F Company. Should this plan not be accepted, RCT-7 intended to order F Company to proceed overland to the MSR between Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri on the night of 30 November. *This, under the circumstances, was an impractical course of action.* RCT-7 was under the impression that its message of 1710 was received by the Division before the Division issued its orders for RCT-5 to pull back to Yudam-ni and for RCT-7 to use the entire regiment to open up the MSR. A similar order for both RCT-5 and RCT 7 had been issued two days earlier upon Smith’s order to abort the entire mission and clear the road to Hagaru-ri on 271430 hrs! The Division order was issued solely on the basis of information that a force of one

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<sup>187</sup> *Changjin Journal*, 10.15.08: (Chapter 72.)

<sup>188</sup> Per Mossman, *Ebb & Flow*, p. 129

battalion had been unable to open up the MSR and a larger force was required.”<sup>189</sup> Again Almond is reacting to Smith’s delay in moving one regiment back to Hagaru; at the same time Smith is reacting to Colonel Litzenberg’s request for someone from Hagaru, “to extricate” or “rescue” *his* RCT-7 Fox Company encircled at Toktong Pass. But their presence there was now also moot to keep that pass open and secure! Indicating they were “*A unit (is) considered encircled when it is surrounded by an enemy force which has cut all ground routes of evacuation and reinforcement.*” Now Fox 7 had now become a liability, rather than a security asset!

Military history (i.e., American Civil War) has recorded an abundance of ambush attacks that led to encirclement under an “element of surprise” doctrine. Certainly the United States Army was never ignorant of this maxim, “We can’t win all of them!” Nor was the 31<sup>st</sup> RCT, indeed those regimental survivors of the Bataan Death March of April 1942, was an event, firmly in mind to this force now encircled east of the Changjin Reservoir. To this regiment, a repeat of the Bataan surrender would never be an option! It is of interest to note that a surrender option was suggested by one S-2 Marine officer from the Yudam-ni west side of the reservoir. While that officer was never with us on the east side of the reservoir, having the thousand plus-wounded Army survivors surrender before making it to Hagaru-ri, would have greatly enhanced that Marine garrison, by this Marine officer’s suggestion. Thus, Hagaru would never become overburdened with Army wounded! Of note also, the survivors of the Bataan Death March, point out their forces “were surrendered” as opposed to each man’s surrender as an individual; i.e., being captured on his own.

#### *Speaking of Lawful orders!*

“The composition of the 31<sup>st</sup> RCT at the Changjin Reservoir an infantry battalion of the 31<sup>st</sup> Regiment and an infantry battalion of the 32<sup>nd</sup> Regiment was not in keeping with the doctrine of 1950 which stated that “*a regiment was a fixed unit.*” Doctrine further stated that employment of a regiment as a RCT normally composed of an infantry regiment, a light artillery battalion, an antiaircraft battery and an engineer company, was not the preferred role. Certainly Faith’s 1/32 did not meet this doctrine MG Almond explained the composition of the 31<sup>st</sup> RCT: “*cross attachment [of battalions between regiments] was not normal. In this situation this employment was an expedient necessitated by the time element and the location of the most available elements.*” Also “no evidence was uncovered that this unusual composition of the RCT had any bearing on the conduct of the action other than that the force was too weak to cope with the Chinese on sought. The composition of the force from a command and control standpoint was similar to the brigade organization in today’s doctrine.”<sup>190</sup> It was, however, a disadvantage—overlooked—in this *Thesis*, that the units were not familiar with each other or the fact that some of the higher echelon 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry commanders ever knew the other unit existed prior to 29 November 1950!<sup>191</sup> Hence, one cannot overlook the chaos created with the statement(s) “was not in keeping with the doctrine of 1950” “as a RCT (normally composed of an infantry regiment, a light artillery battalion, an antiaircraft battery and an engineer company) was not the preferred role.” “...this employment was an expedient necessitated by the time element and the location of the most available elements.” In my opinion the *Thesis*, “time element” statement alone

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<sup>189</sup> Since it is highly unlikely that any force would attempt attacks at night, Smith’s explanation is not valid, as he has time to revise his “one battalion” size as upgraded to the entire regiment withdrawal order within 6hrs & 50mins, the same timeline used with the RCT-31 tank company withdrawal notice before midnight this same day!

<sup>190</sup> *A Thesis*, Major Robert M. Coombs, USA, p. 68, Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir, Korea-1950.

<sup>191</sup> Colonel Edward L. Magill, JAGC, USAR (Ret) to Roy E. Appleman: “I was quite surprised when the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 32<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Regiment, arrived at the inlet on the morning of November 29. Nobody had mentioned to me that there was another infantry battalion in the area. The arrival of this unit was very heartening as we certainly needed the additional troop strength.” *Changjin Journal*: 12-15-02.



endangered the entire mission. That “time element” was the prime blunder, other than this force “was too weak to cope with the Chinese on sight.” That it would never be the complete force it was originally perceived to be! Lacking its additional 2/31 Battalion, and the additional heavy-155mm-artillery “B” Battery from the 31<sup>st</sup> Field Artillery, as planned and outlined (Opn O 25) as a reinforced RCT including the 31<sup>st</sup> Tank Company “in its entirety” neglects that “time element” as the most important and overriding factor dooming this incomplete RCT from its urgent order of movement, into merely a Task Force Status. The timeline assigned to the movement was responsible for the delay of consolidating and “concentrating all units before movement to the reservoir.” The CCF forces already in position for the first night attack 27-28 November, adds further credence to the time lag factor, endangering this force. That time lag, due to the excessive (140-160) miles traveled, prevented our tank company from moving forward from four miles to the rear, due to required maintenance, coupled with the reality that after their (30 November) withdrawal from Hudong-ni to Hagaru-ri, opens another four-mile gap, now occupied by the enemy force. That tank company withdrawal was also never widely known to the forward forces of Task Force Faith. In fact, rampant rumors were circulated that those tanks were attempting a breakthrough in attempt to reach us. “Was it not ironic that Task Force Faith came to its final stop just short of the site of Drake’s 31<sup>st</sup> Tank Company bivouac and the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry Rear CP? Thirty hours earlier there had been 16 operable tanks and 325 soldiers in a perimeter within a stone’s throw of where the convoy died, they had been there since the evening of November 27. Then on November 30 an order came for them to withdraw to Hagaru-ri. Who ordered that withdrawal to Hagaru-ri, and why was the order issued?”<sup>192</sup>

The unanswered natural query: Why with the disproportionate time element allowing for three drafts in a planning stage since 15 November 1950, and delayed until 25 November qualify as: “an expedient necessitated by—any—“time element” and the “location” of the most available elements?” That irrational planning stage is what consumed the time element and certainly not this final (Second Army Division) selected to activate the final Draft Three mission! For Task Force MacLean that ten day corps planning “time element” granted only two days travel time, the “location” 140-160 road miles away.

Thus, “the conclusions reached in the *Thesis* concerning Task Force MacLean commander Colonel MacLean and inherited by Lieutenant Colonel Faith’s failure to secure the road network behind their forces” fails to consider: Colonel Faith (briefed by General Hodes) knew (via March Table) the 31<sup>st</sup> Battalion was behind him, the latter knowing the 57<sup>th</sup> Artillery Battalion was behind them. They in turn knew the tank company was behind them, and the tank company knew the artillery service battery was behind them, and were always a part of the original plan. But this was a mission without realistic corps planning, ever changing as a fluid condition favorable to enemy forces. The tank company was now urgently needed by order of General Smith to “Reinforce Hagaru-ri,” now was placed in charge of that unit, that move now equalizes the distance between 31<sup>st</sup> Task Force and all other Marine units! MG Smith’s “Attempt to reinforce Hagaru-ri” via Task Force Drysdale, and the 31<sup>st</sup> Tank Company and attached units at Hudong-ni were urgently needed inside the perimeter North of Hagaru-ri, as recorded on Marine Map 20, of their history. However, Marine Map 20 fails to show the Tank Company ever located at Hudong-ni, the location of Task Force Faith’s final destruction and Faith’s death. Indicating the sacrifice of Lieutenant Colonel Don Faith forces was weighed and *accepted as an abandoned force east of the reservoir. Smith urgently needing this task force to remain in place as a safety valve* to reinforce his Hagaru-ri garrison from complete destruction. While Smith fails to reprimand his two commanders west of the reservoir for their failure to act on his orders to return to

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<sup>192</sup> Roy Appleman, *East of Chosin*, p. 322.

“reinforce” Hagaru-ri as well.<sup>193</sup> Those two regimental commanders operating as a Joint Command fail to respond to his (inevitable) orders to withdraw via orders on 28 November-29 November-30 November-choosing to use the latter day to realign their forces for their withdrawal. Their 1 December date to coincide with Task Force Faith’s breakout, added a heavy burden on air to ground cover for both sides of the reservoir. So much so that air-to-ground cover was delayed five hours—of precious daylight—for Naval aircraft to appear on line over Task Force Faith, (never to arrive), due to fog and overcast. Recall, “[Part 1:] On 1 December the weather over eastern Korea was very bad. Morning flights from the carriers met a solid overcast over the plateau and were diverted to the EUSAK area, (Eighth Army area), where three missions totaling 23 aircraft found satisfactory control, successfully attacked large concentrations of enemy troops and abandoned friendly equipment, and blew an ammunition dump at Sinanju. But the weather which had altered their employment also prevented their return to base, for the task force had been *obliged to cease flight operations late in the morning*. Unable to get home, the aircraft landed at Wonsan, were kicked out again owing to rumors of a deteriorating ground situation in the neighborhood, and finally spent the night at Kimpo.” [Part 2:] “On the 30th, following General Harris’ first request for carrier air, Task Force 77 had sent 39 sorties to the reservoir, of which 14 struck at Chinese troops surrounding the isolated Army units while 25 attacked the enemy in the hills about Hagaru. [Red Flag:] By bad luck, however, the next day [1 December] brought bad weather both at the reservoir and in the Sea of Japan. Although aircraft from Badoeng Strait and Marine shore-based squadrons got through to napalm the Chinese enemy, the early flights from Task Force 77 were weathered out of the reservoir, and in late morning the force was obliged to cancel operations.”<sup>194</sup> This leaving only (late) air-to-ground support required by Marine planes based at Yonp’o, or from the Badoeng Strait shore-based carriers! The reports filed by early authors, General Smith promised Task Force Faith “priority status” for air to ground coverage—in reality not true! However, that “priority status” was five hours later than 010800 December, for all Marine MAW units west of the reservoir. While Task Force Faith was required to await arrival of Navy carrier based planes—which were weathered out—and coverage after this five-hour wait for Marine units to supply the planes needed to cover our withdrawal!

This is supported by Marine reports: “Plans for 1 December called for all squadrons to furnish close air support flights at dawn. Following the first strikes of the day, planes of the Wonsan squadrons were to land at Yonpo and continue operations from the advanced air base. At Wonsan the snow was light and the first strike, **four Corsairs of VMF-214, was winging toward the reservoir by 0645**. Aboard the Badoeng-Strait, VMF-323 was able to get its first flight airborne by 0845.

But at Yonpo six inches of snow coated the runway. Lacking snow-removal equipment, Marines substituted makeshift plows and muscle to clear a narrow space on the strip. At daybreak the weather began to lift. By 1000 they had gained enough space to permit the 0645 VMF-214 flight to come aboard, but **it was 1215 before VMF-212** could get the first Yonpo strike into the air. In spite of the weather 1<sup>st</sup> MAW planes flew 118 sorties during the day, almost all in support of the 1<sup>st</sup> MarDiv and U.S. Army units east of the reservoir....” It should be noted that only those planes from Yonpo will be those supporting the Army breakout from east of Chosin. The first planes, not arriving until 1300 hours, [1215 strike] thus delaying and exchanging our remaining daylight hours for bright moonlight,

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<sup>193</sup> It should be noted, that General Almond would officially exonerate General Smith and all three regimental commanders, by awarding all of them and LTC Beall the Army’s second highest medal, the Distinguished Service Medal, for the time frame covering 29 November-4 December.

<sup>194</sup> Dispute over any naval forces providing Faith any coverage after 30 November: “*History of United States Naval Operations: Korea* by James A. Field, Jr., DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY-- NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER, Chapter 9: Retreat to the South. (Note the phrase, “Marine shore-based squadrons got through to napalm the Chinese enemy.”)

thus highlighting our position against the reservoir snow covered backdrop of CCF observation. That tradeoff was not a fair exchange for daylight hours!

“Dawn on the morning of 1 December found the Army units preparing to move out towards Hagaru. Vehicles and guns which could not be taken along were destroyed and wounded were loaded aboard trucks. The convoy was formed and Capt. Edward P. Stamford, USMC, who was attached to 1/32 as forward air controller, took his post 20 yards behind the point. Corsairs of VMF(N)-513 and Hedron-12 were on station when the column moved out shortly after 1000. [?] It was fortunate that they were, for just as the convoy started Chinese Reds launched a fierce attack against the head of the column with small arms fire and closed to within grenade range. For a few moments the fighting was touch and go, but Captain Stamford, himself under fire, closely directed the planes in repeated napalm, bomb, rocket, and strafing runs.<sup>195</sup> A rocket from one of the planes was actually fired into a gully only 20 yards from friendly troops, and struck among the grenade-throwing Chinese.” Again, this places the earliest plane arrival three hours prior to their actual arrival! The convoy moved out around 1300 hours, as the planes came on board! Also lacking while Task Force Faith over 24 hours; will never receive any sufficient ammo air drops of resupply. As none are dropped this day to support our breakout effort! However, Fox 7, at Toktong Pass receives early air drops in their area!

It should be noted the importance of Hagaru-ri receiving 25 sorties to 14 for Task Force Faith! This hardly meets the priority air cover promised to Task Force Faith by General Smith’s comment to General Barr that air support to Faith’s withdrawal was tops on the priority list! That importance to “Reinforce” a garrison, General Smith left weak and inadequately defended. Again there were no X Corps orders for Smith to relocate his 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment at Yudam-ni! (Each division was to assign their own units.) Even so the full RCT-1 of Colonel Lewis (Chesty) Puller also required, at Hagaru-ri in its entirety as ordered and verified by General Smith! In other words, all of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division were required to be concentrated “north of Hagaru-ri.”

“Almond planned to launch the attack west on the morning of 27 November. Completing redeployment for the attack would involve the movement of the following units:

One battalion of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division would move from near Oro-ri to Chosin;

Two battalions of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division would move from the Puchong-Hysanjin axis to Chosin;

(Marine Units)

3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 7<sup>th</sup> Marines, would move from Koto-ri to Yudam-ni;

2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 7<sup>th</sup> Marines would move from Hagaru-ri to Yudam-ni;

5<sup>th</sup> Marines, with attachments, would move **from east of the reservoir to Yudam-ni;**

Elements of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division would relieve the 1<sup>st</sup> Marines at Chinhung-ni and Koto-ri;

1<sup>st</sup> Marines, with attachments, would move **from Chinhung-ni and Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri;**

1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division command post would move from Hamhung **to Hagaru-ri;**<sup>196</sup>

X Corps command post would move from Hamhung **to Hagaru-ri.**

In addition there was the need to move supplies and ammunition to support all those units moving to the Chosin area.”

Item in bold print; were never activated per X Corps timelines assigned!

[The last one already solved by moving the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division G-4 into Hagaru-ri!]

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<sup>195</sup> Task Force Faith’s survivors need no renewed remainder of our own fateful napalm event. One part of a friendly mission misdirected. It was an honest error, but nevertheless the napalm was dropped short on the leading force of our task force.

<sup>196</sup> Roe: Part I – Introduction. Pages are unnumbered.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division Plan:

Thus; the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, per X Corps orders are to concentrate their entire 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division into one tight zone—North of Hagaru-ri! General Smith had finally attained what he so desired in his letter to Commandant Cates: “Time and again I have tried to tell the Corps commander that in a Marine division he has a powerful instrument, but that it cannot help but lose its full effectiveness when dispersed. Probably I have had more luck than other division commanders in impressing my point.”<sup>197</sup> Yet General Smith’s delays moving his entire Division forces into this tight perimeter! The question posed here: What difference would it make (to follow X Corps orders) and would it be beneficial in saving lives at the reservoir? The answer—without fear of contradiction: Definitely. Task Force Drysdale would never have been needed—he was already there! The Hagaru garrison now reinforced by the entire 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Regiment (reinforced), plus the Royal Marines (attached) plus all of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, heavy and light tanks, and other heavy equipment, would also be north of Hagaru as well, therefore no need for Captain Drakes 31<sup>st</sup> Tank Company to overload the Hagaru garrison. This was originally X Corps, Marine Zone of operations! That’s 300 lives saved from Task Force Drysdale and who can say how many of those, men from Task Force Faith?

Chronology of the timeline’s between the 24—27 November offensives in X Corps.

X Corps Warning Order Cite 13069 was received by the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division at 1855, 24 November. This order directed the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, **upon relief on 25 November by elements of the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division**, to move RCT-5 from the east side of the Chosin Reservoir to positions west of the Hamhung-Hagaru-ri-Sinpo-ri road. This was in preparation for the attack of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division to the west from Yudam-ni. By this same order, the 7<sup>th</sup> Inf Div was directed to relieve RCT-5 east of the Chosin Reservoir with not less than one infantry battalion by 1200, 25 November. This battalion was to be attached to the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division until the arrival of the CO, RCT-31. During the day of 24 November, the 1/32 Inf had moved to Sinhung-ni [sic] (7 miles north of Hagaru-ri). [*Marine battalions 3/5 and 1/5 were still in the Sinhung-ni (Inlet) area; 1/32 arrived on 25 November and occupied a position south of Hill 1221.*] Although the CO, RCT-31, was to command the Army task force east of the Chosin Reservoir, the first battalion to arrive was one of the battalions of the 32d Inf.<sup>198</sup>

The evening of the 25<sup>th</sup>, while Faith was awaiting arrival of other units, X Corps Operation Order No. 7, for the attack west was being issued, by Colonel MacLean. RCT-5 was still at the east side of the reservoir, although relieved of this area upon Lieutenant Colonel Faith’s arrival. Opn O 7 in effect at 252400 November.

Evening of the 26th \*

In Hagaru-ri itself were some 267 Army troops, 12 attached to the Division and the remainder not attached. These were Corps troops and did not belong to RCT-31. The unattached troops had been sent north to prepare for the establishment of an advance Corps CP at Hagaru-ri. [*Units included D/10th Engineers, 3d Div, and a Platoon from the 4<sup>th</sup> Signal Bn, both in action defending East Hill.*]<sup>199</sup> [Author, GAR]

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<sup>197</sup> Letter to Commander Cates, 15 November 1950. Refer to Clue #4, end of this chapter. Why he has “more luck.”

<sup>198</sup> *Changjin Journal*: Historian George A. Rasula: [GAR] 06.30.08. (Chapter 71.) Per General Smith’s IN THIS ISSUE we continue the 2006-2008 series of the *Changjin Journal* addressing the Chosin Campaign from the viewpoint of Maj. Gen. O.P. Smith, commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division. Sequence of documents published in Maj. Gen. O.P. Smith’s Aide-Memoire.

<sup>199</sup> *Changjin Journal*: Historian George A. Rasula: [GAR] 06.30.08. (Chapter 7.)

\*Marine RCT-5, 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion leaves east side to west side of reservoir. 3/5 and 1/5 remain east of the reservoir although the Regiment were to lead off the offensive 270800 from Yudam-ni!

Morning of the 27<sup>th</sup>: Units of the 31<sup>st</sup> regiment were delayed at the junction leading into Hagaru, to await the transfer of Marine battalions 3/5 & 1/5 to the Yudam-ni. This delay cost 31<sup>st</sup> Units valuable daylight hours to dig in for the night and to prepare for their attack as yet to be outlined by Colonel MacLean.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division was directed to attack at 0800 on the 27<sup>th</sup>, seize Mupyong-ni, 65 miles distant across the mountains, then advance to the Yalu River and destroy the enemy in zone.<sup>200</sup> (Roe: *Death of 31<sup>st</sup> RCT.*)

However, due to the RCT-5 delay to reach Yudam-ni, the full regiment was not there—and the “**plan of attack had to be changed.**”<sup>201</sup> This has no effect on a change of X Corps Plans, only a 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division one—as related back to Holland M. Smith’s delay’s and his problem in WWII. It does however, upset the plan at Yudam-ni in that the two battalions now arriving from the east of the reservoir cannot pass through RCT-7—as planned due to the late arrival of 3/5 and 1/5 battalions. 2/5 hits a road block of enemy forces and the offensive was aborted by General Smith at 271430.

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[RCT-31 of the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division that arrived on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir on 27 November (the same day RCT-5 moved to Yudam-ni) was opposed by the CCF 80<sup>th</sup> Div, the 81<sup>st</sup> Div, later reinforced by a regiment of the 94<sup>th</sup> Div. – GAR]<sup>202</sup>

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# 1—X Corps, Operation Plan No 8—**Draft 3.—22 Nov. 50.** [Lacks a hourly timeline.]

Classification—Top Secret.<sup>203</sup> (4 pages)

[Shortened to items of special interest to this author:]

(4) Extreme minimum temperatures of from 30 to 40 degrees below zero Fahrenheit from December to March, inclusive, will severely restrict both friendly and En ops in the Northern portion of X Corps Z.  
(5) Airlift will be available to supply critical items for the Divisions in present positions if LOCs are blocked due to severe weather conditions.

2. a. X Corps Atks, destroys En in Z, and severe En LOC: MANP’OJIN-KANGGYE-HUICHON.

b. Concept:

(1) Principal CCF axis of Sup in N KOREA is the MANP’OJIN-KANGGYE-HUICHON route.

(3) b. 1<sup>st</sup> US Mar Div:

(1) Adv, seize and secure MUP YONG-NI.

(2) Prep to Adv N on MANP’OJIN-KANGGYE-HUICHON axis on X Corps O.

3. b. 1<sup>st</sup> US MAR DIV:

(1) ADV, seize and secure MUP YONG-NI.

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<sup>200</sup> Roe: Part 2 - The Commanders; Pages unnumbered!

<sup>201</sup> Mossman, *Ebb & Flow*, p. 91. CMH, GPO.

<sup>202</sup> *Changjin Journal*: Historian George A. Rasula: [GAR] 06.10.09 Chapter 73.

<sup>203</sup> R6-38, Box 6, F.6—“Chronology”—MacArthur Memorial—Norfolk VA. A Special Thank You to James W. Zobel for searching and providing the documents I requested.)

(2) Prep to Adv N on MANP'OJIN-KANGGYE-HUICHON axis on X Corps O.

c. 3d US DIV:

- (1) Gain and maintain contact right flank Eighth Army.
- (2) Prep to Atk on HUKSU-RI –SACHANG-NI axis; Prep to Spt 1st Mar Div; Prep assume Opn control 1st KMC Regt and secure WONSAN area: All on Corps O.
- (3) Protect WONSAN-HAMHUNG MSR in Z.
- (4) Provide 1 RCT As Corps Res in HUNGNAM – SUDONG axis.

d. 7<sup>th</sup> US Inf Div:

- (1) Adv, destroy En in Z, employing not to exceed 1 RCT on the HAGARU-RI – CHANGJIN axis.
- (2) Secure PUNGSON area.

[End]

#2—X Corps, Plan 8—**Draft 3.—24 Nov. 50.** [Lacks an hourly timeline.]  
Classification—Secret. (11 pages, inclusive of maps.)

Both of the above are Drafts only, never to be activated until assigned the next Operational Order No  
7!

However, the problem here is that 13-day delay by General Smith. While he has issued a Division order: “1MarDiv OpO 21-50, issued at 2000, 13 November, confirmed the frag orders issued earlier to seize Hagaru-ri, and in addition, provided for RCT-5 to pass through RCT-7 at Hagaru-ri and continue the advance to the north, while RCT-7 occupied a blocking position at Yudam-ni, 14 miles to the northwest.”<sup>204</sup> The continuous delay is no Marine forces are at Yudam-ni, 14 miles west of Hagaru-ri.

#3—X Corps, —Operation O7—252400I Nov.50.

Classification:—Secret.

Ask Orgn: Annex A.

[Shortened to items of special interest to this author:]

2. a. X Corps Atks 270800I Nov to sever En LOC at MUP YONG-NI (BA 8406) and to destroy En in Z to the northern boundary of KOREA, along the YALU River on the left to the mouth of the TUMEN River on the right.

b. Annex C, OPNs map.

3. a. **1<sup>st</sup> US Mar Div**; Atk at 270800I Nov, seize MUP YONG-NI, Adv to YALU River, destroy En in Z.

b. 7<sup>th</sup> US Inf Div:

- (1) Atk N at 270800 Nov from CHOSIN Reservoir, Adv to YALU River, destroy En in Z.
- (2) Secure PUNGSAN (DA 2818) area, coordinating Opns with I ROK Corps.

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<sup>204</sup> George A Rasula, Historian, *Changjin Journal*, 09.01.06.

c. **I ROK Corps:** Defend YALU River line in Z. Adv from HAPSU (DA8763) and CHONGJIN (EB6525) areas destroy En in Z to Northern boundary in KOREA.

d. 3d US Inf Div:

- (1) Gain and maintain contact right flank EIGHTH Army along boundary in Z.
- (2) Protect W flank X Corps in Z.
- (3) Spt 1<sup>st</sup> US Mar Div on X Corps O.
- (4) Protect Afld and harbor facilities WONSAN area.
- (5) Destroy En guerrilla forces in Z.

e. X Corps Security Forces:

- (1) Guard HAMHUNG-HAGARU-RI MSR. Annex E.

[The above should short circuit and put to rest. That the Marines do not have to fight back to the coast!]

- (2) Cont present missions.

The above will be used for later items needing explanations.

Why all the confusion? To solve any mystery, one must search and seek clues extracted from that mystery. Study each clue in minute detail to arrive at a conclusion. So what was missing here at the Changjin Reservoir? Was there any clue overlooked in detail to be explored for any answer to our mystery? I find three clues missing in the time frame between the Army publications of Roy E. Appleman's *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (1960) and Billy C. Mossman, *Ebb and Flow* (1990). **[Bold print is mine.]**

**Clue: #1,** With the withdrawal of the CCF from contact both in the west and northeast Korea about 7 November, confidence soon reasserted itself in both Eighth Army and X Corps, and X Corps on 11 November reiterated its directive to proceed to the Yalu. **Both Eighth Army and X Corps were still enjoined under General MacArthur's directive of 24 October to proceed to the Yalu. Apparently, General Almond hoped that the troops could reach the border quickly, turn over the area to ROK troops, and withdraw before winter really set in.** [70]

Timeline one month from 24 October to (31 days) 24 November next offensive!

**Clue: #2,** After the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines reached the Kot'o-ri plateau **on 10 November**, neither Colonel Litzenberg, the regimental commander, nor General Smith, the division commander, showed any inclination to hurry the advance. General Smith plainly indicated that he was apprehensive about his western exposed flank, that he wanted to improve the road up the pass from the division railhead at Chinhung-ni, that he wanted to develop a secure base at Hagaru-ri, and that he wanted to garrison key points on the main supply road back south. **And most of all he wanted to concentrate the full strength of the Marine division in the Hagaru-ri area before trying to advance further toward the Yalu.** [Smith's new zone is now designated as "North of Hagaru-ri," the result of which is Smith delays moving his rear 2 battalions into this much sought-after area!]

**Timeline, 24 November, after a 13-day delay, General Smith has moved his division forces only 12 miles up the east side of the Changjin reservoir. Their most forward position held by 3/5 Battalion will be the one occupied by Lieutenant Colonel Faith after their Yudam-ni relocation on 27 November.**

**Clue: #3**, Thus it was, that with virtually no enemy opposition, the Marines advanced at an average rate of only a mile a day between 10 and 23 November. But this caution on the part of General Smith **in concentrating the division and his insistence on securing its supply lines** and of establishing a base for further operations in the frigid, barren wastes of the Changjin Reservoir area were to prove the division's salvation in the weeks ahead.<sup>205</sup> Pp. 772-773.

These three clues in the ending chapter to Appleman's work have failed to connect to Mossman work and connect the two books. Damage control has overshadowed these three clues and completely ignored them! These clues obstructing all X Corps planning efforts, as time marches on. Draft One was aborted because there will be no forces at the town of Changjin—ever—to pivot left into Kanggye, damage control: Almond doesn't want his forces that far north. Reality was that there were no forces at this area, Draft One is aborted, leaving (#1) Plan 6, Opn O 6 in effect. No blocking position at Yudam-ni!

**Clue #4**, comes from the X Corps planning sections and outlines General Smith's overriding authority—not under Almond's Administration Authority—only his Operational control. I had trouble with this clue, as the Table of Organization Chart fails to define any difference in the Marine Division being other than directly “connected” to X Corps, rather than “attached” by definition of a “dashed line,” i.e. 41st Royal Marine Commandos “attached” to the Marine Division.

However, X Corps OPN documents: Task Orgn: Annex A, Classified “Secret” lists, for the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, FMF, (Reinf.) Commander ...Maj, Gen. O.P.Smith! Thus, it would seem the chart below should show that by a dashed line, and FMF outside their right box—rather than a broad line to X Corps, indicating to me at least this division is independent and merely “attached” as is the 41s Royal Marines the ROK 3 and other ROK units. This would explain Smith's position of his independent authority. The latter unit being independent units, subject only to Almond's schedules, but had no other authority. The ROK units —subject to their South Korean President Syngman Rhee.

This has additional credence to La Bree's comments. When Smith was back in South Korea and under IX Corps—now under General Matthew Ridgway, Eighth Army—he again requested a 24-hour delay, and was refused by General Bryon E. Moore, the corps commander. “When the First Marine Division had operated under Tenth Corps control, it had experienced a certain autonomy and independence that it would not have under Ninth Corps. It was functioning now as simply another land division, under rigid army control.”<sup>206</sup> Since the Marine Corps Air Wing was returned to command under The Air Force operations command it also seems, Smith has lost his FMF status as well. Hence, 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division would **now** be listed as correct—but later in 1951—on this earlier (1950) North Korean Chart 2.

## CHART 2- ORGANIZATION OF UNC GROUND FORCES IN KOREA 23 NOVEMBER 1950<sup>207</sup>


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<sup>205</sup> All three clues: Citing Roy Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, CMH, GPO. pp. 772-773.

<sup>206</sup> Clifton La Bree: *The Gentle Warrior*, The Kent State University Press, p. 201.

<sup>207</sup> Mossman: *Ebb and Flow*, Chapter II, Chart 2, p. 30. CMH, GPO. 1990.





## Chapter 15

### Using Numbered Clues to Explore the Problem

In an interview with General Almond concerning his Comments on General O.P. Smith and the Army's History,<sup>208</sup> General Smith's views on the X CORPS attitude "Optimism or pessimism without middle ground," and his other views that are "also admirably illustrated," in his letter to General Cates, namely, among which can be cited that, "Almond's Orders were wrong, etc.," leave much to be desired in objective historical reporting. General Almond's orders were issued in execution of GHQ Order Part 2, CX 67291. General Smith showed his objections, not only on this occasion, but he so often at other times thought that the orders he received were wrong. To [General Almond's] certain knowledge, the periods in which he had such feelings, are mentioned here in order:

1. In the planning for the INCHON LANDING, General Smith thought it was impossible, and certainly impossible of execution in September, and maintained this position until General Almond offered to substitute for the 7<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment the 32<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Regiment, two battalions of which had had amphibious training. This brought General Smith to his senses and he finally decided that the landing might be made after all.
2. There was his objection to the manner of execution of the landing at INCHON.
3. Then came his objection to plans for the capture of SEOUL. [Recall my reference that this was a repeat—a blood-chilling, clone-copy replay—of what happened at the reservoir.]
4. He objected to the out loading of Marines on 7 October, among other reasons, stating that his own supplies had to be abandoned and when [General Almond] questioned what supplies he referred to, he began to describe whereupon [General Almond] demanded to see what he meant and found a warehouse full of steel clothes lockers which had been brought from Japan for the service of the Marines after the landing, when General Smith, and everyone involved, knew that ship space was at a great premium. In spite of this, General Smith brought material useless for the landing operations in the form of steel clothes lockers.
5. When the Japanese Stevedores struck at WONSAN about 25 October, General Smith objected to using any part of his combat troops to unload his own supplies, in spite of the fact that this was the only possible way to accomplish the operation; he wanted a "written order" before he would comply and he got it! [Of course, the order would have to be a Navy one!]
6. He objected to the advance against the enemy in the vicinity of the CHOSIN Reservoir area in the effort of the X CORPS to comply with Orders from General MacArthur. [In spite of the fact that the Division had issued an order to execute: "1MarDiv OpO 21-50, issued at 2000, 13 November, confirmed the frag orders issued earlier to seize Hagaru-ri, and in addition, provided for RCT-5 to pass through RCT-7 at Hagaru-ri and continue the advance to the north, while RCT-7 occupied a blocking

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<sup>208</sup> The following is taken from a letter from General Edward M. Almond, USA (Ret) to General H. C. Pattison, Chief of Military History, U. S. Army dated March 7, 1969. General Almond is commenting on a draft of Volume III of the Army history of the Korean War *Policy and Direction*.

position at Yudam-ni, 14 miles to the northwest.”<sup>209</sup> [The enemy, was already well entrenched in the Yudam-ni area and attacks 26 November. Refer below to Lt. Frank Mitchell.]

7. He had many other objections on numerous other occasions, which an interview with the undersigned [General Almond] could establish.

General Almond stated, “In my opinion, it is most unwise to quote General Smith on such matters as he has been quoted without affording rebuttal opportunities to those in opposition to his estimate, namely, the combat commanders concerned.”

Returning to the particular objection of General Smith to push his Division North of Hamhung and toward the CHOSIN RESERVOIR where the enemy was, it is abundantly clear to General Almond, and it was to his Staff, that what General Smith was really complaining about was the fact that his division happened to be the division used to push into the forward area and meet an unknown force inland.

More telling is Almond’s interview by his grandson years later, when he made these comments concerning General Smith’s exoneration for his delays [All bold print is mine; my comments will also be in brackets.]

GENERAL ALMOND: My general comment is that General Smith, ever since the beginning of the Inchon landing and the preparation phase, was overly cautious of executing any order that he ever received. **While he never refused to obey an order in the final analysis, he many times was over cautious and in that way, delayed the execution of some order. The case that you mentioned, the Chosin Reservoir, is one of them.** My orders from GHQ were to press forward and determine what, if any, and how much Chinese forces there was in my front that might threaten the Eighth Army’s right flank. This I was doing and my instructions to the 7<sup>th</sup> Division and Marine Division were based on my opinion that **offensive action was the best way to determine the threat that existed in that situation.**

[**This would seem to verify my Clue #4:** That Almond has no direct authority to reprimand General Smith over any of Almond’s descriptions concerning General Smith’s many delays! Certainly the delays described in Clue #2 and Clue #3 is important as to the extent of the time delay covering **between 10 and 23 November.** This was an excessive amount of delay, while three separate drafts were being formulated to comply with the CINCFE upcoming “Home by Christmas” offensive. Each draft was dependent on the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division moving actively up the east side of the Changjin Reservoir to—at least—seize and pass through the town of Changjin. Once there, Draft One could have them pivot left (west) towards Kanggye. Since no friendly forces were that far north, the plan had to be aborted. Likewise Draft Two, (reason for including: “not to exceed **one 7th Division RCT**”) also showed no forces were holding a “blocking position” at Yudam-ni, that original “line of departure” for the new Marine offensive towards Mup’yong-ni! Again, this draft had no forces in place of execution, and was altered and revised, and then send to Tokyo via Almond’s G-3 (Operational Officer) for the CINCFE decision! That decision (as defined **from the timeline** concerning after-effects) will add the—ENTIRE—**7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division to the reservoir.**]

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<sup>209</sup> George A Rasula, historian, *Changjin Journal*, 09.01.06. (Chapter 62).

CPT FERGUSSON: But did not events prove General Smith was right in that a part of his division was cut off and, practically annihilated at the Chosin Reservoir?

GENERAL ALMOND: Now that is not exactly right. We had determined the strength of the enemy in front of us by moving into the area that the enemy was supposed to be in. When we learned this, that fact alone **determined General MacArthur's action in withdrawing the Marine Division.**<sup>210</sup> **Our position would be to protect our line of communication and to engage the enemy in contact with us in every possible manner.** General Smith had objected to the advance against the enemy in the vicinity of the Chosin Reservoir area when the effort of the X Corps was to comply with orders from General MacArthur to determine the enemy on our front which would threaten either the front of the X Corps or the front and right flank of the Eighth Army. General Smith met the enemy and it was determined that it was too strong to withstand. General MacArthur had the good judgment to order a change in the orders of the operations of the X Corps and the Eighth Army accordingly. As a matter of fact, the full determination of the threat to the Marines was not forthcoming until the day of the Eighth Army's intended advance, the 27<sup>th</sup> of November. On that day, I was in the midst of the Marine's operation and was at the command post of the 7<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment before General Smith was. I was personally present and when I learned the extent of the threat that eventually plagued the Marines in their withdrawal, I could report to General MacArthur that the possibility of further advance and the possibility of retaining the position of the Chosin Reservoir area was rather grim. As a matter of fact, on the other side of the Chosin Reservoir area, two battalions of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division were engaged with the enemy which was trying to move around to the northeast of our line of communication from Hamhung to the Chosin area. There, the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 32<sup>nd</sup> Infantry had a serious engagement with the enemy which is well (sic) recorded history and about which I have written. (In my opinion, it is most unwise to accept General Smith's (sic) statement on these matters without regard to the opinions of other combat commanders who were intimately involved in the Chosin situation.) Returning to the particular (sic) objections of General Smith to push his division north of Hamhung and towards the Chosin Reservoir where the enemy was, it is abundantly clear to me and it was to my staff in Korea, that what General Smith was really complaining about was the fact that his division happened to be the division used to push into the forward area and meet an unknown force that would determine the strength of that force. On the very day that General Smith was doubting the X Corps Commander's judgment (sic) and leadership **by exposing his division to the enemy unduly and pushing forward to the flank to protect the right flank of the Eighth Army,** the 3<sup>rd</sup> U.S. Infantry Division was beginning to arrive in Wonsan for the purpose of supporting the X Corps and protecting the left flank where the gap was, and where General Smith feared the worst, that he would be out on a limb. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Division was the force that was to be in echelon on the left of the west side of the Corps Zone, **an echelon to the rear of the open flank side of the Marine Division where General Smith claimed that he had no protection.** And, as a matter of fact, he had **the protection of three regiments, echeloned in depth on his left rear. He had to protect his own left flank.** Unfortunately the enemy was in such great numbers that in his withdrawal they flowed in all directions as they flowed around the Eighth Army at Kunu-ri.<sup>211</sup> [Shortened here.]

These last two sentences are important to the date Smith's Division first encounters the CCF in the Yudam-ni area. That date was 26 November. While doing an earlier study over the Marine Division Medal of Honor awards, I was confused over their one award for a battle on 26 November concerning

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<sup>210</sup> This is a controversial issue, as to if the Marine Division was placed in a "reserve status" at the reservoir!

<sup>211</sup> This is side #1 of tape #5 of the interviews with Lieutenant General Almond, Interviewer Captain Thomas Fergusson, CGSC student. The date is March 29, 1975. The interview is taking place at the home of General Almond in Anniston, Alabama.

the A/1/7 Company stumbling into a CCF staging area, within their advance to the Yudam-ni Zone of operation, and connected to their standing Division order: “1MarDiv OpO 21-50, issued at 2000, 13 November,” (listed above) while 13 additional days have passed, this battle was within their **original** Plan 6 Zone. This Marine battle is now under Operational Order 7. As reported this “**strong patrol**” was sent out by Colonel Litzenberg to reconnoiter the Yudam-ni advance area. A sudden fire fight erupted and three Marines, including First Lieutenant Frank Mitchell were killed. First Lieutenant Eugenous Hovatter, the company commander, feared his wounded would not survive the night. He decided to withdraw the company. Lieutenant Mitchell’s citation outlines the battle.<sup>212</sup>

### **Mitchell, Frank N.**

Rank and organization: First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps, Company A, 1st Battalion, 7<sup>th</sup> Marines, 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division (Rein.). Place and date: Near Hansan-ni, Korea, 26 November 1950. Entered service at: Roaring Springs, Tex. Born: 18 August 1921, Indian Gap, Tex. Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as leader of a rifle platoon of Company A, in action against enemy aggressor forces. Leading his platoon in point position during a patrol by his company through a thickly wooded and snow-covered area in the vicinity of Hansan-ni, (sic) 1st Lt. Mitchell acted immediately when the enemy suddenly opened fire at pointblank range, pinning down his forward elements and inflicting numerous casualties in his ranks. Boldly dashing to the front under blistering fire from automatic weapons and small arms, he seized an automatic rifle from one of the wounded men and effectively trained it against the attackers and, when his ammunition was expended, picked up and hurled grenades with deadly accuracy, at the same time directing and encouraging his men in driving the outnumbering enemy from his position. Maneuvering to set up a defense when the enemy furiously counterattacked to the front and left flank, 1st Lt. Mitchell, despite wounds sustained early in the action, reorganized his platoon under the devastating fire, and spearheaded a fierce hand-to-hand struggle to repulse the onslaught. Asking for volunteers to assist in searching for and evacuating the wounded, he personally led a party of litter bearers through the hostile lines in growing darkness and, although suffering intense pain from multiple wounds, stormed ahead and waged a single-handed battle against the enemy, successfully covering the withdrawal of his men before he was fatally struck down by a burst of small-arms fire. Stouthearted and indomitable in the face of tremendous odds, 1<sup>st</sup> Lt. Mitchell, by his fortitude, great personal valor and extraordinary heroism, saved the lives of several Marines and inflicted heavy casualties among the aggressors. His unyielding courage throughout reflects the highest credit upon himself and the U.S. Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country. [He is still listed as MIA.]

This action, as others was covered under X Corps Annex B. Intel instructions: 24 November.

### 3. Intelligence Mission to Subordinate and Adjacent Command.

#### b. 1st Marine Division and 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division **will**:

(1) Report any evidence of an attempt of the enemy to establish strong defensive positions, including entrenchments, obstacles, wire entanglements, or pill boxes.

(2) Report any evidence on the part of the enemy forces to staunchly defend positions by fire or counterattack to include the time and location of such counterattack and the identification of the counterattacking force.

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<sup>212</sup> Martin Russ, *Breakout: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign*, Korea, 1950, Penguin Books, pp. 86-88.

While it was common knowledge and procedure for each division G-2 or regimental S-2 Intelligence Staff to investigate, this successful enemy attack should have been reported to that staff. This was serious information, as Task Force MacLean was en route and approaching the reservoir this same day, plus the Marine 2/5 Battalion was road bound, relocating to Yudam-ni, through that same area! So how was this, 26 November event handled?

**“At 1500, a patrol from A Company 1/7 made contact with an undetermined number of enemy southwest of Hansang-ni (4 miles southwest of Yudam-ni), exchanged fire with the enemy, who withdrew to the southwest. The patrol returned to the perimeter at 1730 reporting the area cleared of the enemy.** Other local patrols of the 1/7 ranged as far as 2000 yards east of the MSR without making enemy contact.”<sup>213</sup> Point: There was no immediate follow up by Marine G-2 section!

As the enemy attacked **between 1500 and 1730 well after dark** and with no plane cover immediately overhead, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the RCT-5, were spread out the 14 miles between Toktong Pass and Yudam-ni, the results could well have seen the utter destruction of this one battalion of the RCT-5! But this battle (by outnumbering enemy) was reported and apparently ignored by someone in Marine G-2. Failure to follow up on this attack was a fatal flaw by that entire G-2 Division and S-2—Battalion Intelligence Staff. It seems to me like excessive damage control, that one officer from that same S-2 Marine Staff could be such an expert on our Army experience and failures east of the reservoir.

Results of the battle: “The narrow Hansang Valley was like an open invitation to the Chinese to attack the southwest portion of the Yudam-ni perimeter. Litzenberg was worried enough about it to direct Major Francis Parry to position his 105mm howitzers in the direction of the tactical funnel it presented. By noon, the Marines of Able Company, 7<sup>th</sup> realized that they were not going to be allowed to return to Hansang to retrieve Lt. Frank Mitchell’s body and the bodies of the other two Marines who died in action on the twenty-sixth; such a non-tactical mission would weaken a perimeter that already had too many holes in it.”<sup>214</sup> Had this threat been investigated, and then fully promulgated at this same time, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines moving above Hagaru and westward into Toktong Pass could be trapped en route the full 8 miles past Hagaru, onto 14 miles further through Toktong Pass, into Yudam-ni. That danger could have been completely avoided had they been pulled into Hagaru instead. Regardless, that benefit would have secured Hagaru without need of Task Force Drysdale or 31<sup>st</sup> RCT Tank Company! This was a major oversight on General Smith’s 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division command in their failure to pull this battalion into Hagaru until this investigation oversight on this hourly timeline corresponded with that timeline battle at Hansang. Compounding the error—the morning of the 27<sup>th</sup>—was General Smith’s continuing error to allow the 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion to also relocate through Hagaru knowing these related facts. The reality was that the weak garrison at Hagaru has these additional events—over and above Smith’s failure to assemble his entire 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, as ordered, by X Corps, within his newly assigned Zone—North of Hagaru. So the problem of leaving Hagaru so weak and in need of additional forces to compensate for an entire RCT-5 relocating into Hagaru, was a tragedy of General Smith’s own making—involving a need to interfere with the other Army two units not his own! On the morning of the 27<sup>th</sup>, my Headquarters battery of the 57<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery was deliberately delayed at that junction between Hagaru and our movement east of the reservoir, ironically

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<sup>213</sup> George Rasula, Historian, *Changjin Journal*, 11.10.07 [Chapter 69] OPS AIDE-MEMOIRE IN CHANGJIN JOURNAL SERIES, 7<sup>TH</sup> MARINES AT YUDAM-NI.

<sup>214</sup> Martin Russ: *Breakout, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, Korea 1950*. p.169.

past Hill 1221, where within five days would become Task Force Faith's monument to the sky and to his death. All this time lost to await the last two battalions of the RCT-5 Regiment to clear this junction so we could proceed to our own fateful locations.

But this (Lt. Mitchell) event is two days *after* MacArthur's Home by Christmas Offensive, 24 November. It should be noted that earlier authors reject this date as the official one for X Corps to enjoin the offensive, as the delaying date, Almond's has set for 270800I November!

### *High Noon at the Reservoir*

How does 7<sup>th</sup> Division OPN O #25 apply?

Will the X Corps join the Eighth Army 24 November 1950 combined offensive, as ordered by CINCFE? Or merely delay their participation in this offensive until 27 November 1950?

Historical answer: The official offensive date is fully activated on schedule at 240800 November 1950!

Status of Draft number Two—or—altered Opn O6 for 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division?

The 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division was to establish a "blocking position at Yudam-ni" (From Hagaru-ri) while the 5<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment will advance up the east side of the Changjin Reservoir, and close at the Yalu River!

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### Marine Corps Validation

Since: 24 November the Marines have no forces at Yudam-ni: Only difference from Plan #6: A new "Line of departure" is issued to "seize Yudam-ni at once" this order altered, from "Hagaru-ri to Yudam-ni." [Again in the U.S. Army, an order cannot be changed except by the issuing authority.]

*Wonsan to the Reservoir; Red China Enters the Fight*, Historical Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

"The Marine advance was ordered in preparation for the combined offensive of the Eighth Army and X Corps scheduled for the 24<sup>th</sup>. From the 21<sup>st</sup> until that date the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines patrolled vigorously east of the Reservoir, covering a wide area without flushing out any large enemy group. The same ominous lull prevailed west of the Reservoir along the steep 14-mile road from Hagaru-ri to Yudam-ni. Baker Co of the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines, plodding through snowdrifts, reached the halfway point at Sinhung-ni on the 22d, meeting only a retiring enemy force of about company strength. The entire 1<sup>st</sup> Bn continued to push toward Yudam-ni during the next two days, advancing 2,500 yards northwest of Sinhung-ni against negligible opposition consisting largely of undefended road-blocks."

"New X Corps orders of the 24<sup>th</sup> outlined the part of the 1<sup>st</sup> Mar Div in the general offensive. RCT-7 was to **seize Yudam-ni at once**. RCT-5, upon relief by 7<sup>th</sup> Inf Div elements, was to advance into the Yudam-ni area after shifting from the east to the west side of Chosin Reservoir. Before these moves could be made, the situation was changed by reports of heavy resistance encountered by the Eighth Army. Amended X Corps orders of the 25<sup>th</sup>, therefore, called for a 1<sup>st</sup> Mar Div drive westward to cut CCF communications at Mupyong-ni. The object of this attack on the enemy's flank was to relieve pressure on the Eighth Army."<sup>215</sup> [Note the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines list meeting enemy forces, on the 22th, and

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<sup>215</sup> Historical Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, *Wonsan to the Reservoir; Red China Enters the Fight*, by Lynn Montross\*  
\*Lynn Montross is also co-author of the Marine Corps Chosin Reservoir History, Volume III. KWE.[Lack page numbers.]

opposition two days later (24<sup>th</sup>) now adds the 26<sup>th</sup> (Able Company) Battle, and we should have a Red Alert warning issued, for this entire area of the reservoir!]

FACT: Operating under Plan #6 of 11 November. “1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division had moved into Hagaru on 14 November. One day earlier, this order was issued: “1MarDiv OpO 21-50, issued at 2000, 13 November, confirmed the frag orders issued earlier to seize Hagaru-ri, and in addition, provided for RCT-5 to pass through RCT-7 at Hagaru-ri and continue the advance to the north, while RCT-7 occupied a blocking position at Yudam-ni, 14 miles to the northwest.”<sup>216</sup> As above the Marines—after 13 days—have yet to secure an X Corps “blocking position” at Yudam-ni. Neither have they sent a force east of the reservoir until 23 November! **[This tends to validate my Clue #4 that General Almond has no direct authority to order General Smith (FMF) anywhere at any time. Therefore he is exempt from any Army regulations! I will rely on this hypothesis view for the rest of this Changjin Campaign.]**

“General Almond had given his divisions their border objectives on 11 November. The 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division was to occupy a forty-mile stretch of the lower Yalu River bank due north of the Changjin Reservoir; the 7<sup>th</sup> Division was to hold the region between Hyesanjin and Hapsu; the two divisions of the ROK I Corps were to clear the remaining ground to the east. General MacArthur, however, chose to revive the concept formulated but not used in October of sending X Corps forces westward toward the Eighth Army. Since the UNC front slanted across the peninsula with the Eighth Army holding the more southerly portion of the tilted line, a westward attack by Almond’s forces would place them deep in the enemy’s rear, giving them an excellent opportunity to ease the Eighth Army’s progress.”<sup>39</sup>

“Almond **initially proposed** that he could best help the Eighth Army by continuing northward and then, if feasible, by attacking west from some point above the Changjin Reservoir. This proposal fairly coincided with what MacArthur had in mind. On 15 November he instructed Almond to open an attack to the west **after** his inland flank forces reached the town of Changjin, twenty five miles north of the reservoir. Thirty miles west of Changjin lay Kanggye and a junction with the arterial road and rail line connecting Manp’ojin and Huich’on. The road and track obviously served as enemy supply routes, and it was MacArthur’s intention that the X Corps’ westward attack would cut them.”<sup>40</sup> [Aborted, as no friendly forces will ever be at Changjin! To be reassigned to the 7<sup>th</sup> Division.]

“**Apprehensive, after further consideration**, that the supply line of the attack force would become precariously extended in any drive westward from a point as far north as Changjin town, Almond offered the alternative of an attack over the road leading into the Eighth Army zone from Yudam-ni at the western edge of the Changjin Reservoir. The enemy supply routes were to be cut at the village of Mup’yong-ni, fifty-five miles west of Yudam-ni and forty miles north of Huich’on. Almond **intended** that the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division make the westward effort into Mup’yong-ni and then press an attack northwestward to the Yalu, pinching out in the process the ROK II Corps on the Eighth Army right. MacArthur agreed to the change and instructed Almond to begin the attack as soon as possible.”<sup>41</sup> Thus General MacArthur has approved Draft One, this being a sole Marine operation!

“Almond set the 27<sup>th</sup> as the opening date. **The 7<sup>th</sup> Division meanwhile was to expand its zone westward, placing forces on the east side of the Changjin Reservoir for an advance to the Yalu through the zone previously assigned to the Marines.** The ROK I Corps was to continue to the

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<sup>216</sup> George A Rasula, Historian: Changjin Journal, 09.01.06. (Chapter 62)



border from Hapsu and Ch'ongjin **while Almond's remaining major units**, the U.S. 3d Division and 1<sup>st</sup> Korean Marine Corps Regiment, secured the corps rear area between Wonsan and Hungnam."<sup>217</sup> [Bold print is mine. Note of interest here: The 7<sup>th</sup> Division Opn O 25 to seize Mupyong-ni is issued for 270800I November 1950.]

RED FLAG: For validation of the "Amended" Draft Two—*tentative Plan 6*—to Draft Three: "Amended X Corps orders of the 25<sup>th</sup>, therefore, called for a 1<sup>st</sup> Mar Div drive westward to cut CCF communications at Mupyong-ni." This quote, I will use in this chapter to explain the change between Draft Numbers One, Two and Three! The reader should not confuse Draft One or Draft Two, with changing any existing missions for the rest of X Corps. Only the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division to the rear and west of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division Zone are involved in this *tentative Plan 8*; Draft Two mission! [Effective only between 232400–242400 November.] The remainder of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division, and the entire 7<sup>th</sup> Division, plus the ROK Divisions will continue their present mission as defined under Plan 6, 11 November, until changed under Draft Number Three of Plan 8, (Now assigned: 252400I—Operation Order No. 7) per MacArthur's CINCFE early morning approval, 240025I November 1950 is proceeding as scheduled. Since the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division validating that the 232400I timeline is already underway, and *excludes* these latter divisions, the 27 November—*delay date*—only includes those division units, still operating under Plan 6, far, far removed from the reservoir. The Marine mission remains, to secure (one RCT-7) a blocking position at Yudam-ni and a RCT-5 to proceed north to the Yalu River.

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On 23 November RCT-5 moves, east of the reservoir!

"Although the projected Eighth Army attack on the 15<sup>th</sup> had to be postponed because of logistical difficulties, the Army on the 14<sup>th</sup> ordered an attack to be made, on a day and hour to be announced, to seize a line running generally from Napch'ongjong, on the west coastal road, eastward through Taech'on- Onjong-Huich'on to Inch'o-ri. This was to be the line of departure for the projected coordinate attack. The Army was then to be prepared to continue the advance on order to the northern border of Korea. General Walker's order reflects an intention to proceed with a closely coordinated attack in order to have the Army under control at all times. It also reflects a considerable degree of caution and a certain respect for the enemy forces. It appears on the weight of the evidence that General Walker wanted to make the attack. He expected opposition, but apparently believed he could reach the border. His chief of staff, General Allen, shared this view."<sup>218</sup>

"On 17 November, with the logistical situation improved, Eighth Army announced to its subordinate organizations that the attack north would start on 24 November. General MacArthur notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the same time of the tentative attack date, emphasizing that the delay in mounting the offensive had been due to logistical difficulties. He optimistically reported that the intensified air attacks of the past ten days had isolated the battlefield from added enemy reinforcements and had greatly reduced the flow of enemy supplies.

On interest to the 24 November start date, Marshal Peng over the CCVF would set his main timeline of attack for the night of the full moon, which was also 24 November, however, due to a bombing raid on

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<sup>217</sup> Billy C. Mossman, *Ebb and Flow*, Center for military History, Government Printing Office, pp.48-49.

<sup>218</sup> Roy Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, p. 775. Both men "apparently believed they could reach the border."

his headquarter above Kanggye killing the son of Mao he has delayed his offensive until the 27th as well!

Up to the launching of the 24 November attack the U.S. Eighth Army and the X Corps had suffered a total of 27,827 battle casualties in the Korean War; 21,529 in Eighth Army and 6,298 in X Corps. Of the Eighth Army total, 4,157 had been killed in action, 391 more had died of wounds, and 4,834 were missing in action.”

On the afternoon of 21 November Eighth Army advised I and IX Corps and the ROK Army that H-hour for the army attack was 1000 24 November. Word of the attack hour had reached the front-line units by 23 November. That was Thanksgiving Day. The Army front was generally quiet. Patrols went out several thousand yards in front of the line with little enemy contact. Nearly everywhere the enemy seemed to have withdrawn during the past week, leaving behind light outpost and covering positions. At no place did U.N. forces uncover what could be considered a main line of resistance.

As Eighth Army units moved out in attack on 24 November they encountered only a few small enemy squads-and platoon-sized groups employing small arms fire. Even in the ROK II Corps zone of attack enemy opposition was unexpectedly light. In most places the U.N. advance was unopposed.”<sup>219</sup> [Caution is needed here, to remember that General Walton (Bulldog) Walker’s zone extends north of X Corps boundary, as Walker “*believed he could reach the border.*” Therefore, under Draft Two, Walker’s boundary line remains and will not be lowered below Yudam-ni until Draft Three effective on 25 November 1950.] “Walker issued a single order on the 25<sup>th</sup>, one that shortened the final objective line of the ROK II Corps to conform with the 27 November attack by General Almond’s forces.”<sup>220</sup>

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Retuning to X Corps, General Almond has orders from GHQ to consider a new Plan 8, Draft One, to send the Marines westward *after* reaching the Town of Changjin some 35 miles north of Hagaru, his reason to cancel—extending his forces too far north—in reality he has no guarantee of having any Marine force whatsoever, that far north, anytime soon. Therefore Draft One, planned and approved by General MacArthur is null and void.<sup>221</sup> [*The excuse that Almond did not want to send his forces that far north is disproven by reassigning the Town of Changjin—the pivot point westward of Draft One—to the 7<sup>th</sup> Division under Draft Number Three!*] It reinstates a Marine force, within their present—Plan 6—Zone of operations, to seize this same Town of Changjin and proceed due north to the Yalu River at Huchang’gu and Singalpajin on/near the Yalu River, meanwhile securing that “blocking position at Yudam-ni.” Its rejection leaves Plan 6—“1MarDiv Op O 21-50, issued at 2000, 13 November”—in place, while Draft Number Two is under planning stages to replace it. This will still place the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division mission to the Yalu River adjacent to the right flank of the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (21 Nov) at Hyesanjin in the center of X Corps zone of operations.

#### A Second USMC Validation:

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, as follows:

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<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 774-775.

<sup>220</sup> Eighth Army GI SS Rpt, 25 Nov 50; Rad, GX 30007 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 25 Nov 50.

<sup>221</sup> It is important to note that General MacArthur, in approval of Draft One, had lowered the Walker boundary line below Kanggye, now also null and void. Also since Draft Two does not authorize X Corps to cross over into Walker’s boundary, it has also not been changed!

“On 24 November, Gen MacArthur issued new orders to X Corps and Eighth Army calling for a general offensive to end the war. While Eighth Army continued to advance to the north on the western side of the Korean War peninsula, X Corps, with the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division as the spearhead, was to attack west to link up with Eighth Army in a massive envelopment. To direct the new attack, a division command group moved forward to Hagaru, with the assistant G-4 included to direct logistic operations. The 7<sup>th</sup> Marines attacked west on the 24<sup>th</sup>, reaching Yudam-ni two days later. The 5<sup>th</sup> Marines moved up behind the 7<sup>th</sup> on 27 November, prepared to pass through and continue the attack to the west. Meanwhile, the 1<sup>st</sup> Marines stationed a single battalion at Hagaru, Koto-ri, and Chinhung-ni to guard the line of communications to the coast.”<sup>222</sup> [This last is reference to the Marine Division order leaving two of their 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Battalions **south of their newly reassigned zone north of Hagaru**, again if under the Fleet Marine Force, that would be directly under the Department of the Navy, **overriding X Corps command.**]

FACT: the above date 24 November is under (tentative) Draft Two timeframe, not Draft Three! Timeline of westward mission will —now— be limited from Hagaru-ri-to-Yudam-ni, as a new Eighth Army boundary line has not yet been lowered at this timeline at Yudam-ni—effective 252400I November 1950. Almond has also reestablished this new Marine “Line of Departure” to compensate for their prior 14-mile delay to seize Yudam-ni! Had they used their 13-day delay timeframe, they could have been at Yudam-ni two weeks in advance! That 13-day delay was approved by General Smith himself: Not until the 23 November did he order both regiment to activate his new mission under Draft Number Two.

“On 23 November, the 7<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment attacked north from HAGARU-RI toward YUDAM-NI, while elements of the 5<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment **took up positions** on the east shore of the CHOSIN Reservoir.”<sup>223</sup>

Note that ever since General Smith delayed moving a Marine battalion under Plan 6 to a “blocking position” at Yudam-ni, he objects to Almond’s Plan 6, 11 Nov 50, as outlined. “I was told to occupy a blocking position at Yudam-ni with the 7<sup>th</sup>, and to have the 5<sup>th</sup> go by the east side of the reservoir and continue on to the Yalu. I told Murray and the 5<sup>th</sup> to take it easy; that we would fix an objective every day. The only objective the Corps gave me was the Yalu River. I told Litzenberg not to go too fast. He didn’t want to go over the pass and down to Yudam-ni because we had this tremendous open flank. But the pressure was being put on me to get going. Finally, I had to tell Litzenberg to go on over and occupy Yudam-ni.” That “*pressure*” was Draft Two, approved (21 November—active—232400I through 242400 November) by General MacArthur himself. However, General Smith is not authorized to cross over this X Corps boundary line at Yudam-ni. The only change for Plan 8, Draft Two is Smith’s new “Line of Departure” change from Hagaru to Yudam-ni to compensate—and exonerate—Smith’s 14-mile delay under Plan 6. Nevertheless, he has that delay east of the reservoir to seize the town of Changjin.

It should be noted here that as accurate as Roy Appleman was in his book *East of Chosin*, he is in error, lacking any knowledge of a Draft Three document, on Draft Two as stated: “On November 21, Almond’s staff had a new, revised plan ready, labeled “Operation Plan No 8, Draft 2. It satisfied Almond’s earlier objections.” This statement should discuss Smith’s new Line of Departure! On 22

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<sup>222</sup> *Marine Supply in Korea*, by Kenneth W. Condit: Historical Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, KWE.

<sup>223</sup> Headquarters, X Corps Command report: Operations Report on Chosin Reservoir, 27 November to 10 December, p. 34.

November, X Corps has Plan Three ready; this new plan calls for not to exceed 1 RCT from the 7<sup>th</sup> Division. What were Almond's objections? And what action would MacArthur take to appease them?

RED FLAG: The reality was that on 22 November 1950, X Corps planners had created Plan 8, Draft No. 3. It calls for the addition of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division, "*not to exceed 1 RCT*" as below:

"d. 7<sup>th</sup> US Inf Div:

1) *Adv, destroy En in Z, employing not to exceed 1 RCT on the Hagaru-ri-Changjin axis.*

2) *Secure the Pungsan area.*"

It should be noted, that the last order activating Operation Order 7 will not change this requirement **for only** 1 RCT for the 7<sup>th</sup> Division! However, Almond is operating under instructions from his G-3 Lt. Col. Chiles and what he tells Almond he is allowed to do by his visit to MacArthur's Headquarters in Tokyo—the night before. As to what was discussed, at that meeting, we can never know for sure? The 7<sup>th</sup> Division is to relocate the **entire** Division at the reservoir! Another example of: What History Failed to Record?

Appleman continues below:

"Almond sent it at once to Tokyo for review by the Far East Command. On 24 November, General MacArthur directed Almond to implement it, making only one minor change that moved the boundary between Eighth Army and X Corps further south in the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division zone."<sup>224</sup> RED FLAG: Appleman's error, i.e. "*making only one minor change that moved the boundary between Eighth Army and X Corps further south in the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division zone.*" The reality is that "This message in three parts." The error was this boundary change is the second of three changes by the CINCFE to Almond via a RAD message 69661—timeframe 240025I November!<sup>225</sup>

Change number one was in Part 1, X Corps Operation Plan 8, Draft Number Three, as discussed at GHQ this date will be implemented at the earliest practicable date. D-day will be determined by CG X Corps." Indicating not the Plan *as written, rather, as discussed* will be implemented—and no one other than the CINCFE, Colonel Chiles, X Corps G-3, and General Almond, has that official knowledge of what exactly has been discussed at GHQ! Change number two changes Eighth Army boundary lines. Change number three directs GHQ representatives to visit General Walker on 24 November and inform him of these other two changes. Other than the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all other Commands in Korea will be sent a RAD copy of this "Top Secret" document. No copy is indicated as being sent to the JCS! So what is known from this Draft Number Three? What changes are made on X Corps orders i.e., Renamed Opn O 7, 252400I Nov. 1950.

From above:

1) *Adv, destroy En in Z, employing not to exceed 1 RCT on the Hagaru-ri-Changjin axis.*

This #1) has now been changed to add the *entire* 7<sup>th</sup> Division, *to the Hagaru-ri-Changjin axis.*

I would consider that more than one minor change!

Draft Three alters Draft Two and rescinds General Smith's prior objection: "*After all, we can't make a main effort in two directions. We've got one main effort, which is going up this road by the Chosin*

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<sup>224</sup> Appleman, *East of Chosin*, p. 8.

<sup>225</sup> Source for this RAD message was General MacArthur's Memorial, State of Virginia.

*reservoir to the Yalu, and here you are telling us to prepare for as major attack out to the northwest.*"<sup>226</sup> FACT: Draft Three removes the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines' east side mission to the Town of Changjin from General Smith's prior mission. Smith's 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division order 251400I relieves RCT-5 previous zone of operations, now having only one mission, to seize Mupyong-ni and advance to the Yalu River. Why do they delay, for two days, movements out of this 7<sup>th</sup> Division Army zone of operations?

Each General Now faces his own Showdown Dilemma!<sup>227</sup>

Hence, the CINCFE—tentatively—authorizing Draft Two creates an entirely new dilemma for General Smith!

Smith's lack of knowledge over the upcoming amended Draft Two into Draft Three (OPN O 7) requires, had he seized Yudam-ni, (under boundary line removal at Yudam-ni,) a new "attack in two different directions," as he states again to Benis Frank: "The Fusen Reservoir was about opposite the Chosin Reservoir, and we went out that way and had reconnaissance patrols go out, and there was no road from our side going to the Reservoir. The road came in from Gen. Barr's side, where the 7<sup>th</sup> Division was. I finally talked Gen. Almond into letting us off the hook on that, so the 5<sup>th</sup> could follow up the 7<sup>th</sup>. Then the 1<sup>st</sup> Marines gradually was released down below and came on up, and I was given an order to move out to the Northwest, out another road from Hamhung and establish a blocking position out there. I went to Almond and said, "After all, we can't make a main effort in two directions. We've got one main effort, which is going up this road by the Chosin Reservoir to the Yalu, and here you are telling us to be prepared for a major attack out to the Northwest." By that time the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division had landed, and I said, "Why can't they take over that job? And they did eventually." Thus Almond has granted two extra concessions here, overlapping the 3<sup>rd</sup> & 7<sup>th</sup> Division, to replace the RCT 5 Marine efforts! So for now, Smith's mission remains unchanged under the original—11 November—Plan 6. As a third concession, Almond has also totally exonerated Smith's 14-mile delay by adjusting his new Draft Two, 232400I–242400I "line of departure from Hagaru to Yudam-ni." It seems Almond has done all he can to pacify General Smith's objections, following his letter of 15 November to his Marine Commandant, outlining his concerns over General Almond's aggressive attitude. Almond has also removed Smith's main and consistent concern, about consolidation of his division. **Almond reduces General Smith's entire 1st Marine Division zone of operations, now into a 14-mile area: "North of Hagaru"!**

Marine Zone now narrowed from that road leading to the east side of the reservoir from Hagaru-ri to Yudam-ni!

Here: recall the duplication of that; Blood Chilling Clone Copy two months earlier at Seoul!

#### *Likewise, Almond Has His Own Dilemma*

He cannot delay MacArthur's prior orders to begin Draft Number Two as ordered ASAP. Almond now has a new draft prepared, and needs MacArthur's approval under Draft Number Three to implement it. He also needs General Walker's boundary line lowered under Mupyong-ni, to retain his individual control over X Corps. His new Draft Number Three also adds a second U.S. Army division—the 7<sup>th</sup> Division—to the Changjin Reservoir Campaign. Now it is CINCFE "combined offensive" date that

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<sup>226</sup> Benis Frank, Smith interview, 1969.

<sup>227</sup> William B. Hopkins, *One Bugle. No Drums*, p. 92: "What does a military commander do when ordered to do something he knows is wrong? Does he owe his first allegiance to his superior, or to his troops? This was Oliver Smith's dilemma."

comes into play—will Smith continue to delay? If he does, he will directly defy General MacArthur’s command authority. Almond’s plan reactivates his concept of an attack in two different directions, as already rejected by General Smith and transferred to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division. Smith’s opinion that his division: “can’t make a main effort in two directions”—not that he won’t, but can’t make a main effort. However, due to Almond’s continuing vacillation and concessions to Smith, Almond thereby completely exonerates General Smith of any past delays! Meanwhile, General Smith’s “new line of departure” under Plan 8, 232400 November, is amended to state his new “line of departure” will be moved back 14 miles to Hagaru-ri. Almond can only wait for General Smith’s compliance to these new orders, as X Corps G-3 Operations Officer Colonel Chiles—on this same day—leaves for Tokyo for a face-to-face meeting with General MacArthur.

*Draft Three-Enter the Entire 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division*  
Timeframe 240025 November 1950

Top Secret: To CG X Corps (240025) From CINCFE under CX69661.

RED FLAG: What Lt. Col. Chiles carries in his briefcase to GHQ, is as stated in CINCFE directive, specifically Parts 1, 2, and 3:

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*Timeline 240025I Nov 50. [Received at X Corps HQ.]*

*This message in three parts:*

*Part 1: X Corps Operation Plan nr 8, Draft nr 3, as discussed at GHQ this date, will be implemented at the earliest practicable date, D-day to be determined by CG X Corps*

*Part 2: Eff on D-day the bdry between Army Eight and X Corps will be as fol:...*

*Part 3: X Corps Operation Plan nr 8 will be discussed with Army Eight Staff by—HQ Representatives on 24 November.*

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Now we have the CINCFE “altered” Draft Three! Now, we also have a second change, Part 1.)

The “entire 7<sup>th</sup> Division:” plus Part 2. The boundary change!

While we do not know what was “discussed at GHQ this date,” we do know there was no change to the entire 7<sup>th</sup> Division’s mission until *after* the timeframe 240025 November 1950. The first indication is to reroute Lieutenant Colonel Faith’s battalion to the east side of the Changjin Reservoir at 240900.

Almond grabs General Barr to reroute his 1/32 Battalion and abort their present order to proceed to Samsu, on the Yalu River, now amended to proceed to the Changjin Reservoir! Timeframe is 240900 November 1950.

However, we also know General Smith was never informed of any changes in his altered Draft Three mission until 251000 November 1950. Per Smith: “At 1000, 25 November I attended a briefing at Corps Headquarters concerning the new plan that provided for our westward movement. By this time, the 8<sup>th</sup> Army offensive had been stopped by a massive Chinese counter-offensive against its right flank. At the briefing I learned that the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division was to make the main effort of the Corps. The 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division was to take over our previous mission of advancing due north along the east side of the Chosin Reservoir to the Manchurian border. Apparently the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division was now expected to accomplish this mission with one RCT. The 7<sup>th</sup> Division was required to maintain one

RCT in the general vicinity of Hamhung and another of its RCT's was still on the Yalu River at Hyesanjin, 90 air miles northeast of Hagaru-ri. This left one RCT to take over our mission."<sup>228</sup> FACT: an equal exchange, one Marine Regimental Combat Team for one Army Regimental Combat Team! Recall that USMC "Amended X Corps orders of the 25<sup>th</sup>, therefore, called for the 1<sup>st</sup> Mar Div drive westward to cut CCF communications at Mupyong-ni." What seems evident here is that Smith is one of the last to know the full plan!

RED FLAG: Recall that X Corps has no authority (Plan 6 or under Draft 2) to advance into Eighth Army territory! CINCFE had failed to order any changes to General Walker's boundary line! Here is that "one modification." Most authors will comment on this: CINCFE had lowered Walker's boundary line at Kanggye, in pre-approval of Draft One! But has overlooked it in Draft Two! "On 23 November, Colonel Chiles, X Corps operations officer, took this plan to Tokyo where he discussed it with General MacArthur's staff. On 24 November, General MacArthur directed that the plan be carried out with one modification, a shift of the proposed boundary between the X Corps and Eighth Army farther west and south in the zone of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division. General Almond was told to designate his own D-day." The details of the corps plan were passed on to General Walker and the Eighth Army staff by visiting GHQ officers on 24 November.<sup>229</sup> "Walker issued a single order on the 25<sup>th</sup>, one that shortened the final objective line of the ROK II Corps to conform with the 27 November attack by General Almond's forces."<sup>230</sup>

*Pick Your Author, or Pick Your Book*

Historian Blair states on page 420 of *The Forgotten War*, "MacArthur made only slight technical changes."

Historian Appleman states on page 8 of *East of Chosin*, "MacArthur: Making only one minor change, that moving the boundary between Eighth Army and X Corps further west and south."

Historian Schnabel states on page 266 of *Policy and Direction*, "On November 24, MacArthur directed plan be carried out with one modification, a shift of the proposed boundary line between X Corps and Eighth Army further west and south in the zone of the 1st Marine Division."

Historian Roe states on page 260 of *The Dragon Strikes*, "General MacArthur approved X Corps Operation Plan 8, draft 3, with minor changes of boundaries."

Thereafter, the Marine attack to seize Yudam-ni continued through 24-25 November against light resistance, "though retarded by snow drifts and obstacles." Plan 8, Draft Three-Opn O 7: Amends/alters Draft Two! Yet it only has reference to a boundary change! So how does this second Army division, the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, get so involved?

"The 2d Battalion, 5<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment, in the meantime moved to YUDAM-NI in order to continue the attack on the YUDAM-NI - MUPYONG-NI axis. The remainder of the 5<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment was ordered to move to the vicinity of YUDAM-NI as soon as relieved."

"On 26 November, the 5<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiments consolidated positions in the YUDAM-NI area, and at 2708001 November, the 2d, Battalion, 5<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment, attacked Northwest, in accordance

<sup>228</sup> Rasula's Changjin Journal, No. 69.11.10.07

<sup>229</sup> *Policy and Direction: The First Year*, by James F. Schnabel, GPO, CMH, p. 266.

<sup>230</sup> *Ebb & Flow*: Mossman, GPO, CMH, p. 65, "Walker issued a single order on the 25<sup>th</sup>, one that shortened the final objective line of the ROK II Corps to conform with the 27 November attack by General Almond's forces." (fn. 14: Eighth Army GI SS Rpt, 25 Nov 50; Rad, GX 30007 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 25 Nov 50.)

with Opn Order No 7, HQ X Corps, dated 25 Nov 50, in the direction of Mupyong-ni.”<sup>231</sup> FACT: this last quote is misleading, on the 26 November, the 5<sup>th</sup> Regiment was never consolidated with the 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment on this date, or the next as stated below.

RED FLAG: Different version via Army History, General Smith applies a new tactic:

“Smith ordered the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines to strike first for the village of Yongnim-dong, twenty-seven miles west of Yudam-ni, where the Marines’ route of advance joined a road leading southwest along the upper reaches of the Ch’ongch’on River to Huich’on. The 7<sup>th</sup> Marines, when passed through, were to protect the division supply road between Yudam-ni and Sinhung-ni, a village located in the Toktong Pass midway between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri. Smith appointed the 1<sup>st</sup> Marines, in and below Hagaru-ri, as division reserve. His reconnaissance company, then pulling west flank security duty off the left rear of the division, was to reconnoiter north of Yudam-ni; the 41<sup>st</sup> Independent Commando, Royal Marines, only recently attached to the division, was to come forward from Hungnam to protect the Marines’ left flank by reconnoitering southwest of Yudam-ni.”<sup>6</sup> [Red Flag, #1: “Smith appointed the 1<sup>st</sup> Marines, in and below Hagaru-ri, as division reserve.” Indicating 1<sup>st</sup> Marines originally part of “their plan” changes “their plan” to only one 1<sup>st</sup> Marine battalion to defend Hagaru-ri, as now in reserve status! This is the vital hub of the Marine Division—tree trunk—to support his two full regiments now “out on a limb” and 14 miles west of Hagaru-ri! This was General Smith’s unilateral call, *not* Almond’s! As the doctrine of the time stated: “The Corps issues the necessary instructions to assure coordination between adjacent divisions: As a rule, the detailed execution of defensive measures will be left to the division”.<sup>232</sup> One battalion to secure Hagaru and the other two battalions are divided 24-26 miles to the rear at Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni.

[Red Flag, #2: neither “His reconnaissance company, nor the 41<sup>st</sup> Independent Commando, Royal Marines,” will ever be part of this General Smith’s order! Smith will, however, use them as a Task Force in an “Attempt to Reinforce Hagaru-ri,” Marine two battalions remain divided with the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Regiment 24-26 miles to the rear at Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni, see Map 20.

“In planning the advance, Smith had assumed the full relief of the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines east of the reservoir by noon of the 26<sup>th</sup>. He apparently expected the entire 7<sup>th</sup> Division combat team to arrive by that hour; but General Barr had called for the relief of the Marines by a minimum of one infantry battalion, an order satisfied by the arrival of the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 32d Infantry. In any event, the remainder of Colonel MacLean’s forces did not reach the new zone by noon on the 26<sup>th</sup>, nor by 0800 on the 27<sup>th</sup>, the scheduled hour of the Marine advance. The full 5<sup>th</sup> Marines consequently did not reach Yudam-ni on the 26<sup>th</sup>, and the plan of attack had to be changed. Since Colonel Murray was with his forces east of the reservoir, Colonel Litzenberg, commanding the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines, took charge of the opening effort.”<sup>233</sup> [Red Flag, #3: “*The full 5<sup>th</sup> Marines consequently did not reach Yudam-ni on the 26<sup>th</sup>.*”] [Red Flag, #4: *and the plan of attack had to be changed.*” Also in this report, the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Regiment was also part of *their plan* as well.] [Red Flag, #5: their failure to remain in their Zone was validated by General Smith as Division Reserve, does indeed change the X Corps’ 262400 over all missions! This prevents the 3rd Division access to their mission via X Corps to move into their zone *south* of Hagaru-ri, indicating all plans were tied together as one. Change one and you affect all others! What is Almond to

<sup>231</sup> Headquarters, X Corps Command report: *Operations Report on Chosin Reservoir*, 27 November to 10 December, p. 35.

<sup>232</sup> United States War Department, FM 100-15, *Field Service Regulations: Larger Units* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, June 1942), p. 70. Special Report X Corps-Staff operations: the X Corps in Korea, December 1950/Stewart, Richard W.

<sup>233</sup> Mossman, *Ebb & Flow*, GPO, CMH, pp. 90-91.



do? Call off the entire mission, or reassign the mission to seize Mupyong-ni to the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division by narrowing the Marine zone? Are should he revise his X Corps Plan 8, for a fourth time? Only one option remains, replay that Blood-chilling 24 September event at Seoul. While this latter experiment was a successful one in South Korea, this one in North Korea would be Almond's Achilles Heel. So General Almond reassigns this *entire* Marine mission to the 7<sup>th</sup> Division! Therefore, providing a justification for the 7<sup>th</sup> Division, Document Opn O 25? But the enemy intervenes and changes all further timelines.

Justifying this? "Almond intended that the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division make the westward effort into Mup'yong-ni and then press an attack northwestward to the Yalu, pinching out in the process the ROK II Corps on the Eighth Army right. MacArthur agreed to the change and instructed Almond to begin the attack as soon as possible" "Almond set the 27<sup>th</sup> as the opening date. The 7<sup>th</sup> Division meanwhile was to expand its zone westward, placing forces on the east side of the Changjin Reservoir for an advance to the Yalu **through the zone previously assigned to the Marines**. The ROK I Corps was to continue to the border from Hapsu and Ch'ongjin **while Almond's remaining major units**, the U.S. 3d Division and 1<sup>st</sup> Korean Marine Corps Regiment, secured the corps rear area between Wonsan and Hungnam." Mossman has made this paragraph as vague as humanly possible! **What "Almond intended" seems this reference totally excludes the Marines from the adjoining paragraph as remaining "major units."**<sup>234</sup>

**New, Mystery Clue #5:** An astute observation is recorded by author Eric Hammel; he provides a later date of 29 November concerning a "suggestion" for the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division to advance westward to assist Eighth Army from their position at Yudam-ni. The question I pose: Why a "suggestion" to activate this division to move towards an objective, they claim (2 days earlier) as already activated 240800I and/or (252400I) AND again on 270815I November 1950? The Joint Command (Marine) force revised on 29 November as the "Yudam-ni garrison" per Author Eric Hammel: "X Corps was not making any sense having issued no orders for two days now issued a series of them. The suggestion that the Yudam-ni garrison attack overland into the flank of the Chinese destroying 8th Army came *after* a Corps directive authorizing the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines to attack southward to clear the MSR as far as Hagaru-ri."<sup>235</sup> This revised date added to 27 November + 2 days = 29 November. This indicates the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines had no original mission on 27 November—as they claim—"to seize Mup'yong-ni." This suggests the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division Operational Order #25 remains valid between 27<sup>th</sup> through 29 November (now rescinded) to cut that same road destroying the CCF leading into Eighth Army area! Hammel cites the integrity of such Marine officers as Colonel Al Bowser, Lt. Colonel Buzz Winecoff, and Major Hank Woessner. In any event, the 7<sup>th</sup> Division order would have to be rescinded—it never was—rather it died by natural causes, and then was sent to the National Archives as a "Secret" document, never to see the light of day until 1979. Hammel's book published in 1981 and he failed to research this (declassified) 7<sup>th</sup> Division change of missions and zones! The United States Army 31<sup>st</sup> RCT (S-3) copy states, "7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division attack, 270800 November 50, seizes Mup'yong-ni, advance to the Yalu River." This covers the morning of 27 November. Lt. Col. Murray's RCT-5 has not cleared the east side of Changjin at that time. The other part of that Order #25, the official Army credentials for those men sent to die—or survive as the case maybe—the authority placing the Army units I served with east of Changjin! The question is why all this confusion? Since this Army Operation Order 25 was classified as Secret: its space and place in history was now open-ended, i.e.,

<sup>234</sup> Mossman, *Ebb & Flow*, GPO, CMH, p. 49.

<sup>235</sup> Eric Hammel, *Chosin*, pp. 210-212. Note "*after*" as in original quote.]

leaving all Army forces effectively detached and disengaged. Does this mean, to fill that gap in history it merely requires a “suggestion” given to the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division to fill that historical gap?

To verify the two-day reference CG Smith adds: “For two days we received no order from X Corps to withdraw from Yudam-ni.” No big deal as he resisted concentrating forces there in the first place. Cited in Benis Frank interview: “I was told to occupy a blocking position at Yudam-ni with the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines after Thanksgiving, and have the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines go up the east side of the Chosin Reservoir until it hit the Yalu. I told Litzenberg not to go too fast. . . . But the pressure was put on me to get going. I finally had to tell Litzenberg to occupy Yudam-ni.”<sup>236</sup> Not until the 232400I, under Plan 8 Draft Two would the RCT-7 move west and RCT-5 occupy the eastern side of the reservoir! Unless there is supporting documentation otherwise, Litzenberg could be seen as exceeding his authority to send the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines forward, senior officer or not. If CG Smith, as stated, defied all other X Corps orders, why would he react differently here in this worst case scenario? Did “pressure” play a significant role, and if so why was it never used before? The ultimate “pressure” would be to relieve General Smith of his command on the spot, or likewise to replace his “previous” mission with Army forces. However, his ADC is on emergency leave. This latter scenario supported as General MacArthur’s immediate solution to the problem! As detailed by Billy Mossman —vaguely— in his *Ebb & Flow* Army history, “7<sup>th</sup> Division was now to advance to the Yalu through the zone previously assigned to the Marines.”

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To return to my central point in writing this, which revolves around that timeline focus before any offensive action, or shots were fired by the CCFV (Chinese Communist Volunteer Forces) Forces at this Army 31<sup>st</sup> Regimental Combat Team located east of the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir on 27-28 November 1950. What history missed and failed to record were those complex issues that change regimental combat team and battalion orders, thereby altering a course of historical events that places this 31<sup>st</sup> RCT in an urgent and dangerous haste, to relocate into another (branch) division zone of operations. The 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division 31<sup>st</sup> RCT would never have suffered the scope of its disaster had it remained at its prior location east of the Pujon (Fusen) Reservoir! Lost, for some forty-one years, were related events, yet extremely important data concerning this 31<sup>st</sup> RCT schedule to begin their journey to destruction. As the 31<sup>st</sup> RCT relocates from its center zone into the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division westward zone, these Army men have no advance knowledge that this was now officially their Division zone as well.

Focus on the three days between 24 until 27 November 1950! Did Almond delay his own mission?

Those many myths created and promulgated since 1950 to the present time never seem to die! In spite of the documentation otherwise, authors have redundantly stated that 27 November 1950 is the new starting date for Almond’s offensive from Yudam-ni. Note that in reality Yudam-ni is never mentioned in X Corps orders as any line of departure to Mupyong-ni!

FACT: The latest redundant version of the myth to date is in the book, *The Coldest Winter* (2007): “The timing of Tenth Corps offensive in the east was important. It began on November 27, *two days after* the massive Chinese assault against the Eighth Army.”<sup>237</sup> (Italics are those of the author Halberstam!)

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<sup>236</sup> Oral History, by Donald Knox, *Pusan to Chosin*, 1995 –MCHC–p. 479. Note: two—different—versions of Smith’s interview exist, this one, and the Internet version! I use each in this accounting! Plus his 1969 version fails to recall his own division order issue 13 November to occupy Yudam-ni. Here an offset of 10 days to 23rd after Thanksgiving Day!

<sup>237</sup> David Halberstam: *The Coldest Winter*, p. 437.

Many authors seem to attack MacArthur's version of his 24 Nov 50, and X Corps attack by an additional three-day delay! The reason given, "Almond wanted the 7<sup>th</sup> Division involved." That *even* Almond wants the 5<sup>th</sup> Marine RCT to concentrate their "fresher strength" from the east side, 24 miles to the west side of the Changjin Reservoir! General O.P. Smith is now "pressured" by recorded history to transfer his unilateral delays, as a direct challenge to five-star CINCFE-General MacArthur, rather than Almond under his altered Draft 3. This in spite of Appleman's:

*"MacArthur's plan called for one Marine regiment to go up the east side of the reservoir to protect that flank of the division in its attack towards Mupyong-ni."*<sup>238</sup> So was Draft 2 merely a plot or a ploy to dupe Smith to believe his mission has been shortened to end at Yudam-ni, while his "main effort" shifts to focus exclusively on the town of Changjin? The question now: is will General Smith, USMC, reverse his redundant policy of delay, to yield to this "pressure" and proceed to participate in this general offensive? Regardless, Smith gets a concession prize—as at Seoul—his division rear flank is reduced, directly under Hagaru-ri and reassigned to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division. Nevertheless, he can now concentrate his entire division "*north of Hagaru-ri.*" Whether a plot or a ploy, it forces Smith to move his forces. "But the pressure was being put on me to get going. Finally, I had to tell Litzenberg to go on over and occupy Yudam-ni." Hence, Smith caves under this pressure. If he delays, General Smith will now be directly in confrontation with the CINCFE.

FACT: General MacArthur alters Plan 8, Draft Number Two by merely reversing the role of the two Marine regiments, without involving a second Army division in the Changjin Campaign! "MacArthur's plan called for one Marine regiment to go up the east side of the reservoir to protect that flank of the division in its attack towards Mupyong-ni." Now the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines can merely establish a "blocking position" at the town of Changjin on the east side of the reservoir, "to protect that flank of the division in its attack towards Mupyong-ni." Since Almond (excuse for rejecting Draft One) does not wish to extend them too far north! Here, as in Clue #4, is evidence that even MacArthur cannot force his plan through by using the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division!

Here (23 Nov) at last, Almond has his X Corps mission under way, with the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines on the west side of Hagaru and the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines on the east side of the reservoir! However, time is short, and the town of Changjin is dozens of miles north and yet to be reached! General Almond's Draft Two missions are not yet in operation, as his staff works on its revisions. However, Almond's past delay problems with General Smith are solved. Both generals should now move on with history. The additional changes under Plan 8, Draft Three Operation Order 7: The entire 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division zone has been moved *above* Hagaru-ri, meaning General Smith's, and Lewis "Chesty" Puller's 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Regiment, also belongs north of Hagaru! Therefore, Smith *officially* has his entire division concentrated above Hagaru. He now should have two full regiments above Hagaru, and one east of the reservoir as well, as this is within his new zone of operations, north of Hagaru? The 3<sup>rd</sup> Division has the Marine Divisions (prior) responsibility directly below Hagaru.<sup>239</sup> At last, General Smith has been granted what he has strived to obtain: his division is now concentrated in one zone, NORTH of HAGARU! His insecurity in having his division separated as he wrote his commandant (15 Nov 50) is completely eliminated. Now each side of the reservoir should have a Marine regiment, assigned and active, while one full regiment reinforces the garrison at Hagaru! Now all General Almond has done, under Draft Three, is to reverse the

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<sup>238</sup> Roy Appleman: *Escaping the Trap*. p. xi.

<sup>239</sup> Rasula, *Changjin Journal*, No. 69: 11-10-07. General O.P. Smith, "In accordance with X Corps Op07 the rear boundary of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division had been moved north of a line just south of Hagaru-ri."

CINCFE mission to require this newly concentrated Marine division to seize Mupyong-ni *from* Hagaru-ri. Thus, three divisions will now be involved in the Changjin Campaign—two Army divisions and one Marine division. “Almond meanwhile ordered a plan made for a westward advance along the Hagaru-ri-Mup’yong-ni axis. He directed that the road to the Changjin Reservoir be developed as a corps supply road and that an RCT of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division be assigned to seize Changjin town and to protect the east flank of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division. The two objectives, Changjin and Mup’yong-ni, were too widely separated to be assigned to a single division. General Almond also directed that the planners take into consideration that extreme winter temperatures of 30 to 40 degrees below zero Fahrenheit would severely restrict both friendly and enemy operations.”<sup>240</sup>

Author’s note: Since this book is about events that “History Failed to Record,” the events and the tragedies recorded were the results of those recorded events that deviate drastically from the plans that were made and should have been followed. Example, in the above paragraph: The statement that “The two objectives, Changjin and Mup’yong-ni, were too widely separated to be assigned to a single division” fails to record that *the 31<sup>st</sup> RCT Opn Order 25 records both of these locations assigned to one single division—the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division*, as documented under 1b and Section 2! Thereafter, history records what happened when the plan was different than what was ordered. General Smith’s decision to delay and neglect, to move and consolidate his division north of Hagaru, as necessary to keep two battalions south of Hagaru-ri-Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni, undermined the necessary concentration of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division as being ordered into the Changjin Reservoir Campaign!

#### Background on scrapping Drafts One and Two

[Draft number One:] “Apprehensive, after further consideration, that the supply line of the attack force would become precariously extended in any drive westward from a point as far north as Changjin town, **Smith objects. Almond Cancels!** [Note, as just stated because he will never have a Marine force at the Town of Changjin.] Almond offered the alternative of an attack over the road leading into the Eighth Army zone from Yudam-ni at the western edge of the Changjin Reservoir. The enemy supply routes were to be cut at the village of Mup’yong-ni, fifty-five miles west of Yudam-ni and forty miles north of Huich’on. [Draft Number Two, however, CINCFE has failed to lower Walker boundary line!] Almond intended that the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division make the westward effort into Mup’yong-ni and then press an attack northwestward to the Yalu, pinching out in the process the ROK II Corps on the Eighth Army right. MacArthur agreed to the change and instructed Almond to begin the attack as soon as possible.” **Again, Smith objects, Almond revises Draft 2 into Draft 3, to include the entire 7th Infantry Division.** However, Almond will need General MacArthur’s direct approval! (X Corps: WD, Sum, Nov 50; X Corps Opn plan 8, 16 Nov 50; Rad, CX 69661, CINCFE to CG X Corps, 23 Nov 50.)<sup>241</sup> Author’s note: CX69661 appears three separate times, one to each draft number!

On 23 November, General Almond rejects Draft Two, and sends his G-3 to Tokyo with his revised Plan 8, Draft Number Three.<sup>242</sup> However, he leaves Draft Two active, pending General MacArthur’s approval; Almond has his new mission assigned as approved by General MacArthur! Based on Smith slow advance from Koto-ri on 10 November and slow movement of only one mile a day to locate any marine forces on

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<sup>240</sup> James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year*, CMH, GPO, p. 266.

<sup>241</sup> Mossman, *Ebb & Flow*, GPO, CMH, p. 48.

<sup>242</sup> This is stated as well in X Corps, Special Report! However, it implies that Draft Two was sent to GHQ in Tokyo and suddenly became Draft Number Three. That is a misleading statement.

the east side of the reservoir—23 November!<sup>243</sup> Since the criterion for Draft Numbers One and Two were never in place as activated, the 7<sup>th</sup> Division is continuing their unchanged mission under orders from Plan 6, 11 Nov 50. [Archive documents] As of 252400I November 1950, all other unit missions in X Corps have been changed under Operation Order 7.

Meanwhile, General Smith is continuing his X Corps mission under Plan 6, now tentatively Draft Two—as assigned to seize and establish a blocking position at Yudam-ni! (Montross) However, General Smith has delayed orders to seize Yudam-ni, but at last, he orders a battalion to attack from Hagaru-ri to seize Yudam-ni, the only change in his orders, his new Line of Departure! “New X Corps orders of the 24<sup>th</sup> outlined the part of the 1<sup>st</sup> Mar Div in the general offensive. RCT-7 was to seize Yudam-ni at once.” That is as far as they can go pending General Walker’s order from General MacArthur to lower his boundary via Draft Number Three. Per General Smith’s briefing on 25 Nov 50: “Amended X Corps orders of the 25<sup>th</sup>, therefore, called for a 1<sup>st</sup> Mar Div drive westward to cut CCF communications at Mupyong-ni.”

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<sup>243</sup> Ibid

## Chapter 16

### Summation

As I stated at the start of this book this is a complex issue. It requires taking out all the public relations hype of history and to return to the offensive starting point of 24 November 1950. That date is highly controversial as is the new date set by Almond as the 27th of November. So which one is the right one? And what happened between the two dates that history failed to record? As I have outlined in my last chapter, one must consider the starting timeline of this offensive, and the point from which it starts. I believe there is enough evidence to establish that timeline was 24 November 1950. This was to correspond to General MacArthur's 24 November combined, Eighth Army and X Corps offensive. The line of departure for X Corps was from Hagaru towards Mup'yong-ni.

Otherwise, General Almond is the one delaying CINCFE's ("will be implemented at the earliest practicable date") order to begin the attack as soon as possible. General Smith (under some unnamed pressure) has a force at Hagaru for the execution on 24 November. Likewise, Smith has *no authority to remain in any other division* (especially Army) *area* that has been turned over to a new division commander (7<sup>th</sup> Division, with Assistant Division Commander BG Henry Hodes present) by the same designated Corps commander. The assigned timelines for each division offensive is set by the X Corps commander, and was expected to be strictly obeyed. Smith's forces are in motion towards Yudam-ni from Hagaru on this 24 November date, and they *continue their attack* 270815 November from Yudam-ni, towards Mup'yong-ni. As I stated, Almond has exonerated Smith's prior 14-mile delay by resetting his new line of departure. That resets this 14 mile delay and resets the line back at Hagaru! Therefore, we should wipe the slate clean to prior problems and concentrate on the ones to arise from the 24th on. So all of the public relations hype around this Changjin Campaign; is just that. Since the Marine Corps was the first to publish their own "single *division* history," it has become the reference book for all others to base their beliefs, or build on this one history. However, one can see that official history—from others—dispels some of this earlier history. As that popular saying goes: The first casualty of any war is the truth!

As recorded in Appleman's: *Escaping the Trap* (p. xi):

[1] "*The X Corps was to move west from Yudam-ni on the Chosin Reservoir to intercept this enemy MSR at Mupyong-ni. The 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division was to carry out the main attack to cut the CCF main supply route. MacArthur's plan called for one Marine regiment to go up the east side of the reservoir to protect that flank of the division in its attack towards Mupyong-ni.*" The question posed, why didn't MacArthur hold to his plan rather than accept Almond's? "JSPOG officers believed that if X Corps operations were to be effective in assisting the Eighth Army, only one general course of action lay open. Almond should attack to the northwest, thus threatening the rear of the Chinese formation facing the Eighth Army and forcing their withdrawal to avoid envelopment. The attack could be launched at once using "forces already in position." What should be clarified here is that there are already two divisions involved, the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry (elements) active prior to November 24!

General MacArthur's vacillation:

Draft One: “On 15 November CINCFE instructed Almond to open an attack to the west after his inland flank forces reached the town of Changjin, twenty five miles north of the reservoir.” This plan requires a Marine force (RCT-5) after seizing the town of Changjin above the reservoir, to alter their northward mission and pivot left toward Kanggye, and into Eighth Army territory, thereby cutting off the enemy forces ahead of Eighth Army. The problem is this requires a force at Changjin to execute. And since there will be none, this plan is canceled. Here MacArthur fails to inquire why his plan cannot be executed as soon as the RCT-5 Marine forces seize the town of Changjin. The explanation by Almond that it is “too far north” does not justify, since this will be the same mission eventually assigned to one RCT from the 7<sup>th</sup> Division.

Draft Two: General MacArthur’s Plan: Approved by JSPOG and GHQ in Tokyo and Almond on 21 November 1950. MacArthur agreed to the change and instructed Almond to begin the attack as soon as possible. Once again, the 7th Division *is not* involved in this draft number! General Almond records he activates this draft on 23 November! No change in the Marine mission on the east side of the reservoir, however, one Marine RCT is required to attack from Yudam-ni (X Corps boundary line into Mup’yong-ni in Eighth Army territory). General Smith is not pleased with this plan! This was an exclusive Marine Corps offensive and the 7<sup>th</sup> Division was not a part of it. However, problems surface and Smith rebels against this plan. To make a complex explanation short, Almond now attempts to continue his past concessions to Smith. General Smith continues his delay, but orders the 5<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment to the east side of the reservoir for its northward mission to Changjin town!

1) In Appleman’s accounting, while always praising General Almond as being fiercely loyal to General MacArthur, Almond strangely seems at odds in Appleman’s exchange of views on his mission to seize Mup’yong-ni! Since General Smith’s reliability to seize his assigned objectives in North Korea is continuously delayed, and he has failed to enforce his G-3 orders to seize either Yudam-ni or the town of Changjin, as ordered since 11 November 1950, General Smith’s predictability to continue his delays is now a prime concern for an immediate X Corps solution. Add to this his refusal to concentrate his entire division as ordered *north* of Hagaru-ri.<sup>244</sup> So why would the X Corps planners even continue to include the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division in any further plans? The time wasted could have filled the gaps created! The Marine G-2 section fails to detail and record the Lt. Frank Mitchell event or the other enemy threats I have just outlined in my last chapter. This Marine Corps G-2 neglect does, however, add more Red Flags to the action on this same date which should raise greater concerns over the enemy within their midst. “Supporting Smith’s judgment of probable resistance, three Chinese captured by the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines on the 26<sup>th</sup> asserted that the 58<sup>th</sup>, 59<sup>th</sup>, and 60<sup>th</sup> Divisions of the 20<sup>th</sup> Army were in the Yudam-ni area and would move south and southeast from Yudam-ni to cut the Marines’ supply road. This information, however, had no effect on plans for the Mup’yong-ni attack. Neither did incoming reports of strong attacks against the Eighth Army.”<sup>245</sup> One may wonder why?

After all, the enemy forces have free access to this Yudam-ni area with no patrolling to locate if they were there are not. The prime purpose is to establish an enemy “blocking position” at Yudam-ni, in the first place! Since the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion of RCT-5 is already at Yudam-ni on 26 November, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion does not arrive until 271400 followed by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, all three battalions of the 5<sup>th</sup>

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<sup>244</sup> General Smith, rejecting his own doctrine, in his letter to his commandant 9 days before: “Cannot help but lose their effectiveness when dispersed.”

<sup>245</sup> Billy Mossman: *Ebb and Flow*, CMH, GPO, p. 90.

Marines were now at Yudam-ni. During 26 and 27 November elements of 7<sup>th</sup> Marines have already engaged an unknown number of the enemy south, and southwest of Yudam-ni.<sup>246</sup> However the entire RCT-5 was not there at 270800 “and the plan had to be changed.”<sup>247</sup> At 1430 the attack westward was aborted at Yudam-ni. To Appleman’s credit he does explain those enemy errors that were responsible for their own failure to split the entire two regiments at Yudam-ni. “Their plan called for them to attack as soon as two Marine regiments reached or passed beyond Yudam-ni. In their adherence to this plan lay the salvation to the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division.”<sup>248</sup> However, it reflects back to the Marine G-2 propagating the fact of having this information from earlier captured enemy about an attack but fail to act on it! They could have, as they should have, pulled the RCT-5 into Hagaru as they passed this area. From after action reports (CSI) the remaining RCT-7 would have survived with the RCT-5 fighting towards them—from Hagaru—to rescue Fox Company.

2) Almond’s plan: “General Almond had some reservations about MacArthur’s plan. He thought the 5<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment should be united with the rest of the Marine division on the west side of the reservoir at Yudam-ni for the attack to the west. To replace it on the east side of the reservoir, he recommended a regimental-sized force from the 7<sup>th</sup> Division. He sent Lt. Col. Chiles, his G-3, to Tokyo on 24 November with the proposed change for review. The Far East Command approved the altered plan...”<sup>249</sup> Note that between Drafts One and Two MacArthur’s plan is the one in question here, therefore “the altered plan” as approved was Almond’s! Here Almond is once again yielding to Smith’s desire, by granting concessions because of General Smith’s objections. But Almond has a backup plan, to use the 7<sup>th</sup> Division to take over any delays by General Smith from this point forward!

The interesting (but neglected) part about Plan 8 is its activation date, and order by CINCFE concerning its five-day planning stage (16-21 November) in “*coordination*” of the attack with Eighth Army. Was it to be 24 November under Draft Number Two, 2408001 November to coincide with Eighth Army, and *continue through 27 November* beyond Yudam-ni, under Draft Number Three 2708001 November? The fact that CINCFE was never directly concerned over what final route will be picked; rather, MacArthur’s approval of each draft identifies it was *his urgency* to get this show on the road as soon as possible.

On 21 November the 7<sup>th</sup> Division seized their Hyesanjin objective (under Plan 6) in the center zone of X Corps, and seized Samsu 23 November, plus seized that previously assigned Marine mission of Singalpajin (under Draft 3) by Task Force Kingston on 28 November! This gave the 7<sup>th</sup> Division the single honor of reaching, not one but three points on the Yalu River. The single American Division to reach the Yalu River. It should be noted that the left (westward) flank of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division was now wide open to enemy attack from Sinhung-ni, westward of the Changjin Reservoir *all the way to the Yalu* through the “previously assigned”<sup>250</sup> 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division Zone of operations via Plan Six! In other words, the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division is operating seventy plus miles *above the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division’s* most forward area reached on the east side of the reservoir. That leaves the left flank of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division completely exposed to enemy attacks all the way between Hagaru and Singalp’ajin. While in all fairness, the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division would complain their left flank was open as well by Eighth Army’s failure to advance the same number of miles to the west of them! However, the 7<sup>th</sup> Division was

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<sup>246</sup> Roy Appleman: *Escaping the Trap*. Texas A&M University Press, p.52.

<sup>247</sup> Billy Mossman: *Ebb and Flow*, CMH, GPO. pp. 90-91.

<sup>248</sup> Appleman: *Escaping the Trap*, p. 59.

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid*: p. xi.

<sup>250</sup> Review map page at end of this chapter.



already at the Yalu River and looking across it into Manchuria at Chinese forces. They have completed their assigned mission and were doing mop-up assignments. Alas, this fact by this “inferior” division achievement was also lost to history.

“On 23 November, the 7<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment attacked North (sic-west) from HAGARU-RI toward YUDAM-NI, while elements of the 5<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment took up positions on the east shore of the CHOSIN Reservoir. The 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Regiment was disposed with one (1) Battalion at HAGARU-RI, One (1) Battalion at KOTO-RI, and one (1) Battalion at CHINHUNG-NI.” While General Smith has few problems here, nevertheless he has not urged his division to advance with any great speed, setting in place his doctrine to his regimental commanders that they set a new objective each day. This doctrine would not please General Almond, as he was being pressured by GHQ to assist Eighth Army on their west flank. The Eighth Army had run into problems a month earlier at Unsan which badly mauled the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, and General Walker has also slowed his northern advance on his side of the X Corps.<sup>251</sup> This leaves a wide open flank between Walker and Almond forces, and is a concern for General Smith as well. But to put things in perspective, the 7<sup>th</sup> Division, landing further north at Iwon over one hundred fifty miles above the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, has increased their lead even further ahead by seizing and completing their seizing Hyesanjin on the Yalu River, on 21 November by their 17<sup>th</sup> Regiment. Other units of the division were moving westward along the Yalu to seize other assigned objectives as Samsu to the left of Hyesanjin. On 23 November 3/32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion was moving into Samsu to be joined shortly by 1/32 Battalion led by its commander Lieutenant Colonel Don Carlos Faith, Jr. The 31<sup>st</sup> RCT commanded by Colonel Allan Duart MacLean was located around the Pujon Reservoir east of the Changjin Reservoir. But huge changes were in the works at GHQ concerning upcoming changes to X Corps. These changes would greatly affect the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division located in an area far inland from the coast and out of range of their traditional ship-to-shore gunfire. While they complained about being so far inland, out of their element, and being misused, nevertheless here they were the inland force of the X Corps. However, they were technically in the location and assigned the two reservoir just mentioned. The Marines having equipment and expertise to cross bodies of water, that were within their element as Marines, having 10,000 men of their force stationed on the coast at the Port of Hungnam! Also by the Marine Corps’ admission, all Marines are combatants! It is a blot on marine history than only 500 men would be flown into Hagaru, to relieve those veterans of that campaign!

This would prove to be a common complaint of the Marine commander. But the circumstance over the original landing sites was responsible for the final location of X Corps forces. The 7<sup>th</sup> Division held the center, while the ROK divisions held the coast line. The reason for the ROKs’ location was due to JCS directive barring any American forces under the Russian Border.

Almond changes, via 22 November Draft Number 3 to involve the 7<sup>th</sup> Division as his staff completed the plan citing “employing not to exceed 1 RCT on the Hagaru-ri-Changjin axis,”<sup>252</sup> The intended purpose to free RCT-5 Marine mission to seize the town of Changjin, then have them join the Marine division mission to seize Mup’yong-ni. However, General Almond still needs forces at the town of Changjin for further missions! On 23 November, with a new Draft Number 3 in his briefcase, Almond’s G-3, Lieutenant Colonel Jack Chiles, leaves X Corps for a face-to-face meeting with

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<sup>251</sup> Chinese forces’ mistake: They thought they were attacking ROK forces, as they intended to do.

<sup>252</sup> While other authors will state a Draft Number 2, there were three Draft Number 3s written. This author has copies of those all three drafts.

General MacArthur about this urgent change of Almond's plans. He arrives during the night in Tokyo and meets with MacArthur. To my knowledge, there is no report if any other officers were present in this meeting between these two men. This must be taken into account, and caution is advised here, as no other officers were privy to what was discussed to my knowledge. Therefore, only Colonel Chiles has the *sole authority* to instruct Almond on what was officially discussed at this meeting and what Almond has the unilateral authority to do in his new (admittedly abnormal) X Corps first mixture of two battalion mixed regimental experiment at the reservoir!<sup>253</sup> The result of the GHQ meeting was sent as a Rad message to X Corps Headquarters and arrived there as recorded at 240025I November. It was classified as "Top Secret" My search for this document was a dozen years before obtaining it, and I was elated to get it, expecting the heavens to be opened and a bright light shining forth from this document! I was sadly disappointed! As best I can reproduce it below:

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HEADQUARTERS X Corps  
APO 909 US ARMY  
INCOMING MESSAGE 24 NOV 50

FLASH

From : CINCFE

To : CG X Corps, CG ARMY EIGHT, CG ARMY EIGHT TACTICAL, CG JI COM, CG 5TH AF  
ADV, CO:NAVFE, CG FEAF, ???? COMD, COM 7TH FLT [\*]

NR : CX69661,

Part 1: X CORPS Operation Plan Nr 8, Draft Nr 3, as discussed at GHQ this date, will be implemented at the earliest practicable date. D-day to be determined by CG X Corps.

*[Part 1: Since no author locks in on this part of the plan—"as discussed"—only that Almond can pick his own activation date. The major change from 22 Nov Annex is for (1) 7<sup>th</sup> US Inf Div: Adv, destroy En in Z, employing not to exceed 1 RCT on the HAGARU-RI – SUDONG area.*

*(2) Secure PUNGSAN area. Changed to: 252400I. In other words, whatever was "discussed" at GHQ in Tokyo on 24 November has never found its way into official X Corps documents! Other than that the entire 7<sup>th</sup> Division has been added. And the 7<sup>th</sup> Div attack plan: Per 252400 X Corps, Annex A: 7th U.S. Inf Div: (1) Atk N at 270800I Nov from the CHOSIN Reservoir, Adv to YALU River, destroy En in Z. (2) Secure PUNGSAN (DA2818) area. Coordinating OPNs with I ROK Corps.]*

Part 2: Eff on D-day the bdry between Army Eight and X Corps will be as fol:

A. No change in present bdry south from Sinup CV 1120.

B. From Sinup CV1120 bdry will be gen line northwest through Chang NI CV 2652, northwest through Koln-Dong BV 7836, Yong-Dong BA 5911 to Muup-tong BA 4931, all named towns inclusive to X Corps.\* [\* Part 2: info (on original may not be clearly legible).]

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<sup>253</sup> Lacking a third battalion it will never be a complete RCT!

NO SIG [\*] See original copy] **Copy received at X Corps, 240025L.**

[\*] Note absence of any copy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Recall when General Collins asked Almond “why the Marines happened to be involved in the Chosin Reservoir area, indicating it would seem, that it was no place for them to be.” E/T p.284.

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Draft Number Three: “This plan [Opn O7] for the first time ordered the ENTIRE 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division into the Changjin Campaign. Since Almond’s modification requested only “a regimental combat team to relieve the 5<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment...” so why would MacArthur authorize all Three Regiments of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division to relocate to the Changjin Reservoir, and what was the rest of the division units going to do there? That missing information *is recorded* within section 1) b: on the RCT-31 document Opn O 25, “7<sup>th</sup> Division to attack 27080 Nov seize Mupyong-ni” with signature as official by S-3 Lt. Col. Berry K. Anderson, as detailed by his S-3 staff officers at Hudong-ni, east of the reservoir! This regimental S-3 group was working from division orders to plan the coming offensive, and were not concerned about the upper echelon G-3’s Division complex issues or merit of the mission, only to plan their regimental details, once known to them! However, Division part one was what the rest of the division was doing. In section one that information would come from the Division G-3.

Day 1—24 November 50  
7th Infantry Division, Plan 8, Draft Three  
Dispositions—See overlay—24 Nov 50

Division mission of clearing area continues. **1300 hours: mission received from Division CG at X Corps that eastern portion of the division zone will be turned over to I ROK Corps. Division to move west and take over a portion of 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division zone, area unknown.** 17<sup>th</sup> RCT continues attack to west along YALU: progress slow because of increased enemy resistance and road blocks. RCT to send patrols east to determine condition of roads and railroads for possible supply and withdrawal routes. 31<sup>st</sup> RCT conducted individual and unit firing and maintenance of vehicles. 2d Bn 31<sup>st</sup> Inf. ambushed enemy patrol at IPORI. 32d RCT continued attack: patrol stopped northeast of SAMSU by intense enemy fire. “I” Co closed SAMSU from SILLYONG, relieved by elements of 26th ROK Regiment.

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It is of interest to note on this date 24 November, only 1/32 Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Faith, was the only element involved under this Draft Two, on this day. Operational Order 7, will not become active until 252400L. Almond on 240900 officially involves the first element of the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division and orders it to the Changjin Reservoir ASAP. Indeed, as historical reports promulgate, this small Army “abnormal 31<sup>st</sup> Regiment” is merely rushed into this Marine division arena, from its originally assigned mission in the center of X Corps! This lack of information was due to utter confusion and neglect by the 7<sup>th</sup> Division G-3 and S-3 official’s failure to list important data while this Army 31<sup>st</sup>-RCT force was in motion! Those facts reveal, via missing declassified (1991) document data on OPN O 24, via 1a & 1b sections listed as: 1a) Omitted; 1b) Omitted as related to 1a) Intelligence & 1b) the 7th Division active mission! 1b) Detailing what the rest of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division is doing!<sup>254</sup> The true relationship being, ALL 7<sup>th</sup> Division zones and X Corps boundary lines have been

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<sup>254</sup> This information covering 23 November is also omitted from ACTION REPORT OF 7<sup>TH</sup> INFANTRY DIVISION, FROM 21 NOVEMBER 1950 TO 20 DECEMBER 1950, FROM HYESANJIN TO HUNGNAM OUTLOADING.

completely *eliminated*, and now, via Operational O7, extends across the entire Marine “*previously assigned zone*” into Eighth Army! The 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, now officially listed under the Fleet Marine Commander (FMC) General O. P. Smith USMC; All the way through that downward slope of the Yalu River beyond Manpo’jin. Such was the nature and urgency of our relocation mission. The ROK Division zone of operation expanding into our previously assigned 7<sup>th</sup> Division zone, now reassigned our zone, by relocation of 7<sup>th</sup> Division forces into that previously assigned 1<sup>st</sup> Marine zone at the Changjin Reservoir. “Division mission of clearing area continues. 1300 hours: mission received from Division CG at X Corps that eastern portion of the division zone will be turned over to I ROK Corps. Division to move west and take over a portion of 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division zone area unknown.” However, General Almond’s aggressive persona has already intervened:

### *FAITH MOVES HIS FORCE INTO CHOSIN*

As our curtain reaches the top of the stage and this 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division drama officially opens on 240900 November, we find our lead player somewhat distant from the scene. Lieutenant Colonel Don Carlos Faith, Jr., and his 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Battalion, 32<sup>nd</sup> Regiment had previously been in motion around the Fusen Reservoir protecting the west flank of the division’s extended line. The battalion has been relieved of their responsibility there and was en route on orders to join their parent regiment around Samsu. What their new mission was is unknown and unimportant now. Unlike MacLean’s mission, Faith will mesh with the Marines history at Chosin and enter into their history as fully being there at Chosin. Don Faith’s orders were officially changed he was now to be relocated back into the 7<sup>th</sup> Division rear area to assist the divisional push to the Yalu, to fully complete its assigned mission in its present area. This would require that his battalion relocate some 150 plus miles, inclusive, through MacLean’s area of responsibility at Kapsan. It would mean in reality that his force was now moving away from the Chosin Reservoir, heading northwest towards the Yalu River at Samsu, instead of directly west, towards the Changjin Reservoir.

Recall that Faith had delegated his battalion’s redeployment to his Executive Officer, Major Crosby Miller, while he traveled ahead to meet with the regimental commander Colonel Charles E. Beauchamp. Faith will be some 50 miles ahead of his battalion. At approximately 0900 on the 24<sup>th</sup>, Faith’s 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion would be nearing the outskirts of Hamhung. Major Miller is met here by a division liaison officer from X Corps; he will halt the column and order Major Miller to report to X Corps for further instructions. When Miller reported to X Corps’ General Almond and the 7<sup>th</sup> Division commander General Barr, he was told to relocate the battalion to the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine area on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir. “*As far as possible up the east side of the reservoir*” Major Miller will only later be informed that they were to relieve the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines at Chosin. A strange order indeed, completely cut loose from his parent division, an orphan battalion in a foreign land. Without his battalion commander! Ordered outside of his division’s area of responsibility, a loose battalion of men, reassigned to another “area unknown!” A leading and major role in an upcoming disaster play: However, with no script to work from.

One of the confusing things about Faith’s meeting with the Marines, are varying reports of the enemy activities in their area. It had been reported that they are located around this east side of the reservoir, some 3 divisions, of 30,000 men.

This force, the 32<sup>nd</sup> of 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, Faith’s forces, had previously received (in Japan) some 500 ROK’s the battalion strength was now around 300 ROKs when it moved into Chosin. The exact number is

not known. Each of the rifle companies had 45-50 assigned ROKs distributed throughout the four companies, accounting for 1/3 of that force of 140-150 men per Rifle Company. These ROKs have no training of any reliability whatsoever for maintaining a defensive position, let alone an offensive one. Their very presence on the line endangered that line's stability; yet, that was not their fault. It was rooted deep within this budget war; warm bodies were the prime concern. Bringing the division to a numerical strength was more important than a top notch fighting force. Out of all American forces, we were the only division, the lowest bidder for manpower in this budget style war. These forces were set into positions with that handicap. So our 7<sup>th</sup> Division average efficiency was diminished; had all the American forces been all top notch battle-hardened, perhaps it would not have made a difference. But they were not, and the added mixture of ROKs therefore decreased our overall efficiency. How much each ROK contributed to or diminished the force, no one can truly say or even make an educated guess, there being no extra time to look over your shoulder during attacks to check on them. We were stuck with them. Whatever they contributed even if it "*averaged*" out; those that did not contribute we were at best "*even.*"

What continually amazed me, are those reports from General Smith. His remarks: not that we were lousy, but the comparisons to his own division. He never realized our status would not change, but his would—by downgrading his own forces by that mathematical law of "*average*" between the two divisions—the 7<sup>th</sup> Division and the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division. Indeed that comparison raised "*our average*" somewhat, so maybe I am too harsh in my criticism of his comparison. Maybe, just maybe, he was trying to elevate us in stature instead of degrading us. Given the make-up of rifle companies of the 32<sup>nd</sup> Regiment, 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, it was typical of the other rifle companies within our division, thus the 31<sup>st</sup> Regiment, 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion assigned to Chosin was in no better condition. The 8,000 plus ROKs were spread throughout the entire division. Yet the 7<sup>th</sup> Division had taken those ROKs places the Marine division would not go. So all things are relative in life!

As Colonel Faith now heads for the Changjin area with orders that he was to report to the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division and that he would be attached to them, there will be one little thing amiss about that, and that was that the Marines didn't seem to know anything about it! Faith had met Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray of the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines on the road leading to Chosin, about 0900 on the 25<sup>th</sup>, Murray stated he had no orders of any kind in that "attached order," he assigned Faith an assembly area 2 miles south of his own forward CP. Murray stated he himself had no orders of his own to leave this area. However, he was expecting those orders to be issued in the next morning (26<sup>th</sup>) to join the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines at Yudam-ni. But his force would not totally clear the area until the 27<sup>th</sup>. The 57<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery was coming into the area; the road would indeed be crowded with some additional 120 vehicles from the 31<sup>st</sup> Regiment, plus an additional 88 vehicles that Colonel Ray Embree —Artillery battalion was bringing into the area.

On this first night east of Changjin, Faith would be chomping at the bit to begin the forward movement toward the Yalu—if that was the place he was supposed to go!

*But Until Colonel MacLean Arrived, Faith Was to Remain in Place*

Until then, Faith was for all intent and purpose separated completely from Colonel Beauchamp's 32<sup>nd</sup> Regiment command, and also between being attached to Colonel Allan D. MacLean's forces. On November 24, only Generals Almond and Barr and Colonel MacLean were reported as informed

of the new and ever-changing orders, and it is not entirely clear that MacLean was yet fully aware—the facts would indicate he was not—beyond his orders to move east of Changjin on that date. Operational Order #25 would be written and dated at this location (prior to 270800) probably on the midnight hour of the 26<sup>th</sup>. But Colonel MacLean was the man with the plan, whatever it would be!

So regardless of who was at fault, regardless of why we were here, the problem was now Colonel MacLean's alone.

### *The Forces Unite at Changjin above Hudong-ni!*

The morning of the 26<sup>th</sup> was a clear but bitter cold day, snow clouds were drifting high overhead, with a threat of spitting those snowflakes to earth. Colonel MacLean arrives on the afternoon of the 26<sup>th</sup>. As Colonel Faith waits for more complete instructions and orders on his part of this hurried mission, these had been promised as he left the division rear command post near Kapsan. Around noon, the assistant commander of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division, Brigadier General Henry Hodes arrived at Faith's command post with those orders, and more information on the planned operation. Having flown *into Hagaru-ri by light aircraft*, he was driven north by jeep into Faith's area. He would fill Faith in on the plan. Additional 7<sup>th</sup> Division units were en route to Chosin as he spoke. When the commander of the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry Regiment arrived (Colonel MacLean), he would at that time assume and take command of *all forces* on the east side of the reservoir. He would bring along, per plan, his own 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, his Heavy Mortar Company, his Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, a detachment of medical personnel, and the 57<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery Battalion. This last-named unit would be short one of its firing batteries, but would be reinforced by Battery D, 15<sup>th</sup> AAA-Automatic Weapons Battalion, a unit equipped with half-tracks mounting quadruple .50 caliber machine guns of the M16s; and Dual 40mm guns of the M19s. These would be awesome weapons of firepower, also one battery from the 31st (155mm) Field Artillery! (It would never arrive!)

General Hodes said that the Marine regiment would move on the following day to join the 7<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment and their 11<sup>th</sup> Artillery Regiment in an attempt to secure another important road northwest from Hagaru-ri. The reason for the additional day was never stated. The mission of MacLean's, and thus of Lieutenant Colonel Faith's, Battalion was to secure the important road running along the east side of this reservoir and thence north to the Manchurian border. This could unite his battalion with the 3/32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion moving from Samsu to seize the Marine mission at Singalpajin “through that zone *previously assigned to the Marines:*”

This order and information by General Hodes would therefore clarify the direction of attack from Changjin. It would be north toward the area being secured by Task Force Kingston at Singalpajin. It could therefore link forces in that hammer and anvil tactic between these two forces; it would be that same mission as “*previously assigned to the Marines.*” Being through that very same zone of operations! This would be a fully legal order, therefore no reason whatsoever to withdraw Operational Order #25 from American Military History—had it not been recorded that the 7<sup>th</sup> Division will now ALSO seize Mup'young-ni, **that one and only mission previously assigned to the Marines.** Yet their commander had stated that their mission would be one of a “*Blocking*” nature at Yudam-ni. The reports of the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines leading off on the required time line 270800 November raises boundary line changes, some Red Flags that were explained earlier.

When Colonel MacLean arrived with his staff later that afternoon, he stated his intention of attacking north as soon as the rest of his task force arrived. He approved Colonel Faith's plan to take over the northernmost defensive position as soon as possible after the 3/5 Marines vacated it the next morning! Colonel Faith's moving north prevents the incoming forces to fully know that his battalion is anywhere in this area at all! Some of the 3/31st Battalion officers were surprised to learn of Lt. Colonel Faith's existence upon his relocation back into their perimeter on the 29<sup>th</sup>!

Since MacLean's own directive was for his task force to jump off without/delay towards their own objective at 0800 hours at daybreak, the question posed why the Marines' forces fail, to move until light of day, overlapping this schedule? While the report from General Henry Hodes would shed light on the upcoming mission, what are lacking were those other units MacLean would include and assign to Operational Order #25. This order would include and add the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the 31st Infantry, plus B Battery of the 31st Field Artillery Battalion, this latter would add those 155mm howitzers to this force. This again highlights the rapid redeployment problem, the timeline entirely too short to move all of these units together into Changjin, and the asinine urgency to do so, ignoring that doctrine of "*Using forces already in place.*" That oversight totally made this a major SNAFU-Situation Normal, All Fouled up. (Using: the milder "F" word.)

Still, the most striking and enlightening source of information supplied by Colonel MacLean in his Order #25 was within the Intelligence Summaries about the 7<sup>th</sup> Division having full responsibility to seize Mup'yong-ni. Still, the Marines claim that is their sole objective, while their own commanding general states they were to "*Block*" or *Hold at Yudam-ni*. Strange rhetoric, concerning the Mup'yong-ni mission! Yet no one relates to it, prior to this accounting. WHY? If that is not the reason for this recorded document to be marked SECRET, then what is? Smith's statement relating to the time of movement into Yudam-ni as a "*Blocking Force*" "*after Thanksgiving day*" (the 24<sup>th</sup>), but Almond had picked that mission on the 21<sup>st</sup>. Strange rhetoric indeed! **One has to recall that a copy of this 7<sup>th</sup> Division Order #25 has been sent to a unit (SP) within the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division zone. So they had clear knowledge of this reassignment of Mup'yong-ni being assigned to the 7<sup>th</sup> Division, the question remains also, why didn't their Marine G-3 ever refer to it?**

But again at this hour we have no knowledge this is going on behind the scenes, as the convoy moves upwards of Koto-ri towards the Changjin Reservoir, and to become *the cornerstone* of the Changjin Campaign. Our delays have been due to numerous causes—truck failure, refueling, and those trailer fires in the artillery section a problem difficult too totally eliminate. We had this problem due to the aged ammunition. We were plagued at times by those fires and the need to let them burn them out. One of the reasons could have been careless tossing of cigarettes into these trailers with leaking shells and/or damaged powder bags inside of them, and/or our constant hitchhiker—Murphy's Law—whatever the reason these were created and we were delayed. Still we would try to pick up the pace against impossible odds and obstacles. As this day travels rapidly; into the next disastrous ones.

In The Book of Wisdom it is written: and appropriate here:

Because we were born by mere chance,  
and hereafter we shall be as though we had never been;  
because the breath in our nostrils is smoke,  
and reason is a spark kindled by the beating of our hearts.

When it is extinguished, the body will turn to ashes,  
and the spirit will dissolve like empty air.  
Our name will be forgotten in time  
and no one will remember our works;  
our life will pass away like the traces of a cloud,  
and be scattered like mist  
that is chased by the rays of the sun  
and overcome by its heat.  
For our allotted time is the passing of a shadow,  
and there is no return from our death,  
because it is sealed up and no one turns back. [Wisdom 2:2-5]

## THE ENEMY

### *WHY WOULD THEY BECOME INVOLVED*

The Chinese high-ranking Party Members were arguing the United States might use the atomic bomb, and they should not risk a war with a “first-rate” power like the United States. While they state the use of the atomic bomb would be “it was men and not one or two atomic bombs that would determine the outcome of war.”<sup>255</sup> Those in favor insisted the threat to China made it necessary to accept those risks. That China needed a buffer state along the Manchurian Border to maintain a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. A victory, according to Mao would raise China’s international status, and a stalemate would be a victory for China. A defeat would merely mean that China continue to engage in a war of resistance as was done against the Japanese. “*We are prepared to withdraw if necessary from coastal provinces to the hinterland.*” They had removed machinery, including huge furnaces of and important steelworks from coastal provinces, just in case they would be thrown back from North Korea.

### *WHAT TACTICS WOULD THEY USE?*

Those aimed not to hold ground but to destroy opposing forces in brief actions, the underlying strategy was to invite attack; fight a delaying action while allowing the attack force to penetrate deep; then at a point of Chinese choice, counterattack suddenly while the opposing force was ill-prepared to receive the assault.

### *SO OUR VILLAINS ARE IDENTIFIED*

The reports in all books are indeed confusing! I do not claim to produce a clear picture of what truly happened, no one can, nor even come close, so much confusion as to orders, data, and movements, unreported facts written into reports are missing, rather intentional or by mistake, I can’t say. My lack of knowledge of the events surrounding the activity at Changjin is hard to sift through for accurate facts. Those in charge on the opening date of the CCVF offensive against us were apparently stunned by the force attacking us from all sides. Those distant, nearer to the Port of Hungnam were allowed to study the situation with cooler minds than those up close to the action.

While it goes without saying that the 5<sup>th</sup> and the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines (according to their accounts) were hit hard on the road to Yudam-ni, it must be remembered that their force was much, much larger than those of Task Force MacLean—three times larger—and that includes our rear guard as well, our 22 tanks, a medic and

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<sup>255</sup> *Mao’s Generals Remember Korea: Political Mobilization and Control*, p. 63.



service company. While we would lose our tanks and rear guard the Marines are reported as having all the bulk of the 7<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment, plus the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the 5<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment, the latter being spread behind on the road to Yudam-ni. This was a powerful force; they had stockpiled ammo since they had been at Yudam-ni for three days. While it is not my intent to concentrate on their battle as such; that's not what this book is about, but the force comparison is made by them, therefore it's fair game as it is important in that regard to the tanks assigned to their RCT-5 and RCT-7 parked at Hagaru-ri should be at least ten for each battalion. It is a mystery why their tanks were not stationed on the east side of the Toktong Pass narrow entrance that they could not pass through because of the ice! Those Marine tanks were with them at Hagaru and extra firepower, with their use of our Tank Company as well.

#### Task Force MacLean-Faith—Enemy Forces: A Case Study

In perspective, if we were facing a force of only *one* Chinese division of (using larger numbers estimated at) 10,000, and the Marines were facing a force of three divisions the ratio would be exactly the same (3 to 1), but the Marines were required to defend in this one sole area, its entire division could concentrate on this one battle, thus their statement that the Chinese would mass solely against their division has more reverse credence, that their entire force of some 25,000-man plus force was concentrated and reinforced against the Chinese forces west of the reservoir! However, each division of the enemy was supplied with only small arms fire and mortar weapons of ordinary infantry size. Yet the size of firepower between the forces of MacLean and the two Marine regiments were nowhere near equal, they had our-tanks, we did not; they had 155mm howitzers, we did not; they had engineer equipment, we did not. They had naval corpsman, we had few Army ones above Hudong-ni.

What is known and reported is that the Marines east of Chosin had informed Colonel Faith that there were three enemy divisions on this side of the reservoir. That must be analyzed in depth. This added to the Marine reports that another three divisions were known from captive POWs on the west side to also contain some three divisions. These latter prisoners taken on the 26<sup>th</sup> and before the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines would relocate past Hagaru on the afternoon of the 27<sup>th</sup> this hoists another Red Flag here: again, why would they not pull into Hagaru to verify this increase in enemy threatening Hagaru? Changjin was a point above the reservoir, as should be well known to the reader by now, a point to split enemy forces coming from the north and leading either side of the reservoir, what is so confusing here is that most reports credit the 27<sup>th</sup> Chinese Army as being on the east side of the reservoir. This is in spite of General Ridgway's map placing no American nor ROK forces "*blocking*" this path on the east side! Yet this will be discredited in regards to those forces hitting MacLean and Faith. Here we have to review the disposition of our forces on the east side prior to 26 November, this being the main center of activity. Hagaru had the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines, being there since the 14<sup>th</sup>, and the 5<sup>th</sup>, Marines at Sinhung-ni on the 23<sup>rd</sup>, there being no forces at Yudam-ni prior to the 23<sup>rd</sup> of November. During this same timeline the Chinese were using Yudam-ni area as an unmolested staging area, —and erecting those *forward* road blocks as well—not uncovered until that battle with Lt. Frank Michael—as a MIA on the 26<sup>th</sup>! Those *forward road blocks* pose a mystery to me, as on the east side they were *behind us*, blocking us in from withdrawal —rather than stopping us from going forward deeper into their territory!

One could believe that Chinese Marshal Peng's battle plan was as reported, the three divisions of the 20<sup>th</sup> Army around Yudam-ni area, and those of the 27<sup>th</sup> Army being in place on the east side of the reservoir preparing firing positions overlooking the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines' zone. The 20<sup>th</sup> Army late to arrive and fully engage! An equal amount of enemy force split against equal Marine regiments. Now we must

also consider the force at Hagaru—a vital point—an important hub with an airstrip being carved out there, an easy target in line of East Hill and the road leading north towards Hudong-ni, the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines just leaving Hagaru in a weak defensive position? These positions are now well known to Marshal Peng on this date. On the 23<sup>rd</sup> the forces in motion would be those at Yudam-ni, and Sinhung-ni three days later; so this scenario of the Marine commander saving his forces, without a force of any kind remaining east of Changjin. The number of enemy massed there—your choice of numbers—would be free to move full force against slightly more than one battalion of Marines left at Hagaru to defend its vital rear position, the 7<sup>th</sup> Division forces truly *removed* from record would be some twenty air miles to the east side at the Pujon Reservoir, and this would then be that infamous “sole” Marine Corps operation they claim it to be.

Why would Marshal Peng split his forces, separate the 27<sup>th</sup> Army group, leaving only one division on the east side of Chosin to be responsible to also take Changjin, an easy task if no more forces will be moving into this area. The 27<sup>th</sup> Army has the 79<sup>th</sup>, 80<sup>th</sup>, 81<sup>st</sup>, and the 90<sup>th</sup> Divisions (reportedly 94<sup>th</sup> substituted for the 90<sup>th</sup>) with their force, the 79<sup>th</sup> reported near Yudam-ni, and the 81<sup>st</sup> Division; per Marine history reported as “*No report of contact until 13 December, may have been in Yudam-ni area.*” and on the 90<sup>th</sup> Division: “*No contact reported, may have been in reserve near Hagaru.*” (Marine History G-3, Volume III, page 398.)

I find this amusing! Within this drama there are enough unknowns in the script itself, while we were under Marine command on the night of November 29<sup>th</sup> little is recorded of any action east of Chosin, only our casualties, and that we “*were unable to fight our way out*” one in particular is the casualties suffered there inclusive of enemy losses. As recorded in Appleman’s account, *East of Chosin* “*Little is known of the CCF strength and losses of those engaged in the Chosin Reservoir Campaign.*” He continues, “*if the 80<sup>th</sup> Division was of average Chinese strength of those engaged . . . it had 7,000 to 8,000 men at the beginning. The number of casualties it sustained during the actions against the 31<sup>st</sup> RCT east of Chosin is unknown, but it was a very large number, totaling in the thousands. It is known that the 80<sup>th</sup> and 79<sup>th</sup> Chinese divisions were so decimated that they were not combat-effective when they went into bivouac near Hamhung after X Corps evacuated northeast Korea.*”<sup>256</sup>

That the forces were pulled away from east of Chosin and implied by Marine sources to be used facing the Marines at Yudam-ni -although no evidence to that fact was established, still, “*they may have been*” but they may also have been east of Chosin as well. Since they may have been either place—or *someplace else*—why the automatic assumption that they were an increased force against the Marines at Yudam-ni? Thereby increasing the forces against them, but more so still implying a reduced force against MacLean-Faith, reducing the burden placed on that force now assembled there. If it were only: that easy in reality. To me it would stand to reason if their strength against us was unknown at the time, so, too, their divisional association would be unknown as well.

#### *ALSO AS FAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED, WHO CARES?*

But what is implied outside of Appleman’s account is that irrefutable statement of facts. “*They were only from the 80<sup>th</sup> Division.*” But once again make no mistake here I am not trying to place any more Chinese there than was there. I myself have no additional numbers to plug into the equation, but I am

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<sup>256</sup>Roy Appleman *East of Chosin* — p. 304

curious. Why would Marshal Peng split his forces north of Changjin and send two divisions from the 27<sup>th</sup> Army southwest instead of southeast, away from Hagaru? Thus my hypothesis that follows.

The reservoir itself was a natural barrier against troops flanking east or west of it. In other words, had the reservoir been frozen solid enough on November 26<sup>th</sup> (it wasn't) to move enemy forces straight down its center line to cut the flanks of the Marines left and the 7<sup>th</sup> Division on the right side, its forces could have been sighted by open observation and subject to air attack both day and night, they would have no cover or defense. Napalm dropped in a circle would melt the ice and sink them. Bombing would perhaps also break through the ice and sink them. It was not an ideal area to cross. This was considered by Faith's forces on its withdrawal while it would save many from small arms "Long distance firing" heavier mortar fire and/or artillery fire will create large cracks and gaps and weaken the support surface. The reservoir itself was the lowest ground around and not the best area to seek cover. This will dismiss the reservoir, so the 79<sup>th</sup> Division would be required to cross north well above it, with every indication by marine account that the 81<sup>st</sup> will follow leaving the 80<sup>th</sup> Division alone to take the weakest link, East of Changjin Reservoir.

But the facts are that on the 26<sup>th</sup> this was not the weakest link, but the strongest one. The troops at Hagaru had only slightly more than one battalion of men, and Colonel Faith had already moved into the 5<sup>th</sup> Marine area the day before, the weakest link in the giant "Y" was the middle junction Hagaru. The strongest (to defend Hagaru) was East of Chosin, bolstered by an additional 1,000-man infantry force from Faith's 1st Battalion, 1/32<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Battalion. Since Faith did not have a clue as to his being here, one could surmise that the Chinese had no clue as to his being there as well? Only the obvious to support the rear flank of the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines! This would be a disadvantage to Marshal Peng's advance placement of his forces! As the Marines were being monitored by the 80<sup>th</sup> Division and they were loading to move out, that movement could only be perceived as a move north toward the town of Changjin junction. The Chinese were in place and were preparing roadblocks for night operations. Their plan was to trap any moving force and isolate it, and then destroy it. So in reality the CPVF anticipation of the Marine move forward into Changjin would by military necessity have a larger force situated within your path north. But this force (5<sup>th</sup>) was withdrawing back towards Hagaru, and the Chinese could not know the reason for that movement at that time. No matter, this CPVP Army group was assigned to engage whoever was on this side of the reservoir. Since this American force was being reduced in size it would be to their (CPVF) benefit to meet a smaller force, with their pre-established force. Why relocate them? *Why not use "Forces Already in Place?"* Seems I read that somewhere before!

Now is one to believe, as this last element of Marines, having fully evacuated Sinhung-ni, that the 79<sup>th</sup> Division would suddenly backtrack into Changjin, swing southwest around the reservoir and arrive in time to trap and join the 20<sup>th</sup> Army offensive against the increasing force there? Recall that the main plan is to trap two regiments of Marines as they move through Yudam-ni, and *only then* could they know (by following them) that the other two battalions were moving to Yudam-ni on this morning of the 27<sup>th</sup> to become that full second regiment! Recall that on that same night as the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines move through Toktong Pass, that pass will be blocked and the force there "*Fox Company*" will be surrounded—one of those Red Flags. This division of the 79<sup>th</sup> cannot get to that point, it being further northwest at the branch of the reservoir wedged against its inner banks. While the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines had traveled 26 miles by road this enemy division plus-possibly- followed by the 81<sup>st</sup> Division manually moving their ammo some 30-40 miles over mountainous terrain to meet them. This in my mind is what

seems to be implied; whether that is factual I can't say, but I can be reasonably safe in the assumption that no one else except the Chinese can verify the facts one way or the other, later in history this may become known.

But for now every indication is that the 27<sup>th</sup> Army was to move down the west side of the reservoir. As already stated, I am not trying to change history but use it, so we have to review that little piece that is available here: those enemy movements prior to the events of our drastic changes on November 24.

#### WHERE WERE THE CHINESE BEFORE THAT DATE?

##### *20th ARMY*

As early as November 6, this army would be at Kanggye moving downward to the west side of the Chosin Reservoir closing in the area of the Yudam-ni village, between, November 13 & 15 to “*block*.” This is that main Marine route leading west towards Mup'yong-ni. This highlights the importance of the Marine force being in a reconnaissance check of this area on those later dates.

##### *26th ARMY*

Held in reserve at Lin-Chiang on the Yalu until; “*end of November!*”

##### *27th ARMY*

Its mission: split its forces with the 79<sup>th</sup> moving southwest and the 80<sup>th</sup> on the east to create a pincer movement “*that will close at Hagaru.*” The 81<sup>st</sup> Division and the additional 90<sup>th</sup> Division will be “*somewhere*” in a reserve status.

#### SO WHAT IS REALITY IN THIS HYPOTHESIS?

The answer must be contained within the time element of recorded movements of the 20<sup>th</sup> and the 27<sup>th</sup> Army into the Chosin area and around Yudam-ni, the enemy remaining out of sight on November 15, the 27<sup>th</sup> Army at Kanggye, some days later. It would not be known at this time to X Corps of a fourth division (90<sup>th</sup>) being attached to either army.

The dates are important, because the 20<sup>th</sup> Army was in that “*blocking position*” at Yudam-ni one day after the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines had pulled into Hagaru (Nov. 14) they found it undefended! Had they moved into Yudam-ni earlier, they may have found the enemy in force there. The 5<sup>th</sup> Marines would not be east of Chosin Reservoir until the 23<sup>rd</sup>. So the mission assigned the enemy was set as seizing Hagaru as forces moved outward from there, their pre-set plan. But as reported the 20<sup>th</sup> Army—being idle and unmolested and not engaging any forces moving this side of Hagaru—moved downward as the 27<sup>th</sup> Army moved closer into place above the reservoir. Unseen and undetected they moved at will into positions. It's remaining two divisions in reserve. Ironically, this would be a reciprocal movement by X Corps G-3, Drafts One and Two to swing around the reservoir and “block” the enemy path through Mup'yong-ni into Eighth Army zone and protect General Walker's force from a frontal attack.

But the point to be made here is that the *Chinese did not know the coming disposition of our forces, outside of our now occupying Hagaru*, (on the 14<sup>th</sup>), this being their concern to trap forces moving

out of there north or northwest. We know now about the “*blocking*” enemy forces already around Yudam-ni, (a 13-day delay would allow them to move freely down below Toktong Pass, that area where they let the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines pass through on the 27<sup>th</sup>). Had Marshal Peng been fully aware of the in-fighting within X Corps ranking officers and Smith’s intended delays he could wait longer and move more forces forward to face him at Hagaru? Those delays (highly praised), created a timeline of build-up for Peng’s forces. All this enemy time consumed manual movement of ammunition being stockpiled in places, within shorter distance over time for Marshal Peng’s forces.

If the delaying logic applied to the Marine commander; it also allowed an equal time frame for the other side, for every second of every day applied equally to both sides in an equal distribution of hours. In other words, how were the Chinese using the additional time reportedly gained by the Marines? Their forces were hiding within the huts, villages and surrounding hills obtaining information on our positions. The answer would prove to be that they were using that time to strengthen their positions. One must remember their mission was not to defend any given area but to be on the offensive, forcing us into those defensive positions where they would have the advantage, since Marshal Peng was by no means a complete fool he could estimate where his enemy was and would locate its defensive positions and all he had to do is move ammo into that local zone surrounding that area. For example, the position Peng picked on the east side and “Fox Hill” on the west side, for his pre-planned entrapment. Over 8000 Marines have passed this enemy staging area before Fox Company would arrive as the last unit at this point in time. That adds credence to why they would not move around our Phantom Force east of Chosin, the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines being there for some 6-7 days indicated the Americans most forward line of advance on this side of the reservoir. **That they allowed the Marines freedom to leave this area was a bonus for their forces massed there, if the enemy underestimated anything, it would mean that they miscalculated that timeline to wipe out this Phantom Force and move immediately to Hagaru.** Their delay—not Smith’s—contributed to saving his command more so than the Marines’ praised actions of “*feet dragging*” it all depends on how narrow one views the situation before and after the battle. As Truman stated, “*History is written by the winners.*” While I have not disputed that statement, the losing side can embellish the event all they want from their position, but it does not change one iota the events within history.

Those U.S. Army forces that fought and survived east of Chosin could embellish and elevate their own importance to a degree never before raised in American Military History of Battle—but to what end? No amount of praise can change the end result, it was a *disaster*. Yet, within that disaster are events that could have minimized that disaster, and to elevate events on the other side to hide and minimize that disaster, to rob those in the middle of that disaster of their being there at all is not “historical” in my mind by any means, is shameful for American Military History. One may well remove the Alamo, Pearl Harbor, Bataan, and even 10 years of Vietnam as America has tried so often to pretend to do, placing various spins on events at these places and times in history. But how one wishes and portrays it to be is not reality and will not change the history as it comes to the surface, as the ice melted towards spring on that reservoir at Chosin even through our forces were gone from there—only our dead remained—those waves created by the winds blowing over that reservoir have yet to ripple through American Military History!

But returning to my hypothesis, on the 26<sup>th</sup>, since it was reported by the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines that three enemy divisions were at Yudam-ni, and the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines had reported the same numbers to Lieutenant Colonel Faith, on the same date, we now know their strength, yet they did not know our final positions on this same date. Rapid changes had been made since the 24<sup>th</sup> of the month. The Chinese had invested too much

time in setting their positions to haphazardly change them now; we were the ones weakening our defense east of Chosin, why should they change a sure thing?

At this same time it would seem the 20<sup>th</sup> Army has shifted (drawing their forces away from Yudam-ni) its force downward to cut the road between Hagaru and Koto-ri. Task Force Drysdale was attacked by their 60<sup>th</sup> Division. The 58<sup>th</sup> Division attacking Hagaru and seizing East Hill, this latter division being recorded as weak and unable to sustain repeated attacks on Hagaru, its last effort the night of the 30<sup>th</sup>; “they had shot their bolt.” The 59<sup>th</sup> Division being responsible to hit the rear guard of the marines at Toktong Pass. So those three divisions hitting the Marines on the west side were the 59<sup>th</sup>, and some of the 89<sup>th</sup> from the 20<sup>th</sup> Army, and the 79<sup>th</sup> from the 27<sup>th</sup> Army. (Per Mossman Map 3, page 95.) Portions of the 89<sup>th</sup> having already moved some 20 miles southeast in Eighth Army zone to engage the 3<sup>rd</sup> (Division) Regiment, Sach'ang-ni. But the force at Hagaru did not know that at the time, but in their mind there were more CPVF forces in this area than history would record, so General Smith reacted with a task force, assuming the enemy in greater numbers than history would prove. That would be a fatal assumption that would lock Task Force Faith in the fight for its life; it now being vital to Hagaru, and a safety valve to relieve pressure there, a force that could not be withdrawn until that pressure was equalized. Yet, that is precisely why this force should have been acknowledged instead of removed from history as never being there!

Since Marshal Peng had only his estimates—as we did of his forces—on the 14<sup>th</sup> of November, so also on the 27<sup>th</sup> he was aware that he had underestimated his enemy (again as we did of his forces) that would be assembled at Hagaru-Yudam-ni-Sinhung-ni on the 14<sup>th</sup>. (There was no force either place on that date.) Now they were being rearranged and only the force east of Chosin would be reduced in number. Since Marshal Peng's forces have been hidden prior to his date of attack (Nov. 25) against Eighth Army and he was fully engaging them on this date, and as previously stated his war room had suffered a direct hit by massive bombing raids on the 24<sup>th</sup>, that attack killing the son of Mao-Tse-Tung (Truman's counterpart), he therefore lost men and equipment in those bombing raids as well, plus he now realized that the force around Hagaru was double his original estimate. The stronger force at Yudam-ni and Hagaru, and although Hagaru was still weak, yet, the prime target, he had one route of least resistance to reach it.

Disregarding the larger force at Yudam-ni from the north, he would have to eliminate or ignore that force blocking this route via Sinhung-ni-Hudong-into Hagaru. He decides to engage his forces on the east side of the reservoir, now after the 27<sup>th</sup> the weakest link leading into Hagaru. Given this scenario of concentration, this would indicate special consideration to the battle east of Chosin. He still had those two divisions from the 27<sup>th</sup> Army held in reserve. Whether he could use them or not is recorded as doubtful. But this much is known, he did not have an adequate force available to seize Hagaru after elimination of Task Force Faith. This is borne out by action below Hudong on the night of November 3. Since, no major action or attempt had been made to seize Hagaru after that date and neither any indication of the 81<sup>st</sup> and 90<sup>th</sup> being thrown into action against Hagaru, still held in reserve, a force of 15,000 men.

Where were they, and why were they not used? The only answer can be Marshal Peng's determination that he was not ready or able at that time to use them or able to reinforce the east side of Chosin. He therefore missed his opportunity to avoid his Korean Alamo, East of Chosin, as General Santa Anna could have done in Texas, each man could have skirted each area. But they did not, and

in both cases a military opportunity was lost. When one considers the road between Hudong-ni and Hagaru—some four miles—between December 1 and December 4<sup>th</sup>—while Hagaru is burdened with decimated units from Drysdale and Faith, plus the late arrival of the Marines, it was more vulnerable than ever had those two divisions been thrown against it. Thus, General MacArthur’s statement that his “reconnaissance in force” would trigger the Chinese movement, causing them to move prematurely, has credence here!

The constant confusion over the 1/32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion being “attached” or not was because they were outside of their division zone and transferred to travel through that Marine zone. However, once on the east side of the reservoir this will immediately be the 7<sup>th</sup> Division zone, and the staging area for Task Force MacLean, and his 31<sup>st</sup> RCT! FACT: The 5<sup>th</sup> Marines mission is officially “cancelled” and they are officially relieved of this area effective at 2512001 November 1950! As verified below. Like the mixed regiment on the east side of the Reservoir, there were built-in disasters to the loss of lives! In the Marine zone at Yudam-ni, due to the RCT-5 two-day delay to get there, only one battalion would pass through to the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines at Yudam-ni. The other 2/3rds of the regiment will remain until morning of 270800 to relocate westward! Again why the delay? The results a “Joint Command” requiring an additional two days’ delay to exit Yudam-ni, via a new line of departure from Yudam-ni, back into Hagaru! Whatever caution needed could have benefited the 2/3<sup>rd</sup> Marine regiment by pulling them into Hagaru! With the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Regiment already assigned there this would have been more than sufficient to defend Hagaru! In any event they had no justification to remain east of the reservoir once their mission was cancelled, and they were officially relieved! Likewise, that Marine Company remaining at Sasu-ri likewise had no business there, remaining there until recalled 30 November with our tank command, as needed at Hagaru!

“There is little doubt that MacArthur ardently believed in his mission and that he was more than willing to call what he regarded as a Chinese bluff in order to carry out that mission. He may well have recalled those tenets of American military doctrine which hold that ‘the mission is the basic factor in the commander’s estimate,’ and that ‘to delay action in an emergency because of incomplete information shows a lack of energetic leadership, and may result in lost opportunities. The situation, at times, may require the taking of calculated risks.’ This is borne out by his explanation later of his northward advance as a ‘reconnaissance in force.’ He stated the alternatives which faced him on 24 November. ‘One,’ he testified, ‘was to ascertain the truth of the strength of what he [the enemy] had; the other was to sit where we were. Had we done that he would have built up his forces, and undoubtedly destroyed us. The third was to go in precipitate retreat, which would not have been countenanced, I am quite sure.’”<sup>257</sup>

While there is more to explaining this, it would take another book to do that! However, what is reality? This Hagaru garrison (after 27 November) was defended by slightly more than one battalion from the RCT-1 and desperately needs reinforcements and General Smith’s Joint Command at Yudam-ni, was now encircled and cut off, and locked in place for four additional days, some fourteen miles west at Yudam-ni. Hence that Yudam-ni garrison cannot and will not contribute anything whatsoever—absolutely nothing—to reinforcing Hagaru-ri. To the contrary General Smith requires the Army 31<sup>st</sup> Tank elements (without officially recording as such) from the Army 31<sup>st</sup> RCT to reinforce Hagaru! Likewise, Task Force Drysdale is ordered from Koto-ri to Hagaru for additional defense. All this action leaves, and bleeds, Task Force Faith, completely cut-off east of the reservoir! Casualties resulting to Task Force Faith, after that tank withdrawal: Killed in Action—Casualties after the tank withdrawal: Day Seven (11/30/50)—82 Americans; Day Eight (12/1/50)—114 Americans; Day Nine

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<sup>257</sup> *Policy and Direction: The First Year*, by James F. Schnabel, **Center for Military History**, p. 279.

(12/2/50) 333 Americans. These figures exclude unknowns (non-recorded) and Republic of Korea conscripted soldiers. Final night of Lieutenant Colonel Faith's Task Force battle: total destruction of our column of wounded and the final demise of the Army Task Force. The hypocrisy of using these same tanks on 3 December as a rear defense for the two regiments of Marines coming out of Toktong Pass is recorded in La Bree's accounting: "On 3 December Smith sent the Forty-first Commando and the Army's Thirty-first Tank Company north on the MSR to see if they could relieve some of the pressure the two regiment column was experiencing on the way from Yudam-ni. The Royal Marines and Army tankers cleared the perimeter north of Hagaru-ri of enemy forces making it easier for the Fifth and Seventh Marines to make contact with the Hagaru-ri garrison."<sup>258</sup>

*Marshal Peng Teh-Huai*  
(Peng Dehuai)

The Chinese commander was a veteran of the South China conflicts and the famous Long March in 1934 to 1935 during the Chinese civil war. By the start of the Korean War Marshal Peng had been promoted to deputy commander of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA)

It was erroneously reported in the early days of the Chinese intervention in North Korea that Marshal Lin Biao was the commander of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF). The Chinese would dispute that fact, stating from the very beginning of their involvement, Marshal Peng was the initial commander. With a headquarters in Mukden, his title was acknowledged as Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteer Forces. (CPVF). He can be considered as General MacArthur's counterpart in Korea. His title over the CPVF would confuse those G-2 Intelligence members in the early stages of this conflict. Lacking modern equipment clearly constrained the CPVF's deployment. Due to these delays, Mao instructed the CPVF to engage ROK troops first in order to gain experience before dealing with the more powerful U.S. units. "The CPVF's first encounter with an American force was accidental. Indeed, some CPVF units even tried to avoid U.S. troops."<sup>259</sup> The Thirty-ninth Army attacked Unsan on the night of November 1, believing the town was held by ROK units. Only after sighting a much taller and heavier enemy did the CPVF realize that it was engaging the Americans (the Eighth Regiment of the First Cavalry Division, which was taking over the defense of Unsan from the ROK Fifteenth Regiment)"<sup>260</sup>.

Marshal Peng would later sign the July 1953 Korean Armistice as the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers and as their representative. In 1959 Peng had risen to Minister of Defense of the People's Republic of China, however, in his struggle for power against Mao Tse-tung, he would be sent to a labor camp during the Cultural Revolution, and reportedly was tortured to death by Red Guards, on November 29, 1974. In 1980, he was "rehabilitated" and was once again honored for his role in the Korean War. (*Facts on File, Korean Almanac*, p. 210.)

Marshal Peng's skill in moving his forces in North Korea cannot be diminished in any way. He did one hell of a job in that endeavor, his skill to master the primitive logistics of transporting weapons and ammunition above, below, and into our lines is well recorded. While well recorded, some of his movements were severely distorted—as were so many other things—in the early days of the Chinese first attacks in North Korea. Within the Chosin area, many opinions were given of the massive forces

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<sup>258</sup> Clifton La Bree, *The Gentle Warrior*, p. 172.

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid*: Could be an explanation for Colonel MacLean's frustration in the CCF's avoidance of combat with American units.

<sup>260</sup> *Mao's Generals Remember Korea, What China Learned from its Forgotten War in Korea*, p. 15.



facing the Marines there, those opinions even suggesting that the Chinese commanders knew the exact amount of troops at Chosin, that they had the ability with their primitive backpack methods of moving material at a rapid pace, to compensate for our own shift of forces is untrue. For in reality we could not adhere to a tight time schedule with our mobile transportation methods to cover more miles per hour. In reality, we outran them back to Hungnam and the coastline.

At Chosin MacLean's Task Force was scheduled to move from Sinhung-ni to Changjin on the 27 November, his force was not there for that 0800 offensive, and that forward movement would be offset 24 hours. While the Marine forces had been there for some 10 days their forces could have been known where the enemy was through reconnaissance methods, but the situation on November 24<sup>th</sup> at Chosin had changed dramatically, the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines had just relocated to Yudam-ni, fourteen miles from Hagaru; the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines were still east of Chosin. While regiments and strength can be estimated, they cannot be exact, without morning reports, men assigned to the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines, could for the time being, be elsewhere, at Hagaru for instance.

As for the added forces coming into Chosin, Lt. Col. Faith and Col. MacLean's forces; to this very day, there is no concrete report of the exact number of this force, its rapid movements dislodge some troops, trucks breaking down on the 160-mile road march there, and those ROKs "attached" who could accurately keep track of them? But any Chinese reconnaissance group watching from the hills—as now known they were—could count the number of trucks being added by Faiths 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion on November 25<sup>th</sup>, east of Chosin, swelling the force at that area. It is of no really big concern the mixture of Army and Marine forces! So what is known is that this area east of Chosin is being reinforced on November 25<sup>th</sup> by some 3,000 men American and ROKs, beyond its force there on the 24<sup>th</sup>. This force—added to the full Marine RCT-5—will now be greater than that at Yudam-ni. The confusion of the trucks moving to and from this area had to severely confuse the Chinese reconnaissance squads, and the information related to Marshal Peng's headquarters could not be accurate counts, only estimates.

This gives Peng's forces only two days to adjust its forces on either side of the reservoir. Does he adjust for those increased forces at that moment in time, or does he shift away from this increased force to the other side of the reservoir, which has only one regiment, compared now to a reinforced Marine regiment, plus an increased number of Army troops added, these latter being infantry, as no trucks with artillery pieces attached has yet to be added to this area? But at this time the Chinese are already maintaining their road blocks to attack the forward force at Chosin and trap those above Hudong-ni after dark on the night of the 27<sup>th</sup>. Those Chinese forces within this area could not know or have sufficient time to adjust its forces within some 12 hours to meet the threat of the additional forces of the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines moving over to Yudam-ni. There would really be no need for them to do that, they were given this area by default, why move away from it? The Chinese forces already massed here would have to fight here. While the CPVF would praise their effort for fighting, and driving back our forces, they readily admit over and over, "on many occasions, CPVF units were able to surround UN forces and cut them into smaller groups, yet they were unable to destroy these forces, even during night operations." (This continued throughout their four prior campaigns) "On the political front, CPVF commanders could not convince Mao until after the Fifth Campaign that the old tactics were outdated and that it was almost impossible to annihilate a regimental enemy unit in a single operation."<sup>261</sup> Their "Fifth Campaign (April 14, 1951) was the largest in the war, together with the North Koreans it deployed some 700,000 troops against 340,000 UN forces, and the two sides fought for some forty days, but the results were disappointing for the CPVF. In fact, the campaign failed to achieve its goal

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<sup>261</sup> *Mao's Generals Remember Korea: What China Learned from Its "Forgotten War" in Korea*, p. 23.

of destroying five enemy divisions (including three American ones). At the same time, CPVF's 180<sup>th</sup> Division was completely destroyed by quick counterattacks. Additionally, 17,000 POWs were taken by UN forces, representing 80 percent of the total CPVF POWs during the entire war. More important, the front line was pushed farther north. Peng later admitted that the Fifth Campaign was one of only four mistakes he made during his entire military career."<sup>262</sup> The cost of the Five Campaigns: "From October 19, 1950, to July 27, 1953, the Chinese casualties in the Korean War totaled 1,010,700 men, including 152,000 dead, 383,000 wounded, 450,000 hospitalized, 21,700 prisoners of war, and 4,000 missing in action."<sup>263</sup>

Had the Chinese that were assigned to this area been increased to meet the increased threat of Faith's force, cannot be truly known, but it can be reasonable to believe that they were adequate to meet the 5<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment that had been there since the 23<sup>rd</sup> of November, and given the repeated Marine reports that they had some 80,000 to 120,000 men massed "*solely*" against the "*Marines*" a special effort was needed to annihilate them! However, by the afternoon of the 27<sup>th</sup>, this remaining force, now Task Force MacLean was some 2,000 to 3,000 Americans short within this area east of Chosin. If the force of Chinese therefore was adequate to meet the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines on this side of the reservoir, it was in reality have double the strength to do the job with this smaller inferior force, with "*attached*" ROKs.

But regardless of the enemy force facing MacLean, they had inherited an advantage they could not in their wildest dreams have hoped for: a mobile force not yet fully in position, not yet fully supplied with a ration and ammo dump. These forces would be cut off at Hudong-ni. A force not fully dug-in for defensive positions, not effectively deployed, truly a force set up for a surprise attack and systematic annihilation. This had to be one of Peng's four major mistakes referred to above. Marshal Peng failed to advance his scheduled attack against these two Marine battalions moving out of this area via their Marine truck convoy stretched out 24 miles between Hudong-ni and Yudam-ni. Another opportunity missed was this prime target of attack.

In John Toland's book *In Mortal Combat*, he researched at the World History Institute at Beijing, China. He sheds more light on the Chinese forces facing MacLean. Earlier the "*press agents*" had implied that the Chinese were concentrating on destroying the Marine force at Chosin, but as Toland adds, which seems to imply that Marshal Peng's estimates were after MacLean's arrival at Chosin. In his chapter, "The Chosin Reservoir," Toland wrote in reference to December 3, "*Three days earlier, Peng realized the number of enemy troops he was facing at the Chosin Reservoir was double that of the original estimate. He decided to concentrate the force of the Ninth Army on the weakest link of the reservoir defense, Task Force MacLean. Heavy attacks resulted in MacLean's death and the crushing of Task Force Faith. Now Peng owned everything east of the reservoir and could concentrate on the other side—the Marines.*" Peng now has a second chance to correct his prior mistake by adding forces, while Task Force Faith is fully truck-bound and now highly venerable to defeat.

With the defeat of Task Force Faith, the real estate Marshal Peng now owned was leading directly into Hagaru, the next weakest area, and an important one, more so than Yudam-ni. There was no more defense northeast of Hagaru on December 2<sup>nd</sup>, Task Force MacLean/Faith was gone, it was history, unrecorded but history nevertheless, yet without recording *why* the Marine history would record about

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<sup>262</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.*

the last day of Task Force Faith, without comment, of why or how, or against whom, this report about the condition of the Chinese forces:

*Although the Marines at Hagaru could not have suspected it on the morning of 1 December, the enemy had for the time being shot his bolt, his first large scale attacks, as POW interrogation were to confirm, had used up not only the personnel of a division but most of the limited supplies of ammunition available.<sup>264</sup>*

Missing and never implied in the above report is what they used ammo for, the personnel of a division was also used up, how did that happen? That Marine report retraced to the *morning* of 1 December, there being much, much, more action yet to come as the sun would set this day and a full waning 24 November full noon would light the area. At midnight on the 1<sup>st</sup> of December into the early morning hours of the 2<sup>nd</sup> of December, the lives of 447 American soldiers were being slowly but surely snuffed out four miles up the road east of Hagaru! While our tanks sat in Hagaru awaiting an anticipated attack that would never come! These were the stories those “news reporters” should have been told, because then by the sum of events, the logic of deduction, the amount of wounded suddenly appearing in the center of the ice-covered reservoir all should have stimulated an experienced reporter in a combat setting to ask my recurring question: Where did these men come from, and where had they been?

Press censorship would not be imposed until December 20, 1950. The *Stars and Stripes* article appearing in January issue of 1951 about the ice rescue of “300 Shot up GIs.” Those 119 men to be added are those inclusive of 111 artillery men listed on 12/06/50, the final total for that date was 566 men.

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264 Marine Historical Branch G-3: Volume III; p.243.

## -Chapter 17-

### INSIDE LT. COL. EMBREE'S PERIMETER

I add here my personal recollections of being inside the Army perimeter at this fateful time. Early this same 28 November morning, back at the tail end of the task force area was the artillery headquarters perimeter, just above the rear roadblock set that night. This location **would move one mile further north, into that** location of the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry CP. on the morning of the 29<sup>th</sup>. The artillery at that time will be pulled inward from the road to be sandwiched in between the 32<sup>nd</sup> Infantry CP and the 31<sup>st</sup>. But for now we had that lower and most southern area above the road block also unaware that one—31<sup>st</sup> (rear) CP—was being setup in place just a few miles behind us. Lt. Col. Ray Embree was the artillery CO. His units were those of his HQ, HQ Battery, A & B, Batteries, and the 15<sup>th</sup> AAA-AW units. We would be minus our newly arrived, “C” Battery! The Headquarters command post and fire direction center was located on a lower ridge line of Hill 1456. (This hill would be numbered 1486 by Russell A. Gugeler in *Combat Actions in Korea*. The action I state here are from most of his report; however, I use *Ebb & Flow* by Mossman, this is his hill number 1456 in most of the other Army History Series.) A & B Batteries were already located forward within the 3/31<sup>st</sup> perimeter the afternoon of 27 November.

#### ARTILLERY

The killer howitzers, the big dog down the block with that vicious bite, those attrition bites that cost the enemy a recorded 60% of their casualties under usual conditions, which means artillery in a secure area. Many things enter the mix of a fire mission the most important is that forward observer team, the eyes, the head being around the fire direction center of headquarters battery itself. Without the mission being coordinated between these two—requiring communications—the firing batteries and the howitzers are lifeless units. You cannot hit the enemy if you cannot see him, and the only way you can reach him after seeing him is that final setting of the elevation of the howitzer barrel, the charge calculated, the fuse needed and set, those final calculations sent to the gun crews. Even the best calculated mission requires that forward observers command, “*Fire one round for effect.*” He then adjusts the mission to *zero* in the final round adjustments that must be made for heat and wear of the barrels themselves. These howitzers —and our trucks—were refurbished by the MacArthur Roll-Up program, probably refurbished in Japan somewhere between 1946 and 1949, they were used in our training and the capture of Suwon, numerous harassing missions had been mixed with regular missions in both South and North Korea.

Regardless of the condition of the weapons, the forward observers had an extremely testy situation here, east of Chosin until the forward 1/32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion withdrew into MacLean's perimeter. The latter now consolidated with the artillery, thereby decreasing the distance—the advantage of artillery itself—reducing the range of the howitzers also. You can't land the shells within your own area of defense, and the enemy was the attacking force, without long-range support which the artillery would be best served to seek out that enemy. The artillery always, being that deadly force behind any infantry advance. When that advance stops, the artillery support in any given yards directly ahead of that new defensive line of infantry can now be skirted around by a small individual force against their defensive line, unless and only unless massive artillery shells are available and the gun crews are within a

reasonable secure area to fire those missions. Only one of the many other disadvantages we faced here at Chosin.

This force was now due to our circumstances caught between the inner jaws of a vise, and others were screwing the jaws inward, both enemy and friendly forces, and we were caught in the middle. In reality the artillery howitzers are too close within MacLean's force, it being four miles behind Faith's battalion, some of the howitzers elevation requirements of too high an angle, add the untrained ROKs to the gun crews; this would take a toll on the mission fired. An additional element of Murphy's Law of combat has entered the equation. But Murphy's Law: *"Anything that can go wrong, will go wrong, and at the worst possible moment."* Some corollaries of that law say that Murphy was an optimist. That one of those laws is friendly fire isn't friendly. *"The only thing more accurate than incoming fire is incoming friendly fire."* *"Radios will fail as soon as you need something desperately"* and the most evident fact of reality: *"If you are short of everything except the enemy, you're in combat."*

All of above on a cosmic multi-choice test applied to this force east of Chosin. Whatever the rule of Murphy's Law, all applied here: *"Recoilless rifles aren't."* *"Semi-automatic means semi-only, not automatic."* The age of the ammunition its self was plaguing us. I recall the green corrosive deposits on the firing pin itself, built up by age and weather conditions. This gunk building on the shells leaves that residue to cling to the firing pin that had to be peeled off.

Almost two years before with my advanced infantry training within the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, I had experienced ammo failure in training. Misfiring of that aged ammo was commonplace. I remember my first exercise with the 2.35 bazooka. To become familiar with that weapon you would aim and fire it, but in training it was a two-man operation. You took turns to load the business end of that stove pipe. It contained two individual posts (electrodes) and a wide ground clamp to complete an electrical circuit. I loaded the shell, wrapped the wire around the right electrode and released the clamp, when the trigger was pulled it failed to fire—a dud—next remove the wire, after a short delay for misfire, rotate the tail under the ground clamp, and reattach the wire to the left post. Still it failed to fire. You now had to remove that shell and reinsert its safety pin. So just as ammo was old, so too was the weapons that fired them. Rarer still were periodical ordnance checks, required to keep weapons within specifications, were also rare for whatever equipment you had. Field stripping would sometimes reveal a defect, if a burr, you filed it down yourself. If on a moving part, you had no way of knowing if that loosened the part from required specifications, if it worked you continued with that piece of equipment. The man that possessed mechanical ability was a plus to his section.

Here at Chosin the reason for misfires was hard to pin down, the weather, the weapon age, the combat condition itself were hard to isolate from each other, was it one condition or a combination of all together? Though your life depended on one, replacements were for you to locate, in this area again, there would be extra weapons freed up and available as combat attrition used up this force via casualties. For the men, were wearing out as fast as the weapons. It had been stated that you lose at least 1% of your mental ability for each degree under zero, and hypothermia sets in when the body temperature drops below 95 degrees, at that time shock to your system, without warmth and food, the frozen rations were drawing your body temp down to digest and melt that food, that blood warmth needed for your brain, was now slowing your reactions, and your dexterity—dealing with the increased clothing you had piled on to retain that warmth. This clothing will also burden your movement and increase sweating due to extra exertion to running or working.

As the road march proceeds to Chosin, the route we had traveled into Untaek was now more treacherous to evacuate. The road was now slick and snow-covered the mountain area of paths climbing some 30-40 degree grades for 5-10 mile stretches now had to be traveled back downhill, like a roller coaster ride, the trucks we were following were burning rubber uphill and downhill. There was no latitude allowed in our time schedule, each and every delay chipped away at the assigned A-Hour we were to activate to Chosin, it was an unrealistic time schedule for the mileage involved. This highlighting the fact that this mission could not have been pre-planned for our forces to be at Chosin before November 23, the circumstantial evidence to that fact is far too overwhelming to arrive at any other conclusion. We were rapidly trying to reach this reassigned area of our reassigned Rendezvous with Death.

As we settled into positions east of Chosin, the reservoir was skinning over with ice. Hill 1456 would be the location area for the artillery units, varying shelves of that mountain would be scouted out for Headquarters Battery, and FDC (Fire Direction Center). The wire section(s) would locate, in my definition, in a bowl below the shelf line, even with the road bed and the railroad track. There being a logical reason for that, the wire section crews required continual road access forward that required easy road access to the vehicles and the crews being located near their trucks. But this was a military mistake of placement in a combat area, we were in that bowl surrounded by the MSR, we could not see above the rim of the railroad track and the shelf of hill 1456, which required a climb uphill for supply access, water, food, additional ammo, medical facilities, and those few warming tents. Yet the wire section was no real stranger to discomfort; they were the "work detail" of the battery. We would bed down within our sleeping bags in this assigned area, but the Captain would also bed down in this area as well. Be that as it may, we dug in for the night, the wire crews dropping off their personal gear and equipment and trucks would roll north with telephone wire reels spinning counterclockwise as the wire unrolled from the switchboard area to the firing batteries and forward north to each command post between both MacLean's and Faith's positions north, having made connections with the FDC, all trunk lines were attached to the switchboard center. There was no time to hit the mess tent for chow, warm a can of C rations and take off, our mission required communications, without them the artillery is totally blind, and of no use forward.

So the wire crews were active through dark of night. Stability would materialize around 10 o'clock, as the wire crews completed their defensive positions, so it would seem anyway. My buddy Eldon Ervin would join me for some warm coffee, this would be the last time we would really talk together; he would be fatally wounded within the next eight hours. A small fire to heat some water for coffee, or hot chocolate, this provided by the condiment C ration can of various items, the coffee, grape juice powder, 1/2" pad of chocolate, crackers and a sterno tablet to heat everything, these of little value here in the cold weather, first you have to heat the frozen water from your canteen, that used up the one tablet, the best solution was pilfer or siphon a little gas, mix it with some earth in a can, it would burn slower, that way you could preheat the ice water and the coffee, and warm your hands with the cup as well, all this of minimum duration.

Ervin and I would exchange the usual banter of all soldiers, mostly discuss wonder questions, how far north are we headed, what the hell was the big emergency to get here in record time, how long are we going to be here, does either one of us know something that the other one doesn't know, and if so what is it? What is truth and what is rumor? These were wonder questions only, just killing time with little recall of those good times in Japan, those days now long gone. You both have seen the face of combat up close, you don't dwell on that, you both have changed, and those days were yesterday, never to be revisited again, tomorrow would be forever, for Ervin it would be his last, he would not age one day beyond this midnight hour which was fast approaching.

I would always take the night shift on the switchboard—my choice—I was the section chief, these hours, being wake-up calls from various officers, Colonels Embree, Tolly, Captain Kelly, whatever, and whoever, would place wake-up calls for various hours. I felt like a front-desk clerk, but we could not delegate this to any ROK because of the language barrier.

As Ervin parted company for a last night of sleep, Charles J. Smith of the 1<sup>st</sup> section would wave in passing, it was also a final night for him.—Midnight—Suddenly, the tabs on the switchboard began to drop, calls were routed through to requested points as to FDC, S-2, and S-3, and then back to battery A and B with fire missions to support two companies of MacLean's infantry. What the hell they were just two miles up the road, things were in RED ALERT. Before light of day even one of our firing batteries would be overrun, dislodged from their position, they would counterattack and regain it, however, with the aid of some infantry. Here was our first major involvement with the Chinese, a major clash.

Our position here was to be a temporary one as we would be moving forward with the attack north to the Yalu, most of our equipment was left on the trucks, taken off as needed, those trucks needed for resupply to return to Hudong in the daylight hour would transfer materials and ammo from that supply point there, this a closer point than the seven hours distance to the closest one around Kapsan, or again so it would seem. The plan was as Lt Colonel Faith would move forward he would be followed by Colonel MacLean's Battalion, at a set distance. Faith, those four miles ahead of MacLean's CP. However, we lacked that third (2nd) battalion for rear support. It had been assigned but would never arrive!

That was due to necessity and the situation created by others and earlier time restraints' as the marines had not totally cleared the area, we could not pass through them, while they were moving to the rear, road congestion was bad for our smaller force, trucks had to be pulled aside to await the marine withdrawal back into Hagaru, then-into Yudam-ni. So those—earlier disputed—seven positions were reasoned within the mind of the commander of those units, those with the responsibility to place their forces where they judged best.

Those reasons on known enemy manpower, this was being checked by the reconnaissance platoon MacLean had sent forward. This was a new area and also a new enemy force, the Chinese had avoided combat with us earlier, Faith and MacLean had a low opinion of their desire to fight, a false assumption on their part, the Chinese had been ordered to avoid contact on orders, they would await their own time table set by Marshal Peng their commander. Still the high elevations throughout North Korea restricted us with our trucks and heavy equipment. As would become evident all over these mountains that; was not a problem for these enemy forces. It has been stated; one of the biggest reasons for failure in battle is not understanding and knowing your next move prior to its need. But that element of surprise negates those

moves. The other side must react to that changing event of a surprise attack. It creates confusion and spontaneous reactions those cannot be pre-planned, only anticipated.

When that surprise attack strikes at a weak flank it creates greater confusion. Within this stage of confusion emerges that so called "*Hero*" of the battlefield, a man reacting in response to the danger in front of him. Again a general statement; "*One of the biggest reasons for failure on the battlefield; is not knowing what to do next.*" No training can prepare you for that. Your reaction to turn suddenly to the right instead of the left: maybe a fatal error on your part. Consider back to your youth, that prankster in school, you know the one, his habit to come up on your left side but tap your right shoulder: instinct turns your head right, is that always the right call in combat, and who knows that in advance? You're taught in infantry training to *zigzag* if running across an open field of fire, but if you get hit on the zag; you made the wrong choice, that choice could well be a fatal one.

A military conclusion: "The study of these accounts will reveal that it is the all-around man rather than the specialist who will be successful on the battlefield when the chips are down, even though the specialist does have a vital part in the operation."<sup>265</sup> Here in Korea, both north and south, that all-around man was being sacrificed in the many task forces used both places. Those forces were made up of many men from many towns and villages, back woods, and inter-cities. Their individual actions within these small ad hoc units were too small to record, few reporters were attached—they would be fools to be—too these units. Yet, if they wanted to report actions up front and close, these were the individual units to tag along with. The results would have been fewer reporters reporting, as most of those men were reported as missing in action.

But to return to Colonel MacLean here at Chosin, he had assembled his commanders for his attack orders to take place within hours—the enemy however had their own set time table; it was now! Their first attack would erupt as this meeting was in progress, first by a few probing patrols jabbing at A Company in Faith's perimeter, while another CCF company struck the boundary between the two rifle companies southern end of C Company and northern end of B Company.

Tracer bullets began lighting strands in the dark night from these defensive positions. The CCF would attack in small groups or bands 20-40 per group, probing to break the outer perimeters. Within the next two hours or so the enemy seized the highest point on two ridge lines and held ground within both company sectors. On the left they controlled ground and seized a mortar position. Here wire communications with MacLean's CP. and the 57th Field Artillery went out soon after the attack started. The lines either cut individually, or by shell detonation. This was evident at the switchboard by the cranking coil providing a jerky motion instead of a smooth one. This would alert a line crew to trace that break. MacLean would establish radio communications, a weak link, these were never at any time fully reliable in this cold weather, —they required more battery power to heat the vacuum tubes—than the wire hook-ups. But make no mistake here, there were radio communications within these units! PFC. Don Mayville, 31st Infantry having radio training would attempt to lengthen the radio ranges by trying to erect horizontal dipoles lines for greater frequency ranges, but reported his commander had other duties for him, so things that could have been done were left undone by ignoring those men that had the expertise in their field to solve problems they well could have done.

Here the firing batteries, within MacLean's perimeter would also be hit by attack as well, so in reality the wire connection did not matter at that time. Headquarters Battery had not yet been hit, but they

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<sup>265</sup> Original Author: unknown.



could not get a fire mission response from the firing batteries; they had communications with the forward observers, but could not complete the mission. Lt. Colonel Faith still held in place on the 28 of November, but there were breaks in his lines, although standing orders to move forward at A - 'hour it was hard to even hold and defend his perimeter, with the many casualties received within the past hours. His battalion before moving to Chosin had reported about 90% of its authorized strength, plus his ration of ROK's attached to each company, morale had been recorded as "good". The casualties while not considered high did include a high percentage of officers and non-com's out of action. New leaders had to be assigned to companies and platoons.

Still the strength of the enemy dented the morale of our troops. We did not know this enemy, or any of his tactics. In addition the weather was that factor as well, there were no remaining warming tents within the perimeter, when the enemy withdrew, all they could do for relief from the cold is pull their sleeping bags up to the waist and await the next assault, or await daybreak to assess the damage, fighting off drowsiness, the weather had taken a toll on the machine guns, they required hand jerking the bolt lever to reinsert the next round.

Four miles to the south of Faith's perimeter MacLean would have his problems as well. The enemy had over run two of his infantry companies, and got into the artillery positions before members of A and B Batteries, and before some infantry pushed back and stopped them. Come, first light the enemy would withdraw. Both units had suffered heavy casualties. But, Colonel MacLean has a serious problem here: his intelligence and reconnaissance platoon having failed to return nor would it, so information of what lies ahead of us is unknown, and will remain so.

Colonel Faith would attempt to regain ground lost. **Planes were on line at day (28 November) break which would hold back the enemy.**<sup>266</sup> The planes made many passes so close to friendly forces that several targets were marked by phosphorus grenades thrown by hand. Still the enemy held the knob portion on the perimeter. The artillery was regrouping for fire missions, the forward observers had the enemy in sight from their positions, north of Faith's, somewhere looking down on the enemy, their finding routed through the switchboard into FDC, now a beehive of activity, between the firing batteries and Hill 1221 to the south. As of yet we were in the clear, not under attack. That calm would suddenly change with morning light. We were well alerted to the action, the planes were darting around, rockets were cutting loose from under their wings, this was a good time to check and get equipment from the trucks parked upon the edge of the road. I had an M-1 rifle stored there, which I had picked up and extra ammo for it in an extra back pack. There was some .50 caliber ammo as well for the machine gun ground tripod near the switchboard. I also had an extra heavy barrel for that .50 caliber machine gun. It would be smart to get it and the extra ammo. My shift was delegated, to a crew member, and I moved off to that truck on the upper road, climbing the area between the road and the railroad track.

But on the night of the 27th before midnight, the road out was securely closed, we were isolated forward of this road block, but as of yet not fully informed of it, communication lines would have been established early in the morning, the lines forward were of priority to support the infantry movement, those rear CP lines were secondary.

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<sup>266</sup> Bold print of importance to link: Reserved to Chapter 20. As to who ordered these planes will be a point of historical importance!

But what was required was cut short by the bugle sounds faintly in the distance, what the hell kind of noise -was that? MacLean was in a group with his officers briefing them on the mission to unfold come daybreak, as the meeting was in progress the CCF would descend upon the perimeter just shortly before midnight, the Chinese Army reminiscent of those bitter north winds out of Manchuria just one week earlier would hit the perimeter with a lightning speed, the forward group throwing those German - potato masher- grenades, followed by the burp gun the machine gun, even some vintage Thompson machine guns, shades of Al Capone here, also the 1903 Springfield rifle, bolt action. This sudden attack would send a bone chilling numbness throughout the area, alerting the front line troops, to relay the alarm "Red Alert", the battles seemed to start out of nowhere, the enemy was breaking through the lines at several points, casualties were mounting everywhere on each side, some positions were temporarily over run, counter offensives recovered them by daylight, this was in Faith's forward position, and MacLean's center position, the rear perimeter of the artillery was yet to be hit. However, Colonel MacLean was locked into Colonel Faith's forward area!

Missions were being fired as called in by the-forward observers, as the firing batteries regained their positions and guns, but some of the units were too close to each other, and the shells fired for effect are-falling to close to our forces. As day was breaking and morning light was brightening the perimeter in the artillery section south of MacLean's area, although we were now alerted, it would be hit as well. The Chinese were in the ditches and the ravines near the reservoir itself along its edge coming from the south, perhaps those enemy units manning the rear road block, but my position was in the bottom of that damn bowl, and we could not see over that road bed into those ravines. The supply truck was on the road above, extra ammo-gear and phone supplies.- and an extra barrel was there as well, I would attempt to get both, one trip would get the barrel and a case of ammo, but the truck tarp was suddenly allowing day light to filter in through small round bullet holes now swishing through the tarp, A fast exit and mud caked on the bottom of my rubber overshoes made me slip on the trailer tongue and I slide back into that bowl I had climbed out of, I would climb back up to position myself on the edge of the 2 and 1/2 ton truck I had just left, as I was aiming around the tire it went flat, a puff of snow blow away, within minutes I was wounded here. Back to the bottom of the bowl, and now needing to climb out the other side to the CP. on the opposite hill above, a small piece of shrapnel from a grenade would lodge in small pieces near the bullet wound I had received to my right upper arm. I remember vividly that hot poker feeling of the bullet tearing through tissue and muscle, but it had missed the bone, and I was lucky there. That burning sensation was immediately gone as the cooling blood was dripping from my fingers, before I reached the FDC tent, it was already jelling from the bitter cold weather. That helped to seal the wound but unknown to me at the time creating frostbite to that part of my upper arm.

The attack was short lived, as most are! The enemy either breaching your area, or he does not! If not that attempt failed and their regrouping must be in order. For that limitation of ammo comes into play, that lull in battle, that time when a weapon is silent when that eight rounds was fired in the M-1 rifle and the clip is ejected, and reload is required, that moment in battle when that machine gun becomes deathly quiet more so those quad 50's, that time when the ribbon of shells need replacement, and your heart skips a beat for you know not if that power weapon has been destroyed, but the attack had that element of surprises it always does-having, created many casualties, two of my friends from the wire section, Eldon W. Ervin my best buddy was dying from mortar shrapnel to the throat, choking on his, own blood, he could not be saved, another was Charles J, Smith he had a shoulder wound and it was of a type on any warm day, undoubtedly would not be a fatal wound, but this was a deep freeze

and shock was taking its toll, he would go into shock, so the first half hour had cost two of my friend, I was wounded, along with my section sergeant George Berry, and the area was checking the damage created by the attack, our first one today. So the rear tanks had been stopped, and all three perimeters had been hit, we had no medical company few ambulances, we were cut off completely from our ammunition dump, or ration dump, wounded everywhere, water and blood plasma frozen, and nightfall would come swiftly again.

Many questions were posed, what the hell happened, where were our reconnaissance people, where did all of these troops come from, were they all North Korean, Chinese or a mixture of both, the latter would be identified here? The South Koreans with us knew the difference immediately. They were Chinese no doubts about it. But this had been a secure area for the last ten days now a hot combat zone overnight. It's the afternoon of the 28th the **Marine Air Wing is on board.**<sup>267</sup> Their support is keeping the enemy back in the hills. Food and water is a prime concern, plenty of water in the reservoir, but we cannot get to it, the edges are freezing but the center is just skimming over with thin ice, snow will have to replace drinking water, loss of blood produces thirst, food will be C-rations, these too are all frozen, you have a selection, decisions, decisions, what to have for dinner, will it be the frozen franks and beans, ham and beans, those lousy Salisbury (?) patties, the three to a can the middle one no one can warm on a warm day, how about noodles and ham today for a treat followed by some fruit cocktail rich in frozen juice, are peaches perhaps, a big choice of frozen foods. But, you better eat slowly to avoid common stomach cramps!

Medic's are doing what they can in treating the many wounded, real hero's working with enemy fire all around them, they do what they can, but their company did not get through to them, so they are spread thin around the areas. Whatever supplies they have on hand will have to do, until air drops resupply us. The army corpsman is it, and he is being overworked, that cry of "Corps-man" is heard from all corners of the perimeter. All tents are bullet ridden, a few are on fire, difficult to keep critical wounded warm and from shock to their system, many are dozing off, immobility will take its toll in easing these men into an eternal sleep.

This damn bitter cold wind, and blowing snow, my hands and feet are numb, frozen bodies litter the field, ours as well as theirs, there is a designated area assigned for the dead, stack aside like cords of wood. You suddenly fill a chill about death; it no longer scares you as you see the stacks of dead accumulate. We have to get a handle on our situation, what is our immediate status. Without question we are surrounded cut off from rear support, but, we are told, the tanks are making every attempt to break through to us, not to worry a lot of fire power there.

Crazy thoughts are racing through my brain, what happened, hundreds of rumors of what our situation is. As a teenager in the forty's there was a radio commentator named Gabriel Heater, I would listen to the reports he would give about W.W.II news, during that war and most of the early reporting he would open his broadcast with , "*Folk's there's bad news tonight from the front.*" Not knowing if he was reporting any longer, this would be one of those nights, I could almost hear his words again. This was one of those nights, here in North Korea. A happy time however in—the good old USA, anywhere in its 48 states, Christmas greetings abound, Yule tide greetings, the news from the front had be good the last month, this war was grinding down, almost over. The bad news just about to hit the front pages!\* We could be walking in the front door by Christmas, Bah-Humbug. Its afternoon here, I have been away from the states for two years, no longer equate nor care about any difference in time zones.

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<sup>267</sup> Ibid

I know it's night time in the states, which now seems so remote, so many more miles away today than they: seemed yesterday, before we were trapped.

The shadows are lengthening early as the higher mountains overshadow our area, darkness is enveloping us as our air cover thins and, disappears into the distance, are they coming back, just leaving to reload? Close in fighting will not allow them to assist us up close at night. They have been strafing the hill sides all day we can only wait to see if the strafing and rockets reduced the enemy ranks. But we have some awesome weapons in the twin 40's and the quad 50's, massive firepower but also massive use of ammunition, we will be hard pressed to keep them supplied. They have a rapid fire rate of its RPM rating is listed as 480 RPM, that for one barrel when multiplied by 4 it is indeed awesome, 1,920 rounds per minute, it cut a path of destruction one cannot believe, but it is primarily for aircraft to protect the artillery from fighter planes, so it has to be massive.

Midnight is here again, the Chinese are blowing those bugles again and the night sky is lighting up with tracer bullets, if memory serves me right every fifth round of 30 cal. was a tracer, every 50 cal. a fourth was a tracer, that created a continual bright line, but it also identified the sending end, our quad 50's location for mortar fire. As the Chinese invade our perimeter they are hard to pick out in the dark between our parka clad troops and theirs. But they are stumbling on frozen feet, for they cannot have fires in the open during the day or night, in daylight the plane cover gets them, at night a howitzer shell could seek them out. Our air support has been warming their hides with napalm during the day raids.

\*The national newspapers were reporting the upward movement toward the Yalu River! Everything seemed to be winding down but those reports of the Chinese forces were coming into print! The prior weeks had favored our forces, but the last few reports would concentrate on the Army middle forces reaching their objectives to the east of the Marines at Chosin! (The headlines were not as offensive as the lone reporters of various magazines!)

Tokyo, Thursday (UP) -U.S. Marines reached the shores of the Chosin power reservoir -one of the great prizes of the North Korean campaign-Wednesday to find its Chinese defenders had fled.

But the Chinese were striking back hard in the west, forcing the South Korean Eighth Division into a four miles retreat. The Marines arrival at the Chosin placed American forces at the edges of both great reservoir systems in North Korea.

American Seventh Division units *diverted from the division drive northward, were reported on Monday to have reached the shores of the Fusen reservoir, 20 miles northeast of the Chosin.* Some 1,500 Chinese troops were reported in the vicinity of the Fusen." (The Fusen being that mission assigned now as diverted—from the 1st Marine Division, to the 7th Infantry Division!)

Volume 94-209

Two Allied Columns Head for Manchuria

**U.S. 7th Division and South Korean Capital Begin March.**

Tokyo (UP) - Two United Nations columns jumped off in Northeast Korea towards the Manchurian and Siberian borders today after smashing what spokesman said were the last strong enemy forces in their path. The U.S. Seventh Division, attacked through mountains in two inches of fresh snow toward Manchuria, 20 miles to the north, it expected to take the bombed out enemy strong point of Kapsan today and reach the border by next Tuesday.

On the northeast coast, the South Korean Capital Division struck out anew up the coastal highway towards Siberia, 90 miles to the northeast. " (Volume 94-272) All sources , Belleville News-Democrat,

U.S. 7th Division at Manchurian Border.

**U.S. Commander Fears Reds: Preparing New Assault with 100,000 Troops.**

Tokyo, Wednesday (UP)- "Communist resistance virtually disappeared on the Korean front today in the wake of the U.S. Seventh Division surge to the Manchurian border, but American commanders feared a new assault by 100,000 Reds was building up in the northwest.

The South Korean Capital Division, east of the American Seventh, broke through the last known Communist defense south of the port of Chongjin and drove to within 15 miles of the city and to within 67 miles of the Russian border." (Volume 94-274) November 22, 1950.

This last above in bold print states fear of 100,000 force army in the northwest that is Eighth Army's territory! Yet, the 7th Division that far north on the Manchurian border would be deprived of its rear guard here at Kapsan-the need to retain the 1st Battalion of the 31st there-and relocate Task Force MacLean some 160 miles away at Chosin !

The remaining four days would blend together as one huge event hard to designate the destruction of those days as events overlap and your memory cannot recreate or reproduce the many steps you take to survive each coming day. The last one of more importance but already covered in a small amount!

But whatever, you have become, in temperament after this event was formed and molded in a rebirth here in this kiln of survival! You honor, your integrity, and respect for your fellow soldier's and officer's, Knowing that one or more of these soldiers in this mixture amid death and despair, may well have stepped in front of you, and took that fatal bullet that could well have ended your life, rather than take theirs. That you did not survive because of your own merit and valor, but owe at least some gratitude to another, is a guilt trip burden you will carry with you always. But that respect also breeds resentment and contempt for those officer's that would never defend your honor and integrity, rather remain so silent for their own advancement at the expense over the lives of those men lost east of the reservoir! Those rampant rumors and innuendoes' left unanswered and undefended for four to six decades cannot be dismissed by a Navy PUC some 49 Years later.

The reason for the over use of Task Forces made of small units, because larger units were unavailable. Indeed in General MacArthur's address to Congress, upon his relief by President Truman: "I called for reinforcements, but was informed that reinforcements were not available."

### Task Force Kingston—Another Forgotten Force

It goes without saying, that this task force was one from the 7th Division, it also being lost to history until the 1980's. General Almond had reassigned this objective to the commander of the 32nd Regiment, Colonel Charles E. Beauchamp, a West Pointer (1930) at age forty two he was the youngest and reported "*greenest*" regimental commander in Korea. Yet, his regimental achievements would be a thorn in the side of the Marines. (Remember, General Smith-rejected them at Inchon?) Because of those ROK's "*attached*"

Beauchamp would in turn assign the newly reassigned Marine objective -Singalpajin- to Heinrich Schumann's 3rd Battalion of the 32nd Regiment, as his was the only other regiment of the 32nd at Kapsan; while Don Faith Jr. and his battalion was in motion around the Chosin Reservoir, now enroute back from Kapsan as well.

The mission assigned would be to attack northwest of "Shorty" Powell's 17th Regiment, through Samsu to the Yalu at Singalpajin Unable to commit a full battalion to the objective, Schumann created a thirty-four man motorized task force to be led by twenty-two year old second lieutenant and a platoon leader in K Company; Robert C. Kingston, he enlisted as a private in 1948 and was commissioned through OCS, one year later.

His mission would be one of the most arduous of the war. The Siberian weather lack of maps or aerial photos, rugged terrain, rockslides, and the NKPA (North Korean People's Army) fire repeatedly retarded or blocked Kingston force. The group took Samsu, —this being the 7th Divisions "previous" assigned border zone line, a deserted village in the frozen waste land twenty-three miles south of the Yalu. But the weather or NKPA forced it back into Samsu three days in a row. Thereafter Schumann reinforced Kingston with I-Company. On November 28, he reached Singalpajin, secured the village in a house to house fight with NKPA troops, and became the second, same, and last American Task Force to reach the Yalu!

Important note: Those three days indicates he started on November 25, before the 5th marine Regiment had orders to move from the east side of Chosin. A point to be made, this mission had also been "previously assigned to the marines" notably the 5th Marines.

Here the pride of the Marine Corps would surely surface, had time permitted, surely they would contend; if any Army unit had taken that objective with some 34 men, they could have done it with half that many. But one would be treading on thin ice to walk that path, for if they could take it at all, who was responsible for stating they could not or would not?

General Almond was border happy, he wanted the mission completed. As at Seoul, if the Marines would not or could not achieve an assignment, he would turn the mission over to the 7th Division. Results, mission and the objective seized as ordered. Up to and including we were within or assigned area!

Only Don Faith's one battalion of the 32nd Infantry is known to be within the marine area of operation east of Chosin. Only because they have been mixed together: on 25 November and one cannot remove the 5th Marines without a back-up force east of Chosin. Yet, that oversight can be turned into an advantage at this late date. One has complete freedom -carte blanche- to expand on that space missing in history, as to military objectives that may have been issued, for who can be the lawful authority to rule you wrong? So that stated and understood, the following scenario, events or-any military moves could be valid.

Time frame: November 25-27.

MacLean and Kingston Task Forces are in motion, MacLean's destination Changjin -45 air miles from Singalpajin, Kingston's destination the reverse mileage, Singalpajin-45 air miles from Changjin. This creates a hammer and anvil situation, the enemy trapped between two forces moving towards one another. The hammer force the-3/32 Battalion backed up by the 2/32 Battalion, Commander Lt. Col. Charles Mount, could possibly link-up with Don Faith's 1/32 Battalion as he would lead off toward Changjin with back-up support by MacLean, who assigned Faith to that lead off position. It would or could be reminiscent of that link-up between Inchon and Pusan. How can history prove that were not the case?

The Marines cut loose to do their own thing in the Eighth Army area of operations. They would be above that massive force, and it would solve that left flank problem of General Smith's, as Eighth Army would move upward toward them as they moved laterally above Eighth Army. This latter scenario real, the former one very

likely could be. Almond not opposed as in the past to move forces of the army on a whim. If a success MacLean could be ordered westward into Kanggye above Mupyong-ni . Or Mupyong-ni could still remain the objective of historical fact-though quite late- for the 7th Division as recorded on MacLean's Operational Order #25, it's Intelligence Summary.

While Kingston's task force as such will not be included directly in Plan 8, Draft 3 westward, his authorization to cross the boundary line of the 7th Division into the marine boundary line was part of that authorization for the 7th Division to "expand its zone westward, into the zone previously assigned to the marines"!

## -Chapter 18-

### Summary (Continued)

‘I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God.’<sup>268</sup>

### *EIGHTH ARMY*

MacArthur’s Eighth Army “combat” forces on June 25, 1950, consisted of four under strength infantry divisions and seven anti-aircraft artillery battalions in Japan, one infantry regiment, and two anti-aircraft battalions on Okinawa. He restated that his mission required at least five full-strength infantry divisions, 23 anti-aircraft artillery battalions, and one separate RCT with previous full wartime strength. A pure wish list, that did not exist, due to budget cuts, and the low enlistment rate and budget limitations forced reorganization of all units, and, in reality, shifted numbers. The new table of reference was now 100 percent efficiency among 12,500 men. For example, if we refer to a division as 93 percent effective, the 12,500 x 93% is equal to an 11,625-man force, short 925 men, each in a full division. Thus, the burden fell on the division’s smaller experienced cadre to concentrate on smaller forces (task forces) to get the same job done than had been accomplished by larger forces of World War II.

One of the sad facts about the Korean War concerns the reports over the “quality” of the American occupation forces (leading the good life) committed to action the first six months in particular, was what was expected from these troops. These early forces had to meet and do battle with a North Korean Army that had some four or more years of planned offensive for the invasion of South Korea on their own timetable and at the place of their selection. First, one must obtain some kind of a perspective of what training our American forces had and the equipment they had to work with at the time. Next, the urgent need to throw these men into combat without being a full and complete combat team must also be placed in perspective. On the eve of the North Korean invasion (24 June 1950), the Eighth Army in Japan under the command of General Walton “Bulldog” Walker had about 93 percent of its authorized strength. Each division had an authorized strength of 12,500 men, and none of these divisions were even up to their peacetime strength.<sup>269</sup> Each division was short of its war strength by

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268 Uniformed services of the United States oath of office;  
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

All officers of the seven Uniformed services of the United States swear or affirm an oath of office upon commissioning. It differs slightly from that of the oath of enlistment that enlisted members recite when they enter the service. It is required by statute, the oath being prescribed by Section 3331, Title 5, United States Code.[1] It is traditional for officers to recite the oath upon promotion but as long as the officer's service is continuous this is not actually required.[2] One notable difference between the officer and enlisted oaths is that the oath taken by officers does not include any provision to obey orders; while enlisted personnel are bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice to obey lawful orders, officers in the service of the United States are bound by this oath to disobey any order that violates the Constitution of the United States.[3]

269 Policy & Direction: The First Year, CMH, GPO, p. 54.



nearly 7,000 men, 1,500 rifles, and 100 ninety millimeter anti-tank guns. Three rifle battalions, six heavy tank companies, three 105mm field artillery batteries, and three anti-aircraft batteries were missing from each division. In terms of battle potential, each infantry division could lay down only 62 percent of their infantry firepower, 69 percent of their anti-aircraft artillery firepower and only 14 percent of their tank firepower. Add to this the continuous turnover of personnel which amounted to 43 percent annually in the Far East Command (FEC). Between 1945 and 1949, the main duty of these personnel was that of occupation duty focusing on discipline, courtesy, and conduct. In April of 1949, MacArthur directed and ordered all divisions to complete Regimental Combat Team (RCT) field exercises. The timetables he set in order for minimum proficiency level to be maintained were: (1) company (battery) level—by December 15, 1949, (2) battalion (squadron or task force) level by 15 May 1950, and (3) regimental (group or task force) level by 31 July 1950.

Unfortunately, the 15 May 1950 date was all the time frame we had before the war broke out. At the regimental level—sorry, it was too late. The battle was already underway. (4) Division (air force or task force) level proficiency was to be reached by 31 December 1950, and (5) combined and joint operation training was to include amphibious exercises concurrently with RCT and division level training. The later amphibious training would be updated and folded into the 7<sup>th</sup> Division the only occupation division remaining in Japan in August of 1950 urgent amphibious training for Inchon as well. All of the other three under strength divisions were already in Korea. General Walker’s statement about his deficiency of adequate forces on line, was that he could not guarantee success without a third regiment in each division, to maintain a triangular defense structure of the traditional regimental combat teams, that he had mile-long gaps in his defense lines that the enemy could penetrate with ease.

General MacArthur chose the 24<sup>th</sup> Division (first) because its location was the closest to Korea. Therefore, it could be deployed faster—“using forces already in place.” This division on the last day of May 1950 was reported as being the lowest in combat effectiveness of all major units in Japan.

The list:

- 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division - 84% effective
- 7<sup>th</sup> Division - 74% effective
- 25<sup>th</sup> Division - 72% effective
- 24<sup>th</sup> Division - 62% effective

Keeping firmly in mind that no one at any time had ever made any claim or boast that any of these units were at any time 100% effective. Within the first six months, these divisions were going to be eroded by whatever combat effectiveness they had on the eve of the Korean invasion. They were a prime target, not only for the North Korean Army. Additionally, they were highly susceptible to press criticism (sniping from the rear), because they were not performing at that 100% rate. Expecting a 62% force to operate at 100% efficiency? Come on. Get real. Only if 100% was operating at 62% could one have justification to bitch. The fact on record that the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division was always listed as “reinforced” after the Inchon invasion reinforces this point.

On July 29, General Walker appealed to MacArthur for the 7<sup>th</sup> Division’s 32<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Regiment to be flown into his perimeter. MacArthur denied that request, stating that it would “completely emasculate

pre-set plans for the entire division, which was being reconstructed and will move to Korea possibly in late September.”

MacArthur assisted on rebuilding the division by moving 1,600 men from Okinawa, these men intended for a third battalion of the 29<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment. He diverted to the 7<sup>th</sup> Division an automatic Anti-Aircraft Artillery unit the 15<sup>th</sup> AAA-AW, (this unit apparently a replacement for the divisions own 29<sup>th</sup> AAA-AW Battery). That battery had been deactivated while the division was serving in Korea on occupation duty. This later unit attached proved of prime value at the Chosin Reservoir, saving many, many lives there. Its twin 40mm guns and quad 50s were responsible for many who are alive today. Without this unit, disaster would have been total.

### *The “Buddy System” a new kind of replacement*

General MacArthur—apparently working outside the Washington establishment—conceived a new plan for replacements. South Korea military might be asked to provide soldiers for American units. After that approval, MacArthur would attach more than 8,000 to the 7<sup>th</sup> Division. On August 11, MacArthur directed General Walker to procure, screen, and ship to Japan for use in augmenting the 7<sup>th</sup> Division, able-bodied male South Koreans. The Republic of Korea (ROK) government cooperated, and on the 17<sup>th</sup> of August, about 7,000 Koreans were shipped out of Pusan, to Japan. “They were right out of the rice paddies . . . and had nothing but shorts and straw hats. It was ‘understood’ that they had physical examinations, were inoculated and had some kind of papers.” These men were briefly trained—somewhere—and then “attached” to the 7<sup>th</sup> Division. They were officially outfitted with American fatigues, M-1 rifles, and back packs. For every intent and purpose, they were with the 7<sup>th</sup> Division. By August 7, the 7<sup>th</sup> Division began amphibious training—without these ROKs. Admiral Turner Joy had already conferred before embarkation with General David Barr, the division commander, as to our amphibious objectives.

Preparations for all of these above problems, was further compounded by the required relocation of our division into camps just vacated by the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division. Those of us from Hokkaido were moved closer to the port of Yokohama for embarkation. The problems were many, and then on top of them we had ROKs added to every unit. Still, as I restate throughout this book, the “Hourglass” Division worked the problems through.

### *MacArthur’s Estimates*

The under strength American (Task Force Brad Smith’s) 24<sup>th</sup> Division so hastily deployed to Korea was unable to stop the North Korean drive, but this fact did not become evident for several days after the initial encounter at Osan. The situation in Korea could not be accurately evaluated even in Tokyo, let alone in Washington, where Army officials could do little but wait impatiently for clarification through General MacArthur’s estimates and descriptions. Until these estimates arrived, Washington could neither plan adequately nor gauge the scope of the job to be done. The Army’s plans for supporting MacArthur had to be based on requirements established either directly or obliquely by his estimates. Washington authorities had no recourse, in these early days, but to accept his judgment of capabilities and requirements at face value. They, however, knew the limits of the nation’s immediate resources. General MacArthur told them what was happening in Korea and what he felt had to be done.

In the search for a balance between what they had and what was needed, the nation's military leaders followed advice from the Far East commander which they could not accurately evaluate.

MacArthur's early estimates fell short in appraising the ultimate necessary force, but not in their appreciation of the caliber of the enemy and the seriousness of the threat. The tenor of reports from Church, General Dean, (24<sup>th</sup> Division), and others had already convinced General MacArthur that the situation was indeed serious. The degree of seriousness remained to be determined. He did not immediately arrive at a full appreciation of the strength of the North Korean attack. General MacArthur progressively revised upward his estimate of the strength he would need to defeat the North Koreans.

Late in June, he implied that two American divisions could restore order. But by 7 July his views had changed materially. He told the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "It is now apparent that we are confronted in Korea with an aggressive and well-trained professional army equipped with tanks and perhaps other ground material quite equal to, and in some categories, superior to that available here." The enemy's leadership was "excellent." The North Koreans showed understanding of and skill in tactical and strategic principles-demonstrated by their break across the Han River. To halt and hurl back "this powerful aggression" would, in MacArthur's opinion, require from four to four and one-half full-strength American divisions supported by an airborne RCT and an armored group. To reach this strength level in Korea 30,000 men and officers would have to be sent him from the United States at once. "It is a minimum," he warned the Joint Chiefs, "without which success will be extremely doubtful."<sup>270</sup>

### *The 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division Sails for Korea*

At first, General MacArthur and the staff of the Far East Command had expected that the 24<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> Divisions in support of the ROK Army would be able to check the North Korean advance. Based on this expectation, initial preliminary planning called for a third United States division, the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry, to land in the rear of the enemy forces and, together with a counterattack from in front by the combined American and ROK forces, to crush and destroy the North Korean Army, had weakened the latter. It had been stripped of practically every first grader NCO's except the first sergeants of companies and batteries.

Between 12 and 14 July the division loaded on ships in the Yokohama area. But, by this time, the steady enemy successes south of the Han River had *changed the objective* from a landing in the enemy's rear at Inch'on to a landing on the east coast of Korea at P'ohang-dong, a fishing town sixty air miles northeast of Pusan. Its mission was to reinforce at once the faltering 24<sup>th</sup> Division. A landing at P'ohang-dong would not congest still further the Pusan port facilities, which were needed to land supplies for the troops already in action; also, from P'ohang-dong the division could move promptly to the Taejon area in support of the 24<sup>th</sup> Division. The date of the landing was set for 18 July. The command ship *Mt. McKinley* and final elements of the first lift sailed for Korea on 15 July in Task Force 90, commanded by Rear Adm. James H. Doyle. The landing at P'ohang-dong was unopposed. Lead elements of the 8<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment were ashore by 0610 18 July, and the first troops of the 5<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment came in twenty minutes later. Typhoon Helene swept over the Korean coast and

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<sup>270</sup> *Policy and Direction: The First Year*, CMH, GPO, p. 84.

prevented landing of the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment and the 82d Field Artillery Battalion until 22 July. For three days ships could not be unloaded at Pusan and Eighth Army rations dropped to one day's supply.

Even though it had received 1,450 replacements before it left Japan, 100 of them *from the Eighth Army stockade*, the division was under strength when it landed in Korea and, like the preceding divisions, it had only 2 *battalions in the regiments*, 2 firing batteries in the artillery battalions, and 1 tank company (light M24 tanks). So one must view the makeup of these three occupation divisions now transferred to Korea, and in a combat mode.

### *Back to North Korea!*

The landing of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division has already been covered. Although three (CCF) enemy divisions had been reported, as being around the east side of the reservoir, to Lieutenant Colonel Faith, upon his arrival there, (Marine history does not confirm this fact) other than the 80th Division hitting us! As I state within, "we as a force made no claim to any fame" on our side of the reservoir! There being some arrogance in that now! That now requires more damage control from our "other friendly side" to retain their own hold on that glory they claim on their side, against our Army forces: the 7<sup>th</sup> Division and those of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division. While it is rare that either a Marine or Soldier would ever be interested to research the other side for facts, this author has researched both sources, and am not offended by the other side praising their own efforts, but I am amazed once again, and recall a maxim taught by my mother, early in life, that: "Self-praise sinks!"

Note: The battle on the east side of the reservoir was aborted due to ammunition shortages; the number killed on the way back to Hudong-ni was the result of that lack of ammo. And the lack of night air to ground coverage for our side, still always available on the west side! Hence, this Changjin battle cannot be officially judged as to its final outcome, if we had that ammo! We held those five days, what must be compared is that lack of enemy attacking Hagaru-ri from this east side of the reservoir. Mainly those innuendo reports that we were doing nothing to contribute to the security or any contribution to the security of Hagaru-ri, that rhetoric as defended by General Smith in his 49-year denial (totally supported by the Department of the Navy) of that requested PUC award to Task Force Faith. The damage we could have done and may further have done, to the CCF—unknown numbers—could be only speculative. However, I also feel that has no place in any official history. Regretfully, it was contained in the report below!

CCF in the attack, by S.L.A. Marshall<sup>271</sup>

Part Two is A Study based on the Operations of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division in the Koto-ri, Hagaru-ri, Yudam-ni Area 20 November-10 December 1950.

The significant part in Marshall's Introduction is in his statement, "Since the circumstances of the fighting around Kunu-ri by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division and north of Koto-ri 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division were *wholly unlike*, not only as to the character of the countryside, but as to the manner of initial employment by our forces and initial deployment by CCF, *there is no warrant for any broad comparison between the two operations*. Where that is done hereinafter, it is solely with the object of emphasizing CCF characteristics and capabilities."

### Myths Exposed

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<sup>271</sup> *Ibid.*

As we look back over embellished reports, stated as facts and many recorded officially in Marine history, we find many that were not factual! Speculation is not an official record!

That the Marines were faced with “Elite” forces from the CCF

“In general, the CCF Divisions engaged by the 1<sup>st</sup> Marines appear to have been no better armed than those engaged by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division at about the same time.”

This offset the Marine divisions, substantially stronger strength in ammo than the enemy force. The fact that Task Force McLean-Faith east of Chosin was dropped 6 extra tons of ammo—16 tons as opposed to 10 tons for the west side—seems to indicate that Army forces used far more ammo, and needed more!

“The major material difference was that the CCF divisions engaged by the 1<sup>st</sup> Marines appear to have been critically in short supply, both as to food and ammunition. Whereas the persistence of CCF fire from fixed positions, the circumstance that the machine gunners and grenadiers seemed never to run short of munitions, and the observation that troops in the rifle line were backed up by an ample train bearers, were noteworthy in CCF operations against 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division, *the situation was quite the reverse among* CCF operating in the Chosin Reservoir area. CCF divisions committed to the battle seem quickly to have exhausted such stocks as they had brought forward. Their effectiveness ceased at this point, since resupply had not overtaken them. When they withdrew because of ammunition failure, fresh divisions came forward into that part of the line, and the supply-exhausted division then disappeared from the front.

PW interrogations showed that the great body of these troops had crossed the Yalu River between 13 and 16 November and pressed on toward the battle area as rapidly as possible. It seems probable that all other major considerations, such as competent supply arrangements, were subordinated to the necessity for getting these troops forward in time to intercept 1<sup>st</sup> Marines column and cut the MSR after the preponderant strength of the division had been committed to the attack in the Reservoir area.” This establishes the fact that those enemy forces at Chosin were not as organized nor in place as those facing Eighth Army on the west side in North Korea. The downward slope of the Yalu River bordering China provided a shorter supply line and travel time for CCF forces facing Eighth Army to the west. The immediate danger was always to Eighth Army, the CCF force facing X Corps had moved towards Chosin across our border line. At no time did X Corps operated within Eighth Army assigned territory!

This report does not cover the action on the east side of Chosin Reservoir! It does cover the action and deficiencies of Task Force Drysdale. That due to fragmentation of top command, even though created by the Marines, no one was in single command of setting the force in place. The criticism of the tanks in the lead stopping to fire on the enemy created a road block for those vehicles behind those tanks. This small TF of British Commandos, one company of Marines and one company of Army infantry on the night of 28 November, was sent north from Koto-ri to open the MSR to Hagaru-ri after receipt of the first report that CCF had cut the road. The CCF force was estimated at less than three battalions. In the open country beyond the Koto-ri ridges can be attributed largely to the matter in which the armor was handled.

## Detail Facts

“The major material difference was that the CCF divisions engaged by 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division appear to have been critically in short supply, both as to food and ammunition. Thus it was from enlisted PW’s that 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division first learned that the CCF plan was to attack in main against the MSR. “...after two regiments had passed to the northward.”<sup>272</sup>

Northward being up the east side of the reservoir

Note the discrepancy in direction of the earlier report of northward, “PW interrogations showed that the great body of these troops had crossed the Yalu River between 13 and 16 November, concurrently with 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division’s first advance from the base ports northward, and had then pressed on toward the battle area as rapidly as possible.” “Thus it was from enlisted PW’s that 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division first learned that the CCF plan was to attack in main against the MSR.” ...after two regiments had passed to the northward.” Since the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines were unsure of their timeline are mission to join the RCT 7 at Yudam-ni and that the plan for them to lead off had to be changed!

There is no indication in reality that the CCFs knew anything about the unnamed Army task forces to occupy the “northward” path to Changjin on the eastern side of the Reservoir! Neither could they have known about the rapid change of plans for two Marine regiments to change places from “northward” to “westward” into Yudam-ni!

This changes the rationale and the Marines’ much-promulgated reports that the CCF were massed against the Marines *westward* at Yudam-ni! That force would need further time to rapidly move supplies to the westward to face the Marines there! **This indicating that the blocking CCF was originally massed “northward” of Chosin against that main line of attack ordered and never changed by X Corps.** So those later reports, that the Chinese had to relocate to the east side of the reservoir, are invalid! They were massed there all the time! **Remember this important fact: the 5th Marines, that second regiment, would not relocate to the “westward” until Task Force Faith had arrived “northward” on the eastern banks of the Chosin Reservoir!**

Any logic would indicate that if the two marine regiments had passed to the “northward” that would leave no one “westward” of Hagaru-ri! (A reverse situation of General Ridgway’s map.) Still the report: “1st Marine Division’ first advance from the base ports northward.” This places that force east of Chosin to proceed directly north to seize the town of Changjin. (MacLean’s Order #25.) While later history will record that more CCF were employed on the east side rather than the one division (80<sup>th</sup>) reported at the start, that those forces had relocated there from the west side seems a fabrication of fact, if the earlier forces were east of Chosin moving towards the northward, the Chinese would be deployed in mass there to stop that advance. What seems evident here is the reverse situation created to face Faith’s Forces of lighter resistance was also fabricated and that there was in reality fewer CCF forces facing those to the “westward” [Marines] at Yudam-ni than on the east side. That those Marine reports were in fact fabricated and embellished to favor their engagement in this action “westward” of Hagaru-ri!

Their Army bashing “smoke and mirror” creativity to favor the Corps!

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<sup>272</sup> *Ibid.*

As will be discussed later, “1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division at its four main positions—Yudam-ni, Hagaru-ri, Koto-ri, and Chinhung-ni—put depth of organization, and unity within the local force, above all else, and occasionally with deliberate intent forswore certain of the higher ridges in the immediate vicinity to the enemy, for the sake of greater tightness within its own lines. This choice paid phenomenal dividends and in no instance involved and inordinate cost.”

This is the fate of Task Forces east of Chosin. Withdrawal of their tanks created a tighter perimeter at Hagaru-ri but doomed the other forces.

“CCF proceeded to impale itself upon this line of strong points. In all four areas, as the days and nights wore on, its attacks, at first pressed in full fury, gradually diminished in violence, until finally the enemy pulled off, having had enough. Though they continued in great numbers in the countryside and swarmed among the ridges during the daylight hours, their role was strictly passive and they did not resume the organized attack.”

“Perhaps the most startling example of the effect of a resolute defense upon CCF’s moral aggressiveness was provided by Fox Company, 7<sup>th</sup> Marines, which for five days and nights preserved a perimeter defense in isolation, holding the pass between the division force at Hagaru-ri and the 7<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> RCT’s at Yudam-ni. During this period the company was wholly surrounded by CCF troops in aggregate strength of perhaps two battalions. The perimeter was close invested and broken at one point on the first night, though the ground was regained and CCF driven off before morning came. The enemy attacked along the same line and in about the same strength on the second night, but again repulsed. On the third night, CCF come on less surely, though by that time Fox Company had taken heavy losses. Then came the respite, though CCF forces in large numbers remained within seeing distance during the next two days there was no more assault.”

Red Flag: This last sentence cuts the threat by “seeing distance” for two of those five days.

Three nights then the fighting tapered off! Still this same script was being played out east of Chosin with two additional days to go, and F Company had officially been ordered back into Hagaru-ri.

“On the fifth morning, a battalion of 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment, moving cross-country to the relief of Fox Company, was temporarily halted by strong CCF resistance, within less than 1000 yards of the latter lines.” [This next is a departure from this objective reporting:] “Such was the morale of Fox Company after its successful defense of the position for five days that it offered by radio to send a patrol out and bring the relieving battalion in”!

[History can never record a non-event!]

“The incident was not the rare exception; it was typical of the spirit which activated 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division's operations as a whole. “We had the feeling at all times that we had the upper hand and that we were giving the enemy a beating whenever he chose to fight,” said General Smith of the operations of his forces.” [He also stated that this was the only time he was really worried, why is this included in this report? The reports over whatever a division commander felt, (within examination of a combat defensive operation) have no place outside a PR report! Also as stated below:]

“This estimate is supported by the detailed study of what occurred to companies and platoons in 1<sup>st</sup> Marine fighting line, of CCF losses and reactions. They believed, on the basis of what they saw and felt that they had been victor on every field. They were confident that they had achieved these results

mainly with their own fighting power. They were indignant that what they had done had been in past discounted by those press reports which said by inference that 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, having become overextended in enemy-held country, had to be extricated by the intervention of other than Marine Forces.<sup>273</sup> [Reality of fact: Since they could not contribute anything, whatsoever, too help or assist Hagaru-ri in any way, the facts prove they were overextended! Again what is this doing in an official report? The facts are that Task Force Dog of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division (Army) extricated the withdrawing force from south of Koto-ri into Hungnam, clearing that road for that withdrawing force! Seems to me like a PR report! The Marines' claim that they had to fight back to the coast also has—absolutely—no basis in reality here.]

### Exaggerations

How many enemy forces would hit Task Force MacLean/Faith?

There are no concrete reports of what units other than the 80<sup>th</sup> CCF Division hitting our force east of Chosin. Whatever prisoner interrogation revealed was not widely distributed nor remembered throughout our perimeter. But whatever it was early on the first day was not of enormous concern to those responsible—as all clashes with the enemy have early casualties. Because neither MacLean—or later—Faith in charge did not at that early time to decide to immediately break out until December 1st. (Faith awaiting a breakout order!) Our supplies and wounded were the most driving force. If General Barr on his visit of the 30<sup>th</sup> (already relieved of command of this force) had informed Faith of the decision (being) made this very afternoon at Hagaru conference, that we would receive no help from anyone, then it was an emergency to withdraw. However, the night hours were approaching and the withdrawal would have to wait until morning hours for close air support. We do not know for sure the number of enemy forces surrounding us. But the Marine command should have had some idea reported back to its dispatcher through their air wing—the only reconnaissance available. Yet, apparently, that enemy force, being greater than the 80<sup>th</sup> Division alone. Still all that had to be known through the air wing.

Because the Marine overall casualties count of some 37,500 enemy total reported killed included those they killed around the east side of the reservoir, are we to believe these were not counted at all?<sup>274</sup> Were they combined to simply add to that total to increase those around them at Yudam-ni? If so, no one will dare admit it. So we have to assume that at least “*some*” of those casualties listed within that total count were created by “*other than Marine forces*” unless every one of our bullets including the Quad 50s missed every one of their targets. This again implies there were no contributing factors reported in Marine history. This premise debated over the PUC award over 49 years, and never issued until 1999. This is why I state for journalistic justice and historical accuracy that those figures as reported by the Marines from the air wing *had* to include those around the east side of Chosin. Those figures diminish the Marine total overall.

For the record, again, we made no claim any fame or to any numbers, what the hell difference would it make anyway? Even our task force's (to this day) numbers are never truly known, either before or after the disaster east of Chosin! Indeed, one report credits the Chinese with the destruction of our entire division: “But the Second Campaign also revealed more CPVA shortcomings. On the eastern front, the

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<sup>273</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>274</sup> Of these reported 37,500, the breakdown is as follows from Blair, p. 543:

Based “captured CCF Documents and prisoners and 'other sources' There was no comparable Army study” 15,000 KIA and 7,500 WIA by Marines ground forces + 10,000 KIA and 5,000 WIA by air operations. (J.G. 380)



150,000-strong Ninth Army Group (the Twentieth, Twenty-sixth, and Twenty-seventh Armies) was not adequately prepared for the subzero Korean winter. It was hastily thrown into combat against the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division and the U.S. Seventh Infantry Division. Although the Ninth Army Group scored the CPVF only major victory during the three-year war in Korea when it wiped out an entire regiment of U.S. military (the Thirty-second Regiment of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division), it suffered terrible toll from the Korean winter. More than 30,000 officers and men, some 22 percent of the entire Ninth Army Group, were disabled by severe frostbite, and some 1,000 died. Following this experience, the Ninth Army Group became a giant field hospital for three months as the men recovered from frostbite, the most serious incidence in the PLA's history. The Ninth Army Group therefore was incapable of annihilating a much smaller enemy force, as originally planned."<sup>275</sup> A valid point could be made here to refute the Marine Corps claim that the enemy they were facing was the "elite" of the litter. Even the Chinese, as just covered, dispute that claim. The mistakes by MacArthur were analyzed in depth by the Chinese forces. MacArthur in World War II was praised as knowing "the Oriental," and understanding their mindset, but he was out of touch to the Chinese mindset. Case in point: "The United Nations Force (UNF) commander MacArthur made a mistake again in his calculations. He believed that the Chinese Volunteers in Korea were no more than 50,000 men, not a significant strong force. He launched an all-out northward offensive along the front so as to end the war by Christmas." "[The Second Campaign] involved major operations *on the western front*, our army lured the enemy into an engagement, some of our best units drove through the enemy lines and cut off their rear; then we started a powerful counteroffensive, destroying three American and puppet divisions, . . . *On the eastern front* around the Chosin Reservoir area, our army surrounded and inflicted heavy losses on U.S. Seventh Division and the First Marine Division. This Second Campaign shocked the entire world. It started November 25 and ended December 24, 1950; within one month, we had eliminated 36,000 enemy troops and forced the enemy to withdraw south of the Thirty-eight Parallel."<sup>276</sup> Here the Chinese do a little of their own exaggerating!

### CCF IX ARMY GROUP

#### 27<sup>th</sup> ARMY

79<sup>th</sup> Div. (235<sup>th</sup> 236<sup>th</sup> 237<sup>th</sup>)

80<sup>th</sup> Div. (238<sup>th</sup> 239<sup>th</sup> 240<sup>th</sup>)

81<sup>st</sup> Div. (241<sup>th</sup> 242<sup>d</sup>, 243<sup>d</sup>)

90<sup>th</sup> Div. (268<sup>th</sup>, 269<sup>th</sup>, 270<sup>th</sup>) a.

#### Approximate Strength

ARMY 21,000 – 30,000

Division 8000 – 10,000

Regiment 3,000

a) Attached from 30<sup>th</sup> ARMY

So the point to the question above, does it matter? No, because we were the ones driven back, regardless of the numbers —the casualty score of the game doesn't matter. **The high numbers still win, and the Chinese had both of them!** America 13,000 men, Chinese 60,000 men, it doesn't

<sup>275</sup> *Mao's Generals Remember Korea*: Introduction by Bin Yu, p. 16. (Italics are mine.)

<sup>276</sup> *Mao's Generals Remember Korea*: Beijing's Decision to Intervene, p. 45.

matter in this contest, they still won the game, the real estate reverted to them, and you can protest all you want, it won't make a damn bit of difference. It would not affect their side had they lost an additional 100,000 men more than they did, as it was many more Chinese men against our superior firepower and weapons, but we still lost North Korea and history *does record that*, and has so stated that as fact for the last 62 years, and we still list 8,000+ missing in action, those men part of that collective 13,000 plus casualties suffered in North Korea.

This Chosin action, though costly, will in no way equate to the destruction of World War II! In that action, the enemy had long range weapons, air power, and naval forces. The Chinese had few of these things at their immediate disposal. The North Korean Army had equipment of a modern army until their defeat—tanks, artillery, and even some small degree of air support. The Chinese had mostly American small arms, discarded WW II weapons. The ammunition for these weapons was American-made. This discarded equipment was given to the Chinese as surely as we equipped the South Koreans (ROKs) with their equipment of war. The exception was those German-made “*potato masher hand grenades*,” with the long handles to lob farther distance than our own cast iron “*pineapple*” grenade. The Chinese tactics depended on massive numbers of men with an abundance of grenades mixed with an assault force.

The destruction brought into existence by the Chinese forces on our task forces were the results of the deaths associated with the clash of arms and weapons between the two forces. Yet, in the total accounting to follow, those deaths could have been greatly minimized by earlier events of moving this force into Changjin. Once there, any responsible X Corps commander in charge issuing a timely withdrawal order to MacLean-Faith could have been beneficial in reducing the number of deaths and total destruction to this entire force. General O.P.Smith was NOT that responsible commander. But another benefit we had was that the Chinese were also burdened with their own lack of aggressive officers. “Two problems, however, were evident: First, the commanders had not been educated as much as the soldiers. Some of the former overestimated the enemy’s strength, and as a result they moved slowly and missed opportunity to engage enemy troops. Some unit commanders even recoiled in fear during battle. Second, our indoctrination stressed favorable conditions but did not prepare the troops for unfavorable conditions. Thus, they lacked the mental stamina for a long-term, tough war. . . . Our soldiers were told during mobilization that the enemy had airplanes but we did also. And they complained in the first Campaign, ‘How come we never see any airplanes of ours in the battle?’ . . . As for the commanders, we could pay attention to overcome their ‘overly cautious tendency.’” We could compare successful cases, involving close-quarter combat, or breaking up and surrounding enemy units and annihilating enemy troops, with cases in which hesitant and *delaying moves causes the loss of battle opportunities.*<sup>277</sup> Again, it seems, I read my italic highlights before—from MacArthur perhaps? So all thing seem to balance out!

CCF IX ARMY GROUP  
20<sup>th</sup> ARMY  
58<sup>th</sup> Div. (172D, 173D, 174<sup>th</sup> RGT)  
59<sup>th</sup> Div. (175<sup>th</sup> 176<sup>th</sup> 177<sup>th</sup>)  
60<sup>th</sup> Div. (178<sup>th</sup> 179<sup>th</sup> 180<sup>th</sup>)  
89<sup>th</sup> Div. (265<sup>th</sup> 266<sup>th</sup>, 267<sup>th</sup>) a)  
a) Attached from 30<sup>th</sup> ARMY

Placement of forces: As the Marines would record:

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<sup>277</sup> *Mao's Generals Remember Korea*, Political Mobilization and Control, Chapter 4, Lt. General (Ret) Du Ping, pp. 75-76.

- 1) The 58th Division (the weak one) swings under Hagaru-ri, hitting and anchoring on “East Hill,” and hitting the southern edge of Hagaru-ri.
- 2) The 59th splits its force, cutting the road between (north) 5th & 7th Marine Regiments (-) above Toktong Pass. The other force swings between C/7 Marines (-) and F/7 Marines, trapping the latter at the rear exit through Toktong Pass.
- 3) The 60th Division swings above Koto-ri engaging the 1st Marine Regiment there.
- 4) The 79th Division swings south above the reservoir position road between Yudam-ni and the banks of the western side of the reservoir, thus having the reservoir to their left flank.
- 5) The 89th Division divides its forces, downward below Koto-ri to attack the 3rd Infantry Division 1/7 at Sach’ang-ni to block any force leading into that lateral route between Inch’o-ri and Majong-dong.
- 6) The 80th Division on the east side of the reservoir.
- 7 & 8) The remaining two divisions: the 81st & 90th being held in reserve, there is no direct report—although implied to be—that they were “facing the Marines” at Yudam-ni!

The first assault on the Marines at Yudam-ni would be at 2100 on the evening of the 27<sup>th</sup>! “*The 89<sup>th</sup> & 79<sup>th</sup> did not contest the Marines at Yudam-ni during the night or during the day of the 29<sup>th</sup>*”<sup>278</sup> (Mossman 98). “But forces of the 59<sup>th</sup> renewed their night assaults on Company F in Toktong Pass.”

As Clay Blair would state on those 37,500 casualties of the CCF, these figures may be inflated, but no doubt the Marine Corps historian is correct in stating that the losses sustained by the CCF in northeast Korea in November and December 1950 amounted to a disaster.<sup>279</sup> This seems to me like a redeeming factor and a waste of effort and energy in a retrograde movement to count the enemy after they are killed, less than the important task of recording their numbers prior to that event. That likewise would have been a plus either way in regard to our American forces east of Chosin. But I guess value is really where one places it.

Still one should remember to give the enemy their due as well. They deserve it as well. They faced massive firepower—while we had ammo to deliver it. They had no tanks, no air cover, no organized medical teams, only their massive manpower. It was thus no big revelation that they would fall in great numbers, before our massive firepower, and our longer range weapons. Only through our air supplies from the recent Army Air Corps—its cargo command prolonged the inevitable disaster—one destined, by fate, east of Chosin due to all combined circumstances that added to the end result.

However, it would be extremely easy—and tempting—for everyone from our Task Force—or any one writing about our force—to exaggerate the number of enemy attacking us. It could never be fully disputed nor fully proven—except by the CCF Command. We could claim without fear of contradiction that some of this force was reinforced by the two sister divisions of the 27<sup>th</sup> Army that would definitely place them on our side of the reservoir, thereby reducing that 60,000- man force exclusively against the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division. (Under the Great Seal of the Department of the Navy.)

Task Force Faith could well use that exaggerated advantage, but that is not my intent, or the purpose of this accounting! One does not have to elevate these men east of Chosin beyond what they did there. To

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<sup>278</sup> Mossman, *Ebb and Flow*, CMH, GPO, p. 98.

<sup>279</sup> *Ibid.*

exaggerate and maintain that the enemy was greater than they “*may have been*” or where they “*may have been*” would be an attempt to impress the reader of this book, with an exaggerated point of view. That would defeat my purpose, which is to establish a timeline and perspective of these men—many losing their lives—are due some measure of respect for that commitment (Bacon and Eggs reference again) they personally and individually made East of Changjin. History can never reconstruct its battle there, nor its heroic acts performed throughout its timeline. Those timelines are long-forgotten and too far removed by history to give these men their truly earned dignity. The only true closure for the families, are not medals of any kind. But to identify and return their remains to those existing relatives, those that may faintly recall (after 62 years) from their own family history their linkage to those men that fell in mortal combat in North Korea.

This is my effort to place this event in perspective, not an exaggerated overview of an enemy body count, dead or alive, that is in the past; that matters not. (Recall we did not personally know all of those ROKs “attached” to us.) For the neglect of the events and the location of “our” forces pale in comparison to those enemy forces we clashed with East of Chosin. Still others would attempt to imply that we had no influence at all on the events at Chosin with the commitment given there. But with the later and recent information—implying *more* forces against us—that prior and continuous degradation can no longer stand up to intelligent scrutiny.

### *Odds and Ends*

#### *MY CREDENTIALS TO CRITICIZE*

As one can see, perhaps not as clear as it may seem, so I wish to state here for the record, I have every respect for the Marines in general, but as can also be seem, I have little respect for one Marine general in particular. And what does that matter coming from me? Well, for a few days he was reported as my commander as well, and his actions—and inactions—affected me and the force I served with.

Within my credentials to criticize—my involvement—for had he never been in charge of our forces east of Changjin Reservoir, **I would have no right or reason to criticize him, for what he did with his forces would have been of no concern of mine, and I would not be writing this.** General Smith had sole responsibility for his division. **But his remarks about the survivors of Task Force Faith as “Army Jokers”! For any officer, especially a two-star general, to refer to *any* survivor of Task Force Faith as “Army Jokers” highlights in the brightest neon lights, on the darkest of nights, his regard for Army forces.**

**Within the context of his remarks, it is self-serving to him on his expertise to medically assess the condition of those survivors. How many cans of frozen C-Rations had he eaten within those previous five days? How many hands-full of snow would he melt in his mouth over those five days, because water was frozen therefore not available to drink? How many nights of those five did he, himself, spend outside of a warming tent? How severe was his disability to frostbite? How many wounds did he have? When did he fly into our forward zone after being in charge of Task Force Faith’s force, General’s Almond, and later, Barr did after being relieved of command of this force? What effort did he make to send a radio, that would mesh on the same frequency with his command, or have air dropped, thereby establishing communications to that command? What action would he take to avoid the destruction of 260 tons of our rear ammunition at Hudong-ni? What action did he take**

to secure the tank force to stay behind us and guard that ammo? What effort did he make to send the tank force back to assist us on the withdrawal notice he—disputably—sent for Colonel Faith to withdraw back into Hagaru? From all indication he wanted us to remain as that safety valve to protect Hagaru! If so why deny that fact and our effort and need to “save his command?” Why was he so irritated about those that survived being back at Hagaru, his withdrawal of the tank force, or his failure to return them when needed? All these questions, highlight his use of those very same tanks to support “his” forces withdrawing from Yudam-ni 14 miles distance to the west side, *below the reservoir*. (Never denied, however, never highlighted!)

Had it been recorded that he did even *some* of these things, his credentials to criticize us would be well founded. For we had made many, many, fateful mistakes of our own, after all we were an inferior force, by *his own* early expert opinion. What did he want from us? We had heavy losses of life. We had no ammo, but here we were, at Hagaru—and he was not pleased with us—not too shabby an outfit after all, some of us got through, through our merit, not his! We did the best we could with what we had to work with. We owe no apologies to any one! Can the Marine command be that secure in his positions taken towards us? History, and history alone, can only judge that question!

#### *OPERATIONAL ORDER #25*

“The stone which the builder has rejected, has become the cornerstone”

(Psalms 118:22; Acts 4:11)

It is customary at times when erecting a new building structure to encase various items of that era as a remembrance within a cornerstone of that building. In this drama, within its cornerstone was hidden a valuable piece of onionskin paper. It was known as Operational Order #25. It being written and ordered by one Colonel Allan D. MacLean.

In the modern recent classic motion picture “*The Raiders of the Lost Ark*,” there is a final scene in which the “Ark” is to be hidden in a place where no one will look for it. It shows a lonely man in a lonely warehouse pushing a crate marked “*Top Secret*,” and at the end of a long row of such crates, he shoves it into a vacant slot, to be buried in time, hidden until some future event will reveal its presence.

Such is the case here, someone had marked *Operational Order #25 “Secret”* and buried it in a box at the National Archives. This order being marked “Secret” was therefore not available to every Army historian, even those with top secret clearance could not reproduce and/or distribute it, for it was not yet “*Declassified*” for that purpose.

Under a Presidential Executive Order, these documents were declassified and made available to the public, to be used in whatever research needed. Thus Colonel MacLean’s last order is now public knowledge. Unfortunately, many books have been written without the benefit of this knowledge. As a direct result, various facts had been misstated and degraded about MacLean’s mission and its exact location. Some have embellished their own events to overshadow and even claim the credit and importance that belonged to this force of MacLean- Faith, East of Changjin Reservoir.

The release of Operational Order #25 completely shatters some of the rational history concerning the offensive in X Corps area of operations on November 24-27, whatever its final date. The Changjin Reservoir Campaign is built on the cornerstone of Task Force MacLean/Faith. It is only by tearing down the ancient structure—of the Changjin Reservoir— and removal of its cornerstone can one view the true situation and events of decades past; those events rejected and neglected have now come center stage under the main spotlight. The script—as written to be performed—not on the “*delay*” date of November 27, 1950, but rather the opening date of November 24. The same date as the Eighth Army date on the west side of North Korea!

There will be much controversy over this drama as written. But these are new facts, which encourage new versions of an old story of an ever ongoing drama.

### *The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986*

The disaster at Chosin was softened by the teamwork efforts of all concerned to bridge the destroyed span at Funchilin Pass just below Koto-ri. Those combined actions allowed the forces trapped above to complete their withdrawal into the Port of Hungnam. The events that transpired those miles above that span were, however, a *divided* combatant effort. A conflict between those same divided branches of the service. Personal egos of top-ranking officers overshadowed what should have been, what it was later stated to be: a historical event. The public relations campaign to establish the Changjin Reservoir actions to that historical event are buried and ignored the inter-service rivalry—an uglier side of war. That should, would have, and finally did expose problems unresolved by the National Security Act of 1947.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, therefore, focused and resolved what should have been solved long before Korea and Vietnam. Between these two “Conflicts” over 100,000 American lives combined battle and non-battle casualties were lost. The concept of OPCON [Operational Control] to the theater Commander in Chief, (CINC) prior to this Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, were either, ignored, or insufficiently applied, in each of those “conflicts.” This is evident in abundance within the Changjin Reservoir Campaign.

Regretfully those losses did not have to be that severe. But few higher ranking officers complained about the deficiencies in the system, and lack of a combined OPCON regulation, on the battlefield. However, that was the arena where the problem existed and should have been recorded. Still as I use a redundant statement throughout this book: *Those problems should have—and could have—been resolved, but they were not.*

The Desert Storm Action in 1991 was swift and decisive in its conclusion, and sole purpose of a United Command. The first real major crisis and test of The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

Undoubtedly, some problems still may exist, but it seems an effort to reduce battlefield casualties and confusion of command, and promote efficiencies there. After all, that should be the final goal. Hence, it solved the problem of having so many Commanders-in- Chiefs assigned to each separate battlefield or territory, to one single Commander-in-Chief, the President of the United States of America.

**My point: had this Act been in effect during the Korean War, perhaps, just perhaps, this drama of Generals against Generals and the separation of commands (X Corps from Eighth Army Control) may, just may, have been avoided.**

*Task Force MacLean-Task Force Faith  
About Documentation  
Search for a "Smoking Gun"*

***The Frozen Chosin Drama***

I am going to try to simplify my version of the enclosed material. In addition, it is exclusively my version! Two books out there of the action at Chosin, as published early in the eighties; one is the main Marine version, in which Marines participated in accounts given to author Eric Hammel in "Chosin." The other book, by Roy Appleman, is "East of Chosin," and like Hammel's book, but from Army participant's accounts. One main difference escapes general knowledge about Appleman's account. There are no backup credentials nor official authorization orders for Colonel Allan D. MacLean's movement into this area on record and known at that time, until 1979. Nor does Appleman reference any such credentials. There were no legal orders circulating for MacLean's location east of Chosin. Those credentials directly connect Order #24 (242400 Nov '50)] and #25 (270800 Nov.'50). However, neither of these orders existed after 29 November 1950. They were classified "Secret" and hidden from view in the National Archives. They are the only legal acknowledgment for MacLean's 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry Regiment to be east of Chosin. Remove them, and you remove the knowledge of our authorization for being there as well.

Remove these orders and you remove us from having legal authority for being east of Chosin—until our transfer to the Marine command. However, that leaves an enormous gap to fill between the time we arrived and that time of transfer. Our defined combat mission may be stated erroneously to corrupt other facts concerning our mission. I cannot state it any plainer than that. The First Marine Division has absolutely no authority over Colonel MacLean's force prior to 292047 November, when this Phantom Force officially turned over to that Marine command.

In 1957, the Marine Corps published their history on the Chosin Campaign, some 7 years after the event. However, that history was highly speculative and embellished beyond fact, more so pure speculation to favor their side. One such example is where the 81<sup>st</sup> Division of CCF "may" have been! That history states around their forces, "may have been around Yudam-ni." Why an official publication under the Department of the Navy Seal, would wish to speculate instead of research such a documented history is beyond me. However, this is a minor point. The major point is within the Ninth Endorsement for the PUC Award to units that served at Chosin. This award recommended by the Army for those men serving at Chosin. General Smith at no time interacted with, nor was he in command of Colonel MacLean's 31<sup>st</sup> RCT. Smith, in his defense of these units qualified to receive this award, never documents MacLean as being in the Chosin Reservoir within his response to the Army Ninth Endorsement. CG Smith will only reference Lt. Col. Faith as being in charge of this RCT. This search for this PUC Award is the "smoking gun" that would haunt General Smith's command for 49 years. That PUC Award issued in 1999, reverses CG Smith's persistent stand in opposing it. This makes him dead wrong on this issue, as that award must now be retroactive to the date of the battle itself. However, one may never retroact those 49 years missing between the time that award was issued.

A full half century has passed since that disaster suffered by Army force on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir. Nagging questions have remained over these last 50 years. Statement: The Fifth Marine Regiment is to attack westward, from Yudam-ni, towards Mupyong-ni, on 270800 November 1950. Recent uncovered “declassified” document (I received in 1991) confirms a new timeline established for the Seventh Infantry Division. There seems to be some confusion here. Since the other two battalions of the Fifth Regiment were just leaving their area east of the reservoir at this hour. Still Seventh Division forces are scattered but moving towards Hagaru-ri! Question #1: Why is that?

### “The Smoking Gun”

So where was the authorization for Colonel MacLean being at Chosin in the first place? It is through Order #25, declassified in 1979. Why was this order placing MacLean pulled from history? What was so incriminating about this order? There is only one reason as I see it. In its intelligence summary, it states that the Seventh Infantry Division will attack 270800 November and seize Mupyong-ni. However, the Marines claim that as *their* mission, to be exclusively reassigned to the 5<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment. However, the 5<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment is not in place on the scheduled hour of the 27<sup>th</sup> to seize or launch any attack towards Mupyong-ni. They (2 battalions) remain east of Chosin on this hour. Therefore, the Marine history will state the 7<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment assumed that role.

As I stated above, Eric Hammel’s book “Chosin” is the main Marine history at Chosin. As the author, he receives the feedback from those of that division he interviewed. In the Marine effort to discredit the Army command for this fiasco at Chosin, they sometimes unknowingly state a fact. One of the oddities stated to Hammel, and put to paper is this alleged statement of fact on page 212, “The suggestion that Yudam-ni garrison attack overland into the flank of the Chinese destroying 8<sup>th</sup> Army came ‘after’ a Corps directive authorizing the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines to attack southward to clear the MSR as far as Hagaru-ri.” (Only a suggestion!) Timeline: November 28-29. MacLean’s orders, were then hidden from history and direct review. How can the Marines advance towards Mupyong-ni without an official order from X Corps to rescind this one summary via Order #25? This remark by Hammel seems to imply that there was no such order prior, to MacLean’s Order #25 pulled from history. I am open to any proof to the contrary.

November 24, 1950

Since 1995, Marine Public Affairs Office has quietly tried to re-establish the above date as the official MacArthur appointed schedule for his “Home by Christmas” offensive in North Korea as being the date for the “Simultaneous offensives of the Eighth Army in western Korea and X Corps in the northeast.” This release invalidates every book written with the date November 27, [including Official Marine History] as being that date picked by CG Almond. This is not a condemnation of this revelation, rather a commendation for honor in admitting and righting a longstanding wrong in history. The November 24 date the official date for both Eighth Army and X Corps to attack “together” in North Korea. That for two main reasons: One, Almond would never offset a date set by General MacArthur. Two, the danger that General Walker of Eighth Army could very well embarrass General Almond by a rapid northern advance and capture his objective below Mupyong-ni, before Almond’s forces seized that area. Therefore, that timeline November 24-27 is the “smoking gun” about Chosin. Between these dates, impossible changes, and heavy burdens are placed on the 7<sup>th</sup> Division, moving in place on the morning of the 27<sup>th</sup>. That schedule impossible to meet and Colonel MacLean would have to offset it for 280800 November.



In my opinion, the Marine Corps' attempt to gracefully return to November 24-27, is akin to a driver traveling miles down the road, upon seeing an unexpected warning sign ahead of a bridge washed out, then suddenly applying the brakes, leaving telltale skid marks on the road. Realizing he's lost time, the driver places the vehicle in reverse and perhaps hopes that the tire marks will erase the earlier ones, as the car backs up over them. However, it does not work that way in real life. Those skid marks created on the roadway of history, for those that find them, are there for all to see, investigate, correct, or criticize.

“There is no unit in the American Army which has served with greater distinction both in peace and in war, than the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry. Never stationed within our continental limits, as the advanced element in our Pacific Defense, the Regiment has always performed its assigned mission with marked gallantry and commendable precision. At Bataan, it achieved its greatest glory as its lines held firm repeatedly against the assault of overwhelming superior forces. As it now faces a future of continued service in our country's cause, its regimental colors fly under a halo of tradition, of honor, duty and sacrifice, which will be an inspiration for American Armies for all time to come.” General Douglas MacArthur, 4 August 1946.

Upon its return, once again, the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry Regiment added to the rolls of the U.S. Army, as part of the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division in Korea.

To me it would seem that someone made a huge mistake by trying to degrade what the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry RCT did at Chosin. Polar Bear silence is never accepted as an outright acceptance of past criticism. The Navy, in their acceptance of Task Force MacLean-Faith's participation of that battle East of Chosin, in 1999, approved that PUC Award, retroactive to the date of that battle, that award places us center stage in this drama, where we always were at that time, in 1950. Now with that Award attached to the regimental banner, with other earned streamers, a future warning. “I shouted, do not provoke me. . . I am the Polar Bear!”

Like their brothers, Polar Bears at Bataan, the Army forces on the East Side of Chosin paid a high price for that battle. This page in history of the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir also belongs to them, and they will not yield that page to anyone. “Beware of the wounded Polar Bear.”\*

[\*See poem by Karl Lowe:]

Sent copy of earlier version of the above to Karl Lowe and Chuck Shaw 6/30/07.

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In a message dated 7/2/2007 7:25:06 A.M. Central Daylight Time, klowe@ida.org writes:

Ray, I suspect you have it about right. No general officer involved in decisions leading to the 31<sup>st</sup> RCT's destruction wanted any record of their decisions to ever become public knowledge. LTG Almond bears responsibility for setting up an uncoordinated shift in his corps' direction of attack. He flew into the Reservoir at a time when there still could have been mutual support arrangements and priorities of fires reallocated to salvage the situation. MG Barr bears responsibility for failing to see to it that his troop movements were supportable and properly supported and that the tactical plan of his subordinate was executable on the corps time line. If any one of those things were not going well, he had an obligation to inform X Corps that the plan was not workable on the time schedule they set. MG Smith bears responsibility for failing to establish communications with a subordinate unit and ensuring

it had adequate fire support and a workable plan for its extraction. BG Hodes bears responsibility for micro-managing the RCT's units such as the I&R Platoon's unsupported movement into oblivion, the ill-prepared attempt of the tank company to break through the gauntlet on Hill 1221, and the premature withdrawal of the tank company and all other units from Hudong-ni—the site of the last road block a day later. The members of Almond's, Barr's and Smith's staffs who planned the shift in direction but failed to see its coordination through also bear responsibility. They are complicit in the disaster and were no doubt as pleased as their bosses to have that knowledge suppressed. A board of inquiry should have been convened, the lessons identified, and the culprits removed from command. Too many of that group went on to higher assignments, several of them eventually getting 4 stars. The documentation is now revealed, thanks to the persistence of guys like you who wanted answers to questions that haunted their lives for a generation. All the best, Karl

## -Chapter 19-

### ODDS AND ENDS

#### *Opening a Pandora's Box Medals*

Be assured: I could care less about the unusually high number of Marine Corps, Medal of Honor awarded at the Changjin Reservoir! Each Division has that privilege to nominate as many combatants as they wish. Therefore, it would be of little value and a waste of my time to examine all of those MOH citations. I have reviewed a few, and explained my reason for doing so, on the one awarded Lt. Frank Mitchell in an earlier chapter. However, I have also stated earlier there was a remark made by Martin Russ in his book, *Breakout* that I had yet to take issue with! That time has come! As I also stated, the United States Army, due to its massive size alone, requires a more rigid standard for its top Medal of Honor to be awarded to their rank and file soldiers. Too many Medal(s) of Honor would indeed undermine the high merit required to be awarded one. The Army Silver Star more than likely compares to the Marine Medal of Honor. However, let me again restate my prior disclaimer; I did not create these discrepancies, I merely highlight them!

While it was disgraceful of General Almond to ignore these Army Medal Regulations, nevertheless, he was commander of X Corps and could freely award the second-highest Army award, the Distinguished Service Medal, (but should not, by disregarding the integrity of their honorable merit) as if they came as a prize out of a box of Cracker Jack. He awarded five of them under the same General Order Number 66 covering and overlapping the same battle timeline. So let me restate the Martin Russ quotation in question and my response to it. "Lt. Col. Don Faith was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions east of the reservoir. Lt. Col. Beall received a Distinguished Service Cross.<sup>280</sup> Captain Stamford was awarded a Silver Star. (Captain Michael Capraro: "If anyone should have received the Medal of Honor it was Beall. He risked his live repeatedly, especially when he climbed up to the road and looked into each of those trucks. Lieutenant Colonel Faith received it for simply doing his duty and not very well at that.")<sup>281</sup> Let me insert a few facts here. Fact One: Had LTC Beall, truly, "*looked into each of those trucks,*" he could hardly have missed the one with Lt. Col. Faith dead in the front seat of one of them, especially, by Lt. Col. Faith wearing the same insignia (Silver Oak Leaf) on his shoulders, as LTC Beall! Fact Two: LTC Beall was never attached to the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, whereas Captain Stamford was! So any oversight to award LTC Beall a Medal of Honor was under the Department of the Navy.<sup>282</sup> The Navy failure to do so indicated Beall was in no "great danger" searching those trucks, also that the men with them had already reported the disasters there. Recall PFC Reeves' tragic story. Fact Three: Beall looking into those trucks was disputed by others. Fact Four: risking one's life while escaping wounds (receiving a Silver Star) seems to me, reward enough for one's effort! Captain Capraro was the Public Information Officer, 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division.<sup>283</sup>

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<sup>280</sup> Separate Distinguished Service Medals exist for the different branches of the military as well as a fifth version of the medal which is a senior award of the United States Department of Defense. The Army version of the Distinguished Service Medal is typically referred to simply as the "Distinguished Service Medal" while the other branches of service use the service name as a prefix. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, 2/19/2013.

<sup>281</sup> Martin Russ, *Breakout, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign Korea 1950*, A Penguin Book, Military History, p. 334.

<sup>282</sup> Review the 49-year effort to have the Navy award the Attached Army Task Force Faith, their PUC Award.

<sup>283</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

Perhaps the same (as the “only”) one; referenced by correspondent Marguerite Higgins. So his bias in favor of the Marine Corps is no great surprise!

But what other facts stand out? That Faith was “simply doing his duty.” May well have escaped noticed had it not been degraded by another one of those constant Marine innuendos “but not very well at that.” Fact Five: Captain Capraro was never involved in that battle east of the reservoir, so his up-front knowledge of the leadership quality of any Army officer lacks any sufficient knowledge of that battle. However, what may also escape notice is his apparent high praise for General Almond issuing these DSM to five Marine officers, (in the first place) none of who rejected them, while all (bitterly) rejected Almond leadership seems to reek of hypocrisy!<sup>284</sup> “He came up to me and asked me if I’d line up Murray and Litzenberg and myself and Beale. He had one Distinguished Service Cross (sic) with him. We suggested that he give the cross to Beale (sic) who was the junior. Let him have the cross and we’d get ours some time later. I never did get a citation for that because that’s that way they operate in those things. I supposed I would have had to write my own. It came out in Army General Order which simply stated that the decoration was for the Chosin Reservoir.” Benis Frank Interview 6/1969. Fact Six: Colonel Faith was never a regimental commander, and was assigned *no duty* as such east of the reservoir. He was only a Lt. Colonel and never was a full bird Regimental Colonel, so this was below his pay grade as a battalion commander. There was only one other (remaining) newly prompted, Lt. Colonel Tolly of the 57<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery east of Chosin.<sup>285</sup> But let us go deeper into this duty factor!

To do that I have to compare Lt. Colonel Faith’s Army Citation east of the reservoir, to LTC Ray Davis USMC’s Citation west of the reservoir. Fact Seven: The Army regulations to receive a Medal of Honor requires: That the Act performed, must be one that the recipient was never required to do—or ever ordered to do. That is why it is so rare, and be outside of his required duty to perform. In other words Lt. Col. Faith has no (7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division) superior (divisional or regimental) immediately over him directing him in any performance of his duty as a regimental commander! Example: Lt. Frank Mitchell, remaining in position while wounded and refusing orders from his superior company leader, to leave when ordered to do so! However, Lt. Mitchell’s MIA status, relates to Martin Russ, *Breakout* once again: This was a 173 man patrol sent out via orders from Colonel Litzenberg over reports of enemy in the area. In the pursuing fight “Pulling back the Marines left three men there.“Hovatter (platoon leader) Marines have always prided themselves on retrieving their dead...so it was agonizing to have to leave Mitch and Coquat and O’Day out there under the stars, but to have gotten them out would have resulted in additional casualties and loss of life, and I decided it would be just plain dumb. Of course we intended to come back for them the following day. There was no question about that,” But they would never return for them as they were reassigned to other positions the next day. So I seem to get a sense of Russ and his position to criticize the Army forces at the reservoir, was another Marine hypocrisy, for in reality what they were promulgating about us, they have already experienced in kind, a day before our battles would begin. The only difference we would remain engaged for five days whereas the marines, in Lt. Mitchell’s case willfully retreat from their battle, and this would required that added effort of damage repair by their PR Captain Capraro. To doctor the records: to read: “area cleared of the enemy,”<sup>286</sup> Those Army innuendoes however spread like wildfire over our breakout situation where we could well have escaped by leaving all of our wounded four miles behind

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<sup>284</sup> Since this is one of three highest ranking awards General Smith received, as ranking above all others received, would be worn in the highest three positions above all others. Worn in order to his other two awards, the DSC, DSM (Navy), DSM (Army).

<sup>285</sup> All other Lieutenant Colonels have been killed in action or wounded.

<sup>286</sup> Martin Russ, *Breakout*: p.87-88

instead of loading them on trucks and attempting a breakout. Which failed but reported: as angering the Marine, over those increasing innuendoes; wildly promulgated about us!

Below is LTC Davis' Citation. Note that he is not operating on his own initiative—as Lt. Col. Faith—but under direct orders (his duty) from his regimental Commander Colonel Litzenberg!

### Davis, Raymond G.

Rank and organization: Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps commanding officer, 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 7<sup>th</sup> Marines, 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division (Rein.). Place and date: Vicinity Hagaru-ri, Korea, 1 through 4 December 1950. Entered service at: Atlanta, Ga. Born: 13 January 1915, Fitzgerald, Ga. Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as commanding officer of the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, in action against enemy aggressor forces. Although keenly aware that the operation involved breaking through a surrounding enemy and advancing 8 miles along primitive icy trails in the bitter cold with every passage disputed by a savage and determined foe, Lt. Col. Davis boldly led his battalion into the attack in a daring attempt to relieve a beleaguered rifle company and to seize, hold, and defend a vital mountain pass controlling the only route available for 2 Marine regiments in danger of being cut off by numerically superior hostile forces during their re-deployment to the port of Hungnam. When the battalion immediately encountered strong opposition from entrenched enemy forces commanding high ground in the path of the advance, he promptly spearheaded his unit in a fierce attack up the steep, ice-covered slopes in the face of withering fire and, personally leading the assault groups in a hand-to-hand encounter, drove the hostile troops from their positions, rested his men, and reconnoitered the area under enemy fire to determine the best route for continuing the mission. Always in the thick of the fighting Lt. Col. Davis led his battalion over 3 successive ridges in the deep snow in continuous attacks against the enemy and, constantly inspiring and encouraging his men throughout the night, brought his unit to a point within 1,500 yards of the surrounded rifle company by daybreak. Although knocked to the ground when a shell fragment struck his helmet and 2 bullets pierced his clothing, he arose and fought his way forward at the head of his men until he reached the isolated Marines. On the following morning, he bravely led his battalion in securing the vital mountain pass from a strongly entrenched and numerically superior hostile force, carrying all his wounded with him, including 22 litter cases and numerous ambulatory patients. Despite repeated savage and heavy assaults by the enemy, he stubbornly held the vital terrain until the 2 regiments of the division had deployed through the pass and, on the morning of 4 December, led his battalion into Hagaru-ri intact. By his superb leadership, outstanding courage, and brilliant tactical ability, Lt. Col. Davis was directly instrumental in saving the beleaguered rifle company from complete annihilation and enabled the 2 marine regiments to escape possible destruction. His valiant devotion to duty and unyielding fighting spirit in the face of almost insurmountable odds enhance and sustain the highest traditions of the U.S. Naval Service.

Missing from the above citation is the identification of that unnamed:“beleaguered rifle company.” As 2/F/7! (Original number of men at Fox Company=240). The missing information concerning: “to relieve a beleaguered rifle company and to seize, hold, and defend a vital mountain pass controlling the only route available for two (reinforced) Marine regiments in danger of being cut off by numerically superior hostile forces during their re-deployment to the port of Hungnam.”—Also—“Col. Davis was directly instrumental in saving the beleaguered rifle company from complete annihilation.” That

“beleaguered rifle company” is Fox Company of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion! Why is that missing information any interest here? Three reasons, first, LTC Davis was the commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 7<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment. Second, the commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, LTC Randolph Lockwood, he remained located at Hagaru, and could have been flown in by helicopter to relieve the wounded Fox Company commander. He could have but he never volunteered to do that, indicting this 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion was never the direct responsibility of LTC Davis, as such! That it requires reassignment to him (his duty) by his regimental commander Litzenberg! Third, in the “saving the beleaguered rifle company from complete annihilation,” LTC Davis award now totals three Medal of Honor awards inclusive of the two prior awards to this 2/F/7 “beleaguered rifle company” Barber, William E. Rank and organization: Captain U.S. Marine Corps, commanding officer, Company F, 2d Battalion 7<sup>th</sup> Marines, 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division (Rein.). And one: Cafferata, Hector A., Jr. Rank and organization: Private, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Company F, 2d Battalion, 7<sup>th</sup> Marines, 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division (Rein.). Those last two awards based solely on self-survival of each individual man, now awaiting rescue, by Lt. Col. Davis!

### Faith, Don C., Jr.

Rank and organization: Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, commanding officer, 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division. Place and date: Vicinity Hagaru-ri, Northern Korea, 27 November to 1 December 1950. Entered service at: Washington, Ind. Born: 26 August 1918, Washington, Ind. G.O. No.: 59, 2 August 1951. Citation: Lt. Col. Faith, commanding 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, distinguished himself conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity in action above and beyond the call of duty in the area of the Chosin Reservoir. When the enemy launched a fanatical attack against his battalion, Lt. Col. Faith unhesitatingly exposed himself to heavy enemy fire as he moved about directing the action. When the enemy penetrated the positions, Lt. Col. Faith personally led counterattacks to restore the position. During an attack by his battalion to effect a junction with another U.S. unit, Lt. Col. Faith reconnoitered the route for, and personally directed, the first elements of his command across the ice-covered reservoir and then directed the movement of his vehicles which were loaded with wounded until all of his command had passed through the enemy fire. Having completed this he crossed the reservoir himself. Assuming command of the force his unit had joined he was given the mission of attacking to join friendly elements to the south. Lt. Col. Faith, although physically exhausted in the bitter cold, organized and launched an attack which was soon stopped by enemy fire. He ran forward under enemy small-arms and automatic weapons fire, got his men on their feet and personally led the fire attack as it blasted its way through the enemy ring. As they came to a hairpin curve, enemy fire from a roadblock again pinned the column down. Lt. Col. Faith organized a group of men and directed their attack on the enemy positions on the right flank. He then placed himself at the head of another group of men and in the face of direct enemy fire led an attack on the enemy roadblock, firing his pistol and throwing grenades. When he had reached a position approximately 30 yards from the roadblock he was mortally wounded, but continued to direct the attack until the roadblock was overrun. Throughout the 5 days of action Lt. Col. Faith gave no thought to his safety and did not spare himself. His presence each time in the position of greatest danger was an inspiration to his men. Also, the damage he personally inflicted firing from his position at the head of his men was of material assistance on several occasions. Lt. Col. Faith's outstanding gallantry and noble self-sacrifice above and beyond the call of duty reflect the highest honor on him and are in keeping with the highest traditions of the U.S. Army. (This award supersedes the prior award of the Silver Star (First Oak Leaf Cluster) as announced in G.O. No. 32, Headquarters X Corps, dated 23 February 1951, for gallantry in action on 27 November 1950.)

Note of interest: The above award cover two parts his Silver Star and the additional Medal of Honor, The first part leading his own 32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion and the second part leading the remainder of those survivors of his own battalion and those of Colonel MacLean's 31<sup>st</sup> Regiment! Original number of Army (2,800) men, East of the Reservoir, (plus four Marines led by Captain Stamford USMC). One Medal of Honor awarded. At Fox Company 240 men = Two + One, Medal of Honor awards. Marine to Army Total = 14 to 1. Disputed = 15 to 0 (Colonel Beall)

The medal(s) as requested at Inchon and Seoul and those approved by the Navy:<sup>287</sup>  
 “7) Awards and Decorations—At the close of the period awards had been recommended and presented as follows. The bulk of these awards were for services rendered during the Inchon-Seoul operations.

Award	Recommendations	Presented
Medal of Honor	5*	0
Navy Cross	33*	0
Silver Star Medal	245	156
Legion of Merit	44	8
Bronze Star	585	302
Air Medal	5	3
Letter of Commendation with Ribbon	288	73
TOTAL		1205 542

\*Recommendations for 3 Medals of Honor and 17 Navy Crosses were approved by the Commanding General and forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy by the end of the period covered by this Special Action Report.”

Review of the three Medal of Honor equal 60% of those requested! Likewise the 33 Navy Crosses equal 52%. One may conclude that the 14 Medal of Honor Awards approved at the Reservoir were likewise —only—60% approved as well! Point: some 23 Medal of Honor would have been submitted for final approval. Difference between the three Campaigns: Inchon and Seoul were two separate Campaigns’ and both were successful but the latter one at the Reservoir was not—a defeat, and retreat movement—we held no land in North Korea, and this haunts America (after 62 Years—the North Korean Government now rejecting the Truce Agreement as of April 2013!) to this day! This “Conflict” therefore is now revived, — alive and active— as of 25 June 1950!

However, one other (16th) attempt would be made to award a Medal of Honor to Captain Edward Stamford attached by the Navy to Colonel Faith’s, 1/32nd Battalion east of the reservoir. As related in East of Chosin: Stamford was recommended for the MOH award by Major General Field Harris USMC of the Marine Air Wing, Fleet Marine Force. Attempts to advance it though the Army awards system, met several obstacles. There were no 7th Division personnel involved in supporting this award, therefore it was forwarded to the Navy who had the final decision to grant it under Navy regulations, staying true to their continuing denial of their PUC award (49 years) to any members of Task Force

<sup>287</sup> File 4 [Declassified] 1st Mar Div. Annex AG-1: Dec. ’50

Faith, it would have been a gross hypocrisy to award this Medal of Honor too only one of their own out of the hundreds in Task Force Faith, to Captain Stamford, therefore this medal; was denied under the Department of the Navy. As Stamford was attached with this Army group, he also would have no part in assisting in any effort to assist the forces at Hagaru, in their effort to return to Koto-ri and eventually to the ships at Hungnam! As a matter of fact he was possible criticized for helping save any of us! It was therefore denied! But X Corps (rather than the 7th Division) under General Almond, continuing his precedent of his earlier over-used standard to issue medals', as from my earlier view; as Cracker Jack prizes, awarded the Silver Star to Captain Stamford, and as I claim that Army award is the comparison of the Marine Medal Of Honor. Recall General Smith gave a Silver Star to a Marine for pulling off his mitten and throwing a grenade then defended it by saying that Marine got frostbitten fingers, and he was unjustly accused of that by flying them out of Hagaru, neglecting the fact he criticized those Task Force Faith "Joker's" flying out with just frostbitten fingers!

Stamford, Edward P.

The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, July 9, 1918, takes pleasure in presenting the Silver Star (Army Award) to Captain Edward P. Stamford (MCSN: 0-30251), United States Marine Corps, for gallantry in action against the enemy while serving with the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division (U.S. Army), in the Chosin Reservoir area on 27 November 1950, and again on 1 December 1950. On 27 November 1950, Company A was attacked by a numerically superior enemy force which overran the company Command Post and the third platoon, killing the company commander, the platoon leader and seriously wounding the platoon sergeant. Captain Stamford, sensing the immediate danger, voluntarily and without regard for his own personal safety, exposed himself to withering enemy fire in order to rally the platoon and lead a successful counter attack against the enemy. He then ordered the second platoon to move to a better position so as to bolster the defense of the perimeter. On 30 November 1950, while with the leading elements of the regiment, Captain Stamford directed air strikes against the enemy on the perimeter. When his radio operator was hit and seriously wounded, he placed the radio on his back and continued to direct the air attack, while exposed to small arms and automatic weapons fire. Captain Stamford's courageous leadership, tactical ability and high devotion to duty reflect great credit upon himself and the military service. Headquarters, X Corps, General Orders No. 157 (July 22, 1951). My next chapter will cover Captain Stamford's disputed qualification to earn it!

The Presidential UNIT Citation (PUC) Navy

### **Establishing Authority**

"The Navy Presidential Unit Citation was established by Executive Order 9050 signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on February 6, 1942, and promulgated by Navy Department General Order Number 187 of February 3, 1943.

#### **Effective Dates**

The Navy Presidential Unit Citation has been in effect since October 16, 1941.

#### **Criteria**

The Navy Presidential Unit Citation is awarded in the name of the President to units of the Armed Forces of the United States and cobelligerent nations for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy. The unit must have accomplished its mission under such extremely difficult *and hazardous conditions to set it apart from and above other units participating in the same campaign.*



The degree of heroism required is the same as that which would be required for award of a Navy Cross to an individual.”

Notes of interest: One: For 49 years the Navy was denying (review Navy Maps) those smaller Task Force Units East of the Changjin Reservoir, ignoring the historical reality they were ever there! After all, it is referred to as a UNIT Citation. Two: This award was never intended for a full Marine Division, of over 25,000 men, with attached Army Division personnel, but individual units! This one seemed to have expanded its scope beyond its original intent; as such there are many contradictions to its all-inclusive divisional scope of enclosures, expectably in miles covered. In other words the UNITS trapped (and separated) above the Marine assigned zone of Hagaru-ri could be included (individually\*) in the award, but that would deny excessive praise for the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division (Rein.) at the reservoir. \*Likewise, the Army instead of continually taking issue with the Navy may well have presented their Own PUC Citation request to short circuit that of the Navy! This would have updated that chronological historical Army participation in the Changjin Campaign by those extended and wasted 49 years.

Indeed, there were many discrepancies in the Marine commander’s request! Example: as stated above, “The *unit must* have accomplished its mission under such extremely difficult and hazardous conditions to *set it apart from and above other units participating in the same campaign.*” Using this rigid criterion, one can only comply with the regulation *by the complete removal and separation of Task Force Faith!* Therefore, “*the other units*” within this same Campaign would without contradiction have to be the ARMY: (that standard set, for all other unit evaluations) *participating in the same campaign.*” And they were on the east side of the reservoir, Task Force MacLean/Faith. Only by this separating and eliminating certain Army Units can one exceed that of the Army Task Force Unit battles east of the reservoir.

This award was denied some 49 years to the Task Force(s) MacLean/Faith east of the reservoir. Hence it defines the right of the Department of the Navy to require sufficient data of fact to award it. This seems to validate the claim that General Oliver P. Smith was the FMF Commander with additional authority under the Department of the Navy for reliability concerning his higher authority (other than a division commander) to include any Army (as combined unit members) for this Navy award!

While there is no dispute that the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Air Wing (MAW) contributed to the Campaign, they were not a ground unit and were not directly linked to unit combatants with any enemy opposing aircraft at the reservoir. Below General Smith is adding a unit where: “*10. Information is not available...*” The MAW in no way did not suffer the casualties of Task Force Faith, nor did they have the freedom after the demise of Task Force Faith to concentrate and supply their additional sorties exclusively for the 1st Marine Division. While the movement between Hagaru back to Koto-ri had the benefit of an addition two Marine RCT’s and from survivors of Task Force Faith, it has this MAW increased and individual benefit of air coverage!

**CHANGJIN JOURNAL 04.15.00-Chapter 13**  
**THE ELEVENTH ENDORSEMENT (COPY)**

14 Apr 1953 ELEVENTH ENDORSEMENT on MajGen O.P. Smith’s ltr, ser 9532 of 3 Mar 1952

From: Major General Oliver P. Smith, USMC To: Navy Department Board of Decorations and Medals  
Subj: Presidential Unit Citation; case of 1st Marine Division (Reinf), recommendation for award of...

4. Direct participation of Marine, Army, and other units was as follows: (figures given for each phase are the maximum before the effect of casualties was reflected.) a. Breakout of the 5th and 7th Regimental Combat Teams from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri: Marines and Navy Medical - 8,290 (approx) Army - None b. Defense of Hagaru-ri pending the arrival of the 5th & 7th Regimental Combat Teams at Hagaru-ri: Marines and Navy Medical - 3,540 (approx) Army (including integrated South Koreans) - 325 (approx) Royal Marine Commandos - 180 (approx) c. Attack from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri: (This attack was launched on 6 December 1950....

5. With regard to attached Army units, until 29 November 1950, only 73 Army personnel were attached to the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division. On 29 November 1950, the X Corps assigned operational control of all Army units in the Hagaru-ri - Koto-ri area to the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division. With the arrival of the 2d Battalion, 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry (less Company E) at Koto-ri on December 1950, there were no further accretions of Army units because of the complete blocking by the Chinese of the road between Chinhung-ni and Koto-ri. Army units at Koto-ri and north thereof were divided into three groups, as follows: a. *Eight miles north of Hagaru-ri on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir: Here Task Force Faith, an Army Task Force of about 2,800 men from the 31<sup>st</sup> and 32d Regimental Combat Teams, was under attack and cut off from Hagaru-ri.* b. *At Hagaru-ri: Here were several small miscellaneous Army units and detachments of units with a total strength of about 325 men. Part of these units had been destined for Task Force Faith but had been unable to reach that force.*<sup>288</sup> The remainder, were detachments of units sent forward by X Corps in anticipation of the setting up of an advance Corps CP at Hagaru-ri. These detachments were likewise stranded. The principal units in this group were the *Tank Company, 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry, and Company D, 10<sup>th</sup> Engineer (C) Battalion.* c. At Koto-ri: Here were a large number of miscellaneous Army units and detachments of Army units. Part had been destined for Task Force Faith and part were being moved forward in anticipation of the establishment of an advance Corps CP at Hagaru-ri. All had been stranded at Koto-ri by enemy action. The principal units in this group were the 2d Battalion, 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry (less Company E), Headquarters Company, 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry, and 185<sup>th</sup> Engineer (C) Battalion (less Company A).

Points of interest: #5, "only 73 Army personnel were attached to the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division." a. *Eight miles north of Hagaru-ri on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir: Here Task Force Faith, an Army Task Force of about 2,800 men from the 31<sup>st</sup> and 32d Regimental Combat Teams, was under attack and cut off from Hagaru-ri.* b. *At Hagaru-ri: Here were several small miscellaneous Army units and detachments of units with a total strength of about 325 men.* #1, *Part of these units had been destined for Task Force Faith but had been unable to reach that force.* **These units were our units, at Hudong-ni**, including the Tank Company and they were **never** at Hagaru-ri **prior** to their withdrawal order by the Marine Corps back into Hagaru! #2, The Marine Corps extra efforts to deny where our Tanks had been is further corrupted by the Marine Corps exclusion of their failure in locating them on their Map 20 as being at Hudong-ni—that final location of the final battle that cost Lt Col. Faith his life. #3, plus the Marine Corps claim that "*Part of these units had been destined for Task Force Faith*" (at Hagaru) implies that this was the Marine Zone, as originally assigned, and those Marine units

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<sup>288</sup> "*Part of these units had been destined for Task Force Faith but had been unable to reach that force.*" Implying that these Units "detained" were those at Hagaru-ri and never reaching and remaining four miles north of Hagaru at Hudong-ni where they spent four days and three nights?

*below Hagaru-ri were outside of their original zone—due to delaying action by General Smith. #4, also, implies that our Tanks were held in their zone (Hagaru-ri) via Marine Corps orders, denied permission to leave! #5, it also implies that their PR section (inclusive of Captain Capraro) was cooking the books on the locations of where these Army Tanks—affixed with their 7th Division Stencil marks—were at that time in history. All of this data, coming together, pressured the Navy to override Smith's explanation to continue to deny this UNIT citation to all who traveled below Hagaru. Moreover, issuing this upgrade too this final award changes the entire regulations structure to maintain or justify the entire award as originally written!*

6. In its 9th endorsement hereon, the Department of the Army has listed the complete units comprising Task Force Faith. In the basic letter and proposed citation I have listed Task Force Faith as "Provisional Bn, U.S.A., (Dets. of 31<sup>st</sup> and 32d RCTs)." The reason for this will be apparent from what follows: a. During the evening of 29 November 1950, I received at Hagaru-ri a telephone call (radio link) from X Corps at Hamhung attaching Army Units in the Hagaru-ri - Koto-ri area to the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, and directing me to extricate Task Force Faith, redeploy the 5<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> Regimental Combat Teams (Marine) from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri, and consolidate at the latter place. For the moment there were no ground troops available to extricate Task Force Faith. The garrison at Hagaru-ri had been heavily attacked and was fighting for its life and to protect the vital airstrip (from which 3,150 Marine, 1,500 Army and 25 Royal Marine Commando casualties were later evacuated) and supplies accumulated there. The 5<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> RCTs had to cut their way through four CCF Divisions to reach Hagaru-ri. (They did not reach there until 3 December.) Unlimited air cover was available to Task Force Faith. b. On 30 November Task Force Faith was advised by the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division that it was now attached to the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, that it should make every effort to improve its situation by working toward Hagaru-ri, that it should do nothing which would jeopardize the safety of the wounded, that no infantry assistance could be rendered immediately, but that ample air cover was available. Shortly after acknowledgement of this order radio communication went out. c. During the evening of 1 December 1950, stragglers from the break-up of Task Force Faith (which had been overwhelmed by the Chinese) began to arrive at the perimeter of Hagaru-ri. These men came in small groups without any semblance of organization. Many had discarded their weapons. They brought out no equipment or vehicles. Most of them were suffering from frostbite. Stragglers continued to arrive for three or four days after 1 December. Most of them made their way in over the frozen surface of the reservoir. On 2 December, volunteers from units of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division conducted operations to rescue the wounded and disabled of this Task Force. On 2 December, alone, over 300 of these were brought in. d. As the airstrip at Hagaru-ri had, on 1 December, become fully operational for C-47 aircraft, wounded and disabled men of Task Force Faith were immediately evacuated by air. By 5 December approximately 1,500 Army personnel had been evacuated by air from Hagaru-ri. Most of these came from Task Force Faith, some coming from Army units which had been part of the defense forces of Hagaru-ri. e. As stragglers from Task Force Faith began to arrive at Hagaru-ri, Lt. Col. Anderson, the senior Army officer of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division in Hagaru-ri, was directed to take charge of the stragglers and organize the able-bodied into a Provisional Battalion. Only 385 men were salvaged for inclusion in this Battalion. Many had to be rearmed and re-equipped. This Provisional Battalion took part in the attack of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division from Hagaru-ri to the south. In the Task Organization of 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, OpnO 25-50 of 5 December 1950, which covered the attack of the Division from Hagaru-ri to the south, the Provisional Battalion was listed as attached to RCT-7 and is designated "Prov Bn, USA (31<sup>st</sup> Inf)." In the proposed citation enclosed with the basic letter, I have made the designation of this Provisional Battalion more descriptive of its composition, to wit, "Prov Bn, USA

(Dets of 31<sup>st</sup> and 32d RCTs, USA)". This Provisional Battalion remained constituted as such from 2 to 11 December 1950. Under the circumstances outlined above, I do not consider it justifiable to include the complete units as proposed by the Department of the Army.

“10. Information is not available as to whether VMO-6 (Marine Observation Squadron 6), 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Air Wing, has been included with the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Air Wing in the Distinguished Unit Citation awarded that Wing by the Army. VMO-6 furnished the helicopters and liaison plane which accompanied the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division during the Chosin Reservoir Operation. The performance of this squadron was outstanding and it played a vital role in the successful breakout of the Division. It has been provisionally included in the attached units.”

“The unit must have accomplished its mission under such extremely difficult and hazardous conditions to set it apart from and above other units participating in the same campaign.” The Marine Air wing cannot equal are contribute anymore than the Army units east of the reservoir!

Likewise, included in the original award were Marine artillery units stationed well outside of the Changjin Reservoir vicinity. Those far most units located at Majon-dong and Oro-ri.\*

“11. In addition to the organic units of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division listed in the basic letter to be excluded from the proposed citation, the following artillery units should *also be excluded*: 4.5” Rocket Battery, 11<sup>th</sup> Marines Service Battery, 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion, 11<sup>th</sup> Marines. These units were stationed on the Main Supply Route between *Majon-dong and Oro-ri*. This change has been reflected in the recapitulation given in paragraph 12, below.”

\*The distance from Hagaru zone to Majon-don was 26 miles and an additional 14 miles to Oro-ri.  
It seems General Smith is resisting the excluding these 40 mile distant units.

“12. Considering all the factors involved, it is recommended that the following units and detachments be included in the citation of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division for the award of the Presidential Unit Citation for the period 27 November to 11 December 1950: Organic units of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division: 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division (less Det. Hq Bn; Det. 1<sup>st</sup> Serv Bn; Det. Hq and Cos A and C, 1<sup>st</sup> Tank Bn; Auto Sup Co, 1<sup>st</sup> MT Bn; Auto Maint Co, 1<sup>st</sup> MT Bn; Det. 1<sup>st</sup> Ord Bn; Det. Hq and Co A, 1<sup>st</sup> Med Bn: 1<sup>st</sup> SP Bn; 4.5” Rocket Btry and Serv Btry, 4<sup>th</sup> Bn, 11t Mar.) Attached Marine Corps Units: Cos A and B, 7<sup>th</sup> MT Bn, FMF; Det. Radio Rel Plat, FMF; Air Support Sec MTACS-2, 1<sup>st</sup> MAW; VMO-6 (if not included with the 1<sup>st</sup> MAW in the Distinguished Unit Citation awarded by the Army.) Attached Army Units: Prov Bn, USA (Dets 31<sup>st</sup> and 32d RCTs, USA) Co D, 10<sup>th</sup> Engr (C) Bn Tank Co, 31<sup>st</sup> Inf Hq Co, 31<sup>st</sup> Inf Co B, 1<sup>st</sup> Bn, 31<sup>st</sup> Inf 2d Bn, 31<sup>st</sup> Inf (less Co E) 185<sup>th</sup> Engr (C) Bn (less Co A) Attached Foreign Unit: 41<sup>st</sup> Independent Commando, Royal Marines.”

OLIVER P. SMITH Copy to: CMC ----- END 04.15.00

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Benefits' to the 1st Marine Division

Via

TANK WITHDRAWAL & 1<sup>st</sup> MAW INCREASE

The facts surrounding the number of planes available is of interest from the plan to Breakout from Yudam-ni, on 30 November by the numbers, as cited by Appleman in his “Escaping the Trap” [E/T-p. 213] “on 1 December there would be available 96 shore-based and 184 embarked planes, for a total of 260.” [Continuing to cite E/T-p.245] In my opinion, here is a massive damage control effort to shift all blame for any and all-unequal distribution of air support directly on the new Department of the Air Force! “Until 2 December the 5th Air Force officially had been in control of air support for the ground troops in the Chosin area. On 2 December however, Maj. Gen. Field Harris, commanding the 1st Marine Air Wing, received responsibility for providing close air support for the X Corps. This change was made to give more complete control to General Almond and the X Corps in use of the close support aircraft available in the planned withdrawal from Hagaru-ri to the coast.” If the 2 December date is taken literally, it excludes all errors prior to this date, thereby exonerating the MAW of any liability prior to this date. Those short (1 Dec) Napalm drops and friendly fire on Task Force Faith’s close in battle support on friendly forces atop Hill 1221! Likewise all praise for the increase of planes available after this date accrues too the MAW at the dispatchers level, under General Almond’s effort! However, less history fails to record here: as below (and my second time-and will again in the next chapter) citing Appleman’s prior statements contained in his Center Military History as below:

Citing Roy E. Appleman: SOUTH TO THE NAKTONG,  
NORTH TO THE YALU: (June-November 1950)

First Printed 1961-CMH Pub 20-2-1

“During the time the 7th Marines was heavily engaged in combat with the CCF *124th Division*, a controversy between General Almond and General Partridge over the control of the 1st Marine Air Wing came to a head. Under existing procedure the Fifth Air Force Joint Operations Center at Seoul controlled the assignment of missions to the 1st Marine Air Wing. General Almond felt that, during a period of active ground combat when the local ground tactical situation could change drastically within an hour or two, he, the local commander, should have complete command over the air units supporting the ground troops. On 4 November General Partridge flew to Wonsan to hold a conference with General Almond on the subject. General Almond won his point; the Fifth Air Force ordered the 1st Marine Air Wing to assume direct responsibility for close support of X Corps without reference to the Joint Operations Center. Close support requests beyond the capabilities of the 1st Marine Air Wing were to be reported to the Fifth Air Force.”<sup>32</sup> ([32] X Corps WD, 4 Nov 50, G-1 Rpt, Notes on Conference between CC X Corps and Gen Partridge, 4 Nov 50; USAF Hist Study 71, pp. 76-78.) [Page 744 SOUTH TO THE NAKTONG, NORTH TO THE YALU.]

So less we forget; MAW missions were their responsibility under X Corps (Major General Almond’s) direct command between 4 November to and including 30 November 1950! Any tragic events after 30 November date were those directly recorded under the MAW, commanded by General Harris, in spite of what the Marine Public Relations officer and Martin Russ, in his book-Breakout—attempts to brand Major General Almond as responsible!

Bottom line: Before 1 December, Air drops we received east of Chosin were delivered under the Command of General Almond! After 1 December, under Major General Field Harris!

Perhaps, here was a classic example of misguided Damage Control! “Until 2 December the 5th Air Force officially had been in control of air support for the ground troops in the Chosin area.”

Only true, after the above agreement reached on 4 November and ending 30 November, placing Major General Almond in full charge! General Harris was in total control of the Marine Air Wing, “over the air units supporting the ground troops.” Only and until Lieutenant General Stratemeyer (Commander; Far East Air Force) changed direct control to Major General Harris on 1 December! With only one (remaining) stipulation, that: “*Close support requests beyond the capabilities of the 1st Marine Air Wing were to be reported to the Fifth Air Force.*” General Harris violated this condition on 1 December by an attempt to transfer that responsibility to Naval Aircraft in the Sea of Japan, and his failure to inform the Fifth Air Force! As the record reveals, this privilege was recalled after our forces left North Korea! Part of the reason could be; General Harris fails to honor that one stipulation. On 1 January 1951, the Fifth Air Force reclaimed their original operational control over the 1st MAW. Whether the Marine Corps liked it or not (and understandably, they did not), their air-to-ground control was returned to the authorization of the Fifth Air Force. The Department of the Air Force's "priority" authority was abused and misused, therefore it was recalled.

Of related interest: On Marine delays after Chosin, on Feb. 19, 1951, General Ridgway wanted the 1st Marines to attack within 48 hours out of Wonju. But the division was not fully assembled at Chungju, and a more reasonable time would be Feb.24, Ridgway here insisted they hold to his timetable. General Smith has another problem he has lost his supporting air wing, to the Far East Air Force. He appealed to the Fifth Air Force commander, Pat Partridge, an independent command his appeal was of no use. The Marine Air Wing would stay with the Air Force as a uniform command. Seems someone took something away from Task Force Faith (a full Tank Company perhaps) not too long before!

### Under MAW General Harris’— Direct Command

U.S.S. Leyte: Flight Chart; Source; Declassified document; Report of Action for the period 1 December, through 26 December 1950. [Chart shortened to cover addition flights (sorties flown) for air to ground support for First Marine Division. Coverage needed exclusively and only for withdrawing Marine forces from Yudam-ni-Hagaru-Koto-ri. Note the lack of any flights on 1 December, were assigned to the *Leyte* are missing for 1 December, 1950. These flights were weathered out! The delay in transfer was due to shifting flights to the MAW, resulting in a 6 hour delay for Task Force Faith, however, flights were flown over Yudam-ni and Fox Company-with ammo drops as early as 6:45 A.M.-1 December, 1950. (See Chapter 21)

-Table Three-

12/2/50: 61 sorties were flown;	12/5/50: entire day replenishing ship;
12/3/50: 69 sorties were flown;	12/6/50: 67 sorties were flown;
12/4/50: 77 sorties were flown;	12/7/50: 72 sorties were flown;

12/8/50: Replenish Ship;

12/9/50: 82 sorties flown; covering withdrawal of First Marine Division from Chosin Reservoir to Hamhung;

12/10/50: 61 sorties were flown; Continued... covering withdrawal of First Marine Division to Hamhung;

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Since this analyzes, concerns —and proceeds, a lack of communications, (next chapter) it cannot be complete without overlapping the confusion of who ordered the 31st RCT tank command back to Hagaru from Hudong-ni four miles —behind Colonel Faith’s perimeter? “*Withdrawing these forces*

from Hudong-ni had the effect of signing the death warrant for Task Force Faith and it's wounded."<sup>289</sup> These valid questions were posed by Appleman in his book; [E/C] East of Chosin, concerning the tank withdrawal;

- 1) What commander in his right mind could order such a move in the circumstances without deliberately running the *risk* of sacrificing the task force, and how could he be willing to take that risk?
- 2) What were the *reasons* for the order?
- 3) Who ordered the 31st Rear and the 31st Tank command to withdraw from Hudong-ni?
- 4) When was the order delivered?<sup>290</sup>

Number 1) and 2) depend on each being interlocked with the “risk” and “reasons”. The reason: is verified on Marine Map 20. “Attempt to *reinforce* Hagaru-ri.” This would invoke a typical Catch 22, doctrine, i.e. the 31st RCT tank company located equal distance between two forces, and essential to the survival of each force—while belonging to only one force—must be either held in place to defend its own force, or assume the risk (reality-responsibility) of a withdrawal to save the other force—not its own—thus to “rescue” the foreign Marine force, that officer who rescinds the tank command prior order, (from Colonel MacLean) to benefit his force, must therefore accept the responsibility for the risk, and loss of that force, from which it was withdrawn! In this case, the tank withdrawal has no benefit (rather its death knell) whatsoever for the 31st RCT, or Colonel Faith! Understanding that reality: that any commander “in charge” has the prerogative to relocate and withdraw any of his forces at his sole discretion. In this case to protect his mistake in moving RCT-5 past Hagaru to Yudam-ni! Hence, this is the Catch 22 issue! It has been stated that: No military commander has ever been required to explain his reason for such an action on a field of battle. One exception to the rule would be the court martial of the captain of the USS Indianapolis in his failure to zigzag his vessel to avoid enemy torpedoes. The ship's captain, the late Charles Butler McVay III, survived and was court-martialed and convicted of "hazarding his ship by failing to zigzag." “Despite overwhelming evidence that the Navy itself had placed the ship in harm's way, despite testimony from the Japanese submarine commander; that zigzagging would have made no difference, and despite that fact that, although over 350 navy ships were lost in combat in WWII, McVay was the only captain to be court-martialed.”<sup>291</sup> The fact: that the Navy was out of communications, (also) for four days. Since the ship (being sunk) has no method of communications, it was the responsibility of the Navy to establish the ships last location, and their failure to report that ship missing was a vital fact as well! Although a court of inquiries maybe organized to seek the related cause of any action! The problem at the Changjin Reservoir, is over who will step up-and break their veil of silence-to take or place responsibility for the order to recall the 31st Tank Command back into Hagaru! Again the innuendoes spin doctors claim it was General Barr in spite of the overwhelming evidence of recorded X Corps orders— he has no remaining *command authority* over these 7th Infantry Division men located at the Changjin reservoir!

Number 3) who ordered the 31st Rear and the 31st Tank commands to withdraw from Hudong-ni, is the prime issue, only slightly related to number one and two, indicating if it does not matter, as the commander “in charge” is automatically exonerated, via any reason for his action. Seems futile for any excessive use of damage control to shift the official blame in the first place! Number 3 is important as it is directly tied to number 4, as it defines the timeline and short circuits the shifting of blame, to

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<sup>289</sup> East of Chosin: p. 323

<sup>290</sup> All questions. E/C, p.185

<sup>291</sup> [Ibid: Chapter 4]

another commander of equal rank in an attempt to share the responsibility for this disaster, i.e. General Smith fails to comment or correct the insinuation that General Barr—or BG Hodes—was directly responsible for the Tank Company withdrawal order!

To set our stage for this tragic drama, one should understand Captain Drake's standing order from Colonel MacLean—his regimental commander—to advance some of his command forward the next morning and join the 3/31st Infantry at its forward perimeter. Colonel MacLean's prior order remains in effect until rescinded by some higher ranking officer in the Army "chain of command." CG Smith has absolutely nothing to do with this direct order, nor any authority to relocate this command anywhere at this time! Due to enemy action and icy hill elevations, Captain Drake cannot get his tanks forward in spite of his effort to do so. To understand why, one only has to review the Marine tank situation on the west side. The smaller tanks could not get past the Toktong Pass hills as some slide off into a ditch and it will take a larger heavier Pershing tank—only one of these to get through to Yudamni, meaning the situations were similar. The lighter tanks could not climb the sharp icy grades around the mountain bases. Too shift blame on the Army crews as unable to pull the same icy grades applies a different standard of operations exemptions for the western forces at Toktong Pass.

4) When was the order delivered? [Night of 29 November—via Captain George A. Rasula, S-3 section, Archives, Inclosure- (National Archives) sometime between – 292047\*-292400 November 1950. "On the night of 29 Nov the rear CP received orders to withdraw to Hagaru-ri and that we would now be under the control of the 1st Marine Division." (\*Official timeline order from General Almond.)

Fair and simple answers, still one is led around many twists and turns, but eventually is lead back to one outstanding fact. It was CG Smith that ordered—our tank company back into Hagaru while stating (review PUC above) they have been stranded at Hagaru-ri and were unable to reach the Task Force Faith area! Therefore: General Smith's division was the sole beneficiary of this withdrawal. No one else had that authority after CG Almond's 292047 November timeline transferring CG Barr's authority to Smith!

### Abandoning forces cut-off

Later after the return to South Korea: in regard to a General Ridgway's directive: "The British brigade, having moved north under Milburn's previous order to counterattack, needed only to march east to reach its bridgehead position, which it occupied. Taking longer to make a covered withdrawal from line B, although without enemy contact, the 25<sup>th</sup> Division was fully deployed at the bridgehead by midnight after establishing outposts astride Route 1 some three miles above its main position.<sup>6</sup> Milburn inadvertently collided with Ridgway by ordering General Kean and the British brigade commander, Brigadier Thomas Brodie, to defend the bridgehead "at all costs." Ridgway claimed such an order as his prerogative. Milburn's directive also ran somewhat counter to what Ridgway considered an important step in restoring confidence among the rank and file, that of assuring them that their safety was an immediate concern of their commanders. He expected his command to fight hard, but he also was doing "everything I could think of to impress upon the Corps and Division Commanders that no unit was to be left to be overwhelmed and destroyed; that any units that are cut off will not be abandoned, but will be fought for unless it is clear that their relief will result by the loss of equal or



greater numbers.” Ridgway, in any case, had not designed the Seoul bridgehead as a last-stop position, and he countermanded Milburn’s instructions.”<sup>292</sup>

It seems hard to believe this would take a directive to enforce! Yet, one Marine Division Commander receiving the X Corps Army DSM had done both of these within the citation time limits of that Distinguished Service Medal- dates between 29 November and 4 December, 1950.

Mossman and Clay Blair provide detailed discussions of what happened after the withdrawal from North Korea, and since that is beyond the scope of my book, I refer the reader to their book stores or Amazon or other sources to learn more there about the essential stalemate 1951-1953 phase of the war. However, after MacArthur was removed by President Truman, his successor General Ridgway had this similar situation to that facing protection of Task Force Faith.

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### Map’s General Smith’s complaint to his Commandant

“As I indicated to you when you were here I have little confidence in the tactical judgment of the Corps or the realism of their planning. My confidence has not been restored. Planning is done on a 1:1,000,000 map. We execute on a 1:50,000 map” [Here’s a wild idea, if Smith dislikes Army Map’s use the Navy one’s, they use them on land to measure the height of the hills, via Nautical Miles!] (See Navy Map #19) Smith missed the point and distribution of X Corps maps, to his division, i.e. Like the distribution of radio frequencies, Maps, were provided by X Corps to all units, including the Marine division, in quantity, as listed below; i.e. Map Distribution Table and number, source: X Corps: Appendix 2. Table: to Annex H Opn 07.

Table Two- Distribution of Maps

Map Scales	1:1,000,000	1:250,000	1:50,000	1,500
1 <sup>st</sup> Marine Div	100	1250	1250	1250
3 <sup>rd</sup> Inf Div	100	1250	1250	600
7 <sup>st</sup> Inf Div	100	1250	1250	600
I ROK Corps	50	150	500	100
Type/Area	Korea Road map	Various/area’s	Div/unit Z’s	Town/Plans

Navy justification of their use of their own Mapping System: One other confusing difference in terminology was that the Army land maps had all hills accurately measured and assigned numbers as to height. But the Marines, while using the same maps, renamed the local hills in their area to their liking. Examples of this were Fox Hill, Howe Hill, and North, South, East, West, and Turkey Hill, etc, while still alternating the numbers. That had to confuse the Air Force TACP units calling in close air to ground support as well as the Air Cargo command for supply drops. If only one is used, why alternate the standard terminology in the first place?

One must face reality here. The Army was not piloting battleships through the Korean northern mountain terrain, and neither was the Navy. As stated by World War II Rear Admiral Tarbuck in 1943 (reviewed earlier), "It is surprising how little the Army officers at GHQ knew about water."<sup>293</sup> It was equally surprising how little the Navy knew about land combat operations. That the Marine Corps was devoted to dual purpose operations and elevated (by the press) to one historical event in a mountainous

<sup>292</sup> Ibid.

<sup>293</sup> Nimitz and his Admirals:

region of North Korea, fails to neutralize the expensive cost of Naval-Marine operations on land at Tarawa and Iwo Jima, in World War II.

“There is continual splitting up of units and assignments of missions to small units which puts them out on a limb. This method of operating appears general in Korea. I am convinced that many of their setbacks here have been caused by this disregard for the integrity of units and of the time space factor.”<sup>294</sup> Yet, he orders one of those things he detests, i.e. Task Force Drysdale, with the added obligation, “at all costs.” Again because of his failure to heed and head off the relocation and change his G-3 Order, to pull the remaining two battalions of the 5th Marine’s into Hagaru, as they were passing through to Yudam-ni. Recall Litzenberg would not respond to moving his regiment back to Hagaru, as it would leave Yudam-ni and the RCT-5 stranded there!

After all he delayed moving the RCT-1 into his new zone at Hagaru, which would have placed Colonel Drysdale’s Marines also at Hagaru-ri!

Smith is praised as a "Gentle" leader or warrior. But the facts, promulgated by earlier authors and reports, point to his being more of a timid leader. The recorded facts, verified that his regimental commanders ignored his orders without disciplinary action on his part seems to bare out his timidity of command. The fact that he sought advice from his commandant by asking his opinion about what he should do before doing what he felt he should do, is the overwhelming evidence. The responsibility was his alone as division commander. Plus, there is also the fact that after he sent his letter—not before—pressure was applied to him and he moved the 7th Marines into Yudam-ni. There, he lost his anticipated support—a criticism of him as well as; He endangered his own command.

Smith’s statement to his Commandant (same letter) “Time and again I have tried to tell the Corps commander that in a Marine division he has a powerful instrument, but that it cannot help but lose its full effectiveness when dispersed.” However, at his insistence his 1st Regiment was indeed dispersed in three areas, in violation of X Corps zone assignments! Apparently; again overworking the Marine PR officer at Changjin!

In Navy History one can read their opinions on the conflict, to which any infantry soldier can take issue! Since I covered, their earlier view, “Lacking the clash of fleets”, left them outside of any land based actions, except through their 1st Division Marine Corps (Reif) Fleet Marine Force, Commanded by Major General O.P. Smith—this latter title gave him unilateral placement of that division and prevented Major General Almond of his placement of his other two (3rd & 7th) Army divisions in those area’s he has also assigned Army units to occupy! I.e. within the Changjin Campaign, X Corps assigned the Marine Area to be *north of Hagaru-ri*. (CV5171). But General Smith in spite of the 1st Marine Regiment being included in the marine mission to relieve RCT-5 after they seize Mupyong-ni, (?) Smith’s unilateral delays their reassignment, and leaves them in place at Koto-ri. Recalling that every action has a reaction, this area prohibited the 3rd Infantry Division relocating there. This error by Smith prevents his entire 1st Regiment from ever being concentrated (his stated intention-in his letter) “I now have two RCTs on this road and when Puller is relieved by the Third Infantry Division I will close him up behind.”<sup>295</sup> Seems a good idea two weeks before, so why change his plan to leave them behind outside the Marine Division reassigned zone at Hagaru? That error highlights the need to

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<sup>294</sup> Smith to USMC, Commandant; 15 November 1950.

<sup>295</sup> Smith’s states his reason: The 3rd Division is not capable of defending tis area due to their other commitments. But that was not his concern or responsibility!

strengthen Smith's weak garrison at Hagaru, that need required reinforcements from Koto-ri, that effort requires Task Force Drysdale and others to be rushed to strengthen Hagaru. That effort never adequate to fully reinforce Hagaru requires additional forces to reinforce Hagaru. However, these maneuvers leave him with no other forces within his own (zone) left to reinforce Hagaru! But by that old fickle finger of fate General Almond has unwittingly come under its spell, and has authorized *all other forces between Koto-ri and Hagaru* to be placed under General Smith's direct command! *But the question remains does this included those Army Units East of the reservoir?* Smith zone north of Hagaru, extends only as far as two miles northeast to Sasu (two miles south of Hudong-ni 31st Tank Company) where he has also neglected to withdraw this Captain King's undefended A Company force of his 1st Engineer Marine Battalion at the saw mill located at Sasu.

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Cutting straight to the meat of the problem; avoiding all the PRIOR BS involved. Tell me if you can: Where Major General Oliver P. Smith, gets; are pretends to get his authority from Major General Edward Almond to be in charge of our 31st Tank Command?—COMMAND BEING THE PRIME AUHORITY HERE—ARE WE ALL ON THE SAME PAGE(S) HERE!

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Below: COMMAND REPORT—X CORPS.

II—Command Report—

Chosin reservoir

27 Nov-10Dec.

Returning from this conference to X Corps CP at 1700, 29 Nov 50, the CO directed his staff to draw up plans to implement a CINCFE directive to concentrate X Corps for the protection of HAMHUNG and action against the enemy wherever possible within good judgement. (sic)

At 2100, 29 Nov, Opn Order No. 8 was presented and approved by the CG, which provided for discontinuance of the X Corps attack to the northwest and subsequent withdrawal of forces into the HAMHUNG-HUNGNAM perimeter, for more cohesive action. It is interesting to note that this directed action closely paralleled previous plans for such a concentration.

P.11-13

Here is the time span-and no command authority transfer to Smith!

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EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMANDING GENERAL'S DIARY

27 Nov - - 10 Dec

[NO AUTHORIZATION FOR ANY ARMY ATTACHMENTS TO THE USMC!]

29 November 1950 1200 - Boarded C-54 accompanied by Lt\* Colonels McCaffrey and Glass and Maj. Ladd and departed Haneda for YONPO. Discussed present situation and directed McCaffrey and Glass to begin preparation of new order to Corps to concentrate X Corps for the protection of HAMHUNG and action against enemy wherever possible within good judgment.

1710 - Arrived YONPO. Transferred to L-17 and flew to X Corps CP accompanied by Lt. Col. McCaffrey I630 - Conference with Chief of Staff, Deputies, and General Staff Officers.

2100 - Section Chiefs, X Corps Staff, presented plan for Op Order #8. Due to rapidity of enemy buildup and as a result of conference with CINCFE, the plans for the order provided for the discontinuance of the X Corps attack to the Northwest and the withdrawal of Corps forces to allow cohesiveness of action against the enemy.

P.15

Again the time span and again no transfer of any authority listed here!

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#### IV. OPERATIONS

##### CHOSIN RESERVOIR

27 Nov - 10 Dec 50

This message is in three parts and just as important as the one from General MacArthur to Almond on 24 November but more specific!

**At 292047I Nov 50, 01 No. 19 was issued by Headquarters X Corps. "Part I: Effective at once all Elms 7th Inf Div in KOTO-RI (CV5560) - HAGARU-RI (CV5171) - CHOSIN Reservoir area are Atchd to 1st Mar Div.**

**[Hence only those 7th Division unattached units within (CV5560) and (CV5171) are attached to the 1st Marine Division. This does not —repeat does not— included those 7th Division Army forces in the area directly above the extended (CV5171) Marine occupied area two miles north at Sasu! [Army7th Division Area: miles further north of the saw-mill!]**

**Part II: 1st Mar Div: Redeploy one RCT without delay from YUDAM-NI (CV4182) area to HAGAHU-RI area, gain contact with Elms 7th Inf Div E of CHOSIN Reservoir; coordinate all forces in and N of HAGARU-RI in a perimeter defense based on HAGARU-RI; open and secure HAGARU-RI KOTO-RI MSR. [I have already devoted much time to explaining the error's in understanding the intent of this Part II, and as explained by various authors.]**

**Part III: X Corps coordinates movement to KOTO-RI of Elms 7th Inf Div now S KOTO-RI.**

**During the night of 29-30 November the 1st Marine Division requested**

**p.39**

**that the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment holding the railhead at CHINHUNG-NI be relieved by Corps in order that this unit might be moved north to HA.GARU-RI. This request could not be honored as protection for the railhead was vital**

**p.39**

**Important point: here General Smith has realized his mistake in leaving this Battalion at Chinhung-ni he needs them at Hagaru-ri! But General Almond had listed Hagaru as Smith's only and entire Marine Division Zone prior to this request! General Smith chose to delay moving his two 1<sup>st</sup> marine Battalions there! Now being denied this unit at Hagaru-ri, he still requires more battalion strength there! Where can he possibly find more forces to reinforce and save his**

**own—created— weak Marine Corps garrison at Hagaru? The 31<sup>st</sup> RCT Tank Company, there's an idea!**

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**Journalistic Justice- Eventually All Glory is fleeting!**

The Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir Campaign-The Marine Corps, Last Great Hurrah!

**History of United States Naval Operations – Korea**

**James A. Field Jr.**

Chapter 10 — The Second Six Months

1. February 1951: Back to the Han

BY LATE JANUARY the immediate crisis was over, but as the armies started north again it was still a new war. Not only had the arrival of the Chinese made it difficult to see the conflict as a mere police action against a minor league aggressor; it had also forced the United Nations and the United States back to the original aim of repelling aggression, and in doing so had changed the nature of the fighting. Avoidance of defeat at the Pusan perimeter had been followed by a resort to an amphibious strategy and to larger goals, and by four months of rapid movement up and down the peninsula. But this was history. By January the objectives had been revised, no plans for great amphibious operations existed. X Corps had been integrated into Eighth Army, a more or less continuous front now stretched from sea to sea. Although the focus of action had always been on land, the campaign in Korea in the first half of 1951 was more than ever a ground war.

Depending upon one's preconceptions, one could look at the Korean War as a land campaign with amphibious aspects or as an amphibious war with resemblances to a continental struggle. Whatever the precise nature of this hybrid conflict, which indeed varied with the passing of time, it posed difficult problems of marrying the divergent histories of the Pacific and European theaters of operations, and of coordinating forces which postwar military doctrine had attempted to separate. These difficulties had been briefly apparent during the defense of the perimeter in the previous August; inevitably, with the coming of a stabilized front, the question of how to integrate a naval force into a land campaign again arose. This question had implications for almost all the subdivisions of Naval Forces Far East.

The fate of the Marine Division, designed, trained, and so far largely employed as a force to bridge the gap between control of the sea and large-scale operations ashore, was paradoxical.\* The postwar years had seen the Marines repeatedly accused of trying to develop a "second army," and much effort had been expended within the Defense Department to reduce the corps to guard functions and to prevent its again developing a force of the size and sort so useful in the war against Japan. Now, however, in the existing stringency of Army units, the Marines were integrated into Eighth Army along with the rest of X Corps; after a period devoted to guerrilla-chasing in the neighborhood of Andong they would find themselves committed by higher authority to sustained land combat. Although there was no question of their competence to perform such duty, this continued employment on inland work made it difficult to maintain their special skills, divorced as they now were by distance from the Amphibious Force and naval gunfire support, and by doctrine from their Aircraft Wing.

In July CincFE had promised General Craig that the integrity of the Marine air-ground team would be preserved. But circumstances alter cases, and this situation did not outlast the Hungnam evacuation. With a single front in existence, and with ground commanders eager to share the benefits of Marine

close air support, MAW I was absorbed by the Fifth Air Force and employed in accordance with Air Force doctrine. The wing's commanding general found himself bypassed in the operational chain of command, and efforts by the division to have their own planes assigned to their support were turned down. The long history of cooperative training and the great fund of recent experience acquired at Inchon and at the reservoir were to a considerable degree sacrificed, and so far as air support in the line was concerned the Marines now had to take pot luck with everyone else.

The Amphibious Force, perhaps the most important single weapons system of the war so far, and the one whose capabilities had governed both advance and retreat, was still on hand, but commitment of the landing force to the ground front had greatly limited its future possibilities. [END]

\*Indeed "was paradoxical." As all the thesaurus references apply: absurd, contradictory, illogical, impossible, and inconsistent. The two branches of the services Navy and Army were as different as water and mud and could not be mixed into a consistent mixture to create one functional, Chain of Command. As: "Since the enemy had no navy, the conflict lacks the drama inherent in the clash of fleets. Since the focus of action was always on land, the three services are constantly mixed up in each other's affairs and a (simple) single-*service* history—therefore—become an impossibility."<sup>296</sup> However, this was "*What History Failed to Recorded*": (in the making) on the arrival of the entire 1st Marine Division to Korea-15 September 1950 —until modified— 1 January 1951!

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296 History of United States Naval Operations – Korea James A. Field Jr. p.1.

## -Chapter 20-

### Summation Communications—or Lack Thereof

This is the hardest chapter of all to write! I had written an entire twenty-page chapter on this subject but it seems a hundred would be inadequate to delve into this problem in light of the unbelievable and inconceivable revelations concerning this subject. Those reports, by Appleman, in his *East of Chosin*, concerning the unbelievable ignorance over a complete failure to rectify the main communications problem, which would have provided an instant solution and would have restored the missing communication link that was so vital to our forces. That we were totally cut off from the Hagaru-ri (MAW) Marine Air Dispatcher, to his direct access to order air-to-ground cover and request needed supplies, and also to contact our rear Command Post (CP) and our Tank Company, seems to boggle ones' mind over this issue. First, we were deprived of having an Air Force Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) operator attached to each battalion, east of the reservoir, while the 1/32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion and the 3/31<sup>st</sup> Battalion had one each however the 57<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery had none, but was backed up through (one solution to the problem) the 15<sup>th</sup> AAA-AW, D Battery radio network attached to us! While the Air Force originally provided these TACP units, 1/32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Faith, has one attached from the Marine Corps. That was Captain Edward P. Stamford, on loan from the Navy. Captain Stamford was attached to Colonel Faith's battalion for the Inchon landing, and apparently was lost in the paper work for recall by the Navy. He remained with the battalion with his three enlisted men, throughout the battle for Seoul, and remained attached when the division moved to North Korea. Since the Department of the Air Force was given control over all planes flying over land, the Navy had the direct responsibility to keep their TACP teams updated at all times! It would seem that Task Force Faith's fate was tied to the Navy and the Marine Corps in more ways than one!

As their earlier date (26 November) indicates, the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division RCT-5 remained—in their entirety—within this Army zone east of the reservoir, and they maintained full radio communications with Hagaru-ri. Assuming it was even requested by Captain Stamford, could there be any Marine Corps rationale in their failure to disseminate *the updated* changes concerning: “What was wanted by the Air Force, concerning the Navy (TACP teams): appears to have been a *voice circuit* rather than a manually-keyed one, *and this was provided a few days later*,”<sup>297</sup> (10 November) This new voice circuit was the Department of the Navy vital updated prominent communication information, and was their responsibility to update and distribute this new Marine Dispatchers' radio frequencies directly to the 1/32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, (USMC) TACP team, led by one of their own Captain Edward P. Stamford USMC? Or was this “Top Secret” stuff?

The above quotes should close this case regarding the Army lack of communications, after the RCT-5 Marines exit. Their relocation ends any and all communications between the Marine Headquarters at

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<sup>297</sup> *History of United States Naval Operations- Korea*, Ch. 9, 1, 24 November-6 December, 1950, p. 182.

Hagaru-ri, and the Army 1/32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, East of Chosin. The simple version! As defined by Appleman. The 1/32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion (other than its TACP team) cannot communicate directly to Marine Headquarters at Hagaru-ri—period—end of communication story. But that is not the end of this myth, or just the start of it! What must be understood in Appleman’s accounting, above, (another myth), all other Army “*radios did not net on the same channels.*” “Netting” indicating a lack of either end connecting with the other end, due to the lack of either end, “netting” on the same “frequency” or “channel.” However, we have one disclaimer. According to General Edwin H. Simmons USMC, “*Once Murray departed, the only radio link between Faith and the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division would be that provided by Marine Captain Edward P. Stamford.*”<sup>298</sup> Indicating this “radio link” for exchange of communications between Hagaru and the 1/32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, remained intact! Leaving the question: What change occurs to break this existing radio link between Faith’s Battalion and the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division at Hagaru-ri? Captain Stamford should have his own Marine/Navy log book of frequencies within his Marine TACP network. (Problem solved, right?!) Likewise, Stamford will also have free access to those X Corps communications Directives, and frequency network charts, as provided by X Corps, and distributed to all Army radio operators concerned!

Per Annex F, (Signal) to Draft Three, Opn 07: (Source: 1a. Int Est and Plan, Annex, 2a, 1. 1. b. (1) Information of friendly communications will be found in signal operations instructions (SOI), Annex C Operations Overlay, and Annex A Task Organization. Axis of Signal Communications generally will be as follows: [Of interest, from that Annex A, Task Organization, “*Radio Relay plat, 1<sup>st</sup> Sig Det. (FMF) attached to the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, under Opn 07.*”]

Table One—The Two Axes of Immediate Concern.

Headquarters	Axis of Signal Communications
1 <sup>st</sup> Marine Division	Hungnam-Hagaru-ri
7 <sup>th</sup> Infantry Division	Sinhung-ni-Hagaru-ri
X Corps Advance	Hagaru-ri

2. Install, operate and maintain communications required between X Corps Headquarters and units listed in paragraph above.

(3) d. The units listed in paragraph b (1) will install, operate and maintain communications in accordance with X Corps SOI and their respective SOI’s.

3. X. (1) Commanders of all elements of X Corps will insure that all personnel concerned are thoroughly acquainted with, and strictly adhere to the provisions of X Corps communications Directives. These documents include radio frequencies, radio and telephone code names, radio nets and wire tagging codes.

#### *Wire Communications*

Therefore the above information was available to all radio and wire personnel.

The switchboard units had simplex coils provided on two or four of its line units for telegraph for phantom use. The lower half of front panel acts as a writing shelf and had a sheet of white pyrolin erasable writing surfaces for diagrams, code names or other data. Standard “wire tagging codes” procedure was to use this writing surface to diagram the line designation and code name for each line, and list active call signs/passwords. Therefore, there is no dispute over the wire section having this

<sup>298</sup> *U.S. Marines at the Changjin Reservoir*, General Edwin H. Simmons USMC, p. 45.



data on hand. If one strand of the two telephone wires is broken between links, the operator can check before alerting the wire section crews, to define if both wires are broken, this is also defined by a jerking motion rather than smooth cranking motion to ring the station in question, the switchboard operator can use the phantom circuits to alternately check each wire, if only one is broken, the active one can make contact through the phantom circuit by use of the grounding stake, driven into the ground, thus temporarily restoring that broken link to that station lost! Again, if there was a problem, first thoughts were to solve it!

### *Radio Communications*

Since some *massive confusion* seems to exist between these two sources, one should try to differentiate why *any discrepancy* would exist. Surely any teenager interested in the history of World War Two, as I was, prior to television, would have their ears glued to a radio. However, both radio and television had one common feature, each must be tuned (simultaneously) to a transmitted (channel) frequency via a dial to lock in on one desired station or channel. The concept was a simple one: some stations came in strong and others weak or full of static. Different locations and cities had different channel numbers, i.e., in one location, an NBC or CBS channel may be between different manufacture numbers, as Channel 4 or 7 as the case may be, but each was transmitted on the same frequency assigned by the FCC. So if other stations were transmitting a signal you could lock on their frequency by rotating the selector dial. So what was the major problem of communication's east of the Changjin reservoir? Since communication was so vital in combat, every effort must to be made to maintain its integrity. (However, unlike combat situations, its equipment requires an alternate (over) switching between send and receive!)

“...An exception was the ability of Captain Edward P. Stamford, the forward air controller (FAC) with Faith's battalion, to communicate with the Air Control Center at Hagaru-ri through relay by Corsair fighter pilots overhead. Through them he could inform the control center at Hagaru-ri of the need for Marine fighter planes for close ground support.”<sup>299</sup> The logical question: Why doesn't Captain Stamford, cut out the middleman and communicate directly with the Marine Air Wing dispatcher located at Hagaru-ri, to obtain “*the need for Marine fighter planes for close ground support?*” What was the problem to #1 below? One must analyze the question. The final mythical answer seems to be #2 below.

#1: Captain Stamford was never GIVEN the frequency to that dispatcher at Hagaru!

#2: Captain Stamford failed to relay this message to anyone either within or outside of Task Force MacLean/Faith's command!

However, Captain Stamford's credentials were regarded as impeccable. “Stamford was one of the many Marine enlisted pilots who received commissions in World War II. Stamford received his in September 1943, and the next month he went to the South Pacific, serving first as a second lieutenant in antisubmarine search. Later he served as a dive bomber pilot in the Solomon Islands and other Pacific combat areas. In 1944, Stamford returned to the United States, where he attended the 13-week course at the Marine Air-Infantry School at Quantico, Virginia. This training course was important for Stamford in his later duties as a forward controller. It greatly increased his competence in that role because it gave him an understanding of infantry tactics and problems. He was the communications

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299 Appleman, East of Chosin, pp. 51-52. Tie into his p. 177.

link between the two. The training also qualified him for performance as an infantryman.[\*] In 1950, Stamford was in Japan helping develop the Air Naval Gunfire Liaison (Anglico) teams that were to direct naval gunfire in support of ground troops making a landing and establishing a beachhead. The Marine Corps was the first of the services to develop this technique, but the Army wanted the same capability. That summer in Japan, Stamford's Forward Air Controller Anglico Team trained nine teams from the Fifth Air Force for the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division battalions in the Inchon Landing."<sup>300</sup> A lengthy, powerful, and impressive resume, however, heavily weighted on his infantry command abilities and qualifications! Indeed that is part and parcel to why it is so "unbelievable and inconceivable" about what Appleman (twice) reports, in his earlier book *East of Chosin* (E/C). However, Appleman's later book *Escaping the Trap* (E/T), neglects this important fact altogether! It should be noted that E/C has an entire twenty-three chapters exclusively on the 31<sup>st</sup> RCT East of the Changjin Reservoir. While a splendid work on Appleman's efforts to awaken history about our Task Force, his later book E/T contains only one chapter, (includes the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division throughout the other chapters) but has some upgraded events from those men never covered in E/C.<sup>301</sup> This book replacing much of his earlier coverage on Captain Stamford! Still, this following radio incident is repeated by Martin Russ in his book, *Breakout*, with another innuendo about Colonel Faith and his staff officers! More so since Stamford has served with Colonel Faith, at that battle of Seoul, and his requirements to call in air-to-ground strafing. In my efforts to keep this final chapter short, considering the lead-ins to it, I have decided to quote the problem right up front. Since he was attached to Colonel Faith at Inchon, now over two months, he should understand an infantry communications system, as it relies on the Army Signal Corps, as this Corps, produces, maintains and distributes, signal operations instructions (SOI) and frequency data to *all* Army Communications personnel concerned! Specifically to those with any connecting MOS numbers relating to Communications! Captain Stamford has one single assignment, as the leader/officer. "It should be noted that Stamford's TACP with the battalion consisted of four men: himself, now a captain, and three enlisted men,<sup>302</sup> of his Tactical Air Control Party." He has no other overriding responsibility, until the moment of enemy conflict, other than to stand by, monitor and call in whatever air-to-ground cover is needed, and requested, via any Army infantry officers—day or night! It was never his duty to monitor or interfere with *any* Army officer, or lower-ranking NCO, in their placement of responsibility to oversee their men after the battles have started. Stamford's individual responsibility was to immediately call in air strikes as directed by any of those infantry officers and NCOs in charge of getting their forces in place as required for battlefield combat. Stamford's responsibility was far greater to assist in calling in Air Strikes! He, therefore, could be considered as *deserting his post when he interfered* with the combat forces (of A Company) on line the first night of battle.<sup>303</sup> (It should also be noted: Stamford had that rare ability to perform and be at two locations at the same time!)<sup>304</sup>

[\*] This author is not impressed with his 13 weeks of infantry training mixed with his prime MOS "as a forward controller." I exceed his infantry training by a total of 8 months of advanced training (1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry) and have an MOS as a heavy weapons infantryman in case of enemy aircraft attack at the reservoir. However, I am first in the Artillery communications wire section and my infantry status was secondary (lack of enemy aircraft). However, my communication expertise, (20 months) does not

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300 Roy Appleman: E/C, pp. 61-63. Last sentence: ALL Marines are considered infantrymen when they receive their Globe & Anchor emblem. This seems to imply they ALL MARINES are ALSO fully qualified as Infantry Officers to command as well!

301 Based on his E/C book.

302 Appleman E/C, p. 63

303 Appleman E/C, p.61.

304 Appleman E/C, p. 240.

qualify me as a qualified Cannonner or a forward observer to call in fire missions! Neither would I consider Stamford as a qualified infantry officer, in his (13- weeks) training. But, if you're a Marine, to receive a MOH, it better be infantry- related!

On the first night of the battle in Colonel Faith's more forward position east of the reservoir, Colonel Faith needs night (air) fighters to be online. However, Captain Stamford is busy with (voluntarily)<sup>305</sup> directing infantry units in their placement on line, delegating his (lookout) responsibility to one of his party subordinates! *This was most unusual!* Why is he not calling into the Hagaru-ri Dispatcher to alert him of this Red Alert and request night (Heckler) fighters? This seems to be lost in the 1/32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion dispute over Stamford's *self-involvement and interference* with the combatants on line and under attack, as Captain Stamford was never in a commanding part of this Army Chain of Command! So, unknown was his (first) 31<sup>st</sup> RCT reason for his failure to contact the Hagaru dispatcher! That reason will never, ever, be known—throughout Colonel Faith's command, until 32 years later and long after this battle was over, and only will resurface via Appleman's book *East of Chosin*. Lacking any comments by Lt. Col. Appleman (Ret.) , although Appleman will have several interviews in obtaining this information from Captain Stamford.

#### *Defining the Problem*

As Stamford, 32 years later, reveals to Roy Appleman: He said, "My AN/FRC-1 was capable of tuning any high frequency used by US forces. Had we been given a frequency by a pilot or had Gen. Barr brought one with him, or someone air dropped one, we could have been in business. The 1<sup>st</sup> Mar. Div. Air Section knew what kind of equipment I had."<sup>306</sup>

What is apparent is that Captain Stamford's radio had the ability to SEND and RECEIVE ALL Messages to and from Hagaru-ri! Moreover, Captain Stamford verifies this fact 32 years later in 1982 to author Appleman in one of two interviews! Stamford's statement as published in Roy Appleman's book *East of Chosin*: "The [3/31<sup>st</sup> Battalion-Air Force team] TACP thus had no opportunity to call in any air strikes at the inlet perimeter. Only from November 29, when Captain Stamford and his TACP with the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 32<sup>nd</sup> Infantry, arrived at the inlet, did the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion and the 57<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery Battalion receive the benefit of a TACP. According to Stamford, the 31<sup>st</sup> RCT need not have been isolated without communications to the outside world. He said "My AN/GRC-1 was capable of tuning any High Frequency used by US Forces air or land. Had we been given a frequency used by a pilot or had Gen. Barr brought one with him, or someone air dropped one, we could have been in business. The 1st Mar Div Air Section knew what kind of equipment I had."<sup>307</sup> Seems a "give me" situation in both of the above cases!

And as Martin Russ re-echoes in his book *Breakout*, he attempts to shift the blame from Captain Stamford to the battalion commander Colonel Faith and his entire staff officers, by stating, "(His AN/prc-1 radio was capable of tuning in any frequency used by U.S. forces and could have been employed by Colonel Faith to establish communications with the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division headquarters; apparently these options never occurred to Faith or his staff officers.)" And why should it occur to Faith, if it never occurred to anyone on this four-man Marine Corps radio team that withheld this key secret to the solution? Now expected to be an expert on this sole Marine function, and should Faith

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305 Stamford: Silver Star Citation.

306 Appleman: E/C, p.178.

307 East Of Chosin, p. 307. Maj. Edward Stamford, interviews with author Appleman; Stamford Anglico Report. pp. 93-99, on page 388: #3, Stamford to author Appleman, Apr. 7, 1983. Unfortunately, 32 years too late for any solution!

have known that with Stamford's impressive resume was incapable in obtaining information he was required to have in the performance of his duties?

Captain Stamford's TACP was attached to A Company of the 1/32<sup>nd</sup> Battalion four miles north of MacLean 3/31<sup>st</sup> Battalion perimeter on the evening of the 27<sup>th</sup>, as this company will be the lead-off unit at early light, to begin the attack north to seize the town of Changjin. He and his crew will bunk down for the night in this area. Two entirely different versions exist about the events of this night.

*First Version*<sup>308</sup>

As night fell on 27 November, the first order of business was defense, although a continuation of the northward drive the Marines had begun was planned for the next day. Lending greater force to common knowledge that Chinese forces in undetermined strength were roaming the mountains in the vicinity of Chosin Reservoir, the Marines had told Colonel Faith that on the day before several Chinese prisoners had revealed the presence of three fresh divisions operating in the area of the reservoir. Their mission, the prisoners had said, was to sever the American supply route [9]. The Marines also told Faith's men that on the previous night, in this same location, a Chinese patrol had pulled a Marine from his foxhole, disarmed him, and beaten him.

With this in mind, Colonel Faith placed his companies in a perimeter that lay across the road facing north, with the right flank bent south to face mountains that loomed high to the east. During the late afternoon the companies dug in their positions and cut fields of fire through some scrub brush on the hills. After breaking through eight or ten inches of frozen earth, the digging was easy. There were no stones in the ground. Colonel Faith set up his command post in a few farm houses in a small valley less than a thousand yards behind the front lines. It got dark early, still bitterly cold. For an hour or two after dark there was the sound of shell bursts around the perimeter since forward observers had not completed the registration of artillery and mortar defensive fires before dark. For another hour or two, until after 2100, it was quiet.

The battalion adjutant, having driven a hundred and fifty miles that day from division headquarters, arrived with two weeks' mail. A few minutes later an officer from Colonel MacLean's headquarters brought the operation order for the attack scheduled for dawn the next morning. Colonel Faith called his company commanders, asking them to bring their mail orderlies and to report to his command post for the attack order.

The enemy attacked while the meeting was in progress. Probing patrols came first, the first one appearing in front of a platoon near the road. When the friendly platoon opened fire Company A's executive officer (Lt. Cecil G. Smith), suspecting that the enemy force was a reconnaissance patrol sent to locate specific American positions, tried to stop the fire. He ran up and down the line shouting: "Don't fire! Don't fire!" But by the time he succeeded, the enemy force had evidently discovered what it needed to know and had melted away into the darkness. In the meantime, enemy patrols began

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308 ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES COMBAT ACTIONS IN KOREA Russell A. Gugeler: Chapter Six, Center of Military History United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1987. This book was originally published in 1954, revised in 1970, and in demand and print since then. The accounts of small-unit actions were written primarily for junior officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates of the United States Army who had not yet been in battle. The object was to acquaint them with the realities of their own fields.

to repeat this pattern at other points along the defensive perimeter. A few minutes after midnight the patrolling gave way to determined attack. While one Chinese company struck south along the road, another plunged out of the darkness from the east to strike the boundary between the two rifle companies that were east of the road.

The defensive perimeter began to blaze with fire. In addition to directing steady mortar and small-arms fire against Colonel Faith's battalion, the Chinese kept maneuvering small groups around the perimeter to break the line. As one enemy group climbed a steep ridge toward a heavy machine gun operated by Cpl. Robert Lee Armentrout, the corporal discovered he could not depress his gun enough to hit the enemy. He then picked up his weapon, tripod and all, cradled it in his arms, and beat off the attack.

As the night wore on not every position along the perimeter held as well. Within two or three hours after they first attacked, the Chinese had seized and organized the highest point on the two ridgelines that had belonged to the two companies on the east side of the road. Loss of this ground seriously weakened the defense of both companies, and also permitted the enemy to fire into a native house where Capt. Dale L. Seever had set up his command post. Forced to vacate, he moved his Weapons Platoon and command group to the front line to help defend what ground he had left. On the extreme right flank the Chinese forced two platoons out of position. On the left side of the road they circled wide around the left flank and seized a mortar position.

Wire communications with Colonel MacLean's headquarters and with the 57<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery Battalion went out soon after the attack started. After establishing radio communication, which was never satisfactory, Colonel Faith learned that the Chinese were also attacking the other units of MacLean's task force. This explained why the artillery, involved with the more immediate necessity of defending its own position, was unable to furnish sustained support to Faith's battalion [10].

Colonel Faith's battalion was still in place when daylight came on 28 November, but there were serious gaps in the line. Although ordered to launch his attack at dawn, when the time came to carry out the order, Colonel Faith had his hands full trying to hang onto his perimeter and recover the ground lost during the night. The night attack had been costly in casualties and morale. When it moved to Chosin Reservoir, Faith's battalion had about ninety per cent of its authorized strength plus 30 to 50 ROK soldiers attached to each company. Morale had been good [11]. Although casualties during the night had not been alarmingly high, a disproportionately high number of officers and noncoms had been put out of action. In Company A, for instance, when Lt. Raymond C. Denchfield was wounded in the knee, his company commander (Capt. Edward B. Scullion) set out to temporarily take charge of Denchfield's platoon. An enemy grenade killed Scullion. Colonel Faith then sent his assistant S-3 (Capt. Robert F. Haynes) to take command of Company A. He was killed by infiltrators before he reached the front lines. Colonel Faith telephoned the executive officer (Lieutenant Smith) and told him to take command of the company. "It's your baby now," Faith told him.

The strength and determination of the enemy attack was also a blow to morale. It now appeared to Faith's men that, in addition to the severe weather, their troubles were to be compounded by fresh enemy troops. The cold weather was bad enough, especially as there were no warm-up tents within the perimeter. During the night, when they had not been engaged in beating off enemy attacks, the men could do nothing for relief but pull their sleeping bags up to their waists and sit quietly in their holes

watching for another attack, or for morning. The light machine guns did not work well in the cold. This was especially true during the night when the temperature dropped sharply. The guns would not fire automatically and had to be jacked back by hand to fire single rounds. The heavy machine guns, however, with antifreeze solution in the water jackets, worked all right.

Similar attacks had fallen against the perimeter enclosing Colonel MacLean's force four miles to the south of Faith's battalion. Chinese had overrun two infantry companies during the early morning and got back to the artillery positions before members of two artillery batteries and of the overrun companies stopped them. After confused and intense fighting during the hours of darkness, the enemy withdrew at first light. Both sides suffered heavily. [12]

[9] X Corps: Chosin Reservoir.

[10] Curtis, *op. cit.*

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] 7<sup>th</sup> Division, Command Report on Chosin Reservoir, 27 November to 12 December 1950; narrative section (hereafter cited as 7<sup>th</sup> Division: Chosin Reservoir).

According to the version below, Captain Stamford was asleep in his bunker and unaware of this above meeting and the reality that all infantry officers attending it were rudely aware as well having instant knowledge of this surprise attack. Following the attack, Stamford would comment: "Stamford expressed strong views about how the Chinese accomplished their initial surprise penetration of A Company. He believed that they infiltrated through the line because of the men's lack of alertness. He believed that the Chinese caught the soldiers dozing in their foxholes and simply bypassed or overran some positions before they were discovered."<sup>309</sup> A degrading remark! But who cared what he believed as he was sound asleep! If he was asleep, how could he know what the men in the foxholes were doing? The enemy caught him waking up in his sleeping bag and threw a grenade between his legs, wounding two men but missed wounding Stamford!<sup>310</sup> Another strange note as reported by Stamford, he had been given a SCR 300 radio, to contact Captain Scullion! (*E/C*, p. 63.) He would later report both telephone lines and radio communications were out between A Company and the CP! (*E/C*, p. 68), he now has two radios and both are out of service!

*Second Version*

In Appleman's account, late in the afternoon of November 27, Lieutenant Colonel Faith ordered Capt. Edward P. Stamford, USMC, the forward air controller with the battalion, to move his Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) to A Company's position to run air support, if needed . . . around 2200 hours. Just behind the left center of the company Stamford awoke sometime after midnight to the sound of shots and Scullion shouting. . . . Scullion, whose shouts had helped awaken him, lay dead nearby, shot down only a few yards from the CP bunker when he hurried out to learn what was happening. . . . He moved off to the 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon position on the left to learn the situation there. [The importance of Captain Edward P. Stamford (from Stamford's own account) is highlighted within this event.]

"He found that Lt Raymond C. Denchfield, the platoon leader, had been wounded. Stamford asked for Lt. Cecil Smith, the company executive officer, and was told he was directing the troops near the CP."

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<sup>309</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>310</sup> *Ibid.*

First Lieutenant Carlos J. Ortenzi, A Company mortar officer, came up to Stamford and informed him that “as next senior man he would have to take the company.”<sup>311</sup> This latter is the discrepancy! However, another later revelation in Appleman’s *Escaping the Trap*: “Stamford sent one of his TAC helpers to obtain reports on the situation of the other platoons and placed 1<sup>st</sup> Lt. Cecil Smith, A Company executive officer in charge of the 1st Platoon.” *E/T*, p. 90.

[Lest we lose sight of the timeline, the Marine attack of the west side of the reservoir had been aborted due to enemy action at 271430 Nov. So at this time this entire area was officially under CCF attack.]

These two accounts seem at odds with each other! If there is one outstanding point in this entire book, it is the responsibility of the chain of command. That chain of command, at least in the Army, flows from the *Army* top rank downward. This points to several facts. Stamford’s mission as the TACP was to be activated at the first enemy shots fired! It seems evident here that he has to improvise his importance to sidetrack his assigned mission to alert the Marine Air Dispatcher at Hagaru and request night (Heckler) aircraft to be on line, at the very least by early light, then contact Colonel Faith and Colonel MacLean who is now trapped in Faith’s forward area. “In his overnight impromptu command of A Company, Stamford had performed like a veteran infantry officer. After daylight, Major Miller the battalion executive officer came up to A Company and relieved Stamford placing Lieutenant Smith in command. Stamford was needed as the FAC at battalion headquarters.”<sup>312</sup> (This is not a direct quote and the one stating it is unknown, it has to be between Appleman and Stamford’s own accounts!) It is now daylight on the 28<sup>th</sup>, and the planes are overhead! Colonel, MacLean will return to his own perimeter but will later return to Faith’s, a fatal decision on his part. “About sundown, A Company’s forward observer saw about 300 to 400 enemy troops approaching on the road from the north with a tank and two self-propelled guns. Stanford talked over radio with the observer and directed an air strike by four Corsairs and four RAAF F-51s on this column with devastating results. South Africans pilots flew the F-51s. It took about 20 minutes, Stamford reported, for this air strike to knock out this enemy column as a fighting force.”<sup>313</sup> My observation, the Forward observer did not need Stamford’s assistance to direct those air strikes as he was qualified to do so! About sunset would indicate these were night fighters as well! That Appleman expands his version in *E/T* over his *E/C* (p. 76) version, which states those planes being four Marine Corsairs, corrects in *E/T* they were from the Air Force (mixed) command instead and were also under request by General Almond, rather than General Harris (01 December control!)

So, on 28 November where did those planes come from and who ordered them, since we know it was not Stamford? Did those planes just mysteriously appear out of thin air? The answer could only be through ADC General Hodes’ efforts (with the Tank Company) in the rear CP at Hudong-ni! Colonel MacLean had left his SCR-193 radio back at the rear CP, this being a powerful long-range radio weighing 230 lbs. So MacLean had his lighter SCR-300 radio with him in Colonel Faith’s perimeter. This SCR-193 radio would remain at Hudong-ni and remain active to reach Colonel Faith, throughout the tank withdrawal at 1500 hours 30 November. Hence, remain thereafter at Hagaru! While this CP radio could reach Faith, Colonel’s MacLean’s and Faith’s SCR 300 (shorter range) radio may not contact Hudong-ni, but it could reach any pilot overhead from any of the three perimeters throughout 27-30 November, and also 1 December. Charles Shaw provided me with a copy of his interview with Colonel MacLean’s (SCR 300) radioman (Arthur Mercier). Where he describes an exchange of sharp words

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311 *E/C*, p. 67.

312 *E/C*, p. 69; also *E/T*, p. 90.

313 *E/T*, p. 102.

with a pilot overhead—via his SCR 300 radio—and his insistence that pilot change his prior target for the one MacLean insists be hit. (SCR = Signal Corps Radio.) For some unknown reason this information was totally lacking in Appleman's accounting in both of his books, *East of Chosin (E/C)* and *Escaping the Trap (E/T)*. In Appleman's accounting on MacLean's radio left at the rear CP "Soon after the first messages of enemy action at the 31<sup>st</sup> RCT perimeter north of Hudong-ni came in, Major Lynch tried by the regimental SCR-193 radio to reach Colonel Paddock, the 7<sup>th</sup> Division G-3 at Pungsan Headquarters, 60 miles northeast. To Lynch's surprise General Barr, the division commander, answered the call Barr told Lynch that he wanted to talk with General Hodes, who proceeded to outline the situation as he knew it and asked Barr to arrange for air support the next day. . . radio communications was broken off before the end of the conversation and could not be reestablished. This was the only time the 31<sup>st</sup> RCT on the east side of Chosin Reservoir, had direct communication with its division CP."<sup>314</sup> (*E/C*, p. 87, fn9.) However, this has nothing to do with continuing to use this SCR 193 radio to reach or monitor Colonel MacLean's or Faith's SCR-300 individual radio(s), and maintain an open frequency connections to any of the forward perimeters!

Appleman's footnote #9 seems strange as it relates to Captain Stamford, while he has nothing to do with this conversation at the rear CP! As established, on 27th Nov. Stamford must wait for a pilot to appear overhead to contact him! As cited in *E/C*, footnote 9 on page 356, "Stamford MS, p. 3, and Anglico Report, p. 75; Stamford letter to author, Apr. 7, 1981, with sketch map of A Go's (sic) position." An article entitled, "There are Always Miracles," said to be by Capt. Edward Stamford (as told to Capt. Hubbard Kuokka, USMC), appeared in *Blue Book* magazine in November, 1951. It purported to tell the story of Stamford's experiences at Chosin. Stamford was incensed by the article and asked me not to use it as a source for anything about him. He said it was inaccurate and he did not like its tone or rhetoric. He said that the article had not been cleared with him before publication."

Recall the Army had no air-to-ground FAC crews whatsoever, they were provided by Navy or Air Force planes, recalling the Army lost complete control of their own Air Corps in 1947. The reason, it was delegated to the other branches! However, in Appleman's two books, *East of Chosin* and *Escaping the Trap*, one finds an order by Faith directing Stamford to notify General Barr (not General Smith) at division headquarters of his intended breakout to Hagaru-ri. Here was Faith's, delegation and invitation to Stamford to confess up front, that he never was issued the frequency to send any direct message to the General Barr! Therefore, Captain Stamford's continuing silence retards his independent ability for direct contact to General Barr, or anyone else of major concern! Prior to this (1 December) event the procedure was to call in all requests for ground-to-air support from the U.S. Fifth Air Force, and of interest it would revert back to that procedure after our forces return to South Korea, at which time the Marines will be deprived of any squadron support, prompting General Smith to plead with General Ridgway for at least one squadron for his Marines, to which Ridgway would respond "I'm sorry but I don't command Fifth Air Force."<sup>315</sup> Prior to these earlier (6 November) events at the reservoir, the Fifth Air Force did not feel these Marine close-in air-to-ground tactics paid any dividends, and that one service should not dominate over any other, and they should concentrate all their combined efforts on knocking out the enemy before they reach the front lines

*Fifth Air Force Gives Direct Control of the Marine Air Wing to General Almond*

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<sup>314</sup> *E/C*, p. 87, fn 9.

<sup>315</sup> Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War*, p. 680



“During the time the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines was heavily engaged in combat with the CCF *124th Division*, a controversy between General Almond and General Partridge over the control of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Air Wing came to a head. Under existing procedure the Fifth Air Force Joint Operations Center at Seoul controlled the assignment of missions to the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Air Wing. General Almond felt that, during a period of active ground combat when the local ground tactical situation could change drastically within an hour or two, he, the local commander, should have complete command over the air units supporting the ground troops. On 4 November, General Partridge flew to Wonsan to hold a conference with General Almond on the subject. General Almond won his point; the Fifth Air Force ordered the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Air Wing to assume direct responsibility for close support of X Corps without reference to the Joint Operations Center. Close support requests beyond the capabilities of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Air Wing were to be reported to the Fifth Air Force.”<sup>316</sup> Only on 1 December will control transfer via X Corps directly to the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Air Wing under the command of Major General Field Harris! Martin Russ ignores this date to continue blame on General Almond! “Shortly before nightfall, under heavy overcast, a flight of Corsairs, on orders from Almond’s headquarters, dropped pods of napalm along the length of the column, incinerating the vehicles and the bodies in them.”<sup>317</sup> This was 3 December, and after control had passed to General Harris! This seems another one of many innuendos, as a pure Public Relations effort, to shift this event from the Marine MAW to General Almond! Give credit where credit is due. (Unless I have dismissed his remark, as a compliment to General Almond!)

#### *IN THE AIR FORCE ACCOUNTING*

Lieutenant General George Stratemeyer (CINCFEAF): “Recognizing . . . eastern Korea forces faced hazardous prospects for survival,” on December 1, “He ordered the 1st Marine Air Wing to assume direct responsibility for support of X Corps.” Not Generals Almond or Smith; taking credit for doing so, hereafter! However, keeping in place “If X Corps needed more support Marine Air Wing *was directed* to refer those requests to Fifth Air Force for performance.” Indicating a deadly pattern of reliability: if the Marines can’t handle it,” (then) request help from someone else! (That admission, would severely strain their Public Relations officer for damage control, however, failure would merely reduce support to Task Force Faith!) The problem was Faith had a Marine ground-to-air controller instead of—as he should have—one from the Fifth Air Force! That also could have been, but it was not. The camaraderie between the Air Force and the Army still existed as veterans of the new Air Force were those remnants from the Army Air Corps of World War II. That same bond now, lacking between the Army and the Marines, many innuendos! Hence, the air drops the Army and the Marines received at the reservoir, and all air-to-ground coverage *prior to* 1 December were provided by X Corps via Almond without input from the Marine dispatcher at Hagaru; however, that dispatcher still has the authority to re-route supplies and limit planes to and from this Phantom Force—cutoff—and now considered *an expendable* Army force on the east side of the Changjin reservoir! The neglect of providing a final air drop before our breakout, (re-routed to Fox Company) therefore, rests under the 1<sup>st</sup> MAW dispatcher. Prior to this (1 Dec) date, our Task Force had received those 16 tons of supplies while those at Yudam-ni received six less tons of supplies! So General Almond understood the difference in the needs between the two sides of the reservoir; he could only have had that information directly from Colonel MacLean and Faith via that SCR 193 radio!

#### *Now under the Marine Air Wing Exclusive Control*

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<sup>316</sup> Roy Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, p. 745, CMH, Government Print.

<sup>317</sup> *Breakout*, p. 333.

On 1 December 1950, “Shortly after 9:00 a.m., in heavy clouds, a lone Marine fighter-bomber appeared over the inlet. The pilot came from the carrier *USS Leyte*; the pilot required to have advance knowledge of Stamford’s code name established radio communications with Captain Stamford and told him that if weather permitted he would guide a flight of Corsairs to the perimeter about noon. Stamford gave this information to Faith and then told the pilot to relay to the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Air Wing dispatcher at Hagaru-ri Faith’s request for heavy air support during the day and to notify General Barr, the 7<sup>th</sup> Division commander, of Faith’s intention to try for a breakout.”

This is also a false report! The plane could not have been from the *USS Leyte*, as it was located in the Sea of Japan and all of those flights were weathered out to the reservoir, and diverted to the Eighth Army area of operations. As stated: “As the first steps were being taken to prepare for the ultimate emergency other action was underway to prevent its development. On the 28th, in response to a Fifth Air Force request, Task Force 77 had expanded its area of armed reconnaissance southward, and throughout the day *Philippine Sea* and *Leyte* had kept eight Corsairs and six ADs over the newly enlarged border strip. But reports of the apparent crisis which confronted EUSAK led Admiral Ewen to feel that more could and should be done,”<sup>318</sup> Thus the *Leyte* was under Admiral Ewen!

“Commander Seventh Fleet’s relay of Admiral Ewen’s complaint had elicited an emergency reply. On the morning of the 1<sup>st</sup>, Fifth Air Force reported that many of its TACPs appeared to have been lost to enemy action in the fluid situation then prevailing, that every effort was being made to provide replacements, and that instructions had been issued to give naval flights priority of employment. And as had been proposed by someone in one or another service in every crisis since early July, the Air Force now suggested that for better coordination CTF 77 should provide a representative at the JOC and should establish a direct radio link. In part for technical reasons, in part because of the complex structure of the U.N. Command, communications between Fifth Air Force and the fast carriers had long presented a problem. But somewhere, in some corner of the JOC, *there did in fact exist a direct CW radio circuit, activated on 6 November at the persistent urging of the task force communication officer, over which for two days drill messages had passed with gratifying speed.* What was wanted by the Air Force, however, appears to have been a *voice circuit* rather than a manually-keyed one, *and this was provided a few days later*, by which time Commander Weymouth had once again been flown in to the JOC. And once again, under the lash of necessity, coordination began to improve.” [Thus it was a Navy problem to relay their updated, improved, and modified method, to all of their Navy TACP Teams which included Captain Stamford, and his team, and assure they have all frequencies they were supposed to have! On the 6<sup>th</sup> Of November Stamford was in the 7<sup>th</sup> Division Zone, and as a TACP under operational control of the Air Force, and it would not be the Air Force responsibility to update a Department of the Navy—Air Naval Gunfire Liaison (Anglico) teams—to a new Navy plan to conform to the existing Department of the Air Force plan already in operation. There is no existing information that Stamford was ever lacking any Air Force frequencies, that the 3/31<sup>st</sup> Battalion TACP Team had at the reservoir!]

On 1 December the weather over eastern Korea was very bad. Morning flights from the carriers met a solid overcast over the plateau and were diverted to the EUSAK area, where three missions totaling 23 aircraft found satisfactory control, successfully attacked large concentrations of enemy troops and abandoned friendly equipment, and blew an ammunition dump at Sinanju. But the weather which had altered their employment also prevented their return to base, for the task force had been obliged to

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<sup>318</sup> *History of United States Naval Operations- Korea*, Ch 9, 1, 24 November-6 December, 1950, p. 179.

cease flight operations late in the morning. Unable to get home, the aircraft landed at Wonsan, were kicked out again owing to rumors of a deteriorating ground situation in the neighborhood, and finally spent the night at Kimpo.

Next day [Task Force Faith is now History] the fast carriers again split their efforts, sending 28 sorties to EUSAK and half again as many to the Chosin area. In the west two flights with 10 aircraft had good success, while three totaling 18 found no controllers. But these were the last sorties sent to the western front, where EUSAK had by now disengaged,<sup>319</sup> So where could that plane have come from? Only from the Marine shore-based aircraft carrier, or the land-based aircraft at Yonpo airfield! These lanes were on line earlier and strafing the enemy on the west side of the reservoir.

Here Stamford is simply improvising his neglect to conceal his problem. That obligates that pilot (wherever he came from) to “Roger that” and acknowledge receipt of that message being sent to General Barr. One hour later, “Faith told Stamford to ask for at least 10 aircraft to be over the breakout column at all times to cover the withdrawal.”<sup>320</sup> Colonel Faith is now cut off from his prior connection to X Corps (advance) HQ’s located at Hagaru. Had Colonel Faith been fully aware of Stamford’s inability to send his messages, why would he continue to give his requests to send them? The direct and proper one to receive Faith’s request for planes was that MAW dispatcher, his location of no importance, or either that base where the planes originated, i.e., the carrier *USS Leyte* was located in the Sea of Japan. This carrier had an entirely different frequency than any plane or land-based dispatcher! What is evident here is that Colonel Faith had never been briefed by Captain Stamford on the limitation of his equipment, *as Stamford agrees*, he has no radio limitations. This is supported by Faith’s request for air cover, and to notify General Barr. That Hagaru-ri dispatcher *should* have acknowledged completion of Faith’s message to General Barr, and any replies as well! Also indicated, Faith has no direct knowledge of Stamford freely disclosing *his problem* of obtaining the Hagaru-ri frequency—either to Faith or any other staff officer. Hell, Stamford only revealed it to Appleman three decades and two years later! Apparently after highlighting Captain Stamford’s obsessions on being an infantry officer was overriding his main functions, and Appleman’s interest in making Stamford a main character in his book *East of Chosin*, so much so, even he was sidetracked by Stamford’s own excessive importance that it never ever occurred to Appleman—a retired Army officer—to explain his recurring omission of never once contacting that Hagaru dispatcher until 1982. Regretfully, Stamford’s defense of 27 November! As ordered to take charge of A Company blames, “First Lieutenant Carlos J. Ortenzi, A Company mortar officer, came up to Stamford and informed him that as next senior man he would have to take the company.”<sup>321</sup> First Lieutenant Ortenzi is listed on 2 December as Missing in Action-Declared Dead, so he cannot verify Stamford’s claim one way or the other. However, to imply that Lieutenant Ortenzi would be unaware that Captain Stamford had other duties assigned that override his authority to command any Army infantry man on line is beyond the pale! There is no indication, even from Stamford’s account, that he ever interacted with Lt. Cecil Smith, that Company Commander. Any deviation of the Forward Air Controller to a line leader would require Faith’s direct approval. It would be highly unlikely that he would approve such a move! It would separate Stamford from his own command direct responsibility. It does seem like there was a questionable alliance between Stamford and Bigger’s as the latter is the one stating he did in fact command A Company! But there also is a

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<sup>319</sup> *History of United States Naval Operations- Korea*, CH 9, 1, 24 November-6 December, 1950, p. 182.

<sup>320</sup> Restated in *East of Chosin*, pp. 195-197, and *Escaping the Trap*, pp. 132-135. Stamford cannot activate this request, as no planes were overhead at this time, nor will any arrive prior to 1300 hours.

<sup>321</sup> *E/C*: p. 67.

connection between Bigger's' movements within this same Stamford timeline, concerning Lieutenant Ortenzi and Captain Robert F. Haynes who was killed the same night!\* This expands back to my innuendo evaluations in my last chapter, but relates to the first incident as described in Russell A. Gugeler's version above. That Captain Bigger's' remarks are not consistent with the first night of the attack, and degrading to Colonel Faith's (so-called) quotes! That Faith was at his CP and has no knowledge that a major battle was taking place! While little is stated about what Faith said Bigger's' is stating as a disjointed version, that he was called to the CP and Faith asked him if the "ROKs were firing at each other again!" Faith had no word yet of a CCF attack. But he added, "I have had a garbed message report the something has happened to Captain Scullions—that he may have been killed." There is more on this event in *E/C*, p. 76.

This in no way prevents Colonel Faith from using his own SCR 300 radio to also contact any pilot overhead and cut out Stamford's commands as Colonel MacLean has done on 29 November! It further allows Colonel Faith to send his own relayed messages via any pilot. Nor does it prevent the many artillery radiomen to contact and have the artillery FOs to direct their own targets throughout any perimeter; we are under the assumption here that Stamford was the one and only one calling in all air-to-ground missions. That the others artillerymen had that ability and were using it as well! That is highly questionable under these extreme conditions! Any investigation could reveal the fact! The 31<sup>st</sup> RCT 3/31<sup>st</sup> and 1/32<sup>nd</sup> also had Forward observers as well! The 31<sup>st</sup> inventory of radios ,or listed as authorized, is as follows: AN/GRC #3 o #7 = 6, AN/GRC#4 or #8 = 18, AN/GRC#9 = 16, AN/VCR#1 or #3 = 1, AN/VCR#8 or #10 = 5, SCR-300 = 95, SCR-536 = 117, SCR-608 = 5, SCR-619 = 10. More important those artillery radios and the 15<sup>th</sup> AAA-AW Company with their high frequency network connected to the 31<sup>st</sup> Field Artillery -155mm, Battalion! Add to this just those artillery forward observers, with MOS 5704 numbers, equal to 32 men with the—most with over one year training—ability to call in artillery strikes as well. Too imply that Stamford was the one and only one with his 13 weeks' training was the savior as all is relying on promulgated lies that our Task Force was overloaded with a bunch of buffoons. How did we survive for five days? That we had help via MacLean's radio now back at Hagaru!

Here, one may find a supportive fact in General Simmons' quote, however, a limiting one from Appleman's source, "The Fifth Air Force FAC leader (Lt. Johnson) attached to MacLean's 31<sup>st</sup> Regiment was killed, and his equipment damaged, the first night attack at the reservoir. This means that any and all requests for, air drops of ammo, fuel, food, medical resupply or requesting evacuation helicopters, must come through that one Hagaru-ri Marine dispatcher line of communications, via his direct contact between this 31<sup>st</sup> RCT ground forward air controller, (or\_some pilot,) then "relayed" by that pilot back to the Marine Air Wing [MAW] Control Center at Hagaru-ri. However, as indicated, it is that pilot, that must initiate the connection to Captain Stamford! However, to do that—via radio jargon and regulations—that pilot must single out Captain Stamford, using his code name "Boyhood 1-4." Or visa-versa. Likewise, he must know in advance that pilot's code name as well! However, such radio protocol had to be overlooked under these circumstances! As reported, "During the attack on the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion . . . First Lieutenant Johnson the Fifth Air Force . . . was killed and his equipment damaged. The Corsairs would be left to their own devices in trying to help the beleaguered troops." (*E/C*, p. 84). It's not true any officer had that knowledge and those SCR-300 radios to compensate for this; and under their threat of loss of lives were surely using whatever method was available! This suggests Captain Stamford's Marine team entered this area, lacks any direct means to contact anyone within the Marine MAW network, unless and until some outside source contacts them! This seems like

a military contradiction of terms. If one must have a plane overhead before one can relay a message of one's need for planes, or supplies of ammo, would seem counter-productive to say the least! This would be impossible unless the FAC has that MAW dispatcher frequency. A pilot may be trying to contact MacLean's FAC leader, as well to establish communications with him!<sup>322</sup> Surely under these emergency conditions there was a shorter-than- -twelve-mile effective method of communication. Like giving our forward air controller, direct-frequency access to that Hagaru-ri air control center. This was never done, and the mystery is why; why that dispatcher's frequency was never disseminated to Captain Stamford? *Or could it be that we were already written off as expendable and that frequency channel assigned to us was merely turned off?*

Recall that after General Smith's message to Colonel Faith on 30 November, the radio went blank!<sup>323</sup> Thus we were effectively and conveniently cut off from Hagaru! (Changjin Journal; PUC, 11<sup>th</sup> endorsement #6:) "b. On 30 November Task Force Faith was advised by the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division that it was now attached to the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, that it should make every effort to improve its situation by working toward Hagaru-ri, that it should do nothing which would jeopardize the safety of the wounded, that no infantry assistance could be rendered immediately, but that ample air cover was available. Shortly after acknowledgement of this order radio communication went out." This message had to be sent from the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division Headquarters at Hagaru! Since this message is too vague to comply with, due to the number of his wounded, Colonel Faith decides on his own to breakout, but is delayed awaiting a plane overhead to relay his message, not to Gen. Smith but Gen. Barr, as he instructs Stamford to do! As this (time disputed) one message, the next day (1 Dec). According to Major Curtis, about 3:00 p.m. after the column had traveled approximately two miles from the perimeter and was nearing the valley north of Hill 1221, a "jeep-mounted radio picked up the following message in the clear, 'To Colonel Faith: Secure your own exit to Hagaru-ri., Unable to assist you. —Signed CG Smith, 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division.'" <sup>324</sup> What seems apparent here is PR damage control, that Faith is withdrawing on his orders from General Smith, rather on his own. However, the hour is not set until Stamford makes contact with a pilot, and that pilot states, we will have to wait for the fog to lift before any more aircraft will arrive over our positions to cover the breakout! What is apparent again, unless Stamford notified Smith, he now directly under Marine command, Smith's only source has to be through the air wing dispatcher at Hagaru, who will have to grant clearance for Faith's air cover!

*"The prevailing practice was for the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Air Wing and the Fifth Air Force to send all the planes they could make available from Yonpo Airfield near Hungnam, the Marine Air Field near Wonsan, and carriers off coast near Hungnam to Hagaru-ri every day to support the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division and the 31<sup>st</sup> RCT. A dispatcher at Hagaru-ri would direct the planes to points where they were most needed. The repaired radio set enabled Stamford to reach the dispatcher at Hagaru-ri by relay through the pilots in the air over the inlet...."* <sup>325</sup> Note "Hungnam to Hagaru-ri" axis is within the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division domain, per Table One, this chapter!

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<sup>322</sup> I have a transcript of a recent interview; by Charles Shaw, with Colonel MacLean's radio man about a conversation he had with a pilot.

<sup>323</sup> *Changjin Journal*, PUC, 11<sup>th</sup> endorsement #6:

<sup>324</sup> *E/C* (fn 59) Curtis MS, p. 20, also, (fn-60) Curtis, letters to author Appleman May 9, 1976, and Jan. 30, 1977, Col. Alpha A. Bowser, 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Div. told S.L.A. Marshall in an interview, Jan. 3, 1951, that Gen. Hodes had prepared the order and Gen. Smith had signed it. Transcript of Marshall's interview in author Appleman's possession.

<sup>325</sup> *E/C*, p. 177.

This could have been a legitimate excuse for Captain Stamford that the *repaired radio* lacked this one vital frequency generation for Hagaru! However, there is no record, this disclaimer occurred to Stamford or his team technician. “*The repaired radio set enabled Stamford to reach the dispatcher at Hagaru-ri by relay through the pilots in the air over the inlet....*”

Again, a workable solution is that Captain Stamford *could always, check those frequency charts provided by X Corps?* Likewise, if lost, look for those charts provided to the 31<sup>st</sup> TACP team, since their radio was used for spare parts, that team frequency log could (if not destroyed) be around that area as well! Likewise our 57<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery radio section (rich in radios) had access to these frequencies chart! And of course, so did the Chinese. “The former executive officer of the 5<sup>th</sup> Marines, retired Brigadier General Joseph L. Stewart, USMC, said that “as we advanced up the hill [to Yudam-ni] there were reports that General MacArthur thought the Chinese would not enter the war. However, there were plenty of Chinese on our radios, almost every frequency carried Chinese transmissions and we knew the Chinese were out there, also we were bumping into Chinese patrols almost every day.” Benis Frank, “*The Epic of Chosin*: Head Oral History Section, USMC: Historical Center.” Indicating the enemy is sending and therefore, receiving data (on all frequencies) over our friendly network frequencies!

Another method for Stamford to obtain that Marine frequency was as simple as the enemy forces utilized here, and in World War II to monitor, by scanning all frequencies transmitted by American forces. To block this enemy interference, radio silence was often implemented. This danger was always present in the Changjin reservoir as well and could not be blocked from the enemy obtaining the Hagaru-ri MAW frequency as easy as it would be for any one on our side to scan and tap into that Hagaru-ri frequency. Indeed in World War II scanning was used to obtain the radio frequency of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, thus to follow his flight plan and allow our planes to intercept his plane and destroy it.<sup>326</sup> Scanning as covered was also used by the enemy in Korea as well, so this frequency was available to them if they scanned for it. It is inconceivable that a Marine Captain failed—for two days—while in the middle of a Marine regimental combat team, to obtain those Marine frequencies. More so those following five days of entrapment.

After all, Captain Stamford’s radio was Marine equipment as well, as verified by Stamford to “*net on the same channels*” as the ones at Hagaru-ri! The Army HQ’s artillery wire section had Captain Edward Kelly and Master Sergeant George Berry in charge of over three wire teams and a large inventory of telephone supplies, as phones, switchboards, wire, cable and pole climbing equipment. The danger to those wire teams to travel the road across open fields to place and repair lines were a dangerous profession to say the least. Of this Army group of telephone linemen and phone operators sharing a like MOS 4641 number were 39 casualties. The casualties highlight their dangerous exposure to enemy fire in running and repair of those lines. So this radio communication problem was Captain Stamford’s alone, one officer over his three men—two radio operators and one technician—having a total and exclusive mission to request planes, and direct air-to-ground strikes against the enemy.

Thus this radio fiasco was man-made, as in the classic movie, *Cool Hand Luke*, “What we have here is a failure to communicate.” Indicating the two parties concerned—Stamford and the Hagaru dispatcher—failed to communicate with each other. The question posed is whose responsibility was it

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<sup>326</sup> On April 14, 1943, U.S. naval intelligence intercepted and decrypted a message detailing that Yamamoto would be making an inspection of his forces on the Solomon Islands in order to boost morale. The message was forwarded to Admiral Nimitz who gave the order to launch an attack to kill Admiral Yamamoto and strike a critical blow to the Japanese.

to obtain that Hagaru-ri frequency and call sign/password to connect a loop to each end? Was it Captain Stamford's delegation to his two radio operators whose ONE AND ONLY responsibility was *to establish* air-to-ground coverage through his Marine team, with their adequate equipment set-up to provide it?<sup>327</sup> Did Stamford ever "relay" his request for the Hagaru-ri dispatcher to establish direct contact with him? From Stamford's own admission to Appleman, he did not. However, if so, did that MAW dispatcher refuse to give him his frequency? And if not: why not? However, this last is an oxymoron, because if connected to that dispatcher he already has his frequency! (Unlike the switchboard operator who maintains his ability to connect across all lines, he retains his ability to stay on line as well.) If denied that Hagaru frequency, Stamford was obligated to immediately inform Colonel Faith of any denial for this vital Hagaru frequency. Hence, at *that* time could well become Colonel Faith's problem. Did a pilot offer that frequency as well, or did they also refuse to give it to him? Simply put, did he personally *ask anyone* for that direct connection? The evidence from Captain Stamford himself suggests he did not, and it never crossed his mind to ask for it, he was too concerned with the Army infantry position placements. The 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division air-to-ground control station dispatcher at Hagaru-ri could easily monitor Stamford's open channel (a clue to the problem, was Stamford assigned a reserve Channel, rarely used or monitored, thus rarely open to him?) at any time to communicate with him. The evidence suggests he had never scanned for this connection, and it never crossed the dispatchers' mind as well! As verified by Captain Stamford (and never denied), the Hagaru-ri dispatcher knew what Marine radio equipment our forward air-to-ground controller had, and therefore knew Stamford's frequency as well as his call sign (Boyhood 1-4). What was also never denied, the oddity that our TACP controller did not ask for or request that dispatcher's frequency! That was Stamford's one single function above all others, his main field of expertise, as he was *the Captain* and "senior" officer of his FAC team!

The other issue is that the Hagaru dispatcher also has no restriction via his equipment to contact Captain Stamford! This fact has become a vital dispute by others, perpetuating the misconception that the Marine Air Wing (MAW) at Hagaru never had the ability to send a message to the 31<sup>st</sup> RCT! That the message sent by General Smith to Lieutenant Colonel Faith (011100 December) ordering his withdrawal was never sent to or received by Colonel Faith! That the only means of communication between the prior tank command and Colonel Mac Lean's rear CP location was at Hudong-ni, and could not communicate the four miles north to Colonel MacLean's perimeter! Lacking is the fact that Colonel MacLean has his own radio with the ability to contact 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division HQ, his access via his (personal radio) mobile and CP HQ's SCR-193 radio. His communications officer, Lieutenant McNally, has moved to the forward CP at the inlet. This has an odor of a conspiracy back at Hagaru-ri! The over-stressed point that General Smith will grant air priority to Task Force Faith, over his Marines was never going to happen, as he had stated his fears to the Marine Commandant on possible loss of his division from the start. Plus the reality that he does not maintain direct control over the Marine Air Wing, that was Major General Field Harris USMC. However, Smith does have direct control over the Marine dispatcher at Hagaru.

*Exploring another myth- Army radio sets would not net.*

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<sup>327</sup> Recall Stamford was attached but never a part of the Army Chain of Command. He had only *one* function which required his full attention. While what he did was via his own account, as taking over leadership command as a "senior" officer that was never authorized, in fact short circuited by Faith, after learning about this self-appointment.

Each arm of service—infantry, artillery, armored troops—was provided with its own individual type of radio set, which only differed from each other in the portion of the frequency spectrum in which they operated. Thus, the tank units operated in the band from 20.000 to 27.900 MHz, artillery from 27.000 to 38.900 MHz, and infantry from 38.000 to 54.900 MHz. Each of these indicated bands had general sectors of commonality (.900 MHz overlap) which meant that each unit had the ability to establish cooperating radio communications without special transceivers, so artillery could cooperate between tanks and infantry on the organic radio sets of those arms of service. Each of the radio sets operating in the bands indicated above had a transceiver (RT-66, RT-67, RT-68) and a receiver (R-108, R-109, R-110) that were used as the component parts of a large number of different radio station types. These transceivers and receivers were referred to by the abbreviation “A” units. Other components of some of the new radio stations included the RT-70 transceiver (called the “B” unit) with a frequency range of 47.000 to 58.400 MHz, designated for primary use in setting up cooperative communications among infantry, artillery and tanks.<sup>328</sup> The Army SCR 300 radio operates in the center of that frequency as 40-48 MHz.

#### *Validation*

The Radio Set SCR-300 and SCR-300-A consist of an 18-tube, crystal-controlled portable receiver and transmitter, designated BC-1000 (or BC-1000A), along with batteries and accessories such as the case, handset, and two lengths of whip antenna. It has an innovative tuning that sets both receive and transmit frequency in tandem along with integrated calibration. A squelch circuit is provided to minimize roar in the high-gain circuits when there is no signal. The SCR-300 utilizes the frequency band of 40.0 to 48.0 mc divided into 41 channels of 200 kc. The transmitter power is 0.3 watts with a range of 3 miles with the longer antenna. The BC-1000 was used with the same frequency band in the AN/VRC-3 (used in tanks) so the two sets could intercommunicate between armor and infantry. The entire SCR-300 assembly weighs between 32 and 38 pounds depending on the batteries used (BA-70 or BA-80). The Radio Set SCR-300 was issued with War Department Technical Manual TM 11-242, 15 June 1943 and later dates.

What this means is that Captain Drake’s Tank Company located four miles south of MacLean’s perimeter but only two miles behind HQ’s 57<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery until late 28<sup>th</sup> transmitting two-thirds miles’ distance into another two-thirds receiving area, thereby, overlapping at mid-range. Hence, the tank company (using their radio) could communicate the two miles north (27-28 November) to the 57<sup>th</sup> Headquarters/Headquarters Battery, they, in turn, could “relay” any message (via SCR 300) two more miles to 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry perimeter (location of “A” and “B” Battery) 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry communications center at MacLean’s forward CP could “relay messages” directly to 32<sup>nd</sup> Infantry north of them! The simplistic version to merely disregard all possibilities open to many experienced artillery radio operator is just too naive! The argument that the Army forces—and their Marine communicators—were out of radio contact is simply false. Whether anyone tried to bridge the communications gap through radios entirely capable of covering these well-established distances, is entirely another story.

Most interestingly but overlooked was the air warning net. *“Lt. James Dill, who commanded a 155mm howitzer battery in the 7<sup>th</sup> Division, [—31<sup>st</sup> Field Artillery Battalion—] reported hearing a running report of the final action at the Inlet over the air warning net while at his parent battalion headquarters at Kapsan in the 7<sup>th</sup> Division zone. The report was coming from the 15<sup>th</sup>-AW battery*

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<sup>328</sup> *Soviet View of the War in Korea*, “The War in Korea 1950-1953,” Translated by CW2 Stephen L. Sewel. [Chapter 14, Communications Organization](#), pp. 659-690.



*attached to RCT 31 on a net monitored by all artillery battalions and presumably, by someone in the division headquarters.*"<sup>329</sup> The 15<sup>th</sup> AAA/AW was the artillery defensive arm against enemy air-to-ground attack. Therefore, they had to be connected to a communications system that could inform them of approaching planes threatening their positions well in advance of their arrival. The fact that Captain Stamford dominated Appleman's history of the reservoir overshadows any interviews in depth about those other sources! It is possible that Colonel Faith merely short-circuited Captain Stamford, and used this artillery network—or MacLean's SCR-193 radio—for the requested mixture of ammo we needed dropped by air and requested resupply directly from division sources. Still if that were the case, the controller at Hagaru-ri could still retain control over where or when it would be dropped. There has to be control over Army supply planes, and Marine-Navy fighter planes in the same area at all times! Explains; the designation of a "Controller!"

The next problem, contrary to that stated above, was the complete failure of ALL Army infantry, artillery and tanks to "net" on "any" common frequency. That the tank command at Hudong-ni could not communicate with the forward units or with Hagaru-ri! So we have a strange phenomenon here, no one can communicate with anyone else! (Absolutely no such problems on the Marine west side of the reservoir!) But facts prove otherwise. The most common artillery radio set was the jeep-back pack-mounted SCR 300, with a frequency range of 40-48 MHz. The 31<sup>st</sup> & 32<sup>nd</sup> Infantry and the Marine battalion officers also had this type radio, authorized as 95 units to the 31<sup>st</sup> RCT. Colonel Faith had one mounted on his jeep! All artillery batteries were rich in all communications of radio and telephone to reach all units they support with covering fire missions that may require instant cease fire communications, if the infantry forces advance too fast under this cover fire. (Thus, all units were issued those X Corps; "...documents of radio frequencies, radio and telephone code names, radio nets and wire tagging codes.") Since those artillery missions were fired the first night (27<sup>th</sup>) communications, radio and telephone between the forward observers, infantry, and artillery, were already established! The night of 28 November within the timeline and separation, from HQ's battery, by two Artillery Batteries and four miles of attacking enemy forces at Faith's forward battalion between MacLean's 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry perimeter, inclusive of both A and B firing batteries were (temporarily) cut off from radio and wire communications between these two units. "*Wire communications between the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion and the artillery was cut at the beginning of the enemy attack. It was only when radio communications was established about 1:00 A.M. on November 28 that Faith learned that the 57<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry, were also under heavy attack. The artillerymen were having a desperate time trying to defend their guns; it was out of the question for them to provide support for the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion.*"<sup>330</sup> Significantly, this fact links radio sets (SCR 300) between infantry and artillery units. The next step is to "link this message" two miles south to HQ's Battery—this message was received and acknowledged—three mile south to MacLean's rear CP at Hudong-ni informing the tank command as well. Using the rear CP SCR 193 radio at Hudong-ni!

*"General Hodes had one of Drake's tanks and this was the sole means of communications with the School House [at Hudong-ni] from Hagaru-ri."* Therefore, if true, this tank "link" cannot be used on 1 December to reach as far north as Faith's perimeter as all tanks are now at Hagaru-ri. This would create another mystery, how contact was made between General Smith and Colonel Faith on 1 December. As there was never any (factual) contradiction that the Marine dispatcher ever lacked the

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<sup>329</sup> Patrick Roe, *Death of 31st RCT*, Part 5.

<sup>330</sup> Appleman, *East of Chosin*, p. 75.

ability to contact Colonel Faith or Captain Stamford, one could be led elsewhere as to why so much damage control is used to dispute that Hagaru message to Faith, as never transmitted to him!

To recap, “Shortly after 9:00 A.M., in heavy clouds, a lone Marine fighter-bomber appeared over the inlet.” Around 10 o’clock, “*Faith told Stamford to ask for at least 10 aircraft to be over the breakout column at all times to cover the withdrawal.*” One hour later: “*Smith sent withdrawal instructions to Task Force Faith at 1100 on the 1<sup>st</sup>.* By that time Smith had dropped all plans for sending a rescue force to Faith, whose forces had taken strong assaults around their lakeshore perimeter during the night of the 30<sup>th</sup>. Although they had defeated these attacks, it was doubtful they could withstand more. Hence, Smith judged, waiting to dispatch reinforcements to Faith until the Yudam-ni troops returned to Hagaru-ri would be too late. Nor could he use the 2d Battalion, 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry, ordered forward from Majon-dong by General Almond the day before, since that battalion was only at Kot’o-ri and had to fight to get that far forward. The two previous failures of the 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry’s rear troops to reach Faith from Hudong-ni even when accompanied by tanks proved them too weak for a rescue mission. In fact, they had been recalled to Hagaru-ri on the 30<sup>th</sup> lest they be destroyed by the Chinese below Faith’s position. Finally, Smith’s previous judgment that none of the Hagaru-ri troops could be spared seemed even more sound by morning of the 1<sup>st</sup> after the forces defending the base again had beaten back several night assaults at the southwestern arc of the perimeter and at East Hill. *Smith’s only course was to arrange ample close air support and order Colonel Faith to fight his way south.*”<sup>331</sup> [Four other versions; (2) 7<sup>th</sup> Div Comd Rpt, 27 Nov-12 Dec 50,] [(3) Chosin Reservoir; Montross and Canzona, *The Chosin Reservoir Campaign*, pp. 240-43;] [(4) Gugeler, *Combat Actions in Korea*, pp. 75-76;] [(5) Field, *United States Naval Operations, Korea*, p. 277.]

Note that damage control was created to protect the tanks from destruction, “*lest they be destroyed by the Chinese*” in direct contradiction to Marine history, Map 20, as “Attempt to reinforce Hagaru-ri.”

The foregoing five numbered reports confirming that 11 o’clock incoming-message from CG Smith to Faith! Supportive facts imply this message was *sent directly* through the Hagaru-ri dispatcher (directly) to Colonel Faith! That dispatcher has access to X Corps frequency logs! Since Stamford denies receiving the message, therefore Faith could have received the message via his SCR 300, the 15<sup>th</sup> AAA-AW net, or Colonel MacLean’s SCR 193! This still creates a controversy, not that a message was sent, but where it came from and when this message was received on Faith’s end of the transmission. We do know it was *not relayed* through a pilot—as none were overhead—or who, if anyone, received it at 11:00 A.M. In fact, it had to be repeated two hours over and over again until picked up, in the clear, two miles south of the vacated perimeter by one of those SCR 300 units by an artillery radio operator around 1300 (1 P.M.) hours.<sup>332</sup> This message seems another attempt at Marine damage control to override, yet (unwittingly) exonerate Faith’s “own initiative to withdraw” and replace it with CG Smith’s withdrawal order. It never takes two hours for a drifting frequency to reach the other end. The time indicates that CG Smith’s message was only sent at 1300 hours when received! My focus on this is due to the many Marine innuendoes against Faith’s leadership as “only doing his duty and not every well at that.” Also directly connected is CG Smith’s attempt to distance

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<sup>331</sup> Mossman, *Ebb & Flow*, CMH, p. 132.

<sup>332</sup>“Stamford’s radio was not netted to the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division at Hagaru-ri. His only communications was through the Corsair pilots overhead. I stand by my version as given in the books.” Roy Appleman letter to 1<sup>st</sup> Lt. Edward L. Magill, 15 June 1991. Ignores the fact that one of his team, Cpl. Myron J. Smith, had a second radio-AN/TRC-7 and may have intercepted this message as well. (*East of Chosin*, p. 239.) Given the time restrictions it would be foolish to acknowledge a withdrawal notification sent one hour earlier concerning the withdrawal forces already assembling the convoy.

himself from the withdrawal order for the 31<sup>st</sup> RCT tank commander to return to Hagaru. The facts lack those recorded by Colonel Faith, as his written data was lost with him.

One other “curious” oddity revolves around those statements adding to Murphy’s Law: “That everything that can go wrong will go wrong.” Indicting, those things that never happened are on record as factual. Why all those additions remain a mystery to me! Example, “Shortly after 9:00 A.M., in heavy clouds, a lone Marine fighter-bomber appeared over the inlet...” Around 10 o’clock, “*Faith told Stamford to ask for at least 10 aircraft to be over the breakout column at all times to cover the withdrawal.*” One hour later: “*Smith sent withdrawal instructions to Task Force Faith at 1100 on the 1<sup>st</sup>.*” This quote overlaps three messages over three hours. (1) “...The pilot came from the carrier USS *Leyte*. That pilot established radio communications with Captain Stamford and told him that if weather permitted he would guide a flight of Corsairs to the perimeter about noon. (2) Around 10 o’clock, “Faith told Stamford to ask for at least 10 aircraft to be over the breakout column at all times to cover the withdrawal.” One hour earlier the pilot from the *USS Leyte* had informed Stamford of intended plane coverage, if and when “*weather permitted.*” So #1 or #2 seems misplaced! We have to go to the other side of the reservoir for a clue. Why our excessive five-hour delay, and the connection to the *USS Leyte*? Their flights were delayed due to weather as recorded in *History of United States Naval Operations: Korea*. However, General Smith has stated RCT-31 will receive a “priority” for air-to-ground coverage. The first flights [1 December] west of Hagaru are in operation and continue early; “At Wonsan the snow was light and the first strike, **four Corsairs of VMF-214, was winging toward the reservoir by 0645.** Aboard the Badoeng-Strait, VMF-323 was able to get its first flight airborne by 0845.” These Marine units provide continuous air cover for C-119’s, dropping ammo and supplies to the Marines west at Yudam-ni! While, East of Chosin a delay, of some five precious daylight hours, while neither of these efforts were sent to the east side of the reservoir, nor any air drops provided! The 1 December, excessive early “priority” support and air drops for 2/7/Fox Company at Toktong Pass highlights a “priority” to this Company F, (240 Men) while total denial to the larger Army (2400+) group ten times its size east of the reservoir!

Roy Appleman’s *Escaping the Trap (E/T)* records: (Page 233) “*On the morning of 1 December, eight Corsairs came over F Company and went on to Rocky Ridge. Their strike left it in flames once more. The Corsairs then worked over the hills east and south of F Company’s position while details from the company gathered in supplies just dropped from C-119 Flying Boxcars.*” Were those supplies rerouted from the Army east side of the reservoir to Fox Company? While F Companies’ (2nd Battalion, 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment) commander never left Hagaru-ri, (orders) Fox Company to remain in place pending a “rescue” by the advancing (Yudam-ni-5<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup> & 11<sup>th</sup> Regiments) lead element, 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment. Thus, Fox Company receives an early morning air drop of supplies while 31<sup>st</sup> RCT, with urgent need for resupply of all items, or delayed by supplies that have been air dropped for F Company, and an additional five hours, is added, for any air cover, while Colonel Faith is organizing the remainder of the 31<sup>st</sup> RCT, for its breakout. [By, delayed order from General Smith?] Regardless, Colonel Faith’s goal line was four miles south to unite with the tank company at Hudong-ni. However, upon arrival we learn the goal line has been moved four miles further south, and we were stranded on the 50-yard line, with only empty rifles, and a slick road ahead.

Restated because of its importance from Naval history, concerning the *USS Leyte*: [Part 2:] 14 November-10 December: The Campaign at the Reservoir. “On the 30<sup>th</sup>, following General Harris’ first request for carrier air, Task Force 77 had sent 39 sorties to the reservoir, of which 14 struck at Chinese

troops surrounding the isolated Army units while 25 attacked the enemy in the hills about Hagaru. By bad luck, however, the next day [1 December] brought bad weather both at the reservoir and in the Sea of Japan. Although aircraft from Badoeng Strait and Marine shore-based squadrons got through to napalm the Chinese enemy, the early flights from Task Force 77 were weathered out of the reservoir, and in late morning the force was obliged to cancel operations. At midday, the Army troops began their southward movement with 20 fighters overhead, [had to be exclusively MAW planes, minus any Navy ones!] but in the course of the afternoon a combination of heavy attacks and enemy roadblocks fragmented the column, most officers and key NCOs became casualties, and as darkness fell the force dissolved. It had almost made it in: the disintegration took place only four and a half miles from Hagaru; but although a number of stragglers were brought in across the frozen reservoir, total casualties reached almost 75 percent.”

In summary, we couldn't control the weather. Perhaps the breakout was fated to fail solely from the planes being socked in when they were most needed. But the lack of radio communications factor is a historical red herring that could have been avoided through USMC Captain Stamford's radio team. His explanations, both the earlier one and the last one 32 years after the battle, don't reconcile with the known facts about the available radio equipment, the frequencies, and the network capabilities. He can no longer be asked about his role, because he has gone to his reward. I submit that he could have and should have maintained communications and at least tried to call in air drops of supplies, reinforcements, the tanks, and air strikes, but for reasons now unknown—shock, fatigue, cold weather exposure, injuries, panic, we'll never know—he did not. I do not accuse him of neglect of duty, just that accurate history requires reconsideration of his role as Task Force MacLean/Faith's assigned radio link to the world in the disaster suffered by Army forces East of Chosin. Perhaps help could not be brought or the outcome changed, but why didn't he ask for it?

*WINTER OF THE YALU by James Dill*

Radio contact was lost just before daylight this morning. The radio operator from D of the 15<sup>th</sup> [D/15AAA] came on the air and said the Chinese were in among the guns. He said not many men were still alive, but those that were able to walk had loaded the wounded on trucks and were going to try to break out along the road to Hagaru and reach the Marine lines. Then he stopped transmitting for a minute or so. They then heard him say: “Oh my God! Here they are!” That was all. The radio went dead. Air observation now reports nothing but burning trucks and Chinese. That's what they told me at Pukchong. “They're all dead.”

*HISTORY AWAITS A VERDICT!*

On 2 December 1950, Task Force Faith has—as fast as they had arrived—now vanished from the pages of history.

But yet to be recorded in history is their place in it! The jury is still out, but sooner or later it will render an account of this Task Force and where it belongs in history. That verdict is still out and has yet to be rendered. So above is the closing summation of facts to be weighed on the historical scales of justice.

Over the entrance to West Point carved in stone is the Army motto—Duty, Honor, Country. On these three rest the verdict—on the evidence—to be tallied on Task Force Faith.

*Three Questions Remain:*

## DUTY

Task Force MacLean/Faith fulfilled its duty; we were where we were ordered to be.

## HONOR

Task Force MacLean/Faith fought honorably, yet we made no claim to any fame.

## COUNTRY

Task Force MacLean/Faith gave all Pro Patria (for Country), per 31st Infantry Regiment motto. Its remaining survivors, in the twilight of their years, also await the verdict, whatever it may be!

-Chapter 21-

Semi—Closure

17 April 2013

Place Arlington National Cemetery

Army Lt. Col. Don C. Faith, Jr., was born on August 26, 1918 in Washington, Indiana. He was killed in action in Korea on December 2, 1950, and will be buried April 17 in Arlington National

In late 1950, Faith's 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, which was attached to the 31st Regimental Combat Team (RCT), was advancing along the eastern side of the Chosin Reservoir, in North Korea. From Nov. 27 to Dec. 2, 1950, the Chinese People's Volunteer Forces (CPVF) encircled and attempted to overrun the U.S. position. During this series of attacks, Faith's commander went missing, and Faith assumed command of the 31st RCT. As the battle continued, the 31st RCT, which came to be known as "Task Force Faith", was forced to withdraw south along Route 5 to a more defensible position. During the withdrawal, Faith continuously rallied his troops, and personally led an assault on a CPVF position.

Faith was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor, the United States' highest military honor, for personal acts of exceptional valor during the battle.



August 26, 1918 — December 2, 1950

After 62+ years Lieutenant Colonel Faith's comes home.



From Memorial Chapel





To Grave Site

Final Steps to the burial plot..



Reception



## Reception



Colonel George A. Rasula, USA (Retired)

Ray C, Vallowe

### Colonel Rasula

Army Historian-----Chosin Few—Also creator of the Changjin Journal - presently Seventy-six Chapters.

He was located to the rear of the Task Force with the Tank Company and was therefore withdrawn back to Hagaru-ri with that body of men. While we have our disagreements over some issues! One reason (while fully eligible) I am not a full member of the Chosin Few. I respect his rank and input and use some of his Changjin Journal accounts in this book. My reason that the early days were dominated by the 1st Marine Division, and I was more of a “Devil’s Advocate” because of the timeline in receiving the documents outlined and explained in this book. This created more questions than I could receive valid answers to those questions I posed! In *this conversion Colonel Rasula is stating his opinion that General Smith was always doing his duty as ordered. We continue to disagree! However, Colonel Rasula’s Chapter76:dated, 12.12.12; Closes with this sentence, but a poignant question: “If the Chinese had been more successful against the soldiers east of Chosin by achieving their objective*


of Hagaru-ri, the story about the Chosin campaign would have been entirely different. “We close with a question seldom asked, should a commander reinforce failure?”



Sgt. Joe Clarkson---Julie Precious—Ray Vallowe  
Julie is the Executive Producer of the upcoming Documentary:

#### TASK FORCE FAITH

Her Dedication and energy to honor and restore lost valor for the men who fought, East of the reservoir can never be expressed are forgotten until those remaining in North Korean soil are returned to American territory. It seems that will be an eternity!



## Acknowledgments

To: Charles (Chuck) Shaw and his many updates through his Freedom of Information requests. His constant search for his uncle Killed in Action 6 December 1950, May his search result for his remains being found soon and returned to him.

Dwight Rider, and his help and friendship over our many e-mails when we met on the Korean Discussion list and his input to this information contained here. Good luck with your own splendid book: HOG WILD—`1945: The True Story of How the Soviets Stole and Reverse-Engineered the American B-29 Bomber.

Colonel George A Rasula (Ret) for his Changjin Journal, sixty-six chapters and a valuable source of information to fill in many lost/missing pieces of this Army/Marine Changjin Reservoir puzzle.

Bryon Sims: as with his newsletter from the Army Chosin Few and *Contributing Editor* (of later chapters) with Colonel Rasula, on the Changjin Journal.

Lynnita Brown, for her publication of my earlier research on her site: The Korean War Educator. (Topic's)

Hal and Ted Barker of the Korean War Project, your continuing efforts to keep the information of all Korean Veterans updated.

Colonel Karl Lowe: for his input through the 31st Infantry Newsletters and his updated versions from that source.

James Zobel: The MacArthur Memorial, for your search of documents for me.

To all others: that e-mailed me for information and provided me information about KIA's and MIA's.

Of course my three sons who sought the documents from the National Archives that activated the many additional years of research to complete this book. Also to my daughter who encouraged me to finish it.

Thank you one and all. Ray C. Vallowe.





## Back of Book Cover

Draft Back of Book Jacket—JV 2-17-13

The Korean War is America's Forgotten War. This undeclared conflict (1950-1953) that saved a free South Korea from communist aggression, but fell between the apocalypse of WWII and the longer, more controversial Vietnam War. If anyone recognizes the 1950 battle of Chosin Reservoir at all today, he most likely associates it with the U.S. Marines who fought bravely in escaping from the *West* side of the reservoir. But the U.S. Army was at Chosin, too, and their battle on the *East* side of the reservoir was as intense—if not more horrific—than the Marines' ordeal. Ray Vallowe, who fought and was wounded at Chosin serving as a corporal with the 57<sup>th</sup> Field Artillery Battalion of the Army's Seventh Infantry Division, analyzes the chaotic events that led to the debacle of this truly *Phantom Force* at Chosin. Using documents declassified long after the Marine Corps and other "official" histories were written, Vallowe provides fresh insights, new material, and a few surprises from the unique perspective of a nonprofessional soldier and non-historian who was there. His personal recollections and reflections make significant contributions to the record of what really happened at "the Frozen Chosin."

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